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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption reform efforts 
in democratic South Africa. These reforms are contextualized within the international 
theory, literature and policy debate that has emerged over the past decade on the 
control of corruption within the context of democratic governance.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms the thesis first covers a 
number of broad themes including: conceptions, causes and consequences of 
corruption; main theoretical approaches underpinning anti-corruption reforms; and 
methodologies to evaluate the effectiveness and seriousness of anti-corruption efforts. 
Specifically focusing on South Africa, the thesis looks at the nature and extent of 
corruption both pre and post 1994; recent legislative, institutional, and policy 
interventions to control public sector corruption; and, as an illustrative case study of 
grand corruption, an in-depth analysis of the government’s handling of allegations of 
corruption in the Strategic Defense Procurement Package or “arms deal.” 
The findings of the thesis are mixed: I argue that democracy is a necessary albeit 
insufficient condition for effectively fighting corruption. Although South Africa has 
an impressive array of institutions, laws and policies to counter public sector 
corruption, the most important ingredient for successful reforms, namely an indication 
of sustained political will, is not yet fully in evidence. The government’s mishandling 
of allegations of corruption in the arms deal is a case in point, suggesting chronic 
weaknesses on the part of institutions such as parliament to safeguard the public 
interest. Lack of regulation in the funding of political parties remains the “Achilles 
heel” of anti-corruption reform efforts. So far as concerns further theoretical framing 
of corruption studies I conclude that a focus on social empowerment (Johnston) in the 
context of democratic consolidation, including an active civil society and vigilant 
media, is crucial for the effective fight against corruption in new democracies such as 
South Africa. 
Keywords: Arms Deal, Corruption, Democracy, Governance, Integrity, South Africa. 
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PREFACE 
 
My objective in writing this thesis is to position an analysis of the South African 
government’s handling of allegations of corruption in the arms deal within the 
broader context of anti-corruption reforms occurring both in South Africa and 
internationally.  
 
The arms deal has been described as the “litmus test” of democratic accountability 
and as such this watershed event in South Africa’s democratic consolidation needs to 
be documented, contextualised and critically analysed to see what lessons can be 
learned for those serious about understanding and sustaining the fight against 
corruption in new democracies. 
 
Having had unique access to many of the key players shaping the first decade of the 
anti-corruption reform agenda in South Africa, I believe I am equipped to write 
authoritatively about the topic of “Corruption and Reform in Democratic South 
Africa.”  
Over the main period covered by this thesis (1995–2007), I worked as an applied 
policy researcher responsible for corruption and governance research at the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, a consultant for the United Nations Global 
Program Against Corruption (in South Africa) and, from 2005 as the co-founder and 
international director of Global Integrity (www.globalintegrity.org) an international 
NGO based in Washington DC that gathers independent information on corruption 
and governance by examining the existence and effectiveness of anti-corruption 
mechanisms and reforms around the world, including South Africa.  
I was intimately involved in the anti-corruption policy process in South Africa. Whilst 
working at ISS, I interviewed many of the key institutional role-players both before 
and after the initial arms deal investigation concluded by the Joint Investigating Team 
(JIT). In May 2001 I was commissioned by the Public Service Commission to 
conduct a comprehensive review of the various agencies in South Africa with an anti-
corruption mandate. Over a year later, in September 2002, as part of Transparency 
International’s National Integrity System study on South Africa, I conducted further 
 v 
interviews with key role-players in the anti-corruption arena, asking specifically what 
lessons had been learned from the arms deal probe. During 2001 I worked alongside a 
United Nations/South African Government team as the lead consultant on the Country 
Assessment Report. 
 
Based in the ISS’s Cape Town offices from December 1999, I spent months 
observing the decline of non-partisanship and increasingly strained relations in the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), Parliament’s most important 
oversight committee. During this time I was exposed to the way individual politicians 
and office bearers responded to events around the arms deal investigation and got to 
know some of the key role-players personally.  
 
Drawing on this rich tapestry of anti-corruption resources the thesis attempts to 
illustrate the credibility of good governance reforms in South Africa over the past 
decade when tested against allegations of serious corruption, such as those 
surrounding the arms deal. The case study approach demonstrates the very real impact 
that political context and culture has on both the interpretation and functioning in 
practice of policies, laws and institutions ostensibly designed to protect the public 
interest. 
 
While my perspective is that of an independent policy analyst, being the daughter and 
grand-daughter of politicians has unwittingly provided me with a personal and 
intimate understanding of the political process, the compromises and sacrifices often 
required by public life, as well as the purposes motivating many political actors to 
serve the public good through taking up public office.  
 
Growing up in apartheid South Africa and yet coming of age as South Africa shed its 
abusive past to become a new and proud democracy, has undoubtedly provided 
further existential material for exploring this topic.  
 
Marianne Camerer 
Durban, South Africa  
May 2008 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One: Context and Outline  
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses primarily on assessing the South African government’s policy 
reforms to deal with public sector corruption following the largely peaceful 
transition to democracy in April 1994. Efforts to fight corruption in South Africa, 
whether ultimately successful or not, may provide lessons for other new 
democracies.  
Since corruption contributes to the de-legitimisation of the political and 
institutional systems in which it takes root, it is rightly a central focus of concern 
in contemporary democracies. Corruption arguably does more damage to 
democracies than would be the case in authoritarian states as it undermines the 
latter (Heywood 1997:5). Essentially corruption is a human rights issue. The study 
of anti-corruption initiatives in South Africa and the assessment of their effectives 
as well as potential limitations makes an important contribution towards good 
governance and the effective, efficient and equitable allocation of limited 
resources by African states to their citizens.  
1.2 International Context 
Since the 1960s attention has been given by both academic and policy-oriented 
studies to the definition, origins, character and costs of corruption in developing 
countries (Doig & Riley 1998:48). The corruption in these contexts was often 
believed to arise from the clash or conflict between traditional values and the 
imported norms that accompanied modernisation and socio-economic 
development with bureaucratic corruption seen as an unavoidable outcome of 
modernisation and development (Mbaku 1996). 
This thesis on the other hand is framed by the more recent international debate on 
good governance and democratic accountability that emerged after the Cold War. 
According to certain analysts, events in developing countries and the former 
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Soviet Bloc in the mid and late 1980s markedly changed the academic and policy-
oriented debate on the character of corruption and the effectiveness of anti-
corruption strategies (Doig & Riley 1998:46). This new context heralded an era of 
political and administrative reform, structural adjustment and a ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation in developing and transitional countries. 
The growing international concern with controlling corruption needs to be 
understood within this wider political context. Revelations of widespread political 
corruption in developed not only developing countries in the early 1990s showed 
that the claim of Western democracies to be better than communist countries 
because they operated in a publicly accountable way was false (Heywood 1997:3). 
Now corruption no longer seemed to be just a temporary disease of modernising 
societies that literacy, development and good public ethics would cure. The 
debilitating economic, political and social effects of both petty corruption and 
grand corruption could be felt everywhere (Doig & Riley 1998). 
The ‘C-word’ mentality – i.e. the taboo on discussing corruption openly or frankly 
in international forums because it might appear that doing so would infringe on 
the sovereignty of a nation state’s particular set of cultural practices – has mostly 
passed. Internationally, regionally and domestically anti-corruption initiatives 
have emerged as a legitimate area of public debate, administrative reform and 
research attention. A multidisciplinary academic literature has proliferated, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘corruption eruption’, as researchers find ways to 
understand and document the various aspects of the phenomenon.  
There have probably been more publications on political corruption in the closing 
decade of the twentieth century than at any other time. The 1990s have seen 
unprecedented expansion in efforts at measuring and monitoring corruption, as 
well as mobilising support for controlling it in both the policy world and in 
universities (Heidenheimer & Johnston 2002). According to Doig and Riley 
(1998:48), academic fashion has echoed policy-making concerns and ‘moral 
panics’ about corruption. The current substantial upsurge in academic and policy 
interest in the (damaging) costs of corruption in the mid 1990s is a product of 
growing concern about the perceived growth in serious corruption world-wide.  
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Since corruption is by no means a new phenomenon, the question arises: ‘why is 
it now such a key issue internationally’? As noted before, the global impetus 
towards democratisation has uncovered large-scale abuses of power in previously 
authoritarian regimes and citizens everywhere are demanding greater probity and 
accountability from their elected representatives. Media investigations of 
corruption have given rise to higher public expectations of what constitutes an 
acceptable standard of behaviour amongst public servants (Heywood 1997:4). The 
phenomena of globalisation and trade liberalisation have given rise to a new 
transparency in domestic and global markets that brings corruption more quickly 
to public attention. There is also an understanding that corruption affects everyone 
in a negative way and that ‘we are all victims’.  
1.3 International Leadership 
Since 1996, leadership on the issue of tackling corruption amongst key 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations has 
undoubtedly played an instrumental role in placing corruption firmly on the 
international policy agenda. Towards the end of his first year in office, former 
World Bank president, James Wolfensohn identified corruption as a major global 
problem. In the 50-odd countries Wolfensohn visited during his debut year, 
corruption was the most striking issue of public concern (Doig & Theobold 
2000:1).  
Since the mid-1990s the World Bank has focused on promoting good governance 
as a means to prevent corruption. Defined by the World Bank Institute as: ‘the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the 
common good’, good governance includes: 
i) The process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and 
replaced; 
ii) The capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and 
implement sound policies, and  
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iii) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (World Bank 2004).  
A new anti-corruption policy introduced by World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz 
(World Bank 2006) was undermined by his recent resignation on the grounds of 
an ethics scandal that have done both the Bank and its leadership in the anti-
corruption arena incalculable harm. 
The importance of combating corruption was highlighted in one of Kofi Annan’s 
early interviews after his appointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(UN). In December 1996 the UN adopted a declaration against international 
corruption and bribery enjoining member states to strive to eliminate these and 
associated pathologies (Doig & Theobold 2000:1). The adoption by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in Merida, 
Mexico on 31 October 2003 further signalled the international community’s 
commitment to addressing corruption as an issue of global concern. 
It is clear that for international organisations such as the World Bank and United 
Nations, dealing with corruption has now become a core commitment for the 
reinvigoration of the state’s institutional capacity, for ensuring society’s trust in its 
leadership and for protecting the fabric of public life (UNDP 1997a; World Bank 
1997). 
Numerous other international organisations, both inter-governmental and non-
governmental, have placed corruption at the top or near the top of their agendas. 
These include the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Forum, World 
Trade Organization, International Chamber of Commerce, The Organizations of 
Latin American States, Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the G-7, European Union, African Union, Southern African 
Development Community, Transparency International and Global Integrity. 
Many western countries and the international development agencies they fund 
have moved the following goals to the top of the agenda: the eradication of 
poverty, participatory development, and support of human rights. It is increasingly 
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recognised that such themes are best addressed through participatory, transparent 
and accountable societies, with an emphasis on sustainable reform, including the 
promotion of economic development and liberalisation, the improvement of the 
social, health and educational prospects of populations, and the provision of a 
responsible and responsive political and legal framework (Doig & Riley 1998:46). 
This has seen good governance reforms moved to the top of the agenda. 
The new international policy agenda of the late 1990s thus involves a number of 
assumptions about corruption and effective means to reduce it. Corruption in this 
context is most obviously defined as public office, public sector, or institutional 
corruption. Anti-corruption reforms are mostly conducted in the context of the 
national governance framework and involve optimistic expectations of both 
economic and political liberalisation. It is also assumed that public sector 
corruption will reduce if the size of the state is reduced, that is, it will be 
minimised through general economic liberalisation and through political 
liberalisation such as moves towards liberal, pluralistic politics involving a free 
press, competitive party politics and the revival or creation of other independent 
institutions, thereby reducing corruption by making it more vulnerable to 
exposure (Doig & Riley 1998:47). More detail on these and other theories 
underpinning anti-corruption reforms are discussed in Part One. 
1.4 The Corruption Challenge 
With the transition to a democratic dispensation in South Africa underpinned by 
constitutional commitments to core values such as openness, transparency and 
responsiveness, the government has grasped the moral high ground by publicly 
committing itself to tackle corruption, largely blamed on the “legacy of 
apartheid”. Corruption as a phenomenon has not disappeared with the decline of 
the old regime and more than a decade later, South Africa faces a critical test: Is 
corruption being effectively addressed?  
In essence this thesis asks the following questions:  
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• Does democratic South Africa have the systems in place to effectively 
address corruption?  
• Do these anti-corruption systems (laws, institutions, policies, strategies) 
work in practice?  
• Does the necessary political will exist in South Africa to effectively 
address corruption, wherever it occurs? 
1.5 Thesis Propositions 
To respond to these critical questions, several propositions provide an analytical 
framework for the inquiry into the South African arms deal case study in 
particular, and the institutions that support democracy as well as the anti-
corruption reform agenda in general. These are: 
First, and most basic, formal institutions in a democracy, structure power 
arrangements so as to express certain standards, norms and the “rules of 
the game.”  
Second, to prevent abuses of power and promote democratic 
accountability, formal institutions such as a multi-party parliament and 
functioning criminal justice system, including specialized anti-corruption 
agencies, must be complemented by a vibrant civil society and independent 
media to both check and balance power.  
Third, to ensure that they fulfil their mandate to protect the public interest, 
these institutional and administrative mechanisms require adequate 
capacity, independence and resources, not only through their formal 
existence “in law”, but also their effective functioning “in practice”.  
Fourth, politics is important. Formal institutions and mechanisms do not 
emerge in a political vacuum but rather exist and function within a 
distinctive political culture more or less broadly commensurate with the 
set of norms associated with the institutions of democratic accountability.  
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Fifth, political interference and intervention in the legitimate functioning 
of democratic institutions may occur and serve to undermine their 
effectiveness and integrity.  
Sixth, because of the multiple institutions, interests and centres of power 
that exist in a democracy (as opposed to a closed political system) 
corruption and abuses of power will be mitigated and eventually come to 
light. 
The above propositions are tested in two ways: first, by examining the case of 
anti-corruption reforms in democratic South Africa and second, by examining a 
specific case, namely the way in which allegations of high-level corruption in the 
Strategic Defence Procurement Package [‘the arms deal’] were handled, or 
mishandled, by the various institutions in South Africa that purport to prevent 
abuses of power. 
By following the detailed case study of the arms deal it will become clear to the 
reader how severely the serious allegations of corruption tested (and continues to 
test) both the integrity and the robustness of the institutions in place in South 
Africa to uphold democratic accountability and prevent abuses of power.  
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of four main parts: 
Part One: Theories of Corruption and Control (Chapters 2–4) looks at 
definitions and conceptions of corruption (in particular political corruption), 
conditions and consequences of corruption (both economic and political) and four 
specific theories of corruption control. The international reform context is 
discussed briefly as well as general principles to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-
corruption strategies, with special attention to evaluating the effectiveness of 
specialized anti-corruption agencies. 
Part Two: Corruption and Reform in South Africa (Chapters 5–7) focuses on the 
case of South Africa, looking specifically at the context of corruption both before 
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and after transition to democracy in 1994. A brief section on the challenges of 
measuring corruption (both perceptions and experience) and some of the data 
around the phenomenon that exists is discussed, before looking at dedicated 
reform efforts the government has made since the mid 90s. Specific attention is 
given to the national anti-corruption strategy and new corruption law.  
Part Three: The Arms Deal (Chapters 8–9) looks at the way in which allegations 
of high-level corruption in the Strategic Defence Procurement Package (SDPP) 
were handled by the government. This includes the decision by the president to 
exclude the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) from the Joint Investigating Team 
(JIT) and the executive intervention that hindered parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) from performing its key oversight 
function and conducting an independent investigation into the arms deal.  
Part Four: Arms and Accountability (Chapters 10-12) examines the challenges 
faced by Parliament and individual MPs [members of Parliament] to fulfil their 
oversight functions and hold the executive accountable. It focuses on the roles of 
two ANC MPs in the arms deal – Andrew Feinstein and Tony Yengeni – as well 
as the outcome of the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) report. 
The concluding chapter responds briefly to the main thesis propositions by 
assessing the impact of the South African arms deal on anti-corruption theory and 
reforms in general, suggesting several outstanding challenges.  
1.7 Research Methods and Sources 
While there is much public discussion about the topic of public sector corruption 
in South Africa, there is a limited academic literature. Indeed, corruption as an 
important concept in governance-related studies hardly features until the early 
1990s. A number of academics have made important contributions in this regard 
although more work remains to be done (Bekker 1991; Cloete 1978; Du Plessis 
1989; Hiemstra 1994; Keenan 1986; Marais 1990; Posel 1998; Reynolds 1991; 
Schwella 1991; Streek 1981; Van der Walt 1991; Wronsley 1991). This is not 
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only a result of South Africa’s peculiar lingering colonial context, but also related 
to the relatively recent focus on corruption as an area of academic interrogation. 
What literature does exist post 1994 deals mainly with the nature, extent and 
perception of political corruption and the institutional capacity of anti-corruption 
agencies to address the problem (Bauer 2000; Lodge 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002a, 
2002b; Mattes & Calland 1996; Mattes & Africa 1999; Mattes, Davids & Africa 
2000; Camerer 1997a, 1997b; 1999a, 2000, 2001.) A number of volumes 
published by the Public Service Commission in 1999 called ‘Fighting corruption’ 
focus on ethics management and strategies for prevention (Balia & Sangweni 
1999a,b). Recent analyses, for a general audience of corruption in the arms deal, 
include Crawford-Browne (2007) and Feinstein (2007).  
In reality, there is a paucity of dedicated academic research on corruption and its 
controls in South Africa. Most contributions to understanding corruption in post-
apartheid South Africa tend to come from policy rather than academic researchers. 
NGOs such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa (IDASA), Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR), Transparency-South Africa (T-SA), and the Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) have all contributed to the policy literature on 
the topic and addressed corruption by conducting surveys, issuing reports, hosting 
seminars and presenting papers at international conferences. 
To truly understand the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms, we must 
move beyond theory. Investigative research and reporting skills applied to actual 
cases of corruption starkly demonstrate the way in which specific laws and 
mechanisms established to prevent abuses in power work in practice, or not. It is 
only by looking at a particular case in detail and at the functioning of institutions 
in practice that it becomes possible to really understand the dynamics of what 
works when it comes to fighting corruption. In this way both the theory and 
practice of anti-corruption are tested. The arms deal case study clearly 
demonstrates the challenges facing different institutions that support public 
integrity and democratic accountability, in the face of serious allegations of 
corruption.  
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All supporting documentation used in this thesis is in the public domain. A 
number of sources are drawn on, including: 
• A personal collection of corruption material, available electronically in a 
searchable database.1 
• A comprehensive literature review of corruption and anti-corruption 
measures internationally and in South Africa.  
• South African press clippings and media studies of corruption. 
• Anti-corruption and democratic accountability assessment surveys and 
indices, in particular the Global Integrity Index (www.globalintegrity.org). 
• Interviews using an informal interview schedule (in June 2001 and 
September 2002) with representatives from key anti-corruption agencies. 
• Interviews with other stakeholders including the media, civil society and 
political parties. 
• Laws and Bills relating to corruption and accountability. 
• Public records such as court judgments, commissions of inquiry, reports 
from Chapter 9 institutions. 
• Minutes of parliamentary committee meetings available on the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s website (www.pmg.org.za). 
                                                 
1 www.crl.edu/areastudies/camp/collections/corruption.htm 
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PART ONE:  THEORIES OF CORRUPTION AND CONTROL 
 
Chapter Two: Definitions and Conceptions of Corruption 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
What is corruption? This chapter examines various types and definitions of corruption 
in the light of our overall understanding of good governance reform. Universal, 
relative, petty, grand, episodic or systemic understandings of corruption are briefly 
discussed before putting forward a working definition that is useful for the remainder 
of the thesis. A model of political corruption articulated by LeVine (1975) is 
examined closely with regard to its relevance for the South African context. 
 
2.2 Defining Corruption  
 
One of the more intractable debates in the literature on corruption, that continues to 
rage, has been over definition (Johnston 1996, Philp 1997, Theobold 1994,). 
Corruption is a highly complex and diverse phenomenon and there are many different 
types, forms and levels of corruption. The way in which corruption is understood 
impacts on the various strategies developed to control it. 
 
The word corruption in the most general context denotes: the “perversion of anything 
from an original state of purity” (OED), and is defined by moralists as “to change 
from good to bad; to debase; to pervert” (Leys 1965: 216). Heidenheimer and 
Johnston (2002) provide a brief history and discussion of the term. Of nine definitions 
of corruption that appear in the Oxford English Dictionary, only one applies in the 
political context, namely – “Perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of 
public duties by bribery or favor; the use or existence of corrupt practices, especially 
in a state, public corporation, etc.” (2002). Lodge (1999:57) picks up on the concept 
of public duties, defining corruption as the “misperfomance or neglect of a recognized 
duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some 
advantage, more or less personal.”  
 
Cases of corruption often point to the existence of a standard of behavior according to 
which the action in question breaks some rule, written or unwritten, about the proper 
purposes to which a public office or a public institution may be put (Leys 1965:221). 
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Corruption occurs “when an individual illicitly puts personal interest above those of 
the people and ideals he or she is pledged to serve” (Klitgaard 1988).  
 
The point must be made that corruption manifests itself in all political systems, from 
communist to capitalist, authoritarian to democratic.  Alatas (1990:3) notes that it 
“affects all classes of society; all state organizations, monarchies and republics; all 
situations, in war and peace; all age groups; both sexes; and all times, ancient, 
medieval and modern”. In a democracy corruption is particularly offensive. The 
corrupt act is inherently undemocratic as it involves the exercise of a public duty 
contrary to the wishes of the electorate who have determined the duty and who 
employ and pay the relevant official to perform that duty properly (ICAC 1993:317). 
 
Robert Klitgaard in Controlling Corruption (1988) notes that the boundaries of 
corruption are hard to define and that corruption comes in many forms, crosses over 
various sectors and can range from the trivial to monumental: 
“Corruption can involve the misuse of policy instruments – tariffs and credit, 
irrigation systems and housing policies, the enforcement of laws and rules 
regarding public safety, the observance of contracts, and the repayment of 
loans – or of simple procedures.  It can occur in the private sector in the public 
one – and often occurs in both simultaneously.  It can be rare or widespread; 
in some developing countries, corruption has become systemic.  Corruption 
can involve promises, threats, or both; can be initiated by a public servant or 
an interested client; can entail acts of omission or commission; can involve 
illicit or licit services; can be inside or outside the public organization.” 
 
2.2.1 Universal or Relative  
 
In terms of conceptualizing corruption it has been argued that one can either take a 
"universal" or “relative” approach. The former approach defines corruption according 
to certain universal common properties with the premise that a combination of these 
properties, or defining characteristics, will make certain behavior "corrupt" in all 
societies. A “relativist” approach contends that what is corrupt in one society may not 
be so in another and that the definition of corruption would now depend on the 
country and culture in question. Relativists argue that since the notion of what is 
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legitimate and legal varies from country to country and time to time, the definition of 
corruption must vary accordingly and there cannot be one for all (Heywood 1997:7).  
 
Some scholars argue that definitions of corruption must address its social significance 
and that cultural standards or public opinions may offer more realistic definitions than 
a purely legal definition (Gibbons 1988; Peters and Welch 1978).  
 
While there is no question that people wrangle over rules, Gambetta (1999) argues 
that to infer that we cannot therefore reach a clear and stable definition of corruption 
conflates variations in the content of an action with variations in the type of action. 
He argues to keep the defining features of corruption separate from legal, ethical and 
efficiency considerations, which, whilst relevant, are not key to an analytical 
understanding of the definition. The universal position he takes is informed by several 
problems he identifies with the current understanding of corruption in the social 
sciences: firstly, that forms of corruption with different properties are bundled 
together; secondly, that the literature mixes up corruption with other social 
phenomena such as organized crime; and thirdly, that it fails to specify how 
corruption differs from other kinds of fraud.  
 
While I agree with Gambetta that conceptual rigor is often lacking when it comes to 
corruption, and that accusations of acts, individuals or institutions being corrupt often 
use a fuzzy application of the term, most contemporary scholars agree that a working 
definition of corruption that can be applied to corruption across country boundaries, 
should be, and indeed is, possible.  
 
2.2.2 A Working Definition 
 
An oft-cited definition of corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
(Gray and Kauffman 1998). This is a definition widely used by the World Bank and 
modified slightly by the international NGO Transparency International (TI) who 
defines corruption as “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.”  This is a 
useful working definition for our purposes. TI further differentiates between 
"according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption: Facilitation 
payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that 
 14 
the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the 
other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from 
providing.1 A further distinction can be made between undue benefits that are paid 
willingly (bribery) and payments that are exacted from unwilling clients (extortion).  
 
Public sector corruption thus involves the improper and unlawful behavior of public-
service officials, both politicians and civil servants, whose positions create 
opportunities for the diversion of money and assets from government to themselves 
and their accomplices (Langseth 2000). This definition includes particular types of 
corruption such as bribery and extortion, which necessarily involve at least two 
parties, and other types of malfeasance that a public official can carry out alone, 
including fraud and embezzlement (Gray and Kauffman 1998). Bribery often involves 
a citizen or someone from the private sector interacting with a public official or 
politician where a bribe is “an inducement improperly influencing the performance of 
a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised” (Noonan 1984).   
 
In the case of South Africa and specifically the arms deal case study, cases of alleged 
corruption involve improper inducements or bribes in the form of luxury motor 
vehicles to key decision-makers (Tony Yengeni et al) and corrupt interactions 
between private sector players (for example Schabir Shaik) with politicians (such as 
Jacob Zuma) to improperly influence public duties.  
 
2.3 Forms of Corruption 
 
There are many different manifestations and forms of corruption. It can be petty or 
grand, incidental, systematic or systemic. It can be judicial, administrative, legislative 
or political in nature. Corruption can include the abuse of power to manipulate, 
control, and diminish other people, to enrich oneself and one’s family and friends 
through nepotism and the misappropriation of public funds (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989:271). Policies to try and curb these diverse forms of corruption should pay more 
attention to the various types and levels of corruption that exist (Riley 1998: 139). 
                                                 
1 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq 
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A useful approach to defining corruption divides it into grand and petty corruption, 
with an increasing recognition of the links between the two. Grand corruption is 
closely linked with political corruption and occurs on a large scale by a prominent 
official, while petty corruption occurs in smaller increments by lower-level officials, 
often in exchange for speeding up a legitimate process. (Doig and Theobald: 2000). 
While grand corruption is often motivated by greed, petty corruption is more likely to 
be driven by need or survival. Arguably, alleged corruption in the South African arms 
deal case study is of a grand nature while corruption that occurred in the homelands 
pre-94 and continues to manifest itself in the exchange between citizens and local 
government officials, is petty and routine.  
 
Petty corruption often referred to as ‘speed’ or ‘grease’ money” (Doig and Theobald: 
2000) describes facilitation or grease payments sought and obtained by junior officials 
who are actually or ostensibly rendering a service to the public. Here members of the 
public have to undertake dishonest transactions with officials in order to obtain 
services of one kind or another or to avoid sanctions (Lodge 1999:61). In some cases 
these payments are made for the provision of a service, which should be a free public 
good; in others they are for a largely fictitious service or relate to imaginary offences 
(as at many an army or police roadblock). In the case of petty corruption the 
motivation is more frequently that of survival in societies where individual civil 
servants and others receive extremely low pay (Transparency International: 2000). 
Closely related to petty corruption, is bureaucratic corruption that is opportunistic 
(rent-seeking) behavior and is related to the scope and extent of government 
regulation of economic activities (Mbaku: 1996).  
 
Defined as ‘the misuse of public power by heads of state, ministers and senior official 
for private pecuniary gain”, grand corruption deals with highly placed individuals 
who exploit their position to extract large bribes from representatives of transnational 
corporations; arms dealers, drug barons and the like, who appropriate significant pay-
offs from contract scams, or who simply transfer large sums of money from the public 
treasury into private (usually overseas) bank accounts” (Doig and Theobald:2000). 
Grand corruption has been used to describe large-scale deals involving senior public 
officials and companies trading or investing on an international basis. It is caused 
largely by the greed of those who are already well off by local, and often by 
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international, standards. Here the objective of the corrupt act is to make the key 
individuals even more wealthy and thus more powerful. This is true whether the 
corrupt act finances a political party or the individuals concerned (or both, as may 
often be the case) (Transparency International: 2000).  
 
An important mechanism underlying various types of grand corruption has recently 
been identified as “the cabal”. According to Transparency International, in most cases 
of grand corruption there is a small cabal of individuals who are strategically placed 
in key government departments or agencies to ensure that a deal can be completed. In, 
say, the purchase of an armaments system where a big bribe is to be paid to the 
Minister of Defence, the latter will have ensured that some combination of the central 
bank, customs and excise, his own Ministry and perhaps a well placed individual in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are cut in on the deal. The significance of this for an 
analysis of corruption is that in a cabal the individual, who may be regarded as the 
potential bribee, is actually part of a network with a vested interest in the project 
(Transparency International: 2000). 
 
Petty and grand corruption may feed on each other as visibly demonstrated by the 
following example of how corruption might typically occur in a policing context: 
“For example, in a police force, roadblocks and other forms of relatively 
minor harassment may be conducted at street level by a group of police 
constables. The participating constables pass a good part of their takings to 
their senior officer, who in turn passes a slice to his own senior, and so on up 
to the Chief of Police. The latter may have some arrangement with the 
Minister of Home Affairs who turns a blind eye to this in view of other deals 
in which the Chief of Police participates…In this case the link between petty 
and grand corruption is fairly close since middle and junior ranks of the police 
force may be allowed to indulge in petty corruption whilst the most senior 
ranks take a slice of these proceeds and are party to a major deal orchestrated 
by a Minister” (Transparency International: 2000).  
 
When does corruption become systemic? Johnston (1998) has a valuable approach to 
this question. 
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According to Johnston (1998:89), systemic corruption is not a special category of 
corrupt practice but rather a situation in which the major institutions and processes of 
the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in 
which many people have few practical alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials 
e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire. Systemic corruption is thus where systems depend on corruption 
for their survival. Now as opposed to a situation where honest behavior is the norm 
and corruption the exception corruption is open and routine and its workings 
constitute a parallel set of procedures to those of the proper operations of the 
bureaucracy (Lodge 1999:57).  
 
Where unrestrained corruption pervades the civil service, statutory boards and public 
corporations what began as occasional acts of public misconduct spread like a cancer 
- the result is a pathological condition of “systemic corruption” – an administration in 
which  “wrongdoing has become the norm”, whereas the “notion of public 
responsibility has become the exception, not the rule”. Corruption is then so 
regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong-doing and 
actually penalize those who live up to the old norms” (Chazan et al 1982:180).  
 
I will argue that corruption in democratic South Africa, whilst perceived to be 
widespread by most citizens (see Chapter Five) is not yet systemic and that corrupt 
practices have not institutionalized themselves to such an extent that the democratic 
system has completely lost its integrity. There is however a real danger of this 
happening if the political will to tackle corruption when it arises, falters. The African 
National Congress (ANC) as an organization has recently recognized this threat and 
spoken out against careerism and patronage in its ranks. 
 
2.4 Understanding Political Corruption 
 
What is political corruption? It is not that dissimilar to the general definitions of 
corruption identified earlier. 
 
Doig and Theobold (2000) identify the essence of political corruption as ‘the abuse of 
public authority for private profit’.  They note that although such a ‘definition’ leaves 
much to be desired, it serves to demarcate the general phenomenon with which we are 
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concerned: the public official, appointed or elected, who uses his/her authority 
illegitimately or illegally to advance his/her own interests. Political corruption always 
involves at least two parties and is typically perpetrated by private interests seeking 
illicit public favors and finding quite willing public officials (Heidenheimer and 
Johnston 2002:9). Thompson (1993) notes that the distinctions between “public” and 
“private” when it comes to corrupt activities can be difficult to draw and that benefits 
may be intangible, long-term, widely dispersed or difficult to distinguish from the 
routine services of the political system.  
 
Political corruption can also be defined as “the unsanctioned, unscheduled use of 
public political resources and/or goods for private, that is non-public ends” (LeVine 
1975). Here “political” pertains to the structural and human components of the formal 
polity (embodied in the institutions of government such as legislatures, executives, 
courts, bureaucracies, and statutory bodies) and necessarily involves persons who 
occupy positions in this formal polity. Political corruption thus includes corrupt 
activities that take place either wholly within the public sphere or at the interface 
between the public and private spheres – such as when politicians or functionaries use 
their privileged access to resources illegitimately to benefit themselves or others. It 
can also refer to the extent to which distortions (of due legal processes) are driven or 
motivated or even directed by political ends as opposed to personal, private or even 
corporate ones” (Heywood 1997). This latter insight is pertinent to recall when 
analyzing the arms deal case study and the legislative and institutional responses of 
the ANC government to allegations of political corruption.  
 
Diverse manifestations of corrupt transactions that fall under political corruption 
range from acceptance of money or other rewards for awarding contracts, violations 
of procedures to advance personal interests, including kickbacks from development 
programs or multinational corporations; pay-offs for legislative support; and the 
diversion of public resources for private use, to overlooking illegal activities or 
intervening in the justice. Forms of corruption also include nepotism, common theft, 
overpricing, establishing non-existent projects, payroll padding, tax collection and tax 
assessment frauds (Doig and Theobald 2000:3).  
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Transactive corruption is part of political corruption and has been defined as “the 
rewarding of particular groups by political parties after their accession to office in 
return for donations or votes and as “a mutual arrangement between a donor and a 
recipient actively pursued by and to the mutual advantage of both parties” (Lodge 
1999:57). In considering the case study of corruption reform efforts in democratic 
South Africa and the particular case of alleged political corruption in the arms deal, 
transactive corruption involving payments from international armaments companies 
to political parties who could serve their interests, may have engaged in deals which 
were mutually beneficial, albeit not serving the public interest. 
 
That completes our survey of the most widespread understandings of the term 
corruption in its diverse forms. I turn now to a consideration of an author whom I 
consider the most useful in his approach to unraveling the dynamics of political 
corruption, namely that of LeVine. 
 
2.5 LeVine’s Model  
 
According to LeVine (1975:2) most important in analyzing political corruption is the 
relationship of the activity in question to the political process, and the motivation for 
it. His model of understanding political corruption consists of two parts:  
1. the core process  - a set of related components that focus on the individual 
office-holder, his activities and the matters with which he is concerned and;  
2. the extended process – which derives from the first, and operates on a larger 
system and subsystem levels.  
 
The core process has five components: 1) Political office-holders 2) Political goods 3) 
Political resources 4) Transaction relationships 5) Conversion networks. The extended 
process has two components: 1) A culture of political corruption 2) An informal 
polity. Each of these components will be discussed. 
 
With political corruption, political office-holders dispose political resources within 
the framework of ongoing political processes or at least use such processes as a base 
for the creation and maintenance of corrupt relationships. They also derive some 
personal material benefit i.e. self-serving behavior (LeVine 1975:3). However the 
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“corruption of the political process” has as its principal effect the degradation or 
perversion of the political process. An example here includes electoral fraud, where 
there is no tangible personal material gain, but the integrity of the electoral system is 
compromised.  
 
2.5.1 The Core Process 
 
Political office-holders: The key to LeVine’s model of political corruption is the 
individual political office-holder in the formal polity. It is people, i.e. individuals, 
acting alone or in concert that engage in corrupt political processes, and not the actual 
institutions or organizations The functions of the individual office holder occupying a 
given office and political position are defined not only by the formal, explicit powers 
and duties attached to the office, but also by a political role, determined by 
expectations as to how the occupant of a given office ought to behave. In the case of 
the arms deal case study this would apply to the role of the deputy president whose 
formal and informal role should be beyond repute. The office-holder is important in a 
number of ways: S/he represents the linkage between the formal polity and those 
outside it; is the agent who can convert the political resources into the goods that 
create, feed and maintain politically corrupt relationships; and by converting public 
resources into private resources, the political office-holder provides both the capital 
and lubricant for the machinations of the “informal polity”.  
 
Political goods: These are defined as “those highly desirable things that governments 
through their agents are in a unique position to dispense” (LeVine 1975:5). They are 
both tangible (money, electricity, water, roads, jobs etc) and intangible (security, 
access to status and privilege). The nature (type, quantity, quality) of the political 
goods to be distributed depends largely on the nature and function of the state.  
 
Political resources: These are defined as “the official and unofficial capital against 
which political goods are drawn”. Every political position confers access to certain 
political resources. For example, the “uniform” of office can become a political 
resource that enables the wearer to trade in certain kinds of political goods. Three 
main varieties of political goods and resources include those related directly to office 
 21 
or position, to a political role attached to position or those attached directly to the 
person of an office-holder (example, family connections). 
 
Transaction relationships: These are “the various means by which political resources 
and goods are used for purposes other than those for which they were originally 
intended” (LeVine 1975:6). An act of misappropriation, in which an individual, acting 
alone, takes or uses public property solely for his own benefit, is not seen as an act of 
political corruption. However, such misappropriation becomes a politically corrupt act 
only when there is a transaction involving at least two persons, of whom at least one 
is an office-holder acting in an official or quasi-official capacity and there is “an 
exchange in which a political good is passed at least in one direction and at least one 
of the parties knows that the disposition of the political good is unscheduled, illegal or 
unsanctioned” (LeVine 1975:6).  
 
Conversion networks: These are the final part of the model. LeVine (1975:6) argues 
that all political goods undergo some degree of transformation as they are distributed 
and used and many lose their identities. This transformation, which begins to occur 
when the goods reach the hands of the first recipient, is termed conversion, and the 
channels through which the goods subsequently travel constitute the conversion 
network. For example:  B pays official A a bribe (money) to do him a service. A 
chooses how to spend the money (for example on a car). The conversion that has 
taken place is from cash to car. It also works the other way: B’s service (political 
good) from A is an introduction to R (an influential man who can help B make a 
profit). The conversion here is the facilitation by A to a potentially valuable entrée. 
 
2.5.2 The Extended Process 
 
The other part of LeVine’s model, the extended process, has two components: 
1) A culture of political corruption 
2) An informal polity 
 
A culture of political corruption is determined, in part, by operative political values, 
orientations, and attitudes and their related practices, as well as by the formalized 
behaviors and structures that go into the maintenance of a political system. Key 
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components include the body of orientations, attitudes and values that yield criteria 
for determining what is politically legitimate and what is not. When politically corrupt 
transactions become so pervasive in a political system that they are the expected norm 
in transactions involving government officials, a culture of political corruption can be 
said exist. Once commonplace, it is unlikely that politically corrupt transactions will 
only involve two people. Rather they will spread into increasingly complex networks 
of personal involvement through which political goods flow (LeVine 1975:8). 
 
An informal polity is constituted when informal political networks become so well 
established within the political system that their activities and influence begins to 
parallel those of government structures. By the time the informal polity develops, 
political corruption is already so widespread that a culture of political corruption 
clearly exists as a prior condition. Thus the more pervasive the political culture of 
corruption the more highly crystallized and enduring the informal polity becomes. In 
the absence of a culture of political corruption, an informal polity cannot develop. 
However, a culture of political corruption can exist without an informal polity 
(LeVine 1975:8).  
 
The informal polity is able to bypass traditional chains of command, and includes 
“informal political networks” i.e. relationships based on inter-personal links such as 
“old boy” ties, struggle comrades, friendship, family, clan, ethnic, business 
obligations and patronage reciprocities. It intersects the formal polity at points at 
which officials enter into networks of corrupt relationships and normally lies outside 
of the formal polity (with its continuity and predictability). It is not defined as part of 
the institutional network of positions and roles (with norms and limitations 
appropriate to positions) but quite often is established within official structures and 
shares individuals who function as both part of the formal polity and informal 
networks and who have access to political resources (LeVine 1975:9). Logically the 
distinctions between the formal and informal polities can become so blurred the two 
seem as one; when this occurs political sanction achieves near-official sanction. By 
definition the informal polity lies beyond the official pale and the distribution and 
conversion of political goods constituting its raison d’etre is unsanctioned, illicit and 
at best morally unacceptable (LeVine 1975:10). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at various definitions of corruption and distilled the key 
components of LeVine’s model for understanding the processes involved in political 
corruption. The case study in this thesis focuses on grand and political corruption in 
the public sector i.e. where individuals engaged in corrupt practices are government 
officials or public representatives. LeVine’s model is relevant to understanding 
political corruption in the South African context particularly the case study of 
allegations of grand corruption in the arms deal and further confirmation of this will 
be found in our discussions on these issues. 
 
While the distinction between petty and grand corruption should always be kept in 
mind, the most useful analysis for our purposes is that of LeVine’s, in particular his 
analysis of the various elements in the process of political corruption - for example, 
access to political goods and political resources, and his argument that an alternative 
polity may be the end result of a particular political culture and unchecked political 
corruption. This is relevant to bear in mind for the South African case.  
 
In the following chapter I will turn to a discussion of the underlying causes and 
conditions that give rise to corruption and outline the most evident negative economic 
and political consequences. This will form the basis for understanding what measures 
are most suitable for controlling corruption. 
 
 
 
. 
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Chapter Three: Conditions and Consequences of Corruption 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
What are the specific conditions that encourage and give rise to corruption? This 
chapter reviews some of the literature that addresses this issue. A particular focus is 
given to explaining corruption in Africa. As the potential effectiveness of anti-
corruption strategies are informed by the social, cultural, economic and political 
environments that create conditions conducive to both the incidence and severity of 
corruption, it is important to consider these too. In the second part of the chapter I 
discuss the largely negative consequences of corruption and this underpins the 
importance of researching ways in which to prevent it. 
 
3.2 General Conditions that Cause Corruption 
 
Talking about the causes of corruption is a shorthand way of conflating the 
conditions, contributing factors, determinants, stimulators, opportunities, incidence 
and explanatory factors for corruption.  Such factors are mainly rooted in the 
particular political and economic conditions and policies of each country although the 
globalization of crime through internationally organized criminal syndicates also 
plays a role. As such its causes are as complex as the types of corruption are varied 
(World Bank 1992:16).  
 
Becoming aware of the conditions that cause corruption, suggests ways in which to 
control it. For example, if low salaries of bureaucrats is something that might 
encourage corrupt behavior, it follows that improving wage conditions is directly 
relevant to preventing corruption. Unless the conditions that cause corruption are 
clearly identified and understood, it is difficult to prioritize effective anti-corruption 
strategies, which ideally should address these conditions in order to prevent 
corruption from occurring in the future (Camerer 2001). 
 
Social, cultural, economic, political, organisational and individual factors may also be 
responsible for the emergence and existence of corruption (Huberts 1996, 1999; 
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Alatas 1990). A review of empirical research on the causes of corruption found that 
corruption is caused by the following factors, all which suggest particular 
interventions: absence of competition; policy distortions including government 
involvement in private markets, decentralization, restriction of economic freedom and 
public procurement procedures; the nature of political systems and public institutions, 
including the role of the media, degrees of openness and democracy, quality of the 
judiciary, recruitment procedures and salary levels; and various cultural determinants 
including trust, hierarchies, colonialism, religion and gender (Lambsdorff 1999). It is 
not possible to explore these individual factors in any detail. 
 
There are a number of different approaches to conceptualizing the causes of 
corruption. The “ideological” approach to explaining the prevalence of corruption 
points to international system-related factors such as the spread of neo-liberalism, 
which in turn is related to globalization. An institutional approach tends to blame 
bureaucratization i.e. the various political and legal structures, institutions and 
practices. The cultural approach attributes corruption to psychological and cultural 
factors where corruption is explained primarily in terms of individuals, their 
characters, and specific cultural features (including religious traditions and attitudes 
towards the state). An economic approach to underlying corruption focuses on macro 
economic systems and claims that the lack of economic development and presence of 
restrictive government intervention, are the main structural factors for creating 
corruption, seen primarily as a consequence of scarcity, artificially created by a 
government’s desire to promote economic growth.  
 
Models of this economic approach include that of rent-seeking and the "second 
economy". These are discussed more fully in Chapter Four.  Here the argument is that 
corruption occurs where rents exist – typically as a result of government regulation – 
and where public officials have discretion in allocating them (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-
Ackerman 1999). Since the ultimate source of rent-seeking behavior is the availability 
of rents, corruption is likely to occur where restriction and government intervention 
lead to the presence of such excessive profits. Examples of rents that lead to rent-
seeking behavior include trade restrictions such as import and export tariffs or quotas 
and the associated licenses that civil servants give to those entrepreneurs willing to 
pay bribes; favoritist industrial policies, including subsidies and tax deductions; price 
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controls and multiple exchange rate practices. It follows that there is less corruption 
where there are fewer rent-seeking opportunities (Mauro 1995, 1997, 1998). 
 
Doig and Riley (1998:45) identify a number of additional factors that stimulate 
corruption including self-serving political leadership; a large, inefficient and 
politically influenced and misdirected state framework within which individual and 
group private interests have priority over the collective good; public officials who 
have considerable discretion to accumulate private wealth through exploiting their 
monopolistic, low and irregularly paid positions, often in collusion with politicians 
and indigenous or foreign businessmen; and where there is limited accountability and 
transparency in governmental operations. 
 
3.2.1 Specific Conditions: The Case of Africa 
 
Patterns of corruption may vary from society to society and over time. Political 
corruption is often perceived as especially characteristic of governments in 
developing or third world countries (Della Porta & Meny 1997). However, that 
corruption occurs only in developing countries is a myth that has been debunked by 
high profile scandals in highly developed industrialized societies. There are however, 
particular socio-economic and political conditions in Africa that make the continent 
particular susceptible to corruption.  
 
Leys (1979) identify as contributory factors pervasive and chronic poverty, extremely 
high levels of material deprivation and severe inequalities in the distribution of 
resources are major determinants of corruption in Africa countries. According to 
Bayart (1993) in Africa the state is usually the major force within the economy and in 
such circumstances it has been argued that political office becomes the main route to 
personal wealth (Bayart 1993). It appears that the democratization of many African 
states has not removed corrupt forms of neo-patrimony nor significantly widened 
political participation as state elites have retained effective control of the political 
process. Corruption in Africa today is also a direct consequence of poorly developed 
laws, institutions and distorted incentive structures.  
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Corruption is therefore a governance issue and part of a set of governance problems 
for developing and transitional countries. Mbaku (1999:120) argues that post-
independence laws and institutions enhanced the ability of the ruling elite to engage in 
opportunism, including corruption, to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of 
the people. The transformation of the post-independence African state apparatus into 
an instrument for the enrichment of members of the politically dominant group is seen 
as a significant contributor to corruption. In our thesis we will test these ideas against 
the case of democratic South Africa and the specific conditions and causes of 
corruption that have occurred here (See Chapter Five).  
 
To understand the immense diversity of corruption’s origins, forms and effects across 
developing countries, it is useful to examine the roles of both internal stakeholders in 
developing countries – politicians, business cliques, civil servants - as well as the 
external actors – such as multinational corporations and international financial 
institutions (Doig and Riley 1998: 45).  
 
With regard to external actors, multinational corporations from developed countries 
are guilty of perpetuating patterns of corruption and bribery in developing countries 
where such countries, desperate to attract foreign investors, may compromise 
domestic, regional and international regulations. Multinational firms routinely offer 
bribes to officials in third world nations as a means of landing lucrative business 
deals. This has been shown to be the case in Lesotho with regards to the Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) where international engineering firms 
such as Acres, Lahmeyer and Impreglio have been found guilty of bribery disguised 
as “facilitation payments” in order to secure lucrative consulting engineering 
contracts.   
 
Closer to home and related to the South African arms deal, British Aerospace (BAE) 
is currently under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in the UK for alleged 
bribes to key internal players in South Africa to secure its piece of the Strategic 
Defense Procurement Package (SDPP). While in the past many developed states not 
only legally permitted such bribery, but even permitted firms to deduct such bribes as 
a legitimate business expense, this is changing with the stronger enforcement of the 
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OECD Convention that prohibits the bribing of foreign public officials by 
international businesses.  
 
It also appears that cases of extreme corruption often correlate with situations in 
which the state derives the majority of its revenues from external resources of easily 
controlled enclaves within the national economy, for example state controlled 
monopolies such as oil or diamonds (for example Nigeria or Angola). Each of these 
represents weak imperatives for fiscal accountability and facilitates elite venality 
(Lodge 1998).  
 
Huntington (1968) puts forth several propositions about the conditions favoring 
corruption in government: According to him corruption tends to increase in a period 
of rapid growth and modernization, because of changing values, new sources of 
wealth and power, and the expansion of government; There tends to be less corruption 
in countries with more social stratification, more class polarisation and more feudal 
tendencies. These conditions provide a more articulated system of norms and 
sanctions, which reduces both the opportunity for and the attractions of corrupt 
behavior. A country’s ratio of political to economic opportunities affects the nature of 
corruption. If the former outweigh the latter, then people enter politics in order to 
make money, and this will lead to a greater extent of corruption; if foreign business is 
prevalent, corruption tends to be promoted; the less developed are political parties, the 
more prevalent is corruption. 
 
According to Johnston (1997a), entrenched corruption features in societies with the 
following characteristics: low political competition; low and uneven economic 
growth; a weak civil society and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with 
corruption. In contrast, societies that are relatively free of corruption are premised on 
respect for civil liberties, accountable government, a wide range of economic 
opportunities, and structured political competition. These conditions he argues are 
mainly, but not exclusively, characteristic of developed western states.  
 
The South African context combines factors affecting both developed countries and 
developing countries in periods of transition, and thus poses particular challenges to 
the control of corruption. For a variety of reasons particularly pertinent to South 
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Africa’s young democracy, corruption is likely to spread in periods of economic and 
political transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. These reasons include 
vacuums of authority left by the removal of authoritarian controls, conflicting values, 
a new elite trying to catch up with the old, decentralization, privatization, and the 
opening of the economy to international participation (Camerer 1996). South Africa’s 
transitional status from authoritarianism to democracy, like transitional/post-soviet 
countries may help explain why there are growing problems of organized crime and 
corruption (Reed 1994, Trang 1994, Kaufmann 1997).  
 
If one considers in particular Huntington’s idea that greater economic opportunities 
can lead to a greater occurrence of corruption, clearly South Africa is a good 
candidate. For one, South Africa has undergone a massive transition and the 
transformation project is far from over. The huge economic stratification that exists is 
not at all of the type that would discourage corruption, but rather highly unstable, with 
the gap between rich and poor appearing to be widening rather than closing. While 
South Africa has a strong economy with the fundamentals in place it has not seen the 
growth required to meet the challenges of addressing poverty and unemployment, 
despite there being a strong presence of foreign business (another condition favoring 
corruption according to Huntington.) While political society in South Africa is 
relatively sophisticated, there is effectively low political competition and a potential 
threat that the ANC’s hegemony will spread over a number of sectors, further limiting 
strong opposition and the checks and balances required to prevent abuses of power.  
 
On the other hand South Africa has a strong civil society and a range of institutional 
mechanisms in place to deal with corruption. Some of the more specific 
characteristics of the South African state and its historical context as well as reforms 
that have been undertaken to prevent corruption will be considered in Chapters Five 
and Six. First however, brief consideration is given to the consequences of corruption. 
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3.3 Consequences of Corruption1 
 
What impact does corruption have on society? It is widely recognized that corruption 
has profoundly damaging political, social and economic consequences, particularly 
when considering its broader, long term effects (Clarke 1983, Rose-Ackerman 1996, 
Johnston 1982).  
 
Politically, corruption subverts good governance by undermining public trust in 
government (Klitgaard 1988) and may reduce political participation by adding to 
growing cynicism about politics and the political process amongst citizens (Johnston 
1991, Rothchild and Chazan 1988). Economically, corruption raises costs, reduces 
government revenues and exacerbates inequality (Ward 1989). In particular 
corruption undermines the development capacities of states by distorting priorities 
(Rose-Ackerman 1978) where it may also skew decisions in favor of capital-intensive 
enterprise (where the pickings are greater, such as the arms industry) and away from 
labor-intensive activities more likely to benefit the poor (UNDP:1997b).  
 
Some economists have argued that corruption may even have beneficial 
developmental effects, especially in those cases where formal bureaucratic controls 
obstruct entrepreneurial growth (Nye 1967 and Leff 1964). Here the argument is that 
acts of corruption help integrate political systems and economic growth by breaking 
through bureaucratic bottlenecks and creating informal markets and price systems. 
This functional theory of corruption argues that the buying and selling of political 
favors has political and economic advantages (at least for some), and that bribery 
“greases the wheels” by cutting through unnecessary red tape, thereby improving 
efficiency and speeding up the wheels of commerce. 
 
It has also been argued that another beneficial effect of political corruption may be 
that it can enhance social stability where constituency based patronage systems have 
resulted in generous levels of public investment in rural areas (Bouissou 1997).  
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on a research paper I prepared as expert testimony for a series of high 
profile corruption and bribery trials in Lesotho (2002 and 2003). It was used extensively by the state’s 
expert witness, Hennie van Vuuren from the Institute for Security Studies in the sentencing phase of 
Schabir Shaik’s corruption trial. 
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However, other scholars give cogent arguments that far from cutting red tape, 
corruption increases inefficiency as bureaucrats contrive new requirements and delays 
in order to extract more payments (Kaufmann 1994). The enormous degree of 
discretion that many politicians and bureaucrats can have, particularly in corrupt 
societies over the creation, proliferation, and interpretation of counterproductive 
regulations means that instead of corruption being the “grease” for the squeaky 
wheels of a rigid administration, it can become the fuel for excessive and 
discretionary regulations. This is one mechanism where corruption feeds off itself 
(Kaufmann 1997). While one may think of examples in which paying a bribe or the 
opportunity to pay a bribe makes some firms/people better off, the overall effect of 
corruption on economic development is negative (Wei 1998).  
 
While most corruption hurts most people most of the time, the “winners” tend to be 
the few and well-connected (Klitgaard 1988). There are exceptions to this rule, but 
generally corruption is used to obtain or protect valuable goods and positions of 
political advantage – benefits, which are almost, always in short supply. The ability to 
use and corrupt influence depends upon the possession of scarce and unequally 
distributed political resources, such as money, expertise, special access and 
connections, personal prestige, or a solid political following – in short, political assets 
which few ordinary citizens are likely to possess (Johnston 1999).  
 
Corruption is contagious: it starts in one specific area, perhaps the area where the 
rules are in fact too rigid, and soon it begins to spread to other areas. In time, most 
activities become affected. When this happens corruption becomes like a distortionary 
tax levied with uneven and random rates. Then it is no longer just “oil for the 
mechanism” but it distorts economic decisions in ways that can be damaging to the 
economy. For example it may encourage unproductive public spending or 
economically unproductive activities, because of the bribes or the “commissions” that 
some public officials can get on such spending or protecting those activities (Tanzi 
1997).  
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3.4 Economic Consequences of Corruption  
 
There are a number of empirical studies providing overwhelming statistical evidence 
to show that countries with high corruption levels have poorer economic performance. 
There are several channels through which corruption hinders economic development 
and growth: briefly, it reduces investment (both domestic and foreign), distorts the 
size and composition of government expenditure away from education, health and the 
maintenance of infrastructure towards less efficient projects that have more scope for 
manipulation and bribe-taking opportunities, and it weakens the financial and tax 
system, strengthening the underground economy and encouraging links to organized 
crime groups. As would be expected from this, a strong connection has been 
demonstrated between corruption and increasing levels of poverty and income 
inequality. The following pages provide more detail of these empirical studies. We 
will take the economic effects first.  
 
3.4.1 Effect on Investment 
 
Corruption has been shown to have a negative and significant impact on investment. 
(The Asian case, which some see as an exception, is discussed later). Mauro (1995) 
presents the first systematic empirical cross-country analysis of the effects of 
corruption on economic growth by focusing on the relationship between investment 
and corruption. Using the Business International (BI) Index where corruption is one of 
the BI risk factors defined as “the degree to which business transactions involve 
corruption or questionable payment” – Mauro estimates the effects of corruption on 
the average ratio of total and private investment to gross domestic product (GDP) for 
the period 1960–1985 for a cross-section of 27 countries.  
 
Mauro’s data analysis finds a significant negative association between corruption and 
investment, as well as a negative impact on growth. For example, Mauro finds that 
corruption has a negative impact on the ratio of investments to GDP – its investment 
rate: “if Bangladesh (with a score of 4.7) were to improve the integrity and efficiency 
of its bureaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay (score 6.8)…its investment rate 
would rise by almost five percentage points and its yearly GDP growth rate would 
rise by over half a percentage point”. It follows that a corrupt country is likely to 
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achieve aggregate investment levels of almost 5% less than one, which is relatively 
‘uncorrupt’, and it will lose about half a percentage of gross domestic product growth 
per year (Kaufmann 1997).  
 
Mauro also constructs a “bureaucratic efficiency index” that includes efficiency of the 
legal system and the judiciary, the amount of bureaucracy and red tape, and 
corruption. This composite index is again negatively and significantly associated with 
investment where a one standard deviation improvement in bureaucratic efficiency is 
associated with an increase in the investment rate by 4.75% of GDP (Ades and Di 
Tella 1996). 
 
A further study of 67 countries covering data from 1960–85, found that corruption 
slows the growth rate of countries (Mauro 1997). For example, if a country such as 
Egypt were to heighten the efficiency of its administration and improve its corruption 
score of 4 out of 10 to the same level as Argentina’s 6, (again where 0 means total 
corruption and 10 means none at all), the rate of investment would increase by 3% 
and the growth rate would increase by 0.5% (Cartier-Bresson 2000). If Bangladesh 
reduced its level of corruption to Singapore’s, its average annual per capita GDP 
growth rate over the period 1960–1985 would have been 1.8 percentage points higher, 
a potential gain of 50% in per capita income by 1985 (assuming growth of 4% a year) 
(Kaufmann 2000). 
 
Using a different corruption indicator an empirical study which includes “corruption 
in government” among other explanatory variables into one single index of 
“institutional quality” to explain economic performance, finds similar results (Keefer 
and Knack 1995). A further study using a corruption index developed by the World 
Bank and the University of Basel for a sample of 41 countries, finds that corruption 
significantly reduces the ratio of investment to GDP (Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder 
1997). A similar conclusion is reached in a larger sample of 60 countries making use 
of corruption data by Political Risk Services (Brunetti and Weder 1998).  
 
There is thus clear evidence that investment (both domestic and foreign) and 
economic growth are lower in more corrupt countries and that corruption in host 
countries discourages foreign investment. Investing in a relatively corrupt country as 
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compared with an uncorrupt one is shown to be equivalent to an additional 20% 
(“private”) tax on the investment. For example an increase in the corruption level 
from relatively clean Singapore to relatively corrupt Mexico is the equivalent increase 
in the tax rate of over 20 percentage points. If India could reduce its corruption level 
to the Singapore level, its effect on attracting foreign investment would be the same as 
reducing its marginal corporate tax rate by 22 percentage points (Wei 1997a). In 
terms of the effect of corruption on domestic investment, one study points out how if 
the Philippines could reduce its corruption level to the Singapore level, other things 
being equal, it would have been able to raise its investment/GDP ratio by 6.6 
percentage points – quite a substantial increase in investment (Wei 1998).  
 
Corruption therefore discourages foreign investment more than a tax because 
corruption, unlike tax, is not transparent, nor pre-announced. As those who pay bribes 
have no legal recourse, contracts through bribery cannot be enforced; this is one 
reason why corruption is more harmful than taxes. Corruption embeds arbitrariness 
and creates uncertainty. It is well established that the level of uncertainty in the 
business environment significantly affects investment. By increasing uncertainty, 
corruption raises the effective costs of investment for the firm and countries having 
high levels of both administrative corruption and state capture (World Bank 2000). 
 
On the other hand Amundsen (1999) argues that the economic effects of corruption 
are nevertheless dependent on the type of corruption in each country, on the way in 
which corruption in organised or disorganised, controlled or uncontrolled, calculable 
or unforeseeable. In general, if businesses are able to forecast and estimate the level 
of corruption, to include it into their calculations as a measurable expense, and if they 
know that a paid bribe will have a positive effect, corruption may not be an 
impediment to investment and trade. If on the other hand corruption is disorganised 
and plentiful, unpredictable and inconsistent, a paid bribe is no guarantee that services 
are rendered and no more bribes expected later, corruption is economically damaging. 
 
Despite high levels of corruption East Asian countries have grown faster than most 
other developing countries.  Motivated by this seeming paradox, Campos et al use 
World Bank data in a cross-section of 69 countries to provide empirical evidence that 
different corruption regimes have different effects on investment (Campos et al 1999). 
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They find that regimes in which corruption is more “predictable” (that is, whether a 
corrupt service is actually delivered as agreed) have a smaller negative effect on 
investment than those in which it is less predictable. However, the level of corruption 
in societies still matters. Even given the same degree of predictability, lower levels of 
corruption still result in higher levels of investment. The World Bank has found that 
countries with more predictable corruption have higher investment rates. Thus, 
countries with endemic but predictable corruption, such as Thailand and Indonesia, 
have had strong investment growth (Cartier-Bresson 2000).  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no evidence that foreign investors are any 
less susceptible to corruption in East Asian economies than in other countries in the 
world. The evidence thus shows that there is no support for the Asian exceptionalism 
hypothesis. Instead, investors from the major source countries are just as averse to 
corruption in East Asia as elsewhere as foreign investors still prefer to go to less 
corrupt countries other things being equal. The reality is that corruption is only one of 
a number of factors explaining growth and development: even the few Asian 
countries that are considerably corrupt have developed a credible rule of law, 
maintained decent macroeconomic management, limited the pervasiveness of 
corruption, and prevented corrupt practices from encroaching on export-oriented 
policies (Kaufmann 1997). 
 
Not only the type of corruption, but the way in which resources extracted through 
corruption are used will have repercussions on both the economy and the political 
system. For instance, if the use of resources is centralised and “controlled”, it might 
be beneficial to local businesses if reinvested in the local economy. In South Korea 
where huge sums had been extracted by the president and the ruling party in 
numerous grand-scale economic transactions, the prosecutors could not find evidence 
of its private use as everything had been re-invested on the South Korean stock 
market (Amundsen 1999). However, this may not be the case elsewhere. In the 
majority of African regimes, corrupt rulers and businesses may have little faith in 
their own national economies and tend to export their legally and illegally acquired 
assets as soon as possible. LeVine’s study of corruption in Ghana showed that capital 
derived from corruption was either invested outside the country or spent on 
conspicuous consumption of luxurious goods. Even when stolen money was invested 
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in the country there was little trickle down benefit to the public at large (LeVine 
1975). 
 
3.4.2 Effect on Revenue Collection 
 
A further major economic effect of corruption is, then, it negative impact on revenue 
collection. Corruption, particularly in the form of large-scale bribery, exacerbates 
budgetary problems by depriving governments of significant customs and tax 
revenues. Higher levels of corruption are found to be associated with a large 
unofficial economy, the size of which can have profound fiscal implications in many 
transitional countries (Johnson, Kaufmann & Zoido-Lobaton 1998). Thus while 
corruption increases private revenues to public officials, it tends to have a negative 
impact on public revenues where corruption in procurement, assignment of subsidies, 
and outright theft leads to an exaggerated flow of funds out of public coffers.  
 
Corruption in procurement leads to public resources being wasted on inferior quality 
products and services that may ultimately deter honest vendors from doing business 
with the state. In a survey in Georgia, the need to make unofficial payment was the 
most cited reason that firms said that they do not participate in state tenders (World 
Bank 2000). When firms produce for the unofficial economy they underreport 
economic activity or avoid the state entirely. This creates competitive advantages that 
can drive honest competitors from the market thereby generating further corruption 
and fiscal shrinkage. The reduction of tax revenues reduces the funds available for 
public services, providing firms with fewer incentives to operate officially. Once 
underground, such firms pay bribes to avoid detection and punishment and the fiscal 
implications in some countries have been staggering (World Bank 2000).  
 
Some of the major corruption scandals internationally have been connected with 
public investment. The intellectual bias favoring capital spending, the controls that 
high level officials have on decisions concerning public projects, and the fact that in 
some way each investment project is unique and is subject to many kinds of designs, 
sizes, technology and other options, make public projects an area of public spending 
to be watched closely.  
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3.4.3 Effect on Public Expenditure 
 
The third major effect of corruption, then, related to distortions in public expenditure. 
In recent years there are a number of studies that examine the negative impact of 
corruption on public expenditure and resource allocation. A systematic study by Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) using cross-country data and regression analysis from Business 
International and Political Risk Services covering the period 1980–1995 shows the 
extent to which corruption impacts on and changes the quality allocation of public 
spending. Their study shows that corruption has powerful effects on both the quantity 
and the quality of public investment which plays a role in the productivity of capital, 
and hence GDP. The increase in public spending is especially in unproductive 
projects because many items in public expenditure lend themselves to manipulations 
by high-level officials to get bribes.  
 
In many cases resources extracted through corruption are allocated to unproductive 
areas. This creates a bias against soft public investments such as health and school 
services and a bias towards spending public money in “hard” investment areas such as 
equipment and construction because these are easier to corrupt. Resources tend to be 
either moved out of the country – money flight to foreign bank accounts and 
investments in foreign businesses – or spent on private consumption and the 
importing of luxuries. Endemic corruption generally misallocates talent to rent-
seeking activities, increases insider trading, and pushes firms underground into the 
black market. 
 
A study by Mauro (1998) demonstrates that highly corrupt countries are likely to 
under-invest in human capital and to distort public expenditures. Government 
expenditure on education and health is negatively and significantly associated with 
higher levels of corruption. He argues that this occurs because education provides less 
lucrative opportunities for corruption than other types of more capital-intensive public 
spending. Since these variables are important contributors to economic growth – the 
harm to development of under-investing in education is well known – corruption is 
therefore assumed to decrease a country’s rate of growth.  
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However, even where money is allocated to a particular sector such as education, a 
large percentage of it may be lost due to leakage because of corrupt officials and 
opaque budget allocation and expenditure tracking processes. Results from a Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) which collected five years of data on spending, 
service outputs and provider characteristics in 250 government primary schools in 
Uganda found that on average only 13% of the annual capitation grant (per student) 
from the central government reached the school in 1991-1995. 87% either 
disappeared for private gain or was captured by district officials for purposes 
unrelated to education, although there was no evidence of increased spending in other 
sectors (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). A relatively inexpensive policy action – 
namely a public information campaign on budget spending –managed to reduce such 
capture in primary school education from an average of 78% in 1995 to 18% in 2001. 
 
Corruption is also found to skew the composition of public expenditure away from 
necessary operation and maintenance towards expenditure on new equipment so that a 
country’s existing infrastructure can be used at only a fraction of its potential 
capacity. For example, roads with potholes cannot carry as much traffic as those in 
good condition. Corrupt high-level officials support too much unproductive public 
investment and under-maintain past investments (Wei 1998, Tanzi 1997). There have 
even been reports of countries where expenditure for operation and maintenance was 
intentionally reduced so that the infrastructure would deteriorate more quickly to the 
point where major new investments would be required, thus providing opportunities 
to some officials to get “commissions” from the companies that would undertake the 
projects. The net effect of corruption is almost surely to increase the fiscal deficit 
while at the same time reducing the efficiency of public spending and of the tax 
system (Tanzi 1997). 
 
Thus unproductive public investments may replace more productive investments even 
when the total is not affected for the following reasons: incompetent officials may 
move up to sensitive positions where the poorer quality of their decisions is damaging 
to economic activity; promotions within the civil service may not be based on merit, 
thus leading to discouragement and bitterness on the part of competent staff ; and 
public projects may be completed in a sloppy way or they may never be completed 
(Tanzi 1997).  
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3.4.4 Corruption and Big Business 
 
A further point is that the social and economic costs of corruption and bribery apply 
not only to the developing countries but also to multinational corporations. In the 
Control Risks Group survey of international business directors of 50 US and 50 
European companies, 20% of the US companies polled and 34% of the Europeans 
said that they had decided not to do business in otherwise attractive countries where 
corruption was a major problem (CRG 1998). Bribery and corruption has the 
following impact: it increases company expenditure, eats into profits and damages a 
company’s reputation for integrity, which is essential in obtaining customers, high 
quality staff, capital and local community acceptance.  
 
Often businesses feel they may have no choice but to bribe corrupt officials. 
However, the problem is that it is very hard to limit the long-term, unpredictable 
repercussions of bribes or other corrupt practices and once a company starts paying, it 
may find it hard to stop. John Bray from Control Risks, a risk consultancy that 
advises multinational corporations in this regard, argues that the very act of paying 
means that they begin to lose control for if they pay once, they will receive more 
demands (this applies to both “grease payments” and to “grand corruption” to secure 
contracts); if they do not get what they pay for, they are in no position to complain - 
there is no source of legal redress because they have themselves broken the law; 
having broken the law, they are vulnerable to various forms of blackmail; and if they 
enter into a corrupt relationship and then try to suspend outstanding payments, they 
may face a variety of different threats – including the threat of violence (Bray 1999). 
 
3.4.5 Corruption and Development: Summary 
 
The arguments that corruption improves efficiency are based on the assumption that 
the economic costs of extensive public regulations may be reduced or avoided 
through bribery (Andvig, Fjeldstad et al 2000). However, using data from three 
worldwide firm-level surveys (6000 firms in 75 countries) and examining the 
relationship between bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and 
cost of capital, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) provide reliable evidence that levels of 
corruption are strongly associated with the time that managers waste with bureaucrats, 
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a good indicator of bureaucratic inefficiency. Firms that pay more administrative 
bribes end up wasting more (not less) time with bureaucrats, and with a higher cost of 
investment. These administrative bribes appear therefore to disadvantage many of 
those paying, the business community as a whole, and society (Kaufmann 2000).  
 
Corruption thus reduces total revenues for social spending, distorts the allocation of 
public expenditures away from social programmes, and denies the poor equal access 
to public goods. Corruption also impairs the means to escape poverty by undermining 
property rights and raising a regressive bribery tax on small entrepreneurs. Corrupt 
regimes bias investment against projects that aid the poor, for example, they often 
prefer defence contracts over rural health clinics and schools. Further, corruption 
increases income inequality and poverty through lower growth, less effective social 
programme targeting, unequal access to education, reduced social spending, and 
higher investment risks for the poor (Kaufmann 2000). 
 
As shown above, corruption is empirically associated with lower economic growth 
rates, thereby weakening the main factor that can pull people out of poverty. 
Moreover corruption has a direct (and disproportionate) impact on the living 
conditions of the poor increasing income inequality and poverty (Knack & Anderson 
1999; Gupta, Davoodi & Alononso-Terme 1998; Narayan et al 2000). While the 
interaction between corruption and income inequality is certainly complex, the 
ultimate result has been clear: income inequality has expanded most in countries with 
high levels of corruption and state capture (World Bank 2000).  
 
Corruption worsens the (relative and sometimes absolute) poverty: corruption lowers 
economic growth, biases the tax system to favour the rich and well-connected, 
reduces the effectiveness of targeting of social programmes, biases government 
policies towards favouring inequality in asset ownership, lowers social spending, 
reduces access to education by the poor and increases the risk of investment by the 
poor (World Bank 2000). When corruption misdirects the assignment of 
unemployment or disability benefits, delays eligibility for pensions, weakens the 
provisions of basic public services such as health and education, it is usually the poor 
who suffer most. Such corruption undermines the social safety net and may deter the 
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poor from seeking basic entitlements and other public services. Corruption clearly 
hinders the ability of the poor to help themselves out of poverty (World Bank 2000). 
We have seen from empirical evidence presented above that corruption threatens 
economic growth by hindering investment (both domestic and foreign), distorting the 
allocation of public investments to areas such as defense and non-productive 
construction where rents are higher and more easily extracted by corrupt public 
officials, and how this impacts on social development to exacerbate inequality in 
societies and worsen the position of the poor.  The research by Dani Kaufmann and 
his team at the World Bank Institute, Governance Matters, continues to use empirical 
data to persuasively argue for the importance of good governance and its impact on 
economic growth. The next section will highlight the political consequences of 
corruption, which are intimately related to the economic consequences. 
 
3.5 Political Consequences of Corruption 
 
Unlike many direct effects of corruption, the political costs of corruption are often 
intangible, widely shared, and often realized only in the long term (Bouissou 1997). 
As mentioned before, corruption has a major political cost in that it undermines trust 
in the fair functioning of the political system leading to instability as well as potential 
disengagement by citizens. Politically, corruption subverts good governance by 
undermining public trust in government and may reduce political participation by 
adding to growing cynicism about politics and the political process amongst citizens 
(Bayley 1970, Klitgaard 1988, Johnston 1991, Rothchild and Chazan 1988).  
 
There are a number of serious political consequences of corruption that emerge as 
different interest groups compete for the benefits which through corrupt means can 
only accrue to the few. As interests other than the public interest compete in opaque 
and unaccountable spaces, it is in effect more difficult for governments to form and 
carry out coherent policies, respond to citizens’ needs and use scarce resources in 
effective ways. Johnston (1993, 1996, 1997,1999) argues that corruption’s mainly 
disintegrative features weaken a society’s ability to reform itself, and to build more 
open, responsive, credible and legitimate political institutions. The following section 
draws on his insights into the damaging political consequences of corruption. 
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First, however we need to consider the argument that, far from being disintegrative, 
corrupt practices actually serve as a means of integrating people into the political 
system (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2000) and that a beneficial effect of political corruption 
may be that it can enhance social stability where constituency based patronage 
systems have resulted in generous levels of public investment in rural areas (Bouissou 
1997). Thus corruption allows access to public officials to groups who would 
otherwise be alienated and in this way can mitigate potential conflicts between 
politicians and bureaucrats since widespread corruption provides profits to everyone 
(Gould & Mukendi 1989).  
 
The evidence here is debatable since clearly corruption does not provide profits to 
everyone. Although systemic corruption at the political level has helped some states 
to maintain a degree of political stability or the survival of the regimes it is also 
acknowledged that such stability has been achieved at considerable human and 
financial cost, for example in the case of Zimbabwe. A more compelling argument is 
surely that politically corruption creates situations of potential instability by 
destroying confidence and trust. If ordinary citizens and the poor become aware that 
the public interest has been compromised by particularistic interests to secure goods 
and services which in a democracy should be accessible to all, stability is potentially 
threatened resulting in unrest and general lawlessness (Camerer 1997c). The growing 
number of protests at local government level in South Africa linking lack of service 
delivery to corrupt officials, is illustrative.   
 
In his research, Wei (1997b) finds that political stability may be negatively correlated 
with corruption-induced uncertainty as well as level of corruption. A politically 
unstable government may cause bureaucrats at all levels to try and grab rents 
whenever and wherever they can. Conversely, a very corrupt and uncertain 
government may breed public discontent and lead to political instability. Khan (1996) 
argues that one of the most obvious effects of corruption is an increase in the 
instability of all property rights when corruption exceeds a critical level. Even when 
the initial structure of rights is such that corruption is beneficial (if only to a few), too 
much corruption can lead to a loss of confidence in the institutional structure of 
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society with the effect that social order breaks down totally resulting in anarchy. This 
is clearly the case in Zimbabwe. 
 
The impact of political corruption is particularly damaging on the economy when the 
chief carnivores are the highest level of leadership (Gould & Mukendi 1989). Large-
scale corruption in high places in government has been cited as being responsible for 
socio-economic deterioration and subsequent coups d’état in much of Africa. Of the 
80 coups attempted in Africa in the period 1960–1982, almost all were justified as 
reaction to and as efforts to improve corrupt regimes (Crawford Young 1984). Even 
in countries where coup attempts are not frequent but where political patronage allow 
regimes to forestall direct challenges, corruption remains a principal feature of 
political and economic underdevelopment blocking initiatives and frustrating the most 
ambitious change prospects (Gould & Mukendi 1989). 
 
Johnston (1999) notes that an open, responsive and effective political process 
requires, at a minimum, a significant amount of citizen trust in officials, in 
institutions, and in each other. Open politics means not only that people are free to 
advocate vigorously their own interests, but also that they abide by official decisions, 
accepting unfavourable outcomes as fundamentally legitimate and mounting their 
responses through the political process. It also means people trust others to do 
likewise, for there is little reason to play by the rules if one’s critics and opponents are 
unlikely to do so.  
 
Over and above its material costs, Johnston notes that one of the primary political 
costs of corruption is that it undermines and can destroy this political trust. Citizens 
can conclude – quite rightly – that it is futile to deal with government through official 
political and bureaucratic channels, or that even if such channels are still functional, 
others will pre-empt them through bribery and “connections”. This idea links into 
LeVine’s notion of the informal polity and its relationship to a culture of political 
corruption, discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Where rights and protections are no longer believable and dependable, before long, 
citizens come to distrust each other and the very right to express oneself politically 
 44 
can become endangered (Johnston 1999). In time, basic notions of an open, 
understandable and accountable political process, and of a meaningful common 
debate over political questions and who is to be given power to deal with them, 
become meaningless. Politics then degenerates into a chaotic “hand-over-fist” 
scramble among people and groups who see themselves as having little or nothing in 
common. The state finds it impossible to formulate and carry out consistent policies, 
particularly those that might involve sacrifice on the part of private interests. Johnston 
(1999) paints a picture where politics then gives way to outright theft, exploitation 
and violence. The damage, he argues, reaches beyond the formal political arena, too, 
for the sort of political-free-for-all threatens a society’s cultural consensus – i.e. the 
basic and widely-shared conceptions of right and wrong, the beliefs about power and 
the nature of justice that are the foundation of legitimate politics and government. Not 
only can corruption destroy this cultural consensus; once it has been lost, even efforts 
at reform become suspect, and trust is doubly difficult to regain (Johnston 1999). 
 
Thus if we assume that the perpetrators of corruption are out to serve their own 
interests, then the stakes of corruption will most often accrue to the “haves”. The cost 
in lost and diverted resources, unsuccessful policies, and lost political choices are then 
borne by the “have-nots” – precisely those who are most dependent upon the formal 
rules and procedures of the system in order to participate in politics at all. The 
unequal distribution of costs and benefits of corruption is an obvious dilemma in 
material terms. But it is a serious political concern too, for it may solidify the notion 
in many people’s minds that politics itself is a sham – that one’s rights and choices 
are illusory, and that the only hope of change lies in the destruction of the system. 
Samuel Huntington is correct in arguing that sometimes corruption can serve as an 
alternative to violence. However, beyond a certain point it may become the cause of 
violence too. There have been times in history, to be sure, when rebellion has been 
justified even inevitable; but corruption may also make people vulnerable to political 
disruption and exploitation (Johnston 1999). 
 
From a citizen’s point of view, corruption can render official procedures 
unpredictable, slow, expensive and arbitrary for all who cannot (or will not) pay the 
price of a bribe or extortion. Widespread extortion means that bureaucrats serve 
themselves, and may respond to no one. On the other hand the corrupt use of 
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institutional procedures – hiring, evaluation, compensation and dismissal procedures 
or, for example, the widespread political intimidation of bureaucrats – can deprive 
administrative agencies of the independence they need if they are to serve society 
effectively. Such political problems within government mean that existing policies are 
unlikely to reach their intended goals, or to be well-conceived, monitored and 
implemented. Accurate information needed for addressing new problems will become 
harder to obtain. Indeed where corruption is a serious problem new problems and 
pressing needs may never make it onto the political and administrative agendas 
(Johnston 1999). 
 
Some types of corruption do more to disrupt linkages between state and society than 
others. Some are more unstable and disintegrative than others, depending on the 
stakes involved. Some kinds of corruption will be more urgent targets of reform than 
others, because they are more disruptive to the political process. There is an important 
irony here: these kinds are the most disruptive because they involve powerful actors 
and the largest stakes, and thus action against them will require the most political will. 
On the other hand, such major cases offer opportunities to make significant and 
visible statement to a nation that the fight against corruption is not futile and the 
agents of reform mean business (Johnston 1999) and can be trusted. The South 
African government’s handling of allegations of corruption in the arms deal is a case 
in point that will be discussed in depth (Part Three and Four). 
 
Not only does corruption affect the state, it also inhibits the growth of autonomous 
groups within civil society. i.e. organizations and interests loyal to the system but 
enjoying a healthy independence from the state. By creating dependency and/or 
exploitative relationships between politically powerful figures on the one hand and 
private citizens on the other, corruption weakens civil society and renders citizens less 
able to influence and balance the state (Johnston 1999). Moreover it can inhibit 
meaningful and structured political competition: what is the point of serving as, or 
remaining in a “loyal opposition” if the real political game consists of finding a well-
placed patron and using corrupt influence, and if elections and other public political 
procedures do not produce real exchanges of power? Competitive party politics, 
offering meaningful choices, will be weakened or destroyed (Johnston 1999).  
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In these ways, corruption impacts profoundly on the effectiveness of democratic 
politics. For while corruption is in no way limited to democracies, it is in such 
systems that its effects are most disruptive for by attacking two of the fundamental 
principles on which democracy is based, namely equality of citizens before the law 
and the open nature of decision making, corruption contributes to the delegitimation 
of the political and institutional systems in which it takes root (Della Porta & 
Vannucci 1997). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Growing international concern about the impact and consequences of corruption have 
led to current international and regional anti-corruption conventions as well as citizen 
initiatives, all who cite the negative consequences of corruption as a main stimulus, 
particularly for governments to take strong action against corruption.  
 
The compelling case made in this chapter, citing empirical evidence, of the mostly 
negative economic and political consequences that corruption has, support the thesis 
that comprehensive anti-corruption interventions are required at a variety of levels. 
However, if and when political leaders committed to fighting corruption arrive on the 
scene, in many countries they face a cynical population that has strong doubts about 
the credibility of the state. Where states have been captured, reformers must first 
overcome a deep chasm of distrust before an anti-corruption programme can be 
effective (World Bank 2000).  
 
In Part Two we will test these general notions of how corruption impacts negatively 
on a country’s economic and political health, by looking at the particular case of 
South Africa. First, however, we need to conclude the theoretical framework guiding 
our study by considering various theories of corruption control and also the possibility 
of accurately measuring degrees of corruption.  
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Chapter Four: Theories of Corruption Control 
 
4. 1 Introduction 
 
While Chapter Two looked at various approaches to conceptualizing and theorizing 
about corruption itself, in this chapter we assesses theoretical approaches to 
controlling and preventing corruption. First, several general assumptions about 
corruption control are examined. Secondly, I outline a number of theories of 
corruption control such as those developed by Klitgaard (on monopoly, discretion and 
accountability); Rose-Ackerman (on reducing incentives and creating risks); Mbaku 
(on institutions, incentives and the rules of the game) and Johnston (on democratic 
consolidation and social empowerment). Thirdly, I turn briefly to international anti-
corruption efforts. Finally, I consider the possibility of accurately assessing the 
effectiveness and sustainability of anti-corruption efforts. In particular, the 
components and rationale behind the Global Integrity Index as an anti-corruption 
assessment tool will be briefly laid and critically analyzed. 
 
4.2 Controlling Corruption  
 
One of the first things to be said about the control of corruption is that it is impossible 
(and some would argue even undesirable) to eradicate it completely. Indeed, the “wise 
reformer knows that corruption can never be entirely eliminated” (Pope 1996:vii). For 
one, the costs of eliminating corruption completely would be prohibitive, and simply 
not be worthwhile in economic terms (Rose-Ackerman 1996). In addition to the 
financial costs, in certain instances the mechanisms needed to eradicate corruption 
would be incompatible with the liberal traditions that influence democracies. Also, the 
control of corruption may be just one of a number of policy agendas that a reform 
minded government is pursuing, and in certain instances may clash with other 
agendas.  
 
While a “zero-tolerance” approach to corruption – such as that promoted by President 
Thabo Mbeki in South Africa - is to be welcomed, i.e. that a government will not 
tolerate corruption when and where it comes across it no matter who may be involved, 
this approach needs to be kept in perspective.  As Rose-Ackerman warns “anti-
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corruption policy should never aim to achieve complete rectitude. Those who take an 
absolutist position are likely to impose rigid and cumbersome constraints that increase 
rather than decrease, corrupt incentives.” (Rose-Ackerman 1999:68). 
 
The way corruption is conceptualized provides insight into how one can attempt to 
control and manage its negative effects. Thus if corruption is largely understood to 
have arisen largely as a symptom of institutional failure, a focus on reforming 
institutions is unsurprising. The broader context of anti-corruption reforms is 
important to bear in mind when looking at the theory that informs it.  
 
As discussed previously, the late 80’s and early 90s heralded a new era of both 
economic reform, structural adjustment and what Huntington referred to as the Third 
Wave of democratisation and the new development agenda of the late 90s involved an 
expectation of sustained efforts in developing and transitional countries towards the 
goals of market economies and liberal democratic political systems (Riley 1998). For 
a variety of reasons corruption is likely to spread in periods of economic and political 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. These include vacuums of authority 
by the removal of authoritarian controls, conflicts of values and a new elite attempting 
to catch up with the old, decentralization, privatization and the opening of the 
economy to international participation (Camerer 1996). An important way to 
strengthen the emerging democracies of Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and 
Asia has been to focus on developing strong institutions for promoting “good 
governance” (Oluwu and Rasheed 1993). This argument is particularly relevant to the 
South African context. 
 
During the 90s industrialized countries with well-established democracies came under 
the corruption spotlight with revelations in Japan, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain and 
the United Kingdom demonstrating that pervasive political corruption can be an 
entrenched element of highly industrialized, democratic societies, and not simply an 
unfortunate dimension of underdevelopment or authoritarianism (Harris-White and 
White 1996:1). 
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This may explain some of the interest in the developed world for tackling the issue 
head on. Corruption is however, particularly harmful for developing countries where 
there are fewer resources overall so it is even worse to “waste” them or not use them 
in the most effective, equitable way. In developing countries there may be more 
opportunities for corruption and fewer resources, particularly skilled human resources 
with experience in audit, financial analysis and fraud investigation, immediately able 
to fight it.  As such the consequences of corruption for developing countries are 
significantly worse, as described in the previous chapter. 
 
Reform measures to fight corruption thus include a range of general and specific 
options. In general corruption can be addressed by democratization and 
decentralization, economic liberalization, reforming public institutions, public sector 
downsizing, legislative reforms, initiatives by civil society and public interest groups, 
investigative journalism as well as attempts to improve public morality by education 
and moral rearmament. Specific strategies might include enforcing penalties for 
wrongdoing, making civil service salaries competitive, creating an independent anti-
corruption commission, mandating declaration of assets, establishing a code of ethics, 
and protecting whistle-blowers. Any and all of these reforms can be adopted as part of 
a comprehensive anti-corruption agenda. Transparency International notes that the 
policy response to combating corruption has several elements common to every 
society: the reform of substantive programs; changes in the structure of government 
and its methods of assuring accountability; changes in the moral and ethical attitudes; 
and perhaps most importantly the involvement and support of government, the private 
sector and civil society. 
 
I identify four main approaches that characterized reform efforts in the late 90s, 
namely: 
• Building systems of well-performing government i.e. a professional civil 
service, sound financial management including state tender procedures, 
effective service delivery and a balance of responsibilities amongst the 
executive and parliament; 
• Strengthening the legislative framework including the rule of law, effective 
enforcement capacity, statutory oversight agencies such as independent anti-
corruption institutions and mechanisms, and an independent judiciary; 
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• Increasing transparency through introducing measures that strengthen the role 
of civil society and the media in demanding better government; 
• Promoting international co-operation on issues such as the criminalization of 
bribery and corruption, and institutional reforms and capacity building 
(Camerer 1997). 
 
What is most useful, in my opinion, is framing the corruption reform agenda as one of 
promoting “good governance” and democratic accountability, rather than controlling 
corruption per se. Democratic systems of governance premised on commitments to 
accountability, openness and transparency are thought to create conditions that 
discourage corruption.  
 
While there is no simple correlation between levels of democracy and levels of 
corruption, over the long run democratic regimes arguably engender more powerful 
antibodies against corruption than systems where political liberties are stifled. A 
regime that has frequent elections, political competition, active and well-organized 
opposition forces, an independent legislature and judiciary, free media and liberty of 
expression is bound to generate more limits on the scope and frequency of corruption 
than one that does not have them. As the balance of power between leaders and their 
publics continues to shift in favor of more open democratic governance with the 
primary driving force behind this change an “information-rich” and more transparent 
environment, leaders are forced to give a fuller public accounting of themselves than 
ever before (Glynn et al 1996).  
 
Growing democratization hopefully means the emergence of a more active national 
media and stronger legislature with the power to hold leaders accountable and whilst 
democratic institutions do open up a long-term prospect of institutional remedies for 
corruption, these require a powerful political impetus to make them work effectively 
(Harris-White and White 1996). Political will is thus a key ingredient to ensure an 
effective, well-resourced anti-corruption strategy and will be discussed in some detail 
later in the chapter. 
 
While democratization involves the spread of political and civil freedoms, it can also 
open up an era of license without responsibility to the benefit of existing and 
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emergent economic and political elites. Democratic systems provide incentives and 
opportunities for corrupt behavior, notably the enormous costs of mounting election 
campaigns (which can stimulate corrupt practices such as bribery of voters in order to 
get re-elected), the capture of political parties by economic elites, the politicization of 
the state apparatus by elected officials and the desire of the latter to compensate for 
political uncertainty by building up a capital stake through corruption. These 
phenomena are particularly strong in fledgling democracies where a procedural 
transition has not been accompanied by real or substantive democracy (Harris-White 
and White 1996). Thus democracy itself may open up new opportunities for corrupt 
behavior, for instance through corrupting influences of money on elections with 
excessive and unaccountable sources of funding of political parties. This will be seen 
to be a core deficit in South Africa’s anti-corruption armor. 
 
4.3 General Assumptions Underpinning Corruption Control 
 
A pluralist approach assumes that political initiatives centered on the creation of new 
democratic institutions – such as elected legislatures, parliamentary committees and 
watchdog bodies – are central to the success of efforts to control corruption. It is 
argued that moves towards liberal, pluralist politics, involving a freer press, 
competitive party politics, and the revival or creation of other independent institutions 
such as the judiciary or professional associations, will reduce corruption by making it 
more likely that it will be exposed and be politically damaging (Riley 1998:143). As 
such a limited, legitimate, honest and transparent state ought to be the center of the 
development process in both developing and transitional countries. All too often it is 
not and the public interest is therefore undermined and human rights infringed. In 
many cases the state sector is swollen, inefficient and corrupt. Individual and group 
private interests have priority over the collective good and public officials have 
considerable discretion to accumulate private wealth through exploiting their 
monopolistic, low and irregularly paid positions, often in collusion with indigenous or 
foreign businessmen. 
 
The systems approach i.e. improving the management systems of organizations is a 
popular response to controlling corruption (Klitgaard 1998). Economic liberalization 
strategies aim at fighting corruption through reducing the scale of government. 
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However, this may ignore the fact that privatization and other distributive 
interventions such as broad-based black economic empowerment (BBEEE) bring with 
it new forms of corruption. Fighting corruption through civic awareness and public 
education is another approach, however, the involvement of civil society actors is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to reduce corruption and the role of such 
groups in the fight against corruption needs further research (Harsch 1993, Theobald 
1994). 
 
In general, the various theoretical approaches to controlling corruption rest on certain 
assumptions of both the state and the market, with corruption largely seen as a 
problem for, within and involving the public sector. The main assumption is that 
public sector corruption will be reduced if the size of the state is reduced and the 
economy deregulated. The argument is that there is a relationship between market 
structure and the incidence of corruption. Government intervention in the marketplace 
creates opportunities for individuals to engage in corruption. The remedy prescribed 
is thus less government intervention in private exchange and greater reliance on 
markets for the allocation of resources.  
 
If economic and political liberalization are two theoretical approaches that inform the 
debate around controlling corruption, what do these approaches mean in practice? i.e. 
how is corruption reform related to the economy and its institutions? 
 
The economic environment contributes to the evolution of corruption in so far as 
economic strategies and policy instruments, together with institutions for the 
implementation of economic policy, may provide different opportunities for the 
pursuit of corrupt practices. In particular, the process of economic reform in a 
transitional period provides significant new opportunities for corruption, for example 
risks associated with privatization projects. Whilst in the long run a deregulated 
economy is bound to offer less scope for corruption than a centrally planned one, the 
sudden deregulation of entire new arenas of economic activity can vastly expand 
room for misconduct, opening the door to fraud and all sorts of abuses by 
“businessmen” trying to take advantage of the new opportunities created by 
deregulation.  
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The reader will have noticed that I seem to be saying both that a) liberalize the 
economy and deregulate, lessen the role of the state to prevent corruption, and b) the 
introduction of liberalizations opens the scope for corruption, at least at the start of 
such liberalization. These are clearly contradictory. But the apparent contradiction 
falls away when one takes the time factor into account for the economy and polity are 
not static. The move towards less state control is important for reasons that are 
independent of the corruption issue, namely the value of individual freedom and also 
the expansion of the economy. In the general context of joining the global free market 
system, individuals in state bodies are in a position to exploit their positions. The 
economic role of such bodies should therefore be lessened. It could very well be that, 
under the previous system, before the introduction of the free market approach, there 
was far less corruption.  
 
For instance when it comes to privatization, officials in charge of privatizing publicly 
owned assets can become instant tycoons by selling them at low prices for a bribe or 
possibly acquiring them through families and friends. Where seen to affect 
development by catering for special interests at the expense of public interests, 
corrupt practices may threaten the legitimacy of the privatization process. 
Internationally, privatization schemes have been used to legalize the ill-gotten gains 
or criminal organizations that build ties with elites and businesses, inevitably 
involving the corruption of state officials, in order to facilitate money laundering. It is 
well known that the ability to corrupt officials depends on how integrated the criminal 
organization is into legitimate structures, for the relationship between the underworld 
of organized crime and the upper-world of legality is characterized by its parasitical 
and symbiotic nature.  
 
The new system allows for greater individual initiative and flexibility and is therefore 
open to greater abuse by individuals. There is a value dimension too: the new system 
displaces the older hierarchy of values that stressed loyalty and community, by a new 
emphasis on the value of individual initiative and choices. Clearly an educative 
program on public values and interests must be part of any sustainable anti-corruption 
strategy, to bridge the gap between the old and the new.  
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Other economic factors that potentially provide incentives for the pursuit of corrupt 
practices include: the prevailing nature and extent of poverty; the national distribution 
of income and wealth, in general; as well as the recent trends in these distributions. 
The presence of a significant level of absolute deprivation may also be significant. 
The poor may not have many alternative opportunities and are thus “forced” to 
commit crimes in a way that those who do have alternatives, are not. To the extent 
that expectations of a “better life” are frustrated, specific social groupings, and 
individuals could be motivated by the prospect of improving their status to undertake 
corrupt practices.  
 
For its part poverty has contributed to the extension of corruption: those who cannot 
honestly meet their basic needs may resort to less honest means of subsistence (Frisch 
1994:4). This argument is however, only relevant to those who have the opportunity 
to exploit possible openings for corruption. Clearly the poorest groupings, for which 
incentives may be the greatest in this context, will typically have almost no 
opportunities. Rather questions of absolute, or more likely relative deprivation in a 
society will be of relevance to those in, for example, lowly government positions, 
where the remuneration is exceptionally poor, but where the work provides 
possibilities for corrupt activities (Goudie and Stasavage 1997:29). 
 
Politically, corruption is often a consequence of the monopoly power of various kinds 
of modern authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to be strictly distinguished from pre-
modern approaches. Political structure is a critical element in the evolution of 
corruption, not merely in the degree of political centralization and the extent of 
democratic accountability, but also the manner in which the regime interacts with and 
exercises political control or influence through the institutional structures. Political 
structures where representative processes to enforce governmental accountability are 
weak and absent provide the greatest opportunities for corruption in view of the 
absence of political mechanisms through which governments that tolerate, condone or 
participate in rent-seeking and corrupt practices might be dismissed (Goudie and 
Stasavage 1997:18). 
 
The establishment of good governance - the practice by political leadership of 
accountability, transparency, openness, predictability, and the rule of law - is widely 
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accepted as a critical element in securing stable economic development and has been 
shown to be a virtual prerequisite of the enabling environment for market-led 
economic growth (Goudie and Stasavage 1997:11). Good governance reforms rest on 
the economic efficiency argument: economic growth can only be achieved effectively 
and for the long term if decision making is soundly based with institutions in which 
investors and ordinary people can have confidence. Many countries lack the basic 
institutional foundations for markets to grow - they fail to provide law and order, 
protection of property and predictability of policy. High on the list of deterrents of 
potential (foreign) investors is the fear of dealing with countries where the rule of law 
is undermined, where democratic institutions are weak, where the accountability of 
the public service is non-existent and petty corruption is endemic (Chalker 1997). 
 
 As noted in the previous chapter, there is increasing empirical evidence to show that 
investors, especially foreign ones, choose to go elsewhere rather than become caught 
up in costly projects, which squeeze their profit margins. As such there is little 
investment and less economic growth. There is thus a hardheaded economic case for 
good governance reforms, which also serve to tackle corruption. 
 
We can conclude that there are major problems concerning the sequencing of such 
reforms in Africa and elsewhere and the relationship between political and economic 
liberalisation is nowhere near as clear as its advocates suggest. In most African 
societies economic reform has preceded political reform and although down-sizing 
the state and political liberalisation are desirable goals in many African countries, 
they are necessary but not at all sufficient conditions for the reduction of public sector 
corruption. Extensive public sector corruption can coexist with democratic or quasi-
democratic politics in Africa (Riley 1998:141). 
 
Harris and White (1996) argue that general arguments about the inverse relationship 
between economic liberalisation and corruption need to be tempered by case-study 
evidence. The examples of China and South Korea suggest that economic 
liberalisation displaces, refines and may lead to more corruption. In addition “far from 
improving things in the short and medium term, democratisation may actually 
increase the source and scale of corruption without strengthening counter-veiling 
political or institutional capacity.” Thus it can be seen that economic liberalisation 
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will not always reduce corruption; nor will the arrival of democratic politics. But 
combined with institutional reform and political commitment they do provide the 
foundations upon which a successful anti-corruption campaign can be conducted 
(Riley 1998: 149). Corruption frequently takes place in societies where there is 
considerable discretion for public officials, limited accountability and little 
transparency in governmental operation; in such societies civil society institutions are 
often weak and underdeveloped.  
 
4.4 Theories of Corruption Control 
 
There are a number of neo-classical economic and institutional reform approaches 
that the literature has identified in theorizing about the control of corruption.  From 
each of these theories flow various strategic approaches to controlling corruption. 
These are integrated into the discussion, before taking a more general look at current 
international approaches to preventing corruption and promoting accountability. 
 
4.4.1 Monopoly, Discretion and Accountability  
 
The first theoretical analysis of corruption I want to look at is that of development 
economist, Robert Klitgaard. In his well-researched study, Controlling Corruption, 
based upon a principal-agent economic analysis derived from neo-classical (or neo-
liberal) economic theory, Klitgaard articulates his now famous stylized equation on 
the basic ingredients of corruption. His strategy is tested in a number of differing 
developing-country contexts (Klitgaard 1988, 1991, 1997). As he puts it, “Illicit 
behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents 
have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak” 
(Klitgaard 1988:75). 
 
(C)orruption = (M)onopoly + (D)iscretion – (A)ccountability 
 
There are three dimensions of institutional structures that are most critical in creating 
opportunities for officials to engage in corruption: 
1. the monopoly power of officials 
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2. the degree of discretion that officials are permitted to exercise 
3. the degree to which there are systems of accountability and transparency in an 
institution (Klitgaard 1988). 
 
The basic causes of corruption are thus political and bureaucratic monopolies coupled 
with an element of discretion and weak mechanisms of accountability. Officials are 
likely to be most corrupt where they have wide discretion in their actions, little 
accountability and considerable monopoly power. As such interventions to control 
corruption would mean limiting monopoly (possibly through competition) as well as 
discretion (by introducing a more rules based approach) and increasing accountability 
(through the role of the media, civil society, etc.) 
 
While corruption had classically been understood as a bribe-giver and a bribe-taker, 
i.e. a corrupter and one who is corrupted, Klitgaard’s contribution, according to 
Galtung (1998), was to depart from this notion and point out that there are not just 
two but always three actors involved in any corrupt transaction:  
1. the Principal (P)  
2. the Agent (A) and  
3. the Client (C).  
 
This distinction is demonstrated using an example of tax collection. The tax collector, 
who is the Agent (A) abuses the power given by the state, the Principal (P) when 
accepting money from a Client, the tax payer (C) to reduce the latter’s tax burden. As 
such the Principal (P) plays the determining role as P both selects the Agent (A) and P 
sets A’s rewards and penalties (Galtung 1998:110).  
 
Using their monopoly position enables agents to charge what economists call rents. 
Accordingly rents in general or corrupt income in particular, can be reduced by 
decreasing state power, limiting the discretion of officials, and by strengthening the 
controls exercised over public officials (Riley 1998:135). Transparency is also an 
important goal. Opening up previously secret public officialdom and generating freer 
public discussion through a free, questioning press and an active civil society can 
reduce corruption.  
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From Klitgaard’s theoretical approach to corruption flow several general policies 
against corruption, for example when selecting agents, make sure to screen them for 
honesty and get outside guarantees of their honesty and integrity; change rewards and 
penalties through salaries and penalties; gather information using auditing systems 
and management, third parties, clients, a burden of proof; restructure the P-A-C 
relationship through competition, discretion of agents, rotation of agents, client 
groups; change attitudes against corruption through education and example, codes of 
ethics, and organizational cultures (Klitgaard 1988:97). 
 
4.4.2 Reducing Incentives and Increasing Risks 
 
Yale law professor, Susan Rose-Ackerman’s comprehensive study, Corruption and 
Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (1999) argues that the total 
elimination of corruption will never be worthwhile, but certain steps can be taken to 
limit its reach and reduce the harms it causes. Reform measures can reduce the 
incentives for bribery and increase the risks of engaging in corruption and the goal is 
therefore not the elimination of corruption but rather an improvement in the overall 
efficiency, fairness and legitimacy of the state. 
 
In her work she considers the relationship between corrupt incentives and democratic 
forms and discusses the relative bargaining power of public and private organization 
and individual actors, and how the basic structure of the public and private sectors 
produces or suppresses corruption. Reform at this level may well require changes in 
both constitutional structures and the underlying relationship between the market and 
the state (Rose-Ackerman 1999:5).  
 
Corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong with the management of the 
state whereby institutions designed to govern the interrelationships between the 
citizen and the state are used instead for personal enrichment and the provision of 
benefits to the corrupt. The price mechanism, so often a source of economic 
efficiency and contributor to growth, in the form of bribery, can undermine the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of government (Rose-Ackerman 1999:9). She warns that 
reform should not be limited to the creation of “integrity systems”. Instead, 
fundamental changes in the way government does business ought to be at the heart of 
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the reform agenda. The primary goal should be to reduce the underlying incentives to 
pay and receive bribes, not to tighten systems of ex post control. Enforcement and 
monitoring are needed, but they will have little long-term impact if the basic 
conditions that encourage payoffs are not reduced. If these incentives remain, the 
elimination of one set of “bad apples” will soon lead to the creation of a new group of 
corrupt officials and private bribe-payers (Rose-Ackerman 1999:6).  
 
In South Africa it is clear that forms of corruption that manifested prominently in the 
apartheid state such as pension fraud continue to exist as the inequities in society, now 
between black middle class and very poor citizens, continues to exist. Also with 
preferential procurement built into the political economy in the form of black 
economic empowerment, such initiatives that engineer wealth transfer in the economy 
based on access to politicians can potentially create an elite that has benefited from 
undue access and influence, in a way similar to the empowerment of Afrikaners under 
apartheid. 
 
4.4.3 Institutions, Incentives and the Rules of the Game 
 
The third theory of corruption control I shall consider is Mbaku. Mbaku’s public 
choice approach understands corruption as opportunistic (rent-seeking) behavior 
related to the scope and extent of government regulation and control of private 
exchange and economic activities. Corruption is directly linked to state intervention in 
the economy and unless such power is limited, civil servants will be able to engage in 
opportunistic behaviors to increase their compensation packages (Mbaku 1996). From 
this perspective, unless the adopted rules effectively constrain the ability of the 
government to supply special interest legislation, rent-seeking will become pervasive 
as groups seek ways to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society.  
 
Mbaku argues that the only way to deal effectively with corruption and other forms of 
political opportunism is comprehensive institutional reform of the neo-colonial state 
through proper constitution-making, with the end to establish and sustain 
participatory, accountable and transparent governance structures and economic 
systems that guarantee the right to engage in exchange and contract and 
constitutionally limit the state to intervene in private exchange. Public choice theory 
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views the control of corruption and other forms of opportunism as part of the problem 
of constitutional maintenance that requires an effective enforcement system to force 
cooperation and compliance.  
 
Institutional arrangements that cannot be subverted easily by interest groups and 
individuals searching for ways to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of 
society, rests on an understanding of institutions as devising the rules of the game in 
society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. Institutions and the rules on which they are based, structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic. Institutional change shapes 
the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical 
change (North 1990). Mbaku draws on the work of Brennan and Buchanan (1985) 
who argue that rules determine the way individuals and organisations behave. Rules 
create the incentive structure faced by market participants – in both political and 
economic markets. Thus, the behaviour of civil servants and the entrepreneurs who 
bribe them can only be effectively examined within the context of the existing set of 
rules. In other words without a clear understanding of the laws and institutions of a 
country, an attempt to analyse corruption in that country would not yet yield policy 
relevant information.  
 
Institutions determine the incentive structure for each society, helping to shape the 
behaviour of individuals participating in the political and economic markets. As a 
consequence institutions determine outcomes from markets and other forms of socio-
political interaction. Thus, any attempt to affect outcomes must involve a change in 
the structure of incentives. Rules can be explicit (a written constitution) or implicit 
(custom and tradition). Within a given set of rules, corruption may be seen as 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of individuals or groups to generate extra-legal 
benefits for themselves at the expense of society. Accordingly, corruption may be 
regarded as part of the problem of constitutional maintenance which can be handled 
effectively only through the reform of the existing rules (Mbaku 1996).  
 
Basically the rules determine the incentive system faced by market participants and 
consequently their behaviour and the expected outcomes. Corruption, in turn, can be 
seen as an outcome from a market that is defined by a given incentive structure, and 
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of course an existing set of rules. To affect or change the market outcome requires 
modifications of the incentive structure through changes in existing rules, thus the 
appropriate procedure for dealing effectively with rent-seeking and other 
opportunistic behaviours, including corruption, is to reform the rules of the game and 
alter the incentive structure (Mbaku 1996). 
 
How would this apply to the particular African context? Various societal, legal, 
market and political strategies have traditionally been used to control corruption in 
Africa. Each of these strategies represents an attempt to manipulate outcomes within a 
given set of rules and assumes the existence of efficient and effective counteracting 
institutions. If existing rules provide incentive systems that encourage opportunistic 
behaviours, including corruption, the only effective way to control corruption is to 
change the rules and subsequently the incentive structure. Thus proper corruption 
control requires institutional reforms that result in a change in the incentive structure 
to guarantee the outcome desired by society. In other words to understand why 
individuals and groups within a society participate in corruption, it is necessary to 
study the rules that regulate socio-political interaction (Mbaku 1996).  
 
Thus in understanding corruption it is important to take into account how the existing 
rules operate. Rules define how individuals can interact with each other, provide a 
means for the settlement of conflict, and generally place constraints on individual 
behavior, as well as that of the group and collectivity. Effective rules allow 
individuals to pursue their private ends in such a way that they do not infringe on the 
ability of others to do the same. Given an existing set of rules, corruption can be 
viewed as opportunistic behavior on the part of individuals or groups (Mbaku 1996). 
Rules do not in themselves preclude the possibility or even likelihood of serious 
forms of corruption, however, the absence of such regulations, as is the case in the 
majority of African countries, creates the ideal conditions for corruption and conflict 
of interest - or more importantly perceptions of corruption and conflict of interest 
which in turn eat away at the very fabric of public trust and confidence in democratic 
self-government. 
 
As such one of the very first steps in preventing corruption in government must be to 
determine the legitimate scope of acceptable behavior for members of the 
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government. This may be problematic due to lack of consensus (ICAC 1993); 
however there are certain guidelines in relation to certain principles of public life 
which can be followed, such as those promoted by the Nolan Committee (1996) and 
upheld in the South African constitution. In public service occupations, professional 
ethics have been described as the values underpinning impartiality, objectivity, 
integrity, efficiency, effectiveness and discipline of public servants when acting in the 
public interest in general and when exercising discretionary powers in particular 
(Olowu 1993). The failure to observe ethical obligations by members of the public 
service has not only affected the efficiency levels of the service, but even more 
seriously has brought the public service into discredit with the public losing faith in 
their governments. 
 
4.4.4 Democratic Consolidation and Social Empowerment 
 
The final explanatory model to be considered in this chapter is that of political 
scientist, Michael Johnston. According to Johnston (1999) the underlying difficulties 
of democratic consolidation manifest themselves in varying syndromes of corruption 
with differing implications on how to tackle the problem, i.e. the absence or presence 
of degrees of corruption in a particular society reflects deeper challenges caused by 
imbalances between economic and political forces. As such it is important to unpack 
the relationships between political and economic liberalization in countries, such as 
South Africa, struggling to consolidate democracy. Analyzing a country’s corruption 
phenomena can also therefore assist in understanding its deeper democratic 
consolidation challenges. 
 
For Johnston, the economic and political challenges of consolidation require careful 
attention to two central issues namely institutions and participation - notions which 
are essential in defining major syndromes of corruption. Where democracy and 
growth do support each other, their vitality and synergy rests on participation, in the 
form of open yet structured competition within the economic and political arenas, and 
institutionalized boundaries and paths of access between them. Thus building a lasting 
balance between openness and autonomy of institutions and between opportunities for 
political and economic participation is the key to success. Within institutions it is 
important to maintain the balance between openness and autonomy. Institutions must 
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have some degree of autonomy (for instance elected and appointed officials need to 
carry out their work in an authoritative way), but paths of access must also be open 
enough to maintain the accessibility of officials. If these paths do not exist, they will 
be created corruptly. 
 
When it comes to participation there needs to be a balance between political and 
economic opportunities. Where institutional and participation imbalances are 
pronounced, there is the potential for corruption that will reflect in its stakes and 
patterns of influence, the particular imbalances of a given society. Huntington (1968) 
argues that where economic opportunities are relatively plentiful and political 
opportunities are scarce, corruption may occur as people try and buy their way into 
political power; and where political opportunities are plentiful and economic 
advantage more difficult, people are more likely to use their political power to enrich 
themselves. Thus economic and social development must take place in a rough 
balance, or else growing strength in either sector will foster more corruption in the 
other (Johnston 1997). Huntington’s injunction is a reminder that if economic growth 
is not accompanied by wider political access and opportunities we may simply be 
trading one mechanism of corruption for another. 
 
Corruption disrupts competitive participation within, and weakens the institutional 
links and boundaries between the political and economic arenas. For example weak 
political institutions and poorly institutionalized markets enable a variety of illicit 
connections to flourish. 
 
Johnston’s model is important in that it identifies several different syndromes of 
corruption reflecting underlying imbalances in political and economic participation 
and in the accessibility and autonomy of institutions. For example, corruption in the 
worst-off countries may be a qualitatively different problem from cases found in 
established market democracies and suggest the need to understand the patterns, 
origins and consequences to be found in high corruption societies. Anti-corruption 
efforts should therefore aim not just at detecting, discouraging and punishing 
particular kinds of corrupt practice but also at addressing the deeper imbalances that 
gives rise to a particular corruption syndrome.  
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Over and beyond a focus on the institutional reforms in both the market and the state 
in order to control corruption, Johnston focuses on the importance of “social 
empowerment” - expanding the range of political and economic resources and 
alternatives open to ordinary citizens – as an essential part of any attack on systemic 
corruption (Johnston 1998). This is particularly important in cases where the populace 
does not consider political institutions legitimate and corruption is systemic.  
 
Where government is broadly legitimate, civil liberties, systems of accountability, 
property and contract rights, and the rule of law are credible, responses to corruption 
occur through institutional reform. Here, familiar and well-tested options include 
addressing operational problems through improved controls over discretion and 
resources; more transparent procedures; strengthening of internal and external 
accountability systems; improved recruitment, compensation, training and retraining 
for officials and creating channels of appeal for client. Institutional reforms to tackle 
corruption have a good track record in those nations where government is generally 
legitimate and effective and corruption is a problem with limited scope and many 
foes.  
 
While institutional reforms enhancing transparency and accountability in state and 
economic institutions are indispensable parts of any anti-corruption strategy, they also 
need a long-term social foundation, particularly where corruption is systemic. This 
can be addressed through social empowerment – which entails strengthening civil 
society in order to enhance its political and economic vitality; providing more orderly 
paths of access and rules of interaction between state and society and balancing 
economic and political opportunities. Social empowerment involves the judicious co-
ordination of a variety of familiar development and anti-corruption policies and will 
provide necessary support for institutional reforms, weaken the combinations of 
monopoly, discretion and lack of accountability that make for systemic corruption and 
help institutional reform by linking it to lasting interests contending in active political 
and social processes (Johnston 1998). 
 
A number of countries have reduced corruption historically through development of 
civil society and enhanced political and economic competition; changes which, while 
not planned or coordinated as reforms per se, incorporate some of the elements of 
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social empowerment. Johnston’s hope is to identify a general strategy for building 
solid social foundations for institutional reform and for strengthening forces and 
processes that can sustain reductions in corruption over the long term. His conception 
of corruption informs his approach: “Looked at one way corruption is a problem of 
official ethics and public dealings; but viewed another way it is a function of the 
opportunities and alternatives people have in life. While institutional reforms focus – 
rightly – upon the opportunities and alternatives open to officials, it makes equal 
sense to consider those available to citizens, both as they affect their vulnerability to 
corruption and as they shape possible opportunities for responding to it” (Johnston 
1998:88). 
 
Johnston’s appeal to social empowerment comes from contrasting developed and 
developing countries struggling to address corruption. In advanced societies where 
economic and political vitality and a strong civil society can often be taken for 
granted the importance of social foundations for institutional reform can easily be 
overlooked, whereas in developing and transitional countries, by contrast, the 
indifferent record of reformed institutions (particularly those of liberal democracy and 
market economics) in many places give citizens little reason to trust them or to use 
them to defend themselves. The major institutions of the state and the economy must 
win broad-based legitimacy and support. As such “it will not do simply to propose 
democracy and market economics as solutions to systemic corruption.” Rather for 
serious cases of corruption, “reform from the bottom upwards, opening up political 
and economic alternatives and bringing excluded segments of society into an active 
mainstream, is an essential counterpart to increased official transparency and 
institutional change” (Johnston 1998:89). 
 
Social empowerment is a complex, long-term anti-corruption strategy and is in no 
way a substitute for reforms at the organizational, personnel and administrative levels; 
indeed social empowerment and “macro-level” policies must work together as over 
time social empowerment can help sustain reform, both within institutions and at the 
level of day to day economic and political activity. Where social empowerment is 
effective, institutional reforms and the official rules of decision-making and 
administration can converge with social values and thus grow in legitimacy and 
effectiveness. 
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Johnston’s work thus highlights the important role of civil society of balancing the 
state in corruption reform efforts, but notes that the cultivation of civil society is not a 
substitute for institution building and that the two must work together. “Without a 
strong civil society to energize them, even a full set of formally-democratic 
institutions will not produce accountability…. Where civil society is weak…vital 
social support for limits on corruption is lost” (Johnston 1998:94). 
 
The balance notion also applies within the economic and political sectors: a diverse 
economy is likely to have fewer bottlenecks that can be exploited in a monopolistic 
fashion, while the more competition and non-violent conflict within a political 
system, the better it will be able to provide political checks upon corruption in the 
middle to long term and the more difficult it will be to contrive and exploit political or 
bureaucratic monopolies over access, influence and distribution (Johnston 1998:96). 
He suggests the widening of political and economic opportunities within society is an 
important aspect of the struggle against systemic corruption and a way to 
institutionalize reform over the long run. The economic and political strands are 
intertwined: broad-based growth is likely to strengthen civil society and social 
interaction, which in turn is a necessary (if not sufficient) step towards greater 
political competition: such competition, to the extent that it weakens corrupt 
monopolies, is likely to aid further (and broad-based) economic development and so 
on.  
 
Social empowerment is not just liberalization. Instead it is based at the level of 
everyday life and focuses among the range of options and resources open to ordinary 
citizens. Moreover it involves a substantial component of institutionalization; in civil 
society as interaction fosters stronger social norms and in the state-society 
relationship, as open paths of access between state and society bring about a balance 
between both while boundaries between public and private resources, processes and 
interests are made clearer and more legitimate. Norms and standards are prerequisites 
for institutional reform. Sustainable reductions in corruption are possible; but direct 
attacks upon it as an institutional problem, require a sound social foundation if they 
are to succeed, and if they are to be sustained over the long term (Johnston 1998:100). 
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That concludes our survey of various theoretical interpretations of corruption (and 
how best to control it). Each one of these theories can arguably be seen to add 
something of real value to our grasp of what is at stake in corrupt practices. 
Klitgaard’s “corruption equation” supports our findings in the first part of the chapter 
about the likelihood of greater corruption being coupled with a transition to a less 
state-directed economy. In such a transition individual discretion is greater, but the 
state still has various monopolies and in the absence of adequate accountability 
procedures, these are likely to lead to corrupt practices. This point is not far from that 
made by Rose-Ackerman who points to the state-market relationship as stimulating 
corrupt practices. Mbaku highlights the way in which incentives are largely 
determined by the set of rules governing institutions. Johnston’s analysis is for our 
purposes the most pertinent, focusing as it does on both the institutional and citizen 
empowerment angles. 
 
The applicability of the above theoretical models of anti-corruption controls will 
feature in Chapters Five and Six that sketch the context of corruption in pre- and post 
Apartheid South Africa and anti-corruption reforms that have been taken by the new 
regime.  As background to the South African case study, the rest of this chapter will 
briefly summarize what has happened in anti-corruption efforts in the international 
context. 
 
4.5 International Anti-Corruption Reform Efforts 
 
Corruption is an international problem that requires international solutions. Since the 
mid 90s, international organizations including the United Nations, the World Bank, 
the OECD, the Council of Europe and a number of other inter-governmental 
organizations and NGOs such as Transparency International have embarked on 
various anti-corruption initiatives, informed by a “good governance” institutional 
reform agenda. Two main areas around which international organizations reform 
efforts have been concentrated include the criminalization of bribery and corruption; 
and institutional reforms and capacity building. To some extent extraterritorial, 
international restraints can substitute for limitations on the ability of national 
institutions to enforce rules and international agreements are thus a mechanism for 
strengthening commitments not anchored by any domestic institution, serving as a 
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short-term substitute while these institutions are being built up. Whilst the sovereignty 
of national governments to initiate their own reform efforts is respected, there are 
certain issues where international co-operation is required and interventions should 
not be seen as compromising sovereignty.  
 
Most efforts of international organizations are directed at the criminalization of 
corruption for only to the extent to which bribery is punishable as a crime can the full 
government machinery be mobilized to fight it. Making international corruption a 
crime requires changing laws or adopting new ones as well as mechanisms to enforce 
them. Key to international co-operation is mutual assistance treaties in terms of 
extradition as well as the exchange and sharing of information about corruption 
fighting techniques and legislation. The United Nations through the Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch in Vienna has made efforts to co-ordinate the elaboration 
of materials to assist nations in developing anti-corruption reforms, including the 
development of a manual to combat corruption. In 2003 the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption was signed in Merida, Mexico. 
 
In 1977 the United States led way with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act making 
it a criminal offence for US companies to bribe foreign officials. The aim of the 
legislation was to create a level playing field and secure good governance by 
operating an internationally binding convention that would ensure that multinational 
companies such as Unilever and General Electric for example, were bound by the 
same rules when operating around the world. Such reforms indicate that the bulk of 
responsibility for corruption has gradually been shifting from the shoulders of the 
recipients (public officials or heads of state) onto those of the suppliers (the 
companies). 
 
In 1994 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Recommendation urged both developed and developing nations to “take effective 
measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in 
connection with international business transactions.” In the interest of attaining 
consistent standards of criminal legislation in this field, member states were urged to 
review their statutes to ensure that they effectively prohibit, in conformity with 
jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, all aspects of both the giving and the 
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taking of bribes including promises and solicitation of bribes.  Each government was 
required to take concrete and meaningful steps to vigorously enforce legislation in 
this area, especially towards ending large-scale extortion and bribery involving 
politicians and senior officials. In November 1997 OECD member states which 
include twenty-nine countries covering 70% of the world’s goods and services, met in 
Paris to conclude an anti-corruption convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This convention was 
eventually ratified in 1999. There is however, much work to be done and skepticism 
to be overcome, before the necessary legislative frameworks and legal sanctions are 
fully in place.  
 
Organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Millennium 
Challenge Corporation have in recent years been using their financial leverage to 
encourage anti-corruption efforts in recipient countries based on the following 
reasons: corruption negates development and thus the fight against corruption is the 
key to reducing poverty. The World Bank argues that the principal way to reduce 
corruption is to encourage deeper and more thorough economic liberalisation and 
deregulation in borrowers, although reforming and strengthening public institutions is 
also regarded as important (World Bank 1997).  
 
Thus whilst in the past lending decisions were based strictly on economic criteria, 
now financial assistance could be suspended or delayed on account of poor 
governance. It has been put clearly to clients that if there is any sign of corruption the 
project concerned will be suspended. In 1997 the IMF cut off a $220 million loan to 
Kenya because of the refusal of the Kenyan authorities to clean up pervasive bribery 
and self-enrichment and the fact that the anti-corruption measures the government 
was taking “fall short of meeting the clearly expressed concerns of IMF members”. 
By taking such action the ire of a number of member states was invoked. For instance 
China accused the bank of infringing on the sovereignty of member states and warned 
it not to exceed its mandate. Several Fund and Bank members expressed reservations 
about the extent to which controlling corruption should be used as a condition for 
receiving aid from the multilateral financial institutions.  
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The Bank clearly relies on the neoclassical economic analysis of corruption 
articulated by Klitgaard canvassed earlier in this chapter. Accordingly, corruption 
principally occurs where officials are in a monopoly position (and can extract 
economic rents or unofficial additional income) have large discretion in their actions, 
and little accountability. The Bank therefore argues that an effective anti-corruption 
strategy should encourage the reduction of rents (by means of greater economic 
liberalisation and deregulation), channel and reduce discretion (through public sector 
reform and institutional strengthening) and increase accountability (by building up 
institutions such as accountancy units in government and by encouraging the growth 
of a more vibrant, questioning civil society) (Riley 1998:147).  
 
Cynics argue that the corruption issue is just another means for the Bank to secure its 
real goal, namely greater structural adjustment programmes that have been stymied by 
political pressure, and that it is less enthusiastic about strengthening public 
institutions and increasing public education and awareness of the issue (Riley 
1998:138). Structural adjustment programmes emphasise deregulation of the economy 
and greater reliance on the markets for the allocation of resources, reductions in the 
size of the public sector and the elimination of controls on international trade (Mbaku 
1996:123). 
 
One of the most comprehensive models to emerge in this recent debate on anti-
corruption reforms is the National Integrity System approach developed by 
Transparency International, a non-profit organization with 90 autonomous chapters 
around the world. Set up in 1993 by former World Bank employees originally to 
counter corruption in international business, Transparency International encourages 
governments to establish and implement effective laws, policies and anti-corruption 
programs to enhance public transparency and accountability in international business 
and public procurement. In an attempt to promote a holistic anti-corruption strategy 
consisting of measures aimed broadly at increasing transparency and strengthening 
public accountability, the National Integrity Pillars approach includes assessments of 
political will; administrative reforms (including code of ethics; administrative 
practices; disclosure of gifts/assets; privatization; procurement); watchdog agencies 
(such as anti-corruption commission; ombudsman; auditor-general); parliament; 
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judiciary; public awareness and role of civil society; media and the private sector 
(Pope 1996).  
 
A more recent model is the Global Integrity Index developed by the Washington DC 
based international NGO, Global Integrity. This builds on the National Integrity 
Systems approach, taking it a step further by quantifying the strength and weakness of 
national integrity systems.  
 
4.5.1 The Global Integrity Index 
 
The Global Integrity Index is an attempt to capture and quantify the array of anti-
corruption institutions, policies and practices that have emerged over the last decade 
as being important in the fight against corruption. It draws on the work of several 
international bodies and is by far the most comprehensive governance assessment tool 
to have been developed, with a specific focus on anti-corruption reforms, taking into 
account the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access on these mechanisms 
(Camerer 2006).  
 
What “added value” does Global Integrity bring to already existing models? 
Transparency International is a case in point, focusing on in-depth country studies to 
provide policy makers with qualitative information on the systems and practices that 
scholars of anti-corruption cite as key to preventing abuses of power (of which 
corruption is one type). These qualitative studies, while they lay useful groundwork 
for diagnostic and policy reform, also become quickly outdated and fail to capture the 
dynamics of political reform as it unfolds over time. Even more seriously, these 
studies do not take on the methodologically fraught but crucial task of attempting to 
organize and quantify information about anticorruption mechanisms and practices 
gathered by expert local observers on the ground in the various countries under 
examination. To take on that key task is the mission of Global Integrity's Index.  
 
The Integrity Index assesses what might be called "the positive flipside" of 
corruption: that is, the public integrity systems that citizens can count on (and in some 
cases, directly employ) to help keep their public officials honest, and to hold them 
accountable should they go astray. The Index is therefore based on the assumption 
 72 
that the greater the presence of such public integrity systems, the less likely 
corruption is to be prevalent.  
 
Based on referenced, peer-reviewed expert assessments, the Index rests upon integrity 
indicators chosen after a comprehensive examination of the academic literature on 
anticorruption. (The list of 292 also includes governance indicators that are 
considered universally applicable and necessary if abuses of power are to be 
prevented in a given polity.) These indicators, in turn, capture three dimensions 
relevant to preventing corruption and other abuses of power:  
1. The existence of public integrity mechanisms, including laws and institutions, 
that promote public accountability and limit corruption;  
2. The effectiveness of these mechanisms;  
3. The access that citizens have to the information they need in order to hold 
public officials accountable.  
 
The Index does not measure corruption itself. Instead, the Index maps what might be 
thought of as the public integrity "topography" of a given country, revealing both its 
peaks and valleys when it comes to checking or preventing the abuse of power. From 
the table below we can see that the Global Integrity Index includes six categories and 
23 sub-categories that are considered as important to include in any comprehensive 
attempt to put in place accountability systems that will prevent abuses of power (i.e. 
corruption) and promote public integrity. The Index scorecard conveys information 
about the particular strengths and weaknesses in the country's institutionalized public 
integrity "architecture."  
 
The various dimensions making up the index represent what Diamond (2004) calls "a 
comprehensive system of intersecting accountability mechanisms." The rationale 
behind including each of these institutions, such as an access to information act, or 
legislature, into an index that assesses the existence and effectiveness of anti-
corruption mechanisms, is obvious. It should be noted that there is significant overlap 
with the democratic governance literature and that in many respects fighting 
corruption through an approach that promotes public integrity and accountability 
mechanisms, is a similar exercise to a good governance approach that emphasizes the 
quality of democratic institutions.  
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The Global Integrity Index: Categories and Sub-Categories 
 
Category I Civil Society, Public Information and Media 
I-1 Civil Society Organizations 
I-2 Media 
I-3 Public Access to Information 
Category II Elections 
II-1 Voting & Citizen Participation 
II-2 Election Integrity 
II-3 Political Financing 
Category III Government Accountability 
III-1 Executive Accountability 
III-2 Legislative Accountability 
III-3 Judicial Accountability 
III-4 Budget Processes 
Category IV Administration and Civil Service 
IV-1 Civil Service Regulations 
IV-2 Whistle-blowing Measures 
IV-3 Procurement 
IV-4 Privatization 
Category V Oversight and Regulation 
V-1 National Ombudsman 
V-2 Supreme Audit Institution 
V-3 Taxes and Customs 
V-4 Financial Sector Regulation 
V-5 Business Licensing and Regulation 
Category VI Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 
VI-1 Anti-Corruption Law 
VI-2 Anti-Corruption Agency 
VI-3 Rule of Law 
VI-4 Law Enforcement 
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4.6 The Effectiveness of Specialized Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
The Global Integrity approach is justified to the extent that anti-corruption agencies 
are in fact effective. What evidence is there to support the importance of these 
specialized prevention, investigation and prosecution techniques? 
There are, it is clear, numerous successful examples of such entities - Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Botswana, New South Wales (Australia) to name a few - however, 
warning signals have been sounded from some quarters. A tough independent anti-
corruption agency is a potent tool and whilst it represents credible long-term 
commitment to combating corruption there should also be checks on its ability to be 
misused for political ends. In the wrong hands anti-corruption legislation can be 
abused. An anti-corruption commission reporting to an autocratic ruler could be used 
as an instrument of repression, as appears the case in some developing countries 
where they have been used as instruments of partisan politics. 
 
In principle however, the creation of such bodies is essential although the 
effectiveness of bodies that report exclusively to a Head of State or government 
should be viewed with caution. The independence of any such a commission is 
potentially under threat and therefore needs to be headed by a person of 
unquestionable integrity, be fully independent of executive intervention, conferred 
with investigative power, and accessible to all (Chalker 1997). They should also be 
underpinned by an adequate system of prosecution, an open and independent judiciary 
and most importantly if they are to retain their credibility, the resources necessary to 
conduct their work in a proper fashion. 
 
Establishing independent anti-corruption bodies is a significant and symbolic sign by 
governments that corruption is not tolerated and that significant steps to eradicate it 
will be taken. Importantly, these institutions must be independent of government but 
subject to the rule of law or it risks becoming a force of repression in its own right. 
Such bodies may also have the advantage of protecting the honest politician or public 
official in that they tend to discourage the making of baseless accusations of 
corruption since those making such allegations will be aware that there is an effective 
body which may well investigate the allegation and authoritatively and publicly 
pronounce it baseless or even malicious (ICAC 1993). 
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The effectiveness of specialized anti-corruption agencies very much depends on:  
• committed political backing at the highest levels of government; 
• political and operational independence to investigate even the highest levels of 
government; 
• adequate powers of access to documentation and to question witnesses; 
• leadership of the highest integrity 
• sufficient staff and resources with specific knowledge and skills;  
• special legislative powers;  
• high level information sharing and co-ordination; and  
• operational independence.  
 
4.7 General Principles to Evaluate Anti-Corruption Reforms 
 
Finally, we need to comment on general principles used to evaluate anti-corruption 
reforms. Any such evaluation will need to look at a range of factors, including 
sufficient resources and political will. Comparative experience of anti-corruption 
‘clean-ups’ within previously authoritarian systems suggests that to be effective they 
need to rank high on the national political agenda and the political leadership must be 
“committed” to doing what has to be done to implement these programs. A nation that 
is serious about fighting corruption may need to establish new institutions or 
strengthen existing ones to specifically carry out some functions in the anti-corruption 
mandate.  
 
However, anti-corruption institutions, regulations and laws are ineffectual without the 
political impetus as well as the social will to make them effective (Harris-White and 
White 1996). Besides acknowledging the existence of corruption, where political will 
is lacking, the existence of several institutions to control corruption may be of no 
consequence if such institutions lack independence, critical resources, public visibility 
and respect (Olowu 1993). For an anti-corruption campaign to be successful it also 
needs to be reviewed on a continual basis and the successes and failures need to be 
evaluated and updated in order to address any unforeseen problems that may occur. 
Evaluation is thus a critical part of any strategy or plan. 
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Transparency International (1996) argues that a serious and concerted reform effort 
against corruption would need to include the following elements: 
• a clear commitment by political leaders to combat corruption wherever it 
occurs and to submit themselves to scrutiny 
• primary emphasis on the prevention of future corruption and on changing 
systems 
• the adoption of comprehensive anti-corruption legislation implemented by 
agencies of manifest integrity 
• the identification of those government activities most prone to corruption and 
a review of both substantive and administrative procedures 
• a program to ensure that salaries of civil servants and political leaders 
adequately reflect the responsibilities of their posts and are comparable to 
those in the private sector 
• a study of legal and administrative remedies to be sure that they provide 
adequate deterrence 
• the creation of partnerships between government and civil society 
• efforts to make corruption a “high risk” and “low profit” undertaking. 
 
Anti-corruption reform efforts can be derailed in a number of ways including limits of 
powers at the top (where an incoming administration may wish to tackle corruption 
effectively but inherits a corrupt bureaucracy that impedes efforts for change); the 
absence of commitment; overly ambitious promises leading to unrealizable and 
unachievable expectations and a loss of confidence; reforms that are piecemeal and 
uncoordinated so that no one “owns” them and no-one is committed to see that the 
reforms are implemented and kept up to date; reforms that rely too much on the law 
or too much on enforcement; reforms that overlook those at the top and only focus on 
the small fry; the failure to establish institutional mechanisms that will outlive the 
leaders of the reforms; and the failure of government to draw civil society and the 
private sector into the reform process (Transparency International 1996). 
 
Regarding the involvement of key stakeholders, initiatives for reform can come from 
actors other than principals. An example would be the involvement of the judiciary in 
Italy, the role of social movements and for example in Bangladesh and Brazil, NGOs 
which have in recent years contributed to the downfall of corrupt political 
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establishments. The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption’s 
ability to involve key stakeholders, serves to increase both accountability and 
credibility of corruption reform efforts (Galtung 1998:112). The issue of political will 
to address corruption is expanded upon in Chapter Twelve. 
 
4.8  Conclusion 
 
This concludes our survey of theoretical approaches to corruption and also 
methodologies to assess the effectiveness of reform efforts. In conclusion it needs to 
be stressed that there is no blueprint for controlling corruption. While the context for 
corruption control is global, solutions are required to be local and homegrown to have 
legitimacy. Culture and history are both very important to bear in mind when 
designing strategies. Strategies need to be tailored to the local environment and the 
specific rules and incentive structures on the ground. Case studies are a particularly 
useful way to discern the interplay between formal institutional structures and 
informal political cultures that may operate to influence the effective functioning of 
institutions and the rules of the game. For this reason, the general insights gained in 
this summary of theories of corruption and indeed the whole of Part One of our study, 
should be moderated by the particular case study that occupies the remainder of the 
thesis.  
 
There are no quick fixes for corruption and corruption is part of a broader politics of 
power and enrichment, The key issues in trying to maintain public integrity and 
reduce corruption are often the exceptional political and managerial commitment 
necessary to promote reform, as well as issues relating to the sequencing and timing 
of the reform efforts, its details and sustainability. The key issues in assessing anti-
corruption strategies are clearly cost, impact, effectiveness and sustainability, whilst 
also taking into account the relative political and financial strengths of those involved 
in corruption (Riley 1998). Credibility and feasibility are two qualitative ingredients 
to lasting and serious reform efforts. Credibility presupposes sound incentives and a 
high degree of moral integrity (Schedler 1995). Feasibility is based on a certain 
degree of viability within the legal, economic, political and cultural realm (Galtung 
1998:115). A law which cannot be enforced, however impressive it might first seem, 
will neither be credible nor for that matter feasible. 
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A focus on institutional mechanisms, though crucial, will not be sufficient to turn the 
tide on endemic corruption. Also, building national integrity systems is a longer-term 
objective that may raise short-term expectations but not be fulfilled and lead to public 
frustration. Efforts to promote good governance may prove ineffective if they are not 
conceived, planned and implemented in a wide, systemic and multi-dimensional 
perspective. Corruption cannot be effectively attacked in isolation from other 
problems - it is a symptom of problems at the intersection of the public and the 
private sectors and needs to be combated through a multi-pronged strategy. Good 
governance reforms to control corruption need to include preventive, administrative, 
investigative and legislative measures. These should be a top priority of government 
policies and be planned, monitored and where appropriate implemented by a 
specialised body. Essentially, the public determines the level of corruption it will 
tolerate. Public resentment towards corruption that manifests itself in a variety of 
ways is thus the key to the success of reform initiatives. What is ultimately needed is 
a change in the attitudes and behaviour of the public for unethical conduct in 
government is largely shaped and conditioned by such behaviour in society. 
 
The following chapter focuses on the nature and extent of corruption in South Africa 
as well as the efforts at anti-corruption reforms since 1994. These efforts are then 
tested in Part Three and Four against a specific case study, namely that of the arms 
deal. In this way, theory and practice are brought together. 
 79 
PART TWO: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Chapter Five: The Nature and Extent of Corruption in South Africa 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
What do we know about the nature and extent of corruption in South Africa? How 
much corruption is there? Is it worse now than it was under apartheid? Relative to 
other problems, how important is corruption as a problem to citizens? What empirical 
data do we have to answer these questions?  
 
The common perception - which a number of public opinion surveys confirm – is that 
corruption in South Africa is neither a new nor a declining phenomenon. What is clear 
is that public tolerance for corruption is however, declining as local and international 
expectations for clean government grow. To understand the context of anti-corruption 
reform initiatives underway in democratic South Africa, this chapter attempts to 
contextualize what is known about the nature and extent of corruption in South 
Africa, both pre ’94 and post-apartheid.  
 
A recent report, Apartheid Grand Corruption, attempts to document and describe 
instances of corruption that took place during apartheid, particularly during the period 
1976 – 1994. The report argues that the legacy of such a corrupt system “did not 
disappear into the night in 1994, when the white flag was lowered, and a new South 
African banner hoisted”, but that it had entrenched itself to such an extent that it 
would inevitably serve to corrupt the new order. As such “the years before and after 
1994 cannot simply be neatly compartmentalized” (Van Vuuren 2006).  
In 2003 the Country Corruption Assessment Report, undertaken as part of the United 
Nations Global Program Against Corruption for the first time tried to establish 
baseline data on what is known about corruption in South Africa. The Executive 
Summary notes while “all actors would like to know how much corruption there is 
and whether it has increased or decreased relative to the past... to answer this simple 
and legitimate question is not easy. In fact, it is impossible to provide a 
comprehensive and complete answer to this simple question since it depends on a 
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number of factors.” The report then lists a number of these factors that any 
comprehensive assessment should consider, including: what is corruption (definition: 
legal, operational, perception); which corruption is to be looked at (type); 
measurement and frequency (how often); who is involved (actors); available 
knowledge about corruption (sources); public tolerance levels (cultural context); 
purpose of looking at corruption (recording, tracking, evaluation, change-inducement) 
etc. 
The bottom line is that we do not know how much corruption there is in South Africa. 
Survey instruments give us some indication, mainly of citizen’s perceptions and in 
some cases actual experiences. Media reports of corruption also point to areas of 
prevalence, such as in former homelands, in particular departments, such as police or 
welfare, but there is no accurate or single indicator that can wholly be relied on to 
inform us of how much corruption there is. This has largely to do with the nature of 
corruption as a phenomenon and the difficulties with its measurement.  
In this chapter some of the challenges inherent in measuring corruption are discussed 
before briefly examining the research instruments that have been developed 
internationally to assess and measure its nature and extent. Empirical research data 
that has emerged on corruption in South Africa since 1994 is integrated into the 
discussion that deals with manifestation of corruption domestically. 
5.2 Challenges to Measuring Corruption 
How does one measure corruption? This is a question that continues to vex social 
scientists. In a methodological essay, entitled “What cannot be analyzed in statistical 
terms” corruption is cited as the classic example of an observable phenomenon that is 
not quantifiable since “there cannot be statistics on a phenomenon which by its very 
nature is concealed” (Galtung 2001). Corruption does not lend itself readily to 
measurement as it tends to be hidden from view.  
 
If corruption is a crime, surely one can look to criminal justice statistics to tell one 
how much corruption there is? Another approach has been to look at the number of 
public officials convicted for the abuse of public office (Goel and Nelson 1998). 
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However, conviction rates are often not an adequate indicator for the actual incidence 
of corruption but rather reflect the quality of the judiciary. If corruption is not only a 
crime but also manifests itself as ethical transgressions in the public sector through 
“conflict of interest” or “nepotism”, surely departmental data on this type of 
malfeasance and maladministration can give some clues as to the extent of the 
problem? Unfortunately data held by relevant state agencies on corruption-related 
cases is difficult to come by. According to the Country Corruption Assessment Report 
2003: 
“There are no consolidated statistics of corruption incidents or of the internal 
or external legal (civil, criminal and administrative) responses to such 
incidents. The statistics, which do exist, are ambiguous, because corruption 
incidents are often classified as fraud or theft in order to facilitate prosecution. 
Furthermore, there is also no central database of cases which would allow 
Government to learn from incidents in order to understand corruption better 
and to be able to design preventive strategies.”  
 
Certain agencies such as the Public Service Commission have started to collect more 
detailed information on corruption and related offences. Designing systems to capture 
information on corruption has been one of the main focus areas of the public service 
anti-corruption strategy, discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.3 Types of Anti-Corruption Measures 
 
Nevertheless, and despite the difficulties of measuring corruption, in recent years the 
“corruption eruption” of the last decade has produced a range of empirical attempts, 
comparative and contextual, mainly based on perceptions and opinion surveys, using 
various indicators, in an attempt to gauge the nature and extent of the phenomenon. 
This has been spurred in part by anti-corruption reformers believing that what you can 
measure, you can manage.  
 
As Galtung (2001), one time head of research at Transparency International notes, 
“The question is no longer whether corruption can be measured or analysed 
empirically. The questions are: How? With what level of accuracy? And to what 
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effect?” Not all approaches are equally robust and the research challenge is to 
combine specific qualitative and quantitative indicators so as to assess continually the 
quality of public and private institutions and the effectiveness of reforms (Galtung 
2001). This is an approach that has been followed by the Global Integrity Index, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
This next section briefly outlines the range of research tools available to assess the 
extent of perceived and actual corruption. 
 
5.3.1 Composite Indices 
 
The most well known, if not controversial international corruption measure, is the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled annually by Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org), an international anti-corruption NGO with headquarters in 
Berlin. The CPI, as a composite index, is essentially a “poll of polls”, aggregating 
perception data on levels of corruption from a number of sources. Well-informed 
people (such as business executives, risk analysts and the public) are asked their 
perceptions of the extent of corruption - defined by Transparency International as “the 
misuse of public power for private benefit” - in particular countries. The extent of 
corruption reflects the frequency of corrupt payments, the value of bribes paid and the 
resulting obstacle imposed on business. Countries are ranked according to a ten-point 
scale where 10 stands for a less corrupt country and zero equals a more corrupt 
country. Since 1995 South Africa has been included in the CPI ranking.  
 
A similar composite index compiled by Dani Kaufmann and his team at the World 
Bank Institute using mostly qualitative data generated by a range of organizations 
(commercial risk-rating agencies, multi-lateral organizations, think-tanks and NGOs) 
to measure governance, referred to in the introductory chapter as 1) the process by 
which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored and replaced; 2) the 
capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement 
and enforce sound policies and regulations; and 3) the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido 2001). The wide variety of cross-country indicators 
 83 
shed light on the various dimensions of governance, and corruption as a particularly 
relevant indicator of weak governance.  
 
Although aggregate indicators are relatively imprecise – since many countries’ likely 
ranges of governance overlap – these aggregate indicators can identify the group of 
countries facing major governance challenges, and be used to assess systematically 
the benefits of good governance for a large sample of countries. There have been a 
number of critiques of these type of composite indices (Arndt and Oman 2006). In 
particular, perception indices raise concerns about biases. Also, the aggregate nature 
of the data tells us little about the relationship between corruption and individual 
agents, such as firms or service providers. Conceptually macro-level determinants 
cannot satisfactorily explain the intra-country variations of country; firms and service 
providers facing similar institutions and policies may still end up paying or 
demanding different amounts in bribes (Reinikka & Svensson 2003). In recent years 
the World Bank has supported moves towards more objective and actionable 
indicators. 
 
5.3.2 Surveys 
 
Different types of surveys, for example public opinion, victimization, expert panel, 
service delivery, public expenditure tracking and business surveys, are additional 
ways to understand the nature and extent of corruption as a phenomenon. 
 
Public opinion surveys are widely used to determine citizen’s perceptions of the 
levels of corruption, its seriousness as a public policy issue and its location amongst 
different civil servants, departments, and arenas of governance. They are useful in 
measuring trends if the same set of questions is asked over time. These opinion 
surveys are usually household surveys drawn to make up a stratified nationally 
representative sample. Public opinion surveys collect information by selecting 
respondents to answer a set of standard questions posed by trained interviewers either 
over the phone or on site through a face-to-face interview process.  
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In South Africa, since 1996 the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the 
Afrobarometer, as well the Human Sciences Research Council and Markinor have 
conducted a number of public opinion surveys nationally and regionally on citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption and governance. Some of these findings will be referred to 
in the following sections. 
 
Victimization surveys have been developed as a tool to measure the “dark figure” of 
unreported crime, mainly in order to address the shortcomings of police statistics. 
Fraud and corruption as non-violent individual crimes have been included in these 
surveys: Fraud is defined as consumer fraud, or someone cheating another person by 
selling him or her something inferior, or delivering a service of inferior quality, or 
selling the wrong quantity and corruption involves public officials such as a traffic or 
police officer or customs official accepting payment for services. Responses to the 
questions about both fraud and corruption provide a measure of its actual incidence, 
rather than purely perceived levels of corruption as captured in other surveys.  
 
Although not representative, expert panel surveys give some indications of what 
beliefs are held by so-called “experts” as to the nature of corruption in a particular 
society. Examples include the Expert Panel Survey on corruption conducted by the 
Institute for Security Studies in late 2000 based on a similar survey conducted by 
Huberts who used attendees of international anti-corruption conferences as his sample 
group of “experts”. In the ISS study over 150 individuals who had attended one or 
more of the three major anti-corruption conferences held in South Africa during 
November 1998 - April 1999 constituted the “experts”. Survey questions in this first 
ever dedicated corruption survey dealt with respondents’ perceptions of the levels of 
corruption in general, in different spheres of government, in a variety of government 
departments, in several sectors and compared to previous regimes and future levels of 
corruption. Personal experiences of corruption by respondents, how it occurred and 
the seriousness of corruption as a phenomenon were also covered as well as an 
evaluation of anti-corruption measures (Camerer 2001). 
 
Public administration surveys, sometimes called service delivery surveys are a way of 
collecting quantitative data about the quality of public services. Using questionnaires 
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administered to public officials who interact with the public and service users 
respectively, they gather information on how well a service or department is working. 
Survey questions consider the following issues; organizational climate, causes and 
nature of corruption in the public service, prevalence and experience of corrupt 
practices, efficacy of departmental efforts in combating corruption including 
loopholes, the impact of corruption on service delivery and recording of best practices 
to fight corruption. 
 
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) track the flow of resources through a 
legally defined institutional framework where funds pass through several layers of 
government bureaucracy on the way to service facilities which are actually charged 
with the responsibility of exercising the spending. On a sample survey basis, PETS 
can determine how much of the originally allocated resources reach each level of the 
institutional framework and is therefore a method for locating and quantifying 
political and bureaucratic capture, leakage of funds, and problems in the deployment 
of human and in-kind resources such as staff, textbooks and drugs. A typical PETS of 
frontline providers (schools and clinics and their staff) and local governments 
(politicians and public officials) is complemented by central government financial 
data (Reinikka & Svensson 2003). 
 
Using appropriate survey methods and interview techniques business managers are 
often willing to discuss corruption. A number of survey instruments interview 
business people in firms to elicit their views on a range of issues. For example, the 
Transparency International Bribe Payer’s Index ranks leading exporting countries in 
terms of the degree to which their corporations are perceived to be paying bribes 
abroad. Survey questions relate mostly to perceptions about the propensity of foreign 
multi-national corporations and local businesses to engage in bribery and corruption. 
 
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) asks specific information about the 
share of bribes paid in businesses’ total revenue, and the percentage bribe “cut” in 
public procurement projects. An initiative of the World Bank Group, the WBES asks 
local entrepreneurs and managers about their dealings with the institutions, policies 
and practices of the local business environment i.e. the enabling environment for 
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private enterprise, in 80 countries around the world. One of the main purposes of the 
survey is to measure the quality of governance and public services, including the 
extent of corruption. Using local research companies, the data is collected through 
personal interviews at senior managerial level in enterprises with globally over 10 000 
enterprises responding to the core questionnaire (World Bank 2001). 
 
In South Africa, business surveys have been conducted as part of the UN Global 
Programme Against Corruption. These look at obstacles to doing business in South 
Africa, experience of criminal victimisation by businesses including fraud, bribery 
and corruption and perceptions about the propensity of foreign multi-national 
corporations and local businesses to engage in bribery and corruption.  
 
5.3.3 Media Reports 
Since the majority of citizens, including policy makers, report that they receive their 
information about corruption from the media, analyzing the type of information about 
corruption that is available within the public domain is one step towards developing a 
profile of corruption. These type of studies do not report on actual levels of corruption 
but rather present an overview of how the print media reports on corruption. 
A comprehensive media study of corruption undertaken in South Africa by Landman 
and Associates intended to clarify what makes a case of corruption appear in the print 
media, why have these cases, and not others, come to light, and what makes a case of 
corruption newsworthy (Landman 2002). This study is being repeated in 2007, 
analyzing press coverage of corruption during 2006. 
There are some South African peculiarities when it comes to researching corruption. 
Lodge points out that until 1994 it was quite difficult to undertake systematic research 
on corruption and that this academic neglect was primarily attributable to the major 
locations of corruption: those who were its main victims were poor and 
disenfranchised, often the subjects of homeland administrations (Lodge 2001). He 
notes how since 1994 much more information has become available on government, 
business as well as the greater role of the media and opposition parties in exposing 
 87 
instances of corruption. It is possible today, he notes, given the extent of information 
on corruption, “to make some informed guesses about its severity.” 
The next section - which draws heavily on Lodge - examines corruption in South 
Africa both before and after 1994 and integrates findings and analysis of corruption 
from some of the empirical tools described above. 
 
5.4 Corruption in Apartheid South Africa 
 
This section draws largely on Lodge’s analysis that explains the nature of corruption 
under Apartheid, and underlines the overlap in its manifestations in contemporary 
South Africa. 
 
Many argue that contemporary corruption in democratic South Africa is largely a 
carry-over from the previous administration – part of the “legacy of apartheid” – a 
view for which it will be seen there is some justification. As far back as 1989, the 
authors of Uprooting poverty in South Africa predicted that corruption would loom 
large in a new South Africa. Noting the high degree of corruption bred by apartheid, 
they argued that even were a democratic government to gain power, the old clerks 
would not necessarily learn new habits (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). Their prediction 
was uncannily accurate. Since the transition, corruption has burgeoned in both the 
public and private sectors; besides violent crime, it is probably the factor that most 
preoccupies those who express concern about South Africa's future. 
 
Corruption appeared to flourish in pre-democratic South Africa’s public 
administration. Of course, it was arguable that a bureaucracy which was deliberately 
used as an instrument to foster the social and economic fortunes of one ethnically 
defined group had at least a form of transactive corruption built into its functioning 
from the inception of National Party rule (Lodge 2002a:406). Apartheid South Africa, 
like many authoritarian regimes, was intrinsically corrupt. Defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”, corruption is essentially what characterized the 
inherently unjust apartheid state where, a minority group, purely on the basis of skin 
color, benefited unduly from public goods, at the expense of their fellow citizens.   
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From 1948 ethnic favoritism characterized all civil servant recruitment and 
promotions. This behavior may not have been motivated by personal enrichment 
among individual officials, at least not in the 50s and 60s. It has also been argued that 
the extent of patronage and favoritism under the previous regime where it existed was 
mainly geared to the strategic goals of Afrikaner nationalism and did not, at least at 
their inception, involve personal gain and individualized relationships (Seegers 1993). 
Some maintain that controls in the apartheid civil service were so stringent that 
bureaucrats had “little opportunity to use patronage and the conferment of financial 
benefits for the achievement of improper objectives” (Cloete 1978:74). It appears 
financial irregularities as documented in Auditor General reports during this time 
period, were modest (Lodge 2002b:130). 
 
There is however, plenty of evidence that the National Party became more and more 
degenerate and that by the 1980s, “political corruption”  - defined by Levine as ‘the 
unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends’ - was quite 
common in both central government and homeland administrations, especially 
entrenched in those domains of government activity deemed “strategic” - information, 
defence, homeland development - and which expended secret funds (Lodge 
2002a:408). 
 
An example of this came to light in the Information Scandal, also known as 
“Muldergate”, that implicated South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster and Dr 
Connie Mulder (Minister of Information) in plans to use government resources to 
fight a propaganda war for the Apartheid Government. In 1973 John Vorster had 
agreed to Mulder's plan to shift about R64 million from the secret defence budget to 
undertake a series of propaganda projects, including buying the loyalty of The Citizen, 
the only major English language newspaper that was favorable to the National Party. 
The scandal involved senior officials using public funds to pay for holidays for their 
families, tax free supplementary allowances, properties registered in their own names 
as well as R13m loaned to Mr Louis Luyt to start up a newspaper, most of which was 
subsequently invested in one of Luyt’s companies (Lodge 2002a:407). A commission 
of inquiry concluded in mid-1979 that Vorster "knew everything" about the 
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corruption and had tolerated it. He resigned from the presidency in disgrace and while 
this scandal may have forced a change in political leadership, it did not end the large-
scale private appropriation of public funds (Lodge 2002b:131). 
 
In the 1980s the Department of Defence spent four billion rand a year on secret 
projects, involving covert operations and arms procurement – an area that supplied 
ample opportunities for individuals to profit. With democracy came the ending of 
secret budgets to the military and a sharp reduction in defense expenditure. However, 
the resumption of ambitious procurement projects since 1994 opened up new lucrative 
prospects for dishonest officials and well-connected politicians (Lodge 2002b:133). 
Allegations of corruption in the Strategic Defense Procurement Package aka the 
“arms deal” are a case in point that will be studied in some detail. 
 
Arguably the grand myth of so-called “independent” homelands and their associated 
cronies is also responsible for the malaise of maladministration and culture of 
impunity the new government inherited. There are some occurrences in the final years 
of apartheid, for example 200 officials within the Lebowa Department of Justice 
receiving a 100% pay increase in April 1993, that may have represented behavior 
motivated by the realization among officials that their powers and privileges were 
shortly to be curtailed. However reports suggest that graft was entrenched and routine 
in the highest echelons of homeland administrations through much of their history 
(Lodge 2002a: 409). 
 
The system of apartheid was corrosive and corrupting, tainting both those who 
engaged with it as well as struggled against it. In order to survive so long, it had to be. 
In apartheid South Africa successive governments utilised the institution of corruption 
very effectively to co-opt and compromise opposition members, weaken the effects of 
international sanctions against the regime, derive revenue for covert operations 
against opponents of the regime throughout the Southern African region, and 
purchase support for the regime around the world (Ellis 1996). 
 
Bribes were paid, on both sides, creating a climate of suspicion and extortion. Rule of 
law was absent and the power of the state was abused on a regular basis. The 
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apartheid era provided an environment structurally conducive to corruption where 
systems and habits shrouded in secrecy resulted in a lack of transparency and 
accountability that was advantageous to criminality. Lodge (2002a:410) has argued 
that in certain respects the apartheid state must have been structurally susceptible to 
corruption by its officials as denial of any democratic sanctions to most of its subjects 
substantially reduced its accountability. The more powerless people were, the more 
officials abused their position (Lodge 2002a:410). Increasing secrecy of its 
undertakings especially from the 1960s enhanced the arbitrary discretion enjoyed by 
bureaucrats. 
 
The pervasive and almost obsessive secrecy that came to surround the way in which 
people operated in society was infectious, spreading from the public into the private 
sector. The breakdown of business ethics in the private sector is partly blamed on the 
“sanctions-busting mentality” which encouraged ingenious but often immoral means 
to gain access to world markets - attempts which were praised rather than repudiated - 
in this way encouraging a culture where unethical means for doing business were 
valued (Rossouw 1996).  
 
From 1984 onwards the opposition in parliament argued that the Strategic Fuel Fund, 
established twenty years earlier to stockpile oil, was a vehicle for private enrichment 
of officials (Lodge 2002b:131). Towards the end of 2000, Mineral and Energy Affairs 
Minister Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (later South Africa’s first female deputy 
president) would uncover a secret deal between the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF), the 
state-owned oil company, and two private oil trading companies that had effectively 
sold off the country's oil trading operations without the government's knowledge. 
Several officials involved admitted they had accepted bribes and the following month, 
Mlambo-Ngcuka fired the entire SFF board and repudiated the deal (Global Integrity 
2004). This incident is worth noting for two reasons: 1) it points to ongoing 
corruption in the oil industry in South Africa that subsequent revelations, “Oilgate”, 
not dealt with in my thesis, would confirm and 2) it shows the action taken by 
Mlambo-Ngcuka as a government minister against corruption, an action that was later 
recollected in the public mind when she was appointed to deputy president, following 
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the dismissal of her predecessor, Jacob Zuma on allegations of corruption relating to 
the arms deal. 
 
Corruption and dishonesty thus became a feature of South African political and 
economic life. This background combined with increasing opportunities, a “get rich 
quick” social ethos, and along with the observation of large-scale malpractice 
escaping unpunished through institutions not pursuing prosecution or upholding the 
rule of law, undoubtedly contributed to the expansion of violent criminal and 
insidious corrupt activities that plague South Africa today (Camerer 1996b).  
 
5.4.1 The Legacy of the Homelands 
 
It has been argued that before 1994 the incidence of routine corruption probably 
varied in accordance with the degree of rightlessness of those seeking benefits or 
services from officials (Lodge 2002a:409). As such it was black people consigned to 
homelands who were most likely to experience and partake in corruption. For white 
South Africans, familiarity with corruption was probably exceptional rather than 
normal and most often arose from encounters from municipal rather than national 
state agencies (Lodge 2002b:133). 
 
Homeland governments exhibited grand corruption undertaken by both black and 
white officials that was both endemic and chronic, examples being kickbacks for 
work never done, contracts secured by family members, projects never built, services 
undelivered (Lodge 2002b:132). Specific irregularities in homelands that amounted to 
several hundred millions in fraud and nepotism through the 1980s included fictitious 
tenders and contracts awarded to spouses, receipt of gifts by officials and payments to 
firms for imaginary works and materials (Bauer 2002; Lodge 2002a:408). In the 
homelands, bribery was prolific in pension departments, magistrate’s courts and the 
management of public housing, where thousands were evicted to make room for 
tenants who had paid bribes to councillors of officials (Lodge 2002b:132). Sadly, this 
sounds very familiar to latter day South Africa. 
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Routine petty corruption – where members of the public undertake dishonest 
transactions with public officials in order to obtain services of one kind or another, or 
to avoid sanction – was rife (Lodge 2002b:132). We know from Klitgaard (1988) that 
corruption often occurs where there is limited accountability and a monopoly over the 
allocation of goods accompanied by the discretion of officials. This may partly 
explain that the more a civil service bureaucracy interacts with the public, the more 
opportunity it has to be dishonest in its dealings and engage in rent-seeking behavior.  
It has been argued that what may appear to be an increased incidence of abuse in 
these departments (social welfare, safety and security and justice) is probably mainly 
a consequence of more stringent controls and more open disclosure and might fairly 
be perceived as the lingering effects of the old system (Lodge 1998).  
 
The integration of former homeland administrations into South Africa and the 
difference in current experiences of corruption in different provinces (the Eastern 
Cape, bad, vs. Western Cape, not so bad; a case in point) points to the degrees of 
financial mismanagement in certain areas in the past.  The transfer of homeland civil 
servants into regional governments may thus have helped to infect the new system 
with the patrimonial habits of Bantustan officialdom (Lodge 2002b:130). Corruption 
in the new South Africa appears to be more concentrated in provincial and local 
governments, rather than central government. Seven of the nine regional governments 
had to absorb homeland administrations into their bureaucracies, with what appears to 
be the least corrupt provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape, those that have not 
incorporated former homelands (Lodge 2002a:412). It also appears that certain 
departments as well as provinces seem to be more susceptible to corruption than 
others, the worst culprit being the ministries of social welfare, safety and security, and 
justice. This is certainly a legacy that has continued.  
 
In the case of welfare, problems are mainly attributable to the legacy of apartheid in 
the pre-1994 era. The department inherited 14 separate bureaucracies with no 
centralized record for the 2.8 million entitlements to pension payments and many of 
the supposed recipients were dead (Lodge 2002a:416). From 1994, newspaper reports 
of corruption are mostly a reflection of behavioural patterns inherited from the old 
regime. Pension fraud is a case in point. Between 1994 – 1998 up to R5 Billion was 
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paid out to “ghosts” and double claimants (Lodge 2002b:133). Cleaning up corruption 
in the arena of social grants has been an ongoing priority for the new government.  
 
Media reports note how in this regard the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has 
contributed to R146m in savings, R1,624b in prevention of loss and R8,9 million in 
recoveries of funds, where a key contributor to the achievements had been the 
national investigation into the illegal receipt of Social Grants and Pensions by 
government officials. Here the SIU removed 14262 files from the Social Grant and 
Pension System, 571 prosecutions were instituted and 333 convictions secured. The 
annual value of these irregularly obtained pensions were R50 264 0001.  
 
In two years Social Development Minister Zola Swekiya’s anti-fraud and anti-
corruption strategy has led to almost 300 000 of South Africa’s now 11.5m social 
grants being cancelled including 12000 fraudulently claimed by government officials. 
More than 2000 public servants have agreed to repay grant money and 750 people 
have been successfully prosecuted. The antifraud crackdown has delivered a budget 
saving of R1,2bn in the latest fiscal year2. So far nearly 22 000 public servants have 
been found to be drawing pensions, child support or disability grants “irregularly” 
with nearly 14 000 being considered for prosecution. Already 650 government 
employees have been convicted. Another 2000 more cases are to come to court this 
year. In addition to the criminal action about 3000 public servants have agreed to 
repay the grant money that they stole. The next step is to find private citizens who are 
drawing social grants fraudulently. Already the investigation has identified more than 
400 000 individuals. The question can be asked: if this is the scale of corruption in 
just one department, what about the others? Even though much of the corruption is 
petty in money terms, involving officials taking R50 bribes or stealing a bit of grant 
money, it is widespread. And as Business Day argues, the cost is not only in money 
but more profoundly in the erosion of public trust in the public service3. 
 
                                                 
1 Susan Segar, “Corruption unit saves SA millions”, Natal Witness. 10 March 2006.  
2 Editorial, “House not in order”, Business Day, 19 June 2006.  
3 Editorial, “Stopping the rot, ”Business Day. 31 July 2006.  
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From a number of case studies in the literature, it does appear that some departments 
of the central government in the past had a history of routinized elite or grand 
corruption. For example, suppliers of prison food and textbooks for black school, 
where contracts for these were awarded in a nepotistic fashion. The Department of 
Development Aid that channeled development funding to homelands became a fertile 
fiefdom for dishonest bureaucrats (Lodge 2002b:131).  
 
Bureaucratic inflation in which the civil service establishment tripled in size during 
the Apartheid era was achieved through a process of politically motivated and 
ethnically exclusive recruitment. As the number of unskilled and under-qualified 
clerical level entrants increased so did the exodus of competent managers, just as the 
tasks of public administration were becoming increasingly complicated. Public 
service pay scales deteriorated as its professionalism declined. There can be no 
question that the erosion of capacity caused by this expansion facilitated and 
encouraged rent-seeking decades before apartheid’s end appeared inevitable to its 
administrators (Lodge 2002a:401).  
 
Given this heritage, it would be surprising if there were no significant political 
corruption in contemporary democratic South Africa. Authoritarian and secretive 
governments are especially susceptible to bureaucratic venality and South Africa is no 
exception. Given that much of the administration is still run by the same people it 
would be reasonable to expect the continuation of a certain amount of corruption 
(Lodge 2002a:411). Many people think corruption is increasing. The evidence 
suggests that old habits and predispositions may well sustain plenty of the existing 
administrative corruption for one of the consequences of a “pacted” transition is that 
much of the ancien regime remains in place (Lodge 2002a: 421).  
 
New policies require a new range of managerial skills and quite different control 
systems, presenting new challenges for financial regulation (Lodge 2002a:412). Large 
numbers of senior officials have been replaced and there have been fresh recruits to 
senior management levels of political appointments. This, together with 
demoralisation and fears about job insecurity amongst officials employed by the pre 
’94 administration may have helped to evade weak professional ethics (Lodge 2002a: 
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412). As an MEC in the Northern Province conceded, “We have never ruled before. 
We never even knew what a tender board was before we came to power” (Lodge 
2002a:419). 
 
5.4.2 New Opportunities for Corruption 
 
It is difficult to know for certain whether present levels represent a substantial 
expansion of public dishonesty: Corruption was very extensive in the old regime and 
some of the conditions which allowed it to flourish have disappeared: homeland 
administrations have been incorporated and all government activities are now subject 
to well-publicised audits and the extension of the franchise should in theory make 
government more accountable (Lodge 2002a: 419). While democratization and 
unification closed down some opportunities for official spoilation other potential 
avenues for corrupt accumulation have opened up. In this regard the government’s 
policy towards black business empowerment surely makes it vulnerable to charges of 
favoritism (Lodge 2002b: 130).  
 
Not all misbehaviour can be explained away as the prevalence of bad old habits. New 
kinds of government obligations have supplied fresh opportunities for corruption. For 
example, the building of and subsidies for low cost housing and free school meals 
where R143m was unaccounted for in primary school feeding schemes and in the 
province of Mpumalanga, and R1,3m allocated for low cost housing was used to 
renovate ‘state houses”. The Motheo Housing scandal where an unknown company 
run by a close friend of then Housing Minister, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, was 
awarded a R198 million contract to build more than 10,000 houses. The Director 
General in the Ministry of Housing, Billy Cobbett blew the whistle on the deal and 
was fired. The commission of inquiry looking into the matter found no proof of 
outright corruption, but criticized the Mpumalanga government's irresponsible 
handling of housing funds (Global Integrity 2004).  
 
In 2006 the Auditor General, Shauket Fakie, reported to parliament’s Scopa that 
provincial housing departments approved R323m of “irregular” housing subsidies 
between 1995 and 2004, involving more than 50 000 beneficiaries. Fakie found more 
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than 7000 government employees receiving housing subsidies to which they were not 
entitled. Large sums were also paid out to dead people, children and those who 
already owned houses. The AG’s report pointed to severe deficiencies in the housing 
subsidy system, which was able neither to detect nor control irregularities4.  
 
Lodge notes that there are many new and disturbing sources of stimulation for corrupt 
behavior in democratic South Africa. These include non-meritocratic processes of 
recruitment and promotion inherent in certain kinds of affirmative action; tendering 
principles that favor small businessmen and community agencies which require more 
efficient administration if they are to be handled honestly; an increasing shortage of 
skilled manpower in the public service especially in its financial control systems 
which could lead to inefficiencies and delays (such as those experienced by the Home 
Affairs department in supplying I.D. documents and visas) that supply incentives for 
bribery; new sources of public finance, including foreign development aid; an 
ambitious expansion of citizen entitlements to public resources, such as school 
feeding and housing subsidy schemes; contracting out of traditional functions of 
government to private ventures with political connections; rapid social mobility of 
much of the new political leadership from situations of material hardship; and 
financing of political parties in a more competitive funding environment (Lodge 
2002b:133).  
 
When it comes to international development aid funding two cases are illustrative: In 
February 1995, struggle hero Allan Boesak was forced to withdraw from an 
ambassadorial posting as democratic South Africa’s first ambassador to the United 
Nations. Danida, the Danish Aid agency, had first raised the alarm that Boesak’s 
Foundation for Peace and Justice had misappropriated aid money designated for the 
victims of apartheid. An amount of R726 000 earmarked for the production of 12 
videocassettes on voter education and democracy was instead spent on building a 
studio for his wife. Four year later, in 1999, the court found Boesak guilty on charges 
of theft of R259 000 and fraud involving R1.3m and sentenced him to six years in 
prison. Rather than representing South Africa in Geneva, Boesak eventually served a 
year of a three-year jail term in Goodwood prison before being released on parole. 
                                                 
4 Editorial, “House not in order”, Business Day, 19 June 2006. 
 97 
President Mbeki eventually pardoned him in 2005, although has refused to apologize 
for any wrongdoing. 
 
With regards to the aids play Sarafina Two, Health Minister at the time, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma (now the Minister of Foreign Affairs) was accused of misleading 
Parliament about the use of European Union funds in the awarding of a contract of 
R14.2m to produce an AIDS-awareness musical, Sarafina Two. An Auditor General 
Report found that bidding procedures were violated and an inquiry by the Office of 
the Public Protector found donor money was allocated through improper tender and 
awarding procedures with a litany of irregularities. The EU ambassador to South 
Africa stressed categorically there had been no prior authorization and regarded the 
diversion of funds as a serious misuse of EU support. While no evidence or 
implication of the abuse of official position for personal gain was found, this was a 
clear case of diversion of aid in a manner bordering on mismanagement and a lack of 
both transparency and public parliamentary accountability. 
 
In terms of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), “apparent favoritism in public 
tendering in certain contexts might be very difficult to avoid given the small sizes and 
the overlapping character of the black political and business elites as well as the 
frequent and rapid movement of prominent personalities between them. Government 
determination to use the privatisation of parastatal companies or the contracting out of 
government programs as opportunities for black business empowerment helps to 
accentuate the dangers of cronyism (Lodge 2002a: 419).  
 
The next section looks at ways in which the government started to respond to the 
corruption issue, and arguably the data available on corruption started to feed into the 
policy agenda. 
 
 
5.5 Corruption on the Policy Agenda 
 
Policy responses to corruption are often premised on the seriousness with which it is 
regarded as a problem by decision makers with the power to exercise political will. 
This commitment manifests itself in resource allocation, but is also determined by 
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citizens who exercise political will by essentially deciding what levels of corruption 
they will tolerate in society. How seriously do citizens in South Africa regard 
corruption? Is it a pressing policy issue that government should address? In the 
greater scheme of things, how important is corruption as a national priority issue 
requiring focused attention and resources? 
 
National citizens surveys in South Africa have dealt with these questions in a number 
of ways by 1) asking citizens what they think the most important problems are 
confronting South Africa that government should address 2) asking them how 
seriously they regard corruption as an issue and 3) whether government is paying 
sufficient attention to the issue of corruption.  
 
In October 2001 Markinor’s October household survey asked citizens what their 
interpretation was of the seriousness of corruption in South Africa. Over 80% of 
respondents believe that South Africa has a lot of corruption and the majority (41.1%) 
believe it is one of the most serious problems facing the country. 39.1% of 
respondents believe that while South Africa has a lot of corruption, the country is 
confronted with other more serious problems. 14.5% of respondents believe South 
Africa does not experience a lot of corruption with 11.6% holding the view that 
despite this, it is one of the most serious problems the country is confronted with. 
2.9% believe corruption is not among the most serious problems facing South Africa 
and 5.2% did not know.  
 
The 2003 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, derived from a 
subset of 3 questions forming part of the Gallup International annual Voice of the 
People survey, asked a representative sample of South Africans how seriously they 
believed corruption affected different spheres of life, including personal and family, 
business environment, political life, cultures and values in society. The majority of 
South Africans believe corruption has a serious effect on all spheres of life as well as 
on the cultures and values in society. Interestingly corruption is seen to affect the 
business environment very significantly (68.1%) followed by political life (65.4%) 
and the cultures and value in society (63.3%). It is clear South Africans are not neutral 
on this issues but seriously believe corruption affects all spheres of life. 
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Since 1994 Idasa and Afrobarometer public opinion surveys have asked a 
representative sample of South Africans, "What are the most important problems 
facing this country that government ought to address?"  Results from a recent 
January-February 2006 survey indicate that corruption does not yet rate as one of the 
top five priorities for government action. Rather these include unemployment (63%), 
housing (28%), poverty (27%), HIV/Aids (25%) and crime (23%). 
 
Undeniably a serious issue that should be addressed by government, corruption as a 
problem mentioned by less than 20% of the sample (18%) is by no means the most 
important problem facing the country. However, since 1994 as an issue it has 
continued its ascent up the ladder. Referred to by less than 1 percent in the first survey 
following the 1994 election, almost one in five South Africans now see it as one of 
the most important problems in the country. Africans were less likely to mention 
crime (18%) or corruption (15%) than other respondents (Afrobarometer 2006).  
 
5.5.1 Perceptions of the Extent of Corruption 
 
How corrupt do citizens perceive the public sector in general to be? Is corruption 
perceived to be increasing or decreasing in South Africa? Where do citizens believe 
corruption occurs most within the public sector? Which types of officials are 
perceived as most venal, and which sectors and levels of government are most 
vulnerable? 
 
Idasa has repeatedly asked national representative samples as to whether they think 
there is more/increase in corruption in South Africa as opposed to less/decrease under 
the new democratic regime, or whether in fact things have stayed the same. The 1995 
survey revealed that the advent of full, inclusive, non-racial democracy did not appear 
to have improved people’s perceptions of government corruption. Only 24% felt that 
there had been any reduction in corruption from the former apartheid government. In 
fact 41% of the sample in 1996 felt that public corruption was increasing. An 
additional 25% felt there had been no change and 11% were unsure. By 1998, the 
position had improved very slightly if at all with 2% less, 39% saying the new 
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democratic government was more corrupt, but 28% still saying they saw no real 
difference. Thus in both surveys about two thirds could be said to see either no 
change, or an increase in corruption from apartheid to democracy.  
 
The Afrobarometer questions build on one of the most widely quoted sources of 
perception data on the extent of corruption in South Africa, namely surveys conducted 
by Idasa since 1995 where amongst a national representative sample of citizens in 
1995, 46% felt that “most” or “almost all” public officials in South Africa were 
engaged in corruption (17% said “almost all” and 29% said “most”). An additional 
38% said that “a few” officials engaged in it and only 6 % believed that “almost 
none” were engaged in corruption. 11% did not know or were unsure. It seems that 
from 1995 – 1998, perceptions of public sector corruption on average when looking at 
public officials was getting worse with 55% in 1998 compared with 46% in 1995 
believing public officials were corrupt. This improved in 2000 with 50% holding this 
opinion.  
 
Thus when viewed over time, between 1995 and 2000 around half of South Africans 
felt that “all” or “most” officials in national or local government, were involved in 
corruption. But these negative views dived precipitously in 2002 and remained at far 
lower levels in 2004 following highly visible prosecutions of top ANC officials such 
as Winnie Mandela-Madikezela and Tony Yengeni.  
 
Cynicism and perceptions of corruption in certain spheres of government appear to 
have increased sharply in 2006 from 2004. When asked: “How many of the following 
people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say?” just under half of all South Africans say that “all” or “most” of their 
elected local councillors and council officials are involved in corruption (45%).  This 
is over a 20 point increase from 2004 and explained by the myriad of allegations 
about irregularities in tenders and hiring in local councils across the country that 
appear to have wakened citizens’ cynicism about their local government. According 
to the 2006 Afrobarometer conducted in January and February 2006 almost half of 
South Africans (45%) believe that all or most of their elected local councilors and 
officials are involved in some form of corruption. Recent disclosures about suspected 
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tender scandals and contract irregularities had renewed cynicism and led to the sharp 
spike in perceptions that local government was corrupt5. 
 
About one third think the same about national government officials (36%) and one 
quarter from MPs (26%). Afrobarometer analysts argue that the recent reading for 
MPs is statistically unchanged since 2004 and suggests that Parliament’s “Travelgate” 
scandal – where one quarter of MPs were at one stage under investigation for having 
allegedly abused their travel vouchers – has not yet achieved much traction in the 
public consciousness. One in five now say “all” or “most” officials in the President’s 
office (22%) are corrupt, up four percentage points from the 18 percent measured in 
2004, and nine points from the 13 percent recorded in 2000.  
 
In explaining a resurgent perception of corruption in South Africa, both as a policy 
issue on the national agenda and in terms of prevalence, Mattes (2007) drawing on the 
Afrobarometer notes that in the late 1990s and early 2002, South Africa’s elite 
corruption busting units such as the Heath Commission and the National Directorate 
of Public Prosecutions investigated and successfully prosecuted a range of top level 
figures in the ruling ANC. Public perceptions of corruption as measured in the 2002 
and 2004 Afrobarometer surveys then fell rapidly from the high levels measured 
between 1995 and 2000. However, according to the Afrobarometer’s analysis the 
combined effect of the revelations from the trial of ANC confidante Schabir Shaik, 
the impending corruption trial of the former deputy president Jacob Zuma, and a 
myriad of allegations about irregularities in tenders and hiring in local councils appear 
to have reawakened South Africans’ cynicism about government corruption.  
 
It is important to place these perceptions of current day public sector corruption in the 
context of citizens’ perceptions of relative regime comparisons. The Afrobarometer 
(1999-2000) provides a measure of citizens’ perceptions on present day government 
corruptibility as compared to the previous regime.  In Zimbabwe, Malawi, South 
Africa and Zambia more people tend to think that the current regime is more 
vulnerable to corruption while in Namibia and Lesotho it is the opposite. 44% of 
                                                 
5 Anel Powel, “Voters losing faith in councils – study”, Cape Times, 16 June 2006.  
 102 
South African respondents in 2000 felt the government was more corrupt with 25% 
saying it was the same i.e. almost 70% of citizens believe that democratic South 
Africa is the same or more corrupt than the Apartheid regime. Compared to regional 
perceptions of perceptions of how citizens view those in public office, South Africa 
fares on average better than Zimbabwe, marginally worse off than Zambia and 
Malawi, and much worse that Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. Interestingly the 
advent of democracy and regime changes in many of these countries, including South 
Africa, has not positively impacted on perception of government corruption. 
 
In 2003 Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer asked citizens in 
47 countries, including South Africa, the following question: Do you expect the level 
of corruption to change in the next three years? South Africans are amongst the most 
pessimistic of the countries polled. A clear majority of Cameroonians, Georgians, 
Indians, Israelis, Dutch, Norwegians, South Africans and Turks expected corruption 
to increase in their countries. In South Africa almost 50% (49.8%) believed 
corruption would increase in the next three years, 13.5% that it would stay the same, 
30,1% that it would decrease either a little or a lot and 5.6% polled did not know. 
Having looked at findings from perception polls of corruption, what were citizens’ 
actual experiences of corruption in South Africa? 
 
5.5.2 The Actual Experience of Corruption 
 
It seems as if perceptions of crime and corruption are only tenuously linked to actual 
experience. While perceptions of corruption are quite high, actual experience is often 
much lower. We know that perceptions are worse than actual experience, and yet in 
order to tackle corruption comprehensively, we need to address perception too.  
 
How many people in South Africa have had a direct experience of bribery/corruption 
over the past few years? One way of finding out the extent of the corruption problem 
is to ask respondents whether they personally, someone in their family or someone 
whom they know, have been forced to pay a bribe, give a gift or perform some favour 
in order to get government welfare over a certain time period.  
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In 2001, as part of the UN country assessment, this question was asked to a 
representative sample of 3500 South Africans. Over 10% of respondents in the 
Markinor October 2001 survey, reported that in the past 12 months they had 
experienced corruption of one kind or another. However, more than 90% respondents 
had not in the past year experienced any type of bribery for a particular service of 
social good such as a job, pension, electricity or water. The area in which respondents 
did however experience official attempts at extracting rents were in the context of 
jobs (4.4%) followed by electricity and water (3.2%), ID document, passport, birth or 
death certificates etc. (3.2%) and then housing or land (2.6%), pension or welfare 
payment (2.3%), schooling (1.7%) and medical care (1%).  
 
The Afrobarometer, conducted in several SADC countries found that on average 4% 
of South African respondents had experienced corruption in a question phrased: Have 
you or someone you know been forced to pay a bribe, give a gift, or perform some 
favour in order to get various forms of government welfare in the past year?  This was 
less than citizens in Namibia (6%) and Zimbabwe (12%). 7% of the South Africans 
said that they had to pay a bribe, or do a favour in order to get electricity or water. In 
terms of housing or land, 4% of respondents had personally encountered government 
corruption. 2% of the South African respondents said that they had experienced 
corruption whilst trying to find employment. A similar proportion (2%) had 
encountered corruption while trying to get a government maintenance payment, 
pension payment, or loan.  
 
In 1998, the national victimisation survey conducted by Statistics South Africa 
amongst 4000 households found that whilst approximately 29% of individuals 
experienced at least one crime in the five-year period 1993—1997, of these, 6% of 
citizens reported an experience of fraud and 4% of corruption. When looked at over a 
one-year period, 1997 a similar pattern emerges: 15% of people experienced at least 
one individual crime over the year. Of all crimes, 3% experienced fraud and only 2% 
were victims of corruption by a public figure.  
Personal experience of corruption amongst South Africans, defined mainly as having 
to bribe a public official to perform a public duty, thus range between 2 – 10% of the 
population. However, a 2004 Institute for Security Studies survey found corruption 
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was the second most common crime after housebreaking in South Africa. The strains 
of corruption include money, favours and gifts. It was most evident in encounters with 
traffic officials where 100% of people questioned said they had paid bribes.  
 
Similar to the perceptions of the likelihood that certain levels of government, 
departments or types of public officials are more or less prone to corrupt practices, 
there are certain areas such as basic service provision of water and electricity, 
pensions and jobs where citizens are more vulnerable to unscrupulous public officials 
and likely to experience corruption. If corruption occurs where there is a monopoly 
over the allocation of goods (in this case limited social goods such as jobs) the data 
points to areas of intervention which in the case of basic services such as water and 
electricity may be administered by local government.  
 
5.5.3 Corruption in the Criminal Justice System 
 
Police corruption may have worsened since 1994 as a consequence perhaps of 
democratization and disloyalty to the new government. In 1998, 10 000 (out of 140 
000 police officers) were under investigation for charges of bribery, theft, fraud and 
involvement in crime syndicates. For instance the sale of cars from official depots of 
recovered stole vehicles and licensing rackets remained two particularly profitable 
fields of policy activity (Lodge 2002b:133).  
 
A total of 2300 cases of police corruption were reported in 1996. This figure almost 
tripled to an annual total of more than 6400 cases by 2000. The Anti-corruption unit 
was closed in 2002 and the official number of reported cases decreased drastically. By 
2003 an annual average of about 1200 case were being investigated. The SAPS 
annual report for 2004 said 347 police members were suspended as a result of 
“corrupt activities”.  
 
Surveys in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 by a range of different organizations (ICVS, 
UNECA, Markinor) consistently indicate the police as being the main institution of 
state citizens perceive as being corrupt. In 2006 the Afrobarometer survey, found that 
the highest levels of cynicism about corruption were directed at the South African 
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Police Services with one half (48%) of all South Africans think that most police are 
corrupt, up from 36% in 2004. Other corrupt public officials deemed to be corrupt 
were health workers (25%), tax officials (23%), judges and magistrates (22%), and 
teachers and school administrators (19%). The 2003 TI Global Corruption Barometer 
also asked respondents where they would focus their attention if they could eliminate 
corruption from a particular institution. South Africans see the police (23.8%) 
followed by political parties (21.1%) as the main areas for reform. Other important 
areas, which over 10% of respondents thought needed reform, included the education 
system (14.4%) and health/ medical services (11.3%).   
 
While not a new problem, the Department of Justice has seen an increase throughout 
the 1990s in incidences of docket losses and subsequent dismissal of charges against 
suspected criminals (Lodge 2002b:133). A 2005 Court Integrity project by the 
UNODC that interviewed 400 magistrates, prosecutors, lawyers and users of the court 
showed that 68% of magistrates experience problems of lost or misplaced court 
records; many felt that caused “serious problems in the criminal justice system”. 52% 
of all those interviewed said corruption existed in the justice system – one of their 
reasons for lack of confidence in the justice system. 7% of prosecutors and 11,7% of 
court personnel said they knew of bribes being paid to expedite cases and according 
to 60% of court personnel most of these bribes were paid during investigations. 15% 
said the bribes were paid before trial and another 15% knew of bribes being paid after 
trial6. 
 
Corruption in the criminal justice system has been a consistent focus of government’s 
anti-corruption efforts, reforms that are described in the following chapter.  
 
Since the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Hotline in September 2004, a 
total of 1390 alleged corruption cases and 1024 service delivery complaints relating to 
the Public Service have been referred to government departments for further 
investigations7. These and other anti-corruption initiatives will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
                                                 
6 Nashira Davids,  “UN says bribery rife in SA courts”, Sunday Times, 21 May 2006. 
7 Susan Segar, “Clampdown on Corruption”, Natal Witness, 9 February 2006.  
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5.6  Conclusion 
 
What is the nature of the apartheid inheritance when it comes to corruption? Did the 
new South Africa inherit a public administration that was endemically corrupt? Was 
corruption a parallel system or was it localized and isolated and confined to certain 
spheres? Was it primarily routine venality or something more grandiose? 
 
From the existing data we can draw some tentative conclusions about the perceived 
nature and extent of corruption in apartheid South Africa and today, even though 
investing in a dedicated monitoring tool - such as an annual survey of both 
experiences and perceptions - would be useful in being able to measure trends.  
 
From what we do know, from surveys and media analysis, corruption in democratic 
South Africa as in the past, is mainly petty and opportunistic, rather than systemic and 
grand. The arms deal case study however, reveals corruption of a grand sort, not 
picked up by survey data.  
 
Opportunities for corrupt practices appear to be situated in specific areas (such as 
welfare, criminal justice and housing) and at local government and municipal level 
where unethical and dishonest agents of the state with more opportunities for 
misconduct, and fewer safeguards may be more likely to abuse their office and 
powers and there is limited oversight. In the introduction to the HSRC’s State of the 
Nation: South Africa 2007 Southall points out that allegations of corruption often 
arise when there is incompetent management. This may be the case at local 
government level where capacity is stretched thin. The growing number of service 
delivery strikes blaming corrupt officials for conditions of poverty that exist thirteen 
years after democracy, is an important indicator of growing dissatisfaction with 
conspicuous consumption of councilors a trigger for public discontent. 
 
Whereas in the past under the apartheid state there was job reservation for whites, 
today the short-term middle class replacement and on the job affirmative action rather 
than investing in the human capacity over in the long term, has led to the “apparent 
systemization of corruption” within the public service (HSRC 2007). According to 
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Southall indicators that corruption is systemic is linked to the drive for representivity 
and the accompanying culture of entitlement that is linked in turn to the legacy of 
apartheid in terms of lack of formal education and skills training. 
   
With varying emphasis, South Africans believe the main causes of corruption in 
society and in government to be: a decline in morals and values; greed and a desire 
for self-enrichment; socio-economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment; 
institutional weaknesses, manifested in weak checks and balances and 
mismanagement within government and; the legacy of apartheid including challenges 
of transformation (Camerer 2001).  
 
These underlying causes suggest differentiated responses to intervening to control 
corruption.  Improving accountability systems and controls in public sector 
management as a strategy differs from influencing individual or societal morality to 
address a decline in moral values. It would appear that efforts aimed at moral 
regeneration, are a parallel strategy to “hard” interventions such as tightening up the 
legislative framework and improving the criminal justice system. In the following 
chapter (Chapter Six) we will discuss recent policy, legislative and institutional 
responses to creating a system of democratic accountability to effectively prevent 
abuses of power and promote public integrity.  
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Chapter Six: Anti-Corruption Reforms in Democratic South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter traces specific reforms put in place by the South African government 
since 1994 to address corruption and promote public sector accountability. This is 
mostly done chronologically although the debate around the rationalization of anti-
corruption agencies, crosses time periods. The chapter addresses the politics of anti-
corruption reforms , identifying factors that need to be taken into account if reforms 
are to be regarded as both credible and feasible. Key insights into and conclusions 
from the implications of these reforms and what they signify, are highlighted. 
 
6.2 The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reforms  
 
Anti-corruption reforms tend to receive enthusiastic support from both the public and 
the media. By taking this stance a government receives credit for its principled 
approach and also tends to receive credit when corruption is exposed, rather than 
being blamed for the corruption that existed there in the first place (ICAC 1993).  In 
many countries, new leaders have ridden to office on anti-corruption platforms, only 
to be later exposed as thoroughly corrupt in turn. As such it is vital that a citizenry, 
through the media and other civic bodies, demands a high ethical performance from 
its officials and that the political will is sustained to enforce policy measures designed 
to tackle the problem of corruption (Olowu 1993). 
 
Mbaku (1996) argues that in many African countries, incumbents do not seem to be 
genuinely interested in effective cleanup programmes because corruption represents 
an important source of revenue and a means through which incumbents can channel 
resources to supporters and to elites who use the threat of violence to extract rents. 
Some analysts have noted cynically that anti-corruption rhetoric has "... been a routine 
feature of politics, invariably less as a means to longer term reform than as a means to 
diffuse opposition to the incoming regime, placate external agencies and secure tenure 
on office" (Gillespie & Okruhlik 1991).  
 
Particular examples where political rhetoric around corruption control has replaced 
the real issue include countries like Nigeria where "... the preoccupation with panic 
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measures and the creation of ad hoc panels and tribunals to replace non-functioning 
legal institutions for ensuring public accountability have not been particularly helpful" 
(Oluwa 1987). Making an example of senior political figures in fighting corruption 
may set a good precedent, although the political difficulties in this cannot be 
overestimated. In addition, some African governments have resorted to scapegoats or 
have been overtly partisan in their official inquiries (Riley 1998). This is one of the 
critiques that has been leveled at the National Prosecuting Authority in South Africa 
in relation to its handling of the criminal investigation into the arms deal, in particular 
with regard to former deputy president Jacob Zuma. 
 
It is thus clear that efforts to fight corruption can be motivated primarily by political 
exigency rather than by genuine interest in the efficient functioning of the nation’s 
political and economic institutions. Examples include post-coup commissions of 
inquiry to discredit the ousted government and help incoming elites gain recognition 
and legitimacy; clean up programs to stay in power and continue to monopolize the 
supply of legislation and allocation of resources; and campaigns to direct attention 
away from existing problems and the government’s inability or unwillingness to 
provide effective solutions. According to Mbaku (1996), whether this is the case or 
not is determined by three factors: 1) the personal values of the head of state 2) 
challenges from a counter elite 3) popular discontent arising from socio-economic 
conditions. 
 
Political cunning and real determination is required to deal with the difficult challenge 
that entrenched corruption presents (Johnston 1997). Political choices have to be 
made both by leaderships and civil society organizations interested in public integrity. 
Efforts need to be made to identify the types of corruption and the structural 
conditions that may have produced the corruption (for example type of bureaucracy, 
formal rules, civil service salary levels) (Riley 1998).  
 
Riley (1998) argues that public integrity reforms must also be sustainable as well as 
politically feasible. Politicians have to recognise that they can take action without 
seriously damaging their own political prospects. In many African societies, they 
must be able to take the credit and avoid the blame if they themselves are not 
involved. Political determination is a crucial aspect of any public integrity strategy. 
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Without a strong commitment to reform and personal examples and commitments 
from political leadership, governmental statements of intent, attempted reforms and 
strategies remain cosmetic devices. African politicians could demonstrate their 
commitment to public integrity by dismissing corrupt ministers and announcing the 
reason for their dismissal, by restructuring law enforcement agencies to fight 
corruption, and by holding chief enforcement officers accountable for public integrity. 
It is possible to challenge vested interests. And scandal, as well as clearly illegal cases 
of corruption, can be used to initiate action (Levi & Nelken 1996).  
 
Should a government be serious in its reform efforts, choosing the type of anti-
corruption strategy to embark on includes a range of practical considerations over and 
beyond the political, such as where action should be taken and by whom. In the short-
term, the goal for developing countries ought to be finding the means to pursue the 
most effective and economical measures to control corruption. How this is arrived at 
depends on a number of factors, including the legacy of previous anti-corruption 
campaigns; the reaction of the population to anti-corruption inquiries; and the 
perceived impartiality of such inquiries (Findlay and Swart 1992). The approach to 
effective anti-corruption strategies thus requires planning, through assessment, a 
strategy that focuses on corrupt systems and not just corrupt individuals and effective 
implementation (Klitgaard 1997). If states are serious about fighting corruption they 
will require a detailed country-specific assessment of the costs of corruption. This 
must include an assessment of where corruption is likely to impose the greatest costs, 
including tax and customs revenues, business regulation, state sponsorship of 
infrastructure projects, institutional reform, political commitment and public 
involvement (Rose-Ackerman 1997).  
 
Short-term, sustainable and cost-effective measures that have impact need to consider 
the following: Is the focus of the reform effort on the office or officeholder? Is the 
focus on protecting state revenue (income) or on investigating evidence of criminal 
activity such as contract corruption (expenditure)? Should the focus of reforms be on 
visible punishment of wrongdoers (retribution) or on protecting state funds 
(restitution); and what should the vehicle of reform be, for instance an all-purpose 
anti-corruption agency, or a risk assessment of a department and the procedures most 
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vulnerable to corruption? African reformers in particular, need to think more about 
the politics and practicalities of reform efforts rather than relying upon the 
unpredictable, longer-term effects of economic and political change. Although 
downsizing the state and political liberalization are desirable goals in many African 
countries they are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of 
corruption. For short-term anti-corruption strategies to be more effective in African 
societies, more attention needs to be devoted to questions of timing and sequencing, 
the technical details of the proposed public integrity initiatives and their sustainability 
in very poor societies, and the exceptional political and managerial commitment, 
determination and courage necessary to promote, maintain and carry through such 
reforms (Riley 1998). 
 
Controlling or reducing corruption thus requires a long-term strategy. Greater thought 
needs to be given to the timing and sequencing of reform measures. As is well known 
reform efforts may actually generate new forms of corruption. What is required is real 
indigenous political commitment over time, as well as considerable ingenuity if such 
efforts are to make a significant impact on reducing corruption (Riley 1998:154). 
 
6.3 Anti-Corruption Reforms in Democratic South Africa1 
 
Parallel to and indeed largely informed by the public discourse both internationally 
and nationally on corruption, the South African government has taken various 
initiatives to formulate policies and strategies to tackle corruption within the public 
realm. Not only have substantial policy papers, strategies and new laws and 
regulations been enacted to promote good governance but also a number of dedicated 
institutional bodies with the capacity to fight corruption have been established within 
the criminal justice system. An example would be the Special Investigating Unit and 
the Directorate of Special Operations. Resolutions taken at two national anti-
corruption summits (April 1999 and March 2005) that have fed into the Public 
Service Anti-corruption Strategy, are considered part of the state’s dedicated efforts to 
actively confront corruption.  
 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1: Chronology of Anti-Corruption Reforms 
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Since 1997 when the corruption issue was placed firmly on the table - not least 
because of a number of high-profile scandals that dominated the local media (for 
example Sarafina, Motheo Housing) but also the impetus of the international 
community in this regard, culminating in the UN Convention Against Corruption - 
numerous policy statements, laws and institutions have been introduced in democratic 
South Africa to control corruption.  Over several years a comprehensive national anti-
corruption strategy has been developed through a conscious partnership approach 
involving all sectors of society.  
 
In many respects the anti-corruption reform policy process in democratic South Africa 
has been both systematic and sequenced and benefited from the global context that 
since the mid 90s strongly promoted good governance as the key to sustaining 
democratic reforms. Specific programs and policies have largely realized the three 
key policy objectives identified at the First National Anti-Corruption Summit in April 
19992. These objectives were: 
 
1: Combating Corruption: This included a review of anti-corruption 
legislation; establishing a whistleblower mechanism; enacting an access to 
information law; establishing special courts to adjudicate on corruption cases; 
establishing sectoral coordinating structures and a national coordinating 
structure (the National Anti-Corruption Forum) to coordinate, monitor and 
manage the national anti-corruption program. 
 
2: Preventing Corruption: This included efforts to blacklist individual 
businesses and organizations involved in corruption; establishing an anti-
corruption hotline; establishing sectoral hotlines; taking disciplinary action 
against corrupt persons; putting in place systems to ensure consistent 
monitoring and reporting on corruption; and promotion and implementation of 
sound ethical, financial and related management practices. 
 
3: Building Integrity and Raising Awareness: This included the promotion 
and pursuance of social research, analysis and advocacy to analyze the causes, 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 2 Benchmarking Anti-Corruption Reforms 
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effects and growth of corruption; enforcement of a code of conduct and 
disciplinary codes; inspiring youth, workers and employers towards 
intolerance for corruption; promotion of training and education in ethics; 
sustained media campaign to highlight aspects of the strategy. 
 
In 2006 the African Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) Country Self Assessment 
Report for South Africa noted the culmination of the government’s anti-corruption 
efforts in the 2002 adoption of a comprehensive Public Service Anti-Corruption 
Strategy, as a strategy that “has served as a blueprint for consolidating and reinforcing 
the anti-corruption legislative and regulatory framework as well as strengthening the 
institutions mandated to monitor, investigate and prosecute corruption.”  A further 
“corner stone” of South Africa’s anti-corruption effort, noted by the APRM report, is 
the development of key partnerships between the government, civil society and the 
private sector in fighting corruption. Examples of this partnership include the two 
National Anti-Corruption Summits (held in 1999 and 2005 and a third summit 
planned for November 2007) and the launch of the tri-partite National Anti-
Corruption Forum (www.nacf.org.za) in 2001.  
 
Additionally the APRM report (2006) regards anti-corruption legislative and 
regulatory measures adopted since 1994, as “strong and in keeping with international 
practices”. The range of anti-corruption laws include the Public Service Code of 
Conduct 1997; The Parliamentary Code of Ethics 1997; The Executive Members 
Ethics Act no 83 of 1998 and Codes of Ethics 2000; The Public Finance Management 
Act and Municipal Finance Management Act; The Promotion of Access to 
Information Act; The Protected Disclosures Act no 26 of 2000; The Financial 
Intelligence Center Act no 38 0f 2001 and finally The Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (No 12 of 2004).  
 
This “state of the art” Act focused on preventing and combating corruption came into 
force on 27th April 2004 – significantly on the 10th anniversary of South Africa’s 
transition to democracy – and is a particularly comprehensive law that spells out over 
twenty specific corruption offenses. It was crafted against the backdrop of the 
finalization of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and takes into 
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account other regional anti-corruption protocols such as those developed by the 
OECD, SADC and the African Union.  
 
In addition to the above specific laws South Africa’s range of specialized anti-
corruption agencies include the National Prosecuting Authority; Directorate of 
Special Operations; South African Police Services; The Special Investigating Unit; 
the Independent Complaints Directorate; the Public Protector; the Auditor General; 
the Public Service Commission and various Parliamentary Committees (APRM 
Report 2006). 
 
Indeed, South Africa’s anti-corruption arsenal, developed systematically since 1994, 
is impressive and the country appears to have in place, at least at the national level, 
many of the key institutions and laws cited in the good governance and anti-
corruption literature as being important to expose and prevent abuses of power.   
 
The laws and regulations listed are: The Public Service Code of Conduct 1997; The 
Parliamentary Code of Ethics 1997; The Executive Members Ethics Act no 83 of 
1998 and Codes of Ethics 2000; The Public Finance Management Act and Municipal 
Finance Management Act; The Promotion of Access to Information Act; The 
Protected Disclosures Act no 26 of 2000; The Financial Intelligence Center Act no 38 
0f 2001 and The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No 12 of 
2004). 
 
The report also lists South Africa’s range of specialized anti-corruption agencies 
including the National Prosecuting Authority; Directorate of Special Operations; 
South African Police Services; The Special Investigating Unit; the Independent 
Complaints Directorate; the Public Protector; the Auditor General; the Public Service 
Commission and various Parliamentary Committees.  
 
6.4 Establishing New “Rules of the Game” 
 
Emerging from its authoritarian past characterized by policies and systems that served 
a particular ethnic group and encouraged corrupt behavior, the new democratic state 
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effectively had to craft a whole new set of rules for governing including regulating the 
behavior of public servants and citizens according to a new set of norms.  
 
In May 1996 Parliament adopted The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
No 108 of 1996 that came into effect in February 1997. With this Act, the new rules 
underpinning a democratic South Africa were firmly entrenched. As the most 
important law framing the new state’s commitment to both promote public integrity 
and government accountability, certain parts of the Constitution are worth expanding 
upon.   
 
Chapter 1, Section 1 notes that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the following values:  
a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms.  
b. Non-racialism and non-sexism.  
c. Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.  
d. Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections and 
a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.  
The Constitution includes a Bill of Rights (Chapter Two) that binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. Guaranteeing a broad range of 
political, civil, economic, and cultural rights to all South Africans, including 
provisions on the administration of justice (chapter 8) the Constitution also establishes 
a number of key institutions to protect the public interest. In particular it establishes 
the constitutionally mandated role of the legislature in providing oversight over the 
executive. In this regard Section 55(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms - 
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it; and 
(b) to maintain oversight of- 
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation 
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of legislation; and 
(ii) any organ of state.’ 
This requires the National Assembly to do two things: hold organs of state in the 
national sphere accountable, and exercise general oversight over national executive 
authority and organs of state (Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau 1999). In this regard 
specific parliamentary committees such as the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (Scopa) and the Committee on Members Interests, also known as the Ethics 
Committee, play an important oversight role. 
In addition the Constitution establishes so called "Chapter 9 institutions" that support 
constitutional democracy. These include among others the Public Protector and the 
Auditor-General. Both of these institutions play a crucial role in the arms deal 
investigation that will be discussed in detail in parts three and four. 
"Chapter 9 institutions" - are established under the following governing principles: 
 
S 181(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their 
powers and perform their functions without fear, favor or prejudice.  
(3) Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist 
and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity 
and effectiveness of these institutions.  
(4) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of these 
institutions.  
(5) These institutions are accountable to the National Assembly, and must 
report on their activities and the performance of their functions to the 
Assembly at least once a year.  
With its significant majority in parliament following both the 1994 and 1999 election, 
ANC members in parliament would be challenged to play an effective oversight role 
over their own executive, as tasked by the Constitution. Allegations of corruption in 
the arms deal would highlight this tension between parliamentary oversight of the 
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executive branch. Was it indeed possible to be a loyal ANC member of parliament 
and also protect the public interest by fulfilling the oversight role of the public purse 
and the executive, as required by the constitution? This is something two reports to 
parliament would address in some detail. 
When it comes to the basic values and principles governing public administration in 
the new South Africa, Chapter 10 of the Constitution sets these out. These principles 
apply to administration in every sphere of government; organs of state; and public 
enterprises. 
195. (1) Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles:  
a. A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained. 
b. Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
Public administration must be development-oriented.  
c. Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without 
bias. People's needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making.  
d. Public administration must be accountable.  
e. Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information.  
f. Good human-resource management and career-development practices, 
to maximize human potential, must be cultivated.  
g. Public administration must be broadly representative of the South 
African people, with employment and personnel management practices 
based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the 
imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. The specific 
anti-corruption interventions introduced by the government, led by the 
Minister for Public Service and Administration, would be framed by 
these ground rules and values in place for administering public service 
and administration in democratic South Africa.  
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On 17 June 1997 the Code of Conduct for the Public Service became part of the 
regulations for every public servant and was the subject of an ethics promotional 
campaign by the Public Service Commission (Balia and Sangweni 1999). Outlined in 
Chapter M of the Public Service Regulations, it covers five particular areas of concern 
to public servants, namely their relationship with the legislature and executive; the 
public; fellow employees; performance of duty; personal conduct and private 
interests. 
6.5 A Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Ethics Committee 
Shortly after coming to power in April 1994, on 25th October a subcommittee of the 
Rules Committee of the National Assembly resolved to focus on ethics and in 
particular to “investigate and make recommendations on a code of conduct for 
members, including a register of gifts and register of members interests.” Chaired by 
Professor Kader Asmal the committee would produce a report that included a Code of 
Conduct with regard to financial interests of a limited group, namely persons entitled 
to be present and participate in the proceedings of parliament. Only much later would 
this code extend to the executive branch.  
 
On 21 May 1996, the “Code of Conduct in Regard to Financial Interests” was 
published and the introduction is noteworthy: “In order to achieve a political order in 
South Africa that is truly open, transparent and accountable, as is envisaged in the 
Constitution, it is essential that its elected leaders maintain the highest standards of 
propriety to ensure that their integrity and that of the political institutions in which 
they serve are beyond question.” It further notes that “In general, no person bound by 
this Code must place himself or herself in a position which conflicts with his or her 
responsibilities as a public representative in Parliament nor may he or she take any 
improper benefit or advantage from the office Member.” 
 
The code also makes provision for setting up the Committee on Members Interests as 
well as the Register of Members’ Interests (Section 3.2) where acting upon its own, or 
on a complaint by any member through the office of the Registrar, the Committee 
must investigate with due expedition any alleged irregularity with regard to the 
disclosure of financial interests of Members registrable in terms of this Code (Section 
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5.1), setting out the procedures for conducting investigations and reporting (Section 
5.2 and 5.3) and the penalties where it has found that a Member has contravened the 
code (Section 5.4). Details of interests to be disclosed include under “Gifts and 
hospitality”: a description and the value and source of a gift with a value in excess of 
R350; a description and the value of gifts from a single source which cumulatively 
exceed the value of R350 in any calendar year; and hospitality intended as a gift in 
kind. Penalties may include a) a fine not exceeding the value of 30 days salary; b) a 
reduction of salary or allowance for a period not exceeding 15 days; or c) the 
suspension of privileges or a member’s right to a seat in Parliamentary debates or 
committees for a period not exceeding 15 days. 
 
In July 2000 the Executive Ethics Code covering members of the executive was 
proclaimed. The Code covers various aspects of conduct including specific 
instructions regarding conflict of interest, gifts, disclosure of financial interests (these 
include shares, sponsorships, gifts and hospitality, benefits, foreign travel, land and 
property, pensions); and instructions relating to the Register of Financial Interests. 
The Public Protector investigates breaches of the executive code and in the coming 
years, a number of complaints would be laid at his door.  
 
As the scandal around the arms deal unfolded, implicating members of parliament 
such as the ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni in allegations of corruption, it is important 
to recall this early commitment to create checks and balances among MPs in order to 
uphold the integrity and reputation of this key institution. How Yengeni’s case was 
dealt with by parliament’s ethics committee will be looked at in detail in Chapter 12 
where for essentially a breach of the parliamentary code – not disclosing as a gift the 
47% discount he had received from an arms company with an interest in the arms deal 
when he was chair of the Defence Committee – Yengeni would be tried and convicted 
and be sent to jail, even if only for a brief period. The code regarding financial 
disclosure regulations for political office bearers, both Members of Parliament and 
Members of the Executive, will be seen to play an important role in the discussion of 
the arms deal case study that follows. In the coming years, parliamentary 
accountability and oversight of both the executive as well as the relationship with 
Chapter 9 institutions such as the Public Service Commission, Auditor General and 
Public Protector, that are obliged to report to parliament, would be thoroughly tested.  
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6.6 Independent Institutions 
In August 2007 the Report on the ad hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and 
Associated institutions, was released. Embarked on by parliament, even though it was 
initiated by the executive, does as the ANC chair argued, “itself demonstrate that we 
collectively care about our constitutional democracy…” Based on the terms of 
reference the Asmal Committee looked at: (1) the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
institutions; (2) whether the National Assembly played a sufficiently robust oversight 
role over the institutions; and (3) whether the institutions were fulfilling their 
Constitutional and legal mandates.   
The report argued that as the apartheid state had displayed a profound disrespect for 
the human rights of its citizens and failed to honor even the most basic tenets of the 
rule of law, it was necessary to create a set of credibly independent institutions whose 
task would be to strengthen constitutional democracy by assisting to: (1) restore the 
credibility of the state and its institutions in the eyes of the majority of its citizens; (2) 
ensure that democracy and the values associated with human rights and democracy 
flourished in the new dispensation; (3) ensure the successful establishment of and 
continued respect for the rule of law; and (4) guarantee that the state became more 
open and responsive to the needs of its citizens and more respectful of their rights. 
Without going into the detailed findings of the report its recommendations are 
important to mention as they “can be seen as an attempt to enhance the oversight role 
of the National Assembly in recognition of its important Constitutional role in relation 
to these institutions.” And in what the chair of the committee, Kader Asmal termed a 
“surprising but delightful development” almost all of the institutions under review 
expressed the view that the National Assembly should play a more active role in 
holding these institutions to account, and that there should be more engagement 
between these institutions and the National Assembly. In his remarks marking the 
release of the report Asmal notes the following:  
“Independent institutions established across the world to deepen democracy 
and to promote and protect human rights are not always, to put it mildly, 
universally celebrated and enthusiastically supported by those in positions of 
power. They are, however, an essential countervailing force in any 
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democracy…Endorsing and promoting the need for such institutions does not 
imply distrust of the other branches of government – just like the adoption of a 
justifiable Bill of Rights does not imply distrust in the Legislature or the 
Executive. These institutions should be part of the democratic firmament of 
any vibrant and self-confident society and when they act with wisdom and 
passion, within the confines of their mandates, but always aware of the need to 
deepen democracy and promote and protect human rights, they are in effect 
supporting the other branches of government in upholding the Constitution 
and fulfilling their other tasks.”3 
Clearly the relationship between different branches of government in the new South 
Africa as well as various independent institutions is being worked out and high profile 
scandals such as the arms deal, which involved almost all of these institutions, are 
important in that they play a role in defining the landscape of our new constitutional 
democracy and in testing the mandate and powers of these institutional safeguards. 
6.7 Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability 
In July 1999, a report prepared by the University of Cape Town’s public law 
department and submitted to the speaker of parliament, would point to the concerns of 
parliamentary oversight and propose certain ways in which parliament, and the 
independent chapter nine bodies supporting constitutional bodies, might be 
strengthened (Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau 1999). Specifically the UCT report 
addressed the constitutional and theoretical values underpinning the concepts of 
oversight and accountability and the purposes they serve in a democracy particularly 
in relation to the constitutional roles of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces. It made recommendations dealing with both legislation and 
structures that need to be put in place to give effect to Parliament’s obligations under 
the Constitution giving an analysis of the ways in which Parliament can ensure 
accountability of constitutional institutions while at the same time respecting their 
independence. It would take eight years before the Asmal Committee would report 
comprehensively on its findings, as noted above. 
                                                 
3 Remarks by Professor Kader Asmal, MP, Chairperson of the ad hoc Committee at the launch of the 
Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated institutions at the Good 
Hope Building, Parliament, Tuesday 21 August 2007. 
 122 
While it is not possibly to go into a full discussion of the UCT report, there is an 
important section capturing the “difficult” oversight role of parliament in relation to 
the executive, something that the arms deal investigation, particularly the role of the 
main oversight committee, namely the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(Scopa), would confront. The researchers note: 
“The executive in carrying out its tasks, whether by implementing legislation 
or policy, acquires considerable power (the ability to influence or determine a 
person’s conduct). A condition of the exercise of that power in a constitutional 
democracy is that the administration or executive is checked by being held 
accountable to an organ of government distinct from it. This notion is inherent 
in the concept of the separation of powers, which simultaneously provides for 
checks and balances on the exercise of executive power, making the executive 
more accountable to an elected legislature…While our Constitution gives 
expression to the principle of separation of powers by recognizing the 
functional independence of the three branches of government (see Re: 
Certification of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC)), 
our parliamentary system of government does not give full expression to the 
notion of separation of powers because of the close links between the 
legislature and the executive….Our executive is not only chosen from the 
legislature but also primarily from the leadership of the majority party. In 
addition like many other parts of the world a strong party-based system exists 
in South Africa. This can hamper effective oversight as members of the 
legislature may be reluctant to call to account a government that is made up 
of leaders of their party. This is further exacerbated by the electoral system of 
proportional representation because members of parliament presently retain 
their seats through their membership of political parties. Members of the 
majority party in particular may be unwilling to subject the government to 
rigorous scrutiny for fear of being perceived as disloyal or even expulsion 
from the party and a consequent loss of their parliamentary positions (my 
italics).” 
As will be shown in Chapter Ten, the few individuals within the ruling party who did 
take their oversight role as MPs seriously, such as ANC MP Andrew Feinstein, would 
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find themselves in an untenable position as the arms deal investigation proceeded, and 
in Feinstein’s case, resulting in resignation. 
 
6.8 A National Campaign to Prevent Crime and Corruption 
 
In response to the wave of crime threatening to destabilize the country, in May 1996 
the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was released. A National Program on 
Corruption and Commercial Crime was one of seven priorities identified. It noted that 
while corruption in all of its forms seriously undermines public confidence in 
democratic governance itself, this is particularly damaging in respect of such 
corruption and criminal complicity within the criminal justice system. By March 
1997, government ministers responsible for the NCPS had established a program 
committee to work on corruption in the criminal justice system. Led by the ministry 
of Safety and Security the intention was to develop a comprehensive strategy that 
would take into account best international practice and existing oversight structures, 
identify cross-cutting factors contributing to corruption in the system, focus on 
preventive as well as investigative strategies and identify possible solutions to the 
problem. 
 
Early on it was recognized that the relationship between the underworld of organized 
crime and the upper-world of legality is characterized by its parasitic and symbiotic 
nature and that the ability to corrupt officials depends on how integrated criminal 
organizations are within official structures. A less isolated post-apartheid South 
Africa had started to attract new threats such as international organized crime and 
money laundering syndicates and during 1996 several bills were drafted by parliament 
to increase the capacity of South Africa’s law enforcement agencies to address these 
new threats (Camerer 1996, 1999). These included the International Co-operation in 
Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996, the Proceeds of Crime Act No 76 of 1996, the 
Extradition Amendment Act no 77 of 1996 and the Money Laundering Control Bill. 
 
Responding to the need to address the growing crime issue and its negative impact on 
business, Business Against Crime (BAC) was established in 1996 initially for three 
years, to partner with the government on its commitment to prevent crime. Eleven 
years later it is still going strong. The group of business leaders established a number 
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of programs whereby private sector skills could assist the new democratic state. One 
of these programs was the Working Group on Commercial Crime, a task team that 
met once a month with key representatives from the criminal justice agencies, as well 
as business and policy actors. Its purpose was to propose solutions to make the 
criminal justice system more effective when it came to investigating and prosecuting 
so called “white collar crimes”. Efforts of the BAC Working Group yielded much 
needed research and eventually a concrete proposal for government to establish a 
specialized commercial crime court (Camerer 1996, 1998). A court was established in 
Pretoria in August 1999 and a second one in Johannesburg in January 2003. Both 
courts have been enormously successful in prosecuting complex cases of fraud, 
corruption, money laundering and organized crime.  
 
6.8.1 Committing to the Fight Against Corruption 
 
In June 1997 the official opposition in the national assembly, initiated a debate 
entitled “Measures to Combat Corruption”.  The Order Paper’s draft resolution read:  
“That, in the light of numerous incidents of corruption within the State set-up 
recently, the House calls on the Minister for Public Service and 
Administration to urgently take steps to curb such incidents, to set in motion 
all possible measures for the prevention of such corruption, and to have all 
cases, irrespective of who is involved, investigated forthwith.” 
 
In the heated debate National Party (NP) leader FW De Klerk while conceding, 
“many of today's problems may be related to former policies,” argued that crime and 
corruption were worse since the ANC took power. According to him the ANC-led 
governments –central and provincial – “must accept full responsibility for their new 
policies and their management, or lack of management”. “At the heart of the 
problem” he said, “lies unbalanced and over hasty affirmative action as well as 
questionable management of tender procedures and the like. For that the ANC must 
accept responsibility. It cannot hide its blunders and its failure to deliver, behind the 
past."4 
 
                                                 
4 FW De Klerk, “Crime and Corruption are worse since the ANC took power, and it cannot be denied.” 
The Star, 2 July 1997. 
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This debate provided an important opportunity for the ANC government to 
unequivocally state its clear commitment to addressing corruption with ANC Minister 
Pallo Jordan saying “I think this debate has served one purpose only, and this is to 
offer us the opportunity to reiterate this Government's commitment to rooting out 
corruption and combating corruption anywhere." Another ANC MP put things in 
perspective: “We are having this debate today because the ANC is committed to a 
lean and clean administration. We inherited a bloated, ineffective public service, with 
an almost total lack of checks and balances. But we're not hiding behind this as an 
excuse for corruption to continue…We don't hesitate to act harshly and openly against 
people who are appointed to the highest positions… We live in a society that is 
corrupt. We live in a society that is overburdened with high levels of crime. What on 
earth made us believe that the public sector would be spared? Corruption is a reality 
we have to manage. One of the first actions taken by the ANC when it took power 
was to put in place mechanisms designed, not only to expose corruption, but also to 
wipe it out.” 
 
The release of the NP’s Corruption Barometer later that year calling for urgent ANC 
action against corruption and President Mandela to declare the prevention of 
corruption a national priority, provided the NP with yet another opportunity to accuse 
the ANC of being soft on corruption. Although some individuals in the ANC 
government were concerned about spiralling corruption, it noted the absence of a 
general commitment by government to combat the problem.  Reacting, the ANC 
noted it was “ironic that the ANC led government, which has put into place its 
institutions and oversight mechanisms to expose and root out the legacy of corruption, 
is itself blamed for corruption. The ANC has put these institutions in place on the 
basis of the realization that corruption spawned and nurtured under National Party 
rule not attended to expeditiously will in the long run undermine the moral and social 
fibre of our democratic society. We remain convinced that institutions the government 
has put into place are not only equal to the challenges but have begun making serious 
inroads into all forms of corruption.”5 
 
                                                 
5 ANC’s reaction on NP’s Corruption Barometer, 16 November 1997. 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1997/pr1115a.html 
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6.8.2 Confronting the Moral Crisis 
 
Alongside legal, institutional and public administration reforms to fight corruption, a 
concurrent moral debate was occurring in the country to bolster the “moral and social 
fibre of our democratic society”. This was precipitated both by the scourge of violent 
crime and public sector corruption that the government felt great urgency to address, 
lest it become an entrenched feature of South African life. ANC leaders from 
Mandela down would, from 1995, recognize the “moral crisis” facing South Africa 
and the need for an “RDP of the soul”. This was a reference not only to the 
dehumanizing levels of violent and often domestic crimes, seemingly unleashed by 
the vacuum in social authority left by the demise of the apartheid state and its 
damning legacy, but also to crimes of fraud and corruption such as ghost workers, i.e. 
non-existent state employees drawing salaries to which they were not entitled, mainly 
in previous homeland administrations. 
 
In June 1997 President Mandela and key South African religious leaders met to 
discuss the role of religion in nation-building and social transformation. Mandela 
described the ‘spiritual malaise’ underpinning the crime problem: 
“Our hopes and dreams, at times, seem to be overcome by cynicism, self-
centeredness and fear. This spiritual malaise sows itself as a lack of good 
spirit, as pessimism, or lack of hope and faith. And from it emerge the 
problems of greed and cruelty, of laziness and egotism, of personal and family 
failure. It both helps fuel the problems of crime and corruption and hinders our 
efforts to deal with them (Mandela 1997).”  
Six months later, in December 1997, when addressing the African National 
Conference, and stepping down as president of the ANC Mandela further described 
manifestations of moral failure and decay in the new South Africa:"… the corruption 
of public servants by the private sector; the low level of tax morality, white collar 
crime and the subversion of business ethics; venality, theft and fraud within the public 
sector; corruption in the public justice system; the unbridled self-gratification of rape 
and child abuse; disrespect for human life; the easy resort to the use of force; the 
acceptance of theft as a means of personal enrichment; mendacity in the conduct of 
public affairs; contempt for the law; and the virtual collapse of a system of social 
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behavior informed by the precepts of humanism which, historically, have informed 
African culture." 
At the December 1997 conference Thabo Mbeki was nominated to be Mandela’s 
successor as president of the ANC and eighteen months later, in June 1999, would 
become president of South Africa. Linking fighting corruption to his vision of an 
African Renaissance – finding embodiment in the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) that seeks to promote and strengthen systems to enhance 
better governance on the continent – Mbeki would make fighting corruption a 
hallmark of his presidency.  
 
Further policy responses to the “moral crisis” would include the “Moral Regeneration 
Movement” (led by the deputy president, Jacob Zuma who in later years would 
ironically be accused of both rape and corruption). The source of the MRM within the 
ANC came from the commission for religious affairs. A so-called “Moral Summit” 
was held in October 1998 to which President Mandela invited leaders of all political 
parties and religious communities. At the summit a humanitarian ethics pledge and 
Code of Conduct for people in leadership positions was signed with leaders 
committing themselves to the following principles: Integrity; Incorruptibility; Good 
faith; Impartiality; Openness; Accountability; Justice; Generosity; Leadership (Balia 
and Sangweni 1999).  
 
6.9 Corruption on the Policy Agenda 
 
At the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) in Lima, Peru, South 
Africa agreed to host the next IACC two years later in Durban in October 1999.  The 
pressure was on to be in a position to showcase South Africa’s anti-corruption reform 
agenda to the international community. In 1997 an inter-departmental Committee on 
Corruption consisting of the Ministers of Justice, Public Service and Administration, 
Safety and Security, and Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, was 
appointed with the mandate to consider proposals for implementing an anti-corruption 
campaign at both national and provincial level. After much research and consultation 
the Committee recommended that Cabinet approve a number of proposals, including 
establishing a project team to carry out a feasibility study for an anti-corruption 
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agency and the rationalization of existing bodies, a review of the existing legislation 
in order to draft new corruption legislation, and the holding of a National Summit on 
Corruption (Balia and Sangweni 1999). In July 1998 the committee submitted its final 
report for a National Campaign Against Corruption to Cabinet. This Report and 
Cabinet's subsequent approval on 23 September 1998 would become the foundation 
of anti-corruption initiatives in South Africa, in particular within the public sector.  
 
Despite professed commitments to confront corruption, the public remained 
somewhat skeptical. Public opinion surveys conducted by IDASA/Markinor and the 
SABC in October/ November 1998 on government effectiveness at controlling 
corruption painted a sobering picture with 60% of respondents saying government 
was performing its job of controlling official corruption not very well/ not at all well 
(Camerer 1999c). Clearly it was time to show some sort of persuasive commitment. 
 
6.9.1 The Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference (November 1998) 
 
During November 1998 the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference was held in 
parliament, Cape Town and attended by over 200 delegates including the deputy 
president Thabo Mbeki, ministers, heads of agencies and parastatals, senior 
government officials including delegates from parliament, the public service, local 
government and organized labor in the public sector. The aim of the summit was to 
develop a concrete plan of action to combat and help prevent corruption in the public 
sector in particular. The media, donors and civil society were allowed to attend as 
observers.  
 
The initial outputs for the November summit were identified as follows: 
• To develop a clearly articulated national strategy to fight corruption in all 
sectors of society 
• To create a common understanding of corruption in all its facets 
• To obtain a commitment from all stakeholders to deal with corruption 
• To affirm key principles necessary for the establishment of effective and 
coordinated anti-corruption structures 
• To provide guidelines for a program of anti-corruption actions 
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• To recommend legislative measures to give muscle to anti-corruption 
structures 
• To send a clear message that corruption will not be tolerated by government or 
any other role-players in our new democracy 
 
Opening the conference, Mbeki noted how “the threatening state of moral degradation 
in our society is reflected in the high levels of crime, disrespect for authority and the 
rule of law, and the erosion of key institutions such as the family. The culture of 
entitlement, so prevalent in our community, has contributed to the “name it, claim it” 
syndrome where individuals seek an elusive moral justification for engaging in 
criminal activity. The deepening of the crisis in public value is largely visible in the 
lack of professional conduct from so many wearing the badge of public honor in the 
civil service.” He further noted that “zero tolerance” would be offered to the 
“parasites of our land who have scorned the public interest and that sought their own 
self enrichment at state expense.” Also that it was “incumbent on government 
unequivocally to affirm its seriousness and desire to stamp out corruption wherever it 
occurs.” 6 
 
The November 1998 Conference Statement committed itself to developing a 
comprehensive strategy that would combine prevention with “ruthless action against 
transgressions”. It recognized that corruption has “deep roots in our society” and that 
“while some short term measures can have a significant effect, ending corruption 
forms part of the long-terms and laborious process of transformation of government 
and society as a whole.”7 The adopted conference resolutions called to restore a 
public service ethos, for civil society to play a role as an “equal partner”, to strengthen 
financial management and controls and for government to review the scope and 
jurisdiction of anti-corruption agencies, and would form the basis of comprehensive 
anti-corruption reforms in the coming years (Balia and Sangweni 1999). 
 
At the November 1998 conference it was resolved that a working group representing 
the various stakeholders would oversee the implementation of the resolution and 
                                                 
6 Statement of the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Anti-Corruption Summit Conference, Cape 
Town, November 10, 1998. 
7 National Anti-Corruption Initiative, Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference, 10-11 November 
1998, Cape Town. Conference Statement.. 
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declaration and work together to ensure the success of the February Summit in 
developing an effective program for combating corruption. The summit eventually 
took place in April, some believing this may have been a way for the ANC to keep 
anti-corruption top of its agenda pre the June 1999 election. The efforts seem to have 
paid off with public opinion research indicating that government was doing enough to 
fight corruption. A survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council in 
March 1999 indicates that when asked about corruption in the public sector, 34% of 
respondents believe the government is giving sufficient priority to fighting corruption. 
In total 20% said that government was giving the issue of corruption too high a 
priority, whilst ANC supporters were most likely (27%) to think this was the case. 
Numerous pre-election statements by president-elect Thabo Mbeki identifying 
fighting corruption as one of his government’s key priorities for the next five years, 
effectively persuaded citizens that fighting corruption was something the government 
was dealing with satisfactorily. 
 
6.9.2 The First National Anti-Corruption Summit (April 1999) 
During 14-15 April 1999 the National Anti-corruption summit, held in Cape Town, 
brought together government leaders, political parties, business, organised religious 
bodies, the NGO sector, donors, the media, organised labour unions, academics, 
professional bodies and the public sector. Interestingly political parties were not 
invited to participate in the Summit. The Country Corruption Assessment Report 
(2003) notes the following in this regard: “This averted the possibility of political 
parties using the occasion to score political points. The down side, however, is that 
political parties were not a party to the Summit's outcomes. The non-participation of 
political parties also impoverished debate. Issues such as electoral fraud and 
corruption related to political funding were not dealt with.” 
The First National Anti-Corruption Summit created a powerful platform for the 
National Campaign Against Corruption in that it recognized the societal nature of 
corruption, and that the fight against it required a national consensus and co-
ordination of activities. The resolutions adopted at this conference would form the 
main basis for the government’s national anti-corruption strategy and subsequent 
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developments and relate to it’s three-pronged approach, namely 1) combating 
corruption, 2) preventing corruption, and 3) building integrity and raising awareness.  
A key resolution emerging from the National Anti-Corruption Summit in Cape Town 
under the theme of “Combating Corruption” was to “develop and implement whistle 
blowing mechanisms, which include measures to protect persons from victimization 
where they expose corrupt and unethical practices”. Indeed, ‘Blow the Whistle on 
Corruption’ was the conference slogan used to launch the National Anti-corruption 
Initiative. Civil society would play an important role in this regard, making 
submissions to the Justice Committee in October 1999.8  
 
The proposed whistle-blowing legislation initially fell under the Open Democracy 
Bill which made provision for the transparency of government actions and access to 
government records. In March 2000 the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA) came into force, giving effect to the public's broad right to access information 
as set out in Section 32 of the 1996 Constitution. It required private as well as 
governmental bodies to disclose information. Later in 2000 hearings would be held by 
parliament’s Justice Committee on a separate law to protect whistleblowers, namely 
the Protected Disclosures Act.  Under this legislation bona fide whistle-blowers 
reporting on government wrongdoing would be protected from workplace reprisals. 
These might include dismissal, demotions, unfavorable transfer, informal 
discrimination or harassment by managers or co-workers. Because of the need for 
fairness to officials accused of wrongdoing — who will have a right to know of the 
accusations and an opportunity to defend themselves — anonymity for the 
whistleblower will often be impossible. In this instance, the proposed legislation notes 
other protections for whistleblowers such as relocating them without prejudice to their 
career and granting indemnity against prosecutions or workplace disciplinary sanction 
for a whistle-blower’s own complicity in governmental wrongdoing (Camerer 1999d). 
 
The government recognized that there would be an urgent need to promote awareness 
of both the laws and the way in its intended operation. During 2001 a Cape Town 
based NGO, the Open Democracy Advice Centre would set up a free legal advice 
service on how to utilize the act, produce a brochure on whistle-blowing for the 
                                                 
8 Camerer, L. “Whistleblowers must be protected”. Business Report on Sunday. 24 October 1999. 
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Public Service Commission and conduct training of senior public service managers in 
all nine provinces. 
 
6.9.3 The National Anti-Corruption Forum 
 
In August 1999 the Cross Sectoral Task Team on corruption convened consisting of 
representatives from government, business and civil society. This body tasked with 
taking forward the resolutions from the National Summit and engaging all sectors on 
the fight against corruption produced a memorandum of understanding for what 
became known as the National Anti-Corruption Forum. Launched in mid June 2001 in 
Langa outside Cape Town the body comprised 30 leaders representing key sectors. 
Launching the forum, the Minister for Public Service and Administration, Geraldine 
Fraser-Moloketi said: 
“ Notwithstanding the knowledge of the nature of the corruption problem and 
how challenging the road is ahead of us, I think as South Africans we are 
showing that we are committed to deal with this issue as best as possible. We 
have embarked on a strategy of co-operation and supportive partnerships, on 
international, regional and domestic levels. Through comprehensive and 
multi-sectoral approaches, such as this National Anti-Corruption Forum, we 
are increasing our chances exponentially to deal with the problem at hand in a 
decisive manner.” 
 
The founding charter of the National Anti-Corruption Forum requires members from 
all sectors of society to: 
• Establish a national consensus through the coordination of sectoral anti-
corruption strategies 
• Advise government on the implementation of strategies to fight corruption 
• Share information on best practices on sectoral anti-corruption work 
• Advise all sectors on the improvement on sectoral anti-corruption strategies 
 
6.9.4 The Second National Anti-Corruption Summit (March 2005) 
 
In March 2005 the second National Anti-Corruption Summit hosted by the National 
Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) took place in Tshwane. The purpose of the summit, 
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the first since 1999, was to identify a common campaign for all South Africans to 
fighting corruption as it was felt the government’s approach up until this point was 
seen as too “inward-looking”. Sponsored by the UNODCP, DFID and GTZ, it was 
attended by 390 delegates from the public, private and civil society sector.  
 
Deliberations focused on three main areas:  Ethics, Awareness and Prevention; 
Combating; and Oversight, Transparency and Accountability. It also focused on the 
role of the National Anti-Corruption Forum, an entity that was launched in June 2001 
and that would now take on a more formal role. The summit confirmed the NACF as 
the vehicle for building a national consensus on the fight against corruption and 
adopted resolutions that direct the meetings, composition and structures of the NACF. 
Twenty Seven resolutions were drafted and adopted by the Resolutions Committee 
comprising of sectoral representatives, to be translated into programs of action. 
Clusters of resolutions covered whistle-blowing; co-ordination; implementation of 
anti-corruption legislation; post-public sector employment; research; financial 
disclosures; awareness; the National Anti-Corruption Forum, and apartheid 
corruption.  
 
Following the summit, an Implementation Committee, consisting of program co-
coordinators from the public sector (Director-General of DPSA), the business sector 
(CEO of Business Against Crime) and the civil society sector (Convener of the Civil 
Society Network Against Corruption) and accountable to the Executive Committee of 
the NACF was appointed to establish and implement joint National Anti-Corruption 
Program (NAP) projects. The implementation of these resolutions and the activities of 
the National Anti-Corruption Forum will be important to monitor in the coming years. 
In 2008 the Third National Anti-Corruption Summit will convene to consider progress 
made. Clearly corruption is still on the policy agenda. 
As of 2007 the National Anti-Corruption Forum has continued to meet and finally has 
dedicated resources to assist its public information role, with a recently established 
website (www.nacf.org.za).  
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6.10 Specialized Corruption Fighting Bodies 
 
Following the First National Anti-Corruption Summit in April 1999 came the June 
elections, fought largely on a zero-tolerance anti-corruption ticket. Mbeki’s new 
cabinet formally endorsed the Summit resolutions.  While highlighting corruption in 
government was a key election issue raised by opposition parties such as the United 
Democratic Movement, New National Party and Democratic Party hoping to win 
votes from an electorate disillusioned by widespread public sector abuses of power, it 
appeared that the ANC, through a number of high profile conferences and public 
statements on anti-corruption had effectively undercut this tactic.  
 
In his opening address to Parliament, President Mbeki announced the establishment of 
a special criminal investigation unit to tackle high-profile crimes, including public 
corruption. This unit - the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) - more popularly 
known as the "Scorpions” fell under the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The 
NPA was headed from August 1998 until his resignation in July 2004, by former 
ANC chief whip and MP, Bulelani Ngcuka. Based on the troika principle of 
intelligence, investigation and prosecution, the DSO would take on crimes determined 
by the following criteria: High level of seriousness/impact of a national nature; High 
level of violence; High level of organization (enterprise related crime); Requiring an 
integrated multi-disciplinary approach; Very high profile.9 From the beginning one of 
the main challenges facing the Scorpions would be to avoid duplication and 
fragmentation with existing crime-fighting bodies and to increase co-ordination. 
Although 90% of crimes would still be dealt with by the South African Police 
Services (SAPS), from the beginning the tension between the SAPS and DSO in 
terms of operational mandates would prevail, eventually resulting in the Khempepe 
Commission of Inquiry set up in 2005 to investigate the relationship between the two 
agencies. 
 
The DSO was formally launched on 1 September 1999, not a moment too soon. Later 
that month allegations of wide-spread corruption in the Strategic Defence 
Procurement Package would officially surface. The DSO would play a crucial role in 
                                                 
9 Comments by Pete Richer, Head of Operational Support, DSO, UNODC/NPA Expert Roundtable, 
Pretoria May 2000 
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the criminal investigations that followed. Down the line its head, Bulelani Ngcuka, 
would be accused of being a spy for the apartheid regime, and for failing to prosecute 
Jacob Zuma, although announcing a prima facie case of corruption against him, of 
abusing the powers of his agency. This would lead to a Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry (Hefer Commission) and an investigation by the Office of the Public 
Protector, events not covered by this thesis. For now, the Scorpion’s ambition, 
captured in its motto, “Loved by the people, feared by the criminals” was seen as a 
bright light in government’s commitment to effectively address serious crime and 
corruption.  
 
6.10.1 Coordinating Efforts 
 
At a conference in May 2000 organized by the UN on anti-corruption agencies, the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka noted that the criminal 
justice system alone did not function as a deterrent factor against crime or corruption 
and that there were far too few cases that led to prosecution and conviction. While the 
government had created many agencies for fighting corruption Ngcuka stated that the 
overall impact had not been as effective as was hoped for and there was still a lot to 
be done. The “burning problem” of co-ordination and cooperation among different 
agencies was highlighted by Dr Ugi Zvekic, a Senior Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice expert with the UN, arguing that the fight against corruption needed to be 
approached at all levels: through prevention, education, regulation, investigation, 
prosecution and adjudication. Zvekic would play a key role in facilitating a multi-year 
agreement with the South African government as part of the United Nations Global 
Program Against Corruption to conduct baseline country assessments. 
 
In his opening address to the November 1998 conference, President Mbeki had noted 
that “a laudable feature of our new democracy (is) that no less than ten structures exist 
to counteract corruption in line with their constitutional mandates. Some might share 
the view that these bodies are not effective enough, whilst others might feel that they 
need to be replaced by a single anti-corruption agency." This remark needs to be 
understood in the context of a debate that had been raging on co-ordination or 
rationalization of existing anti-corruption agencies, such as the Heath Special 
Investigating Unit. This debate is important as it provides important context to the 
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controversial decision to exclude the SIU from the final arms deal investigation in 
January 2001, discussed in Chapter Nine. 
 
6.11 The Debate Around the Special Investigating Unit 
 
First some background: In 1996, then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, indicated that 
the government was investigating the establishment of a permanent Anti-Corruption 
Commission to investigate allegations of serious corruption (De Lange 2001). 
Widespread corruption relating to ghost workers and social security grants were 
already being investigated by various Commissions of Inquiry such as the Eastern 
Cape based Heath Commission into alleged malpractices in the Ciskei, the White 
Commission to investigate irregular appointments and promotion, and the Semenya 
Commission and Skweyiya Commission dealing with allegations of widespread 
corruption in former homelands. The Eastern Cape-based Heath Commission’s 
apparent success in recovering state assets through civil proceedings had caught the 
attention of President Nelson Mandela. 
 
According to the long time ANC chair of the Justice Committee Advocate Johnny De 
Lange (later deputy Minister of Justice) already at this time it was acknowledged that 
there was a need to create new and innovative mechanism to strengthen the fight 
against corruption: “The view was held that the Public Protector’s Office was not 
ideally suited to the task of investigating allegations of corruption, which were of a 
sufficiently serious or substantial nature, to justify the appointment of a Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry. On the other hand, a conventional commission of inquiry was 
felt to be too limited in scope, as such as commission would have to rely on the 
Executive to implement its recommendations and any remedial action could only be 
taken through conventional civil litigation in the ordinary courts of law” (De Lange 
2001). 
 
In 1996, Parliament had passed a bill that broadened the commission’s responsibilities 
to cover corruption countrywide and deal with the whole spectrum of ‘clean’ 
administration and the protection of the interests of the public regarding public money 
and public property. The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act (74 of 
1996) thus established a new and innovative mechanism “for the purpose of 
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investigating serious malpractices or maladministration in connection with the 
administration of state institutions, state assets and public money as well any conduct 
that may seriously harm the interests of the public, and for the establishment of 
Special Tribunals so as to adjudicate upon civil matters emanating from such 
investigations by Special Investigating Units.” 
 
The Unit would thus investigate matters from a civil perspective and institute civil 
action in the Special Tribunal with all matters of a criminal nature that come to the 
Unit’s attention referred to the relevant prosecutorial authorities in order to proceed 
with criminal prosecutions. In performing its functions, the Unit would liaise closely 
with other bodies such as the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, the Attorney-
General and the South African Police Service (SAPS), in order to co-ordinate 
investigations into matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Unit.10  Ironically, 
this powerful new anti-corruption agency headed by Judge Willem Heath would not 
be used in the multi-agency investigation into allegations of widespread corruption 
surrounding the largest scandal in South Africa’s democratic history, namely the arms 
deal. The exclusion of the SIU, the reasons given, the impact this had on public trust 
in the corruption investigation, is documented in detail in the case study that follows. 
 
Despite not having criminal jurisdiction, the Heath Unit had nurtured an impressive 
public profile as the face of effective anti-corruption efforts in the country. Heath’s 
own belief was that the recovery of money and assets should be the primary objective 
of any fight against corruption: "Criminal action should be secondary. The recovery 
of money proves that economic crime does not pay and this is essentially the message 
to convey. Recovery will not only act as a deterrent but will replace what has been 
removed from the coffers and thus strengthen the economic climate." 11 The Unit’s 
investigative armory included legal representatives specialized in anti-corruption, 
mal-administration and related investigations and civil litigation emanating from such 
investigations. Multidisciplinary teams of experienced investigators, internal auditors 
and accountants, supported by an information technology team to access relevant 
information, had delivered impressive results. At the time 71 people were employed 
                                                 
10 Heath Special Investigating Unit, Interim Report 98/99, Parliament, Cape Town, p. 5. 
11 W Heath, “Governments must set example against corruption in public sector”, The Star, 17 
September 1998. 
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by the Unit and Heath’s belief was that this number was far below what was required 
for the unit’s work to be effectively optimized and had expressed the need to appoint 
additional members to effectively deal with the expected increased workload of the 
Unit. Issues of budgetary constraints, however, were currently limiting these 
appointments and suggestions made by the Unit to supplement its budget through the 
appropriation of a percentage of the recovered proceeds of corruption, had effectively 
been dismissed. 
 
The SIU’s broad powers enabled it to act quickly against official corruption: With the 
authority of a magistrate or judge, unit members could enter and search premises and 
remove documentation on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that it would assist an 
investigation. The unit could also summon anyone to appear before it and compel 
them to answer questions. It has powers to make an order for the return of money or 
property and to issue an interdict to stop the potential loss of such money or property. 
Some critics believed that the special powers invested in the head of the Special 
Investigating Unit were too wide and the question had been raised whether Heath’s 
concept of an independently funded body, combined with its vast legal powers, could 
lead to the Unit becoming untouchable.12 Heath’s response had been: "... we are very 
careful in our approach and apply the principles of the constitution meticulously. 
Although we are independent from government departments we still have to comply 
with the terms of the Act. The Unit can never become more than what the Act 
provides for."13  
 
However, Heath had expressed his frustration over the current terms of the Act. It 
required that allegations first be referred to the necessary authorities, whereafter a 
(usually) lengthy process was followed before the Department of Justice submitted a 
draft Proclamation to the office of the President. This finally culminated in a 
Proclamation referring the matter to the Unit for investigation. This lapse of time 
served to delay and hamper the effectiveness of investigations and Heath had thus 
proposed specific amendments to the Act, notably the scrapping of the requirement 
that the Unit had to wait for a proclamation before investigating cases. These 
                                                 
12 E Botha, “No place to hide from the long arm of Judge Heath”, Financial Mail, 25 July 1997. 
13 W Heath, “Governments must set example against corruption in public sector”, The Star, 17 
September 1998. 
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proposed amendments were viewed as the already powerful unit asking for additional 
powers and were effectively ignored by the Justice ministry.  
 
Thus while the proposed amendments were received with sympathy in some quarters, 
others believed the Unit already had too much power. Objections had been raised over 
what was seen as an increasing tendency of the SIU to bypass the courts. The point 
was made that if fast track procedures were needed to deal with corruption, these 
should be implemented within the legal system.14 Heath had strongly denied that the 
special powers given to his Unit were unfair to the people against whom it acted and 
that the fast track procedures of the Unit and the related tribunal could infringe on the 
civil rights of those it investigated, as was suggested. He indicated that the shortened 
procedure related only to documents, and that defendants had the right to access 
everything pertaining to their cases: "There is no hampering of rights. We are 
completely transparent and we play open cards."  
 
On the eve of the November anti-corruption conference, Heath’s request for more 
powers was met with a stinging attack from the President’s office. In a letter leaked to 
the press, complaints were made that the Unit was guilty of sloppy work which was 
causing the President’s office legal headaches: "Our office has had to assist in dealing 
with litigation or threatened litigation which arose there from, or from the alleged 
failure of your unit to operate within its legal limits." Some commentators believed 
this was clearly a campaign aimed at clipping Heath’s wings.15 In the same week, 
Justice Minister Dullah Omar, in a written reply to a parliamentary question on the 
fate of Heath’s amendments, appeared to express concern that the Heath Unit’s 
powers, once extended, might set precedents for other investigative bodies. He 
questioned whether it was appropriate to have a judge as head of the unit, and whether 
the Unit should indeed continue existing as an independent body, given the existence 
of the Public Protector and the Attorneys-General. His suggestion that the Unit could 
possibly be rationalized to form part of a single anti-corruption centre under a "special 
cabinet committee" was met with outrage by Judge Heath who said that such a step 
                                                 
14 M Acott, “Critics question effective anti-corruption unit’s key powers”, Business Day, 2 March 
1998 
15 P Bell, Courage and Conviction, Leadership, 17(4), 1998. 
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"... would raise the question of whether or not such a body was apolitical."16  
 
In response to Heath’s public call not to compromise on the independence of his Unit, 
both Omar and President Mandela’s office subsequently denied that the proposed 
rationalization amounted to political interference. Instead, in an apparent turnabout, 
Omar claimed that the media had misrepresented his position, and pledged additional 
funds to the Unit and to the Public Protector. He stated that government would protect 
the Unit from political pressure and "... would like to see the two bodies become even 
more independent and strengthened."17  
 
In the heat of the debate which followed the suggestion to rationalize anti-corruption 
existing structures and establish a single anti-corruption agency, presidential 
spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana, made the following statement: "Inevitably all 
structures of government have to be reviewed not only for the purposes of maximum 
efficiency but also to ensure that the general cost of administration is kept at a 
minimum. The reality of the situation is now you have the Heath Special Investigating 
Unit, the police and the Public Protector. Sometimes we even appoint commissions of 
inquiry and you have parliament. The duplication that is taking place is unbelievable. 
Furthermore they all rely on resources from the same coffers. We are not saying that 
the Heath Commission or the Public Protector must die – all we want is to maximize 
efficiency and rationalize out structures."18  
 
The highly contentious debate around establishing a single dedicated anti-corruption 
agency, was temporarily resolved at the November 1998 public sector summit by 
urging existing anti-corruption agencies to publish clear guidelines on the nature of 
corruption they deal with as well as how they deal with these reports. However, on the 
eve of the November 1998 conference, the “possible rationalization” of existing anti-
corruption agencies such as the Special Investigating Unit headed by Judge Heath, to 
possibly be replaced by a single anti-corruption center reporting to a special cabinet 
committee, evoked a political storm. Heath was quoted as saying that “such a step 
would raise the question of whether or not such a body was apolitical” with led to 
                                                 
16 D Greybe, “Anti-corruption talks backed by cabinet”, Business Day, 26 October 1998. 
17 A Koopman, “Conference is no talk-shop – Omar,” Cape Times, 12 November 1998. 
18 “Govt will “strengthen not abolish Heath unit”, Cape Times, 8 October 1998. 
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both Justice Minister Dullah Omar and President Mandela’s offices subsequently 
denying that the proposed rationalization amounted to political interference.  
 
The debate on Heath’s calls for more powers and more resources continued into 1999 
and was starting to polarize public opinion. In mid 2000 the SIU issued a press release 
that it was restricting its interaction with the media. Tensions with the government 
over the SIU’s power were running high and limiting media interaction was seeing as 
one way to calm the situation.  The statement read: 
“…The SIU has, however, now identified that the Unit’s open approach to 
towards the media in the past, has created fertile ground for media reports that 
position the Unit in an adversarial relationship with the Government. These 
media reports have resulted in a perception that the Unit is the “enemy” of the 
Government, whiles in truth the Unit is one of the weapons in the armoury of 
the Government and its fight against corruption and maladministration. This 
perception that the Unit investigates the Government instead of protecting and 
recovering the assets of State Institutions, now appears to have created a rift 
between the Unit and at least some figures in the political arena and this is 
perceived to be a major stumbling block both for the workings of the Unit and 
the morale of members of the Unit. In order to address the problem…and to 
show that the Unit is committed to its real purpose and is opposed to being 
portrayed as operating in the political arena, the Unit has decided to place a 
moratorium on all communication with the media until such time as a 
workman like media policy, which fully addresses the problems set out above, 
has been accepted by the Unit. It is hoped that this policy would be in place by 
July 2000 and until such time any approaches by the media would be 
responded to with a “no comment”. This drastic approach has been forced on 
the Unit by the circumstances it finds itself in, and the Unit apologizes for any 
inconvenience this may cause to any other person or party.19” 
 
Clearly to stay with the popular metaphor, Judge Heath’s wings were in the process of 
being clipped. In November 2000, the Constitutional Court judgment that was used as 
the basis to exclude his Unit from the arms deal investigation rendered him a lame 
                                                 
19 1st August 2000 email from Guy Rich:. Press Release: Media Contact with the Special Investigating 
Unit 
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duck and by July 2001 he had resigned as head of the unit. In August 2001 the Public 
Service Commission would release a comprehensive audit report reviewing the roles 
the various anti-corruption agencies. It would conclude forcefully that South Africa 
did not need a new and separate anti-corruption body, but rather that the existing 
criminal justice capacity and other agencies with an anti-corruption mandate should 
be bolstered (PSC 2001): “This report shows that there is no integrated, holistic 
approach to fighting and preventing corruption amongst existing agencies. Only once 
the anticorruption capacities of the existing agencies are optimally utilized in a 
holistic and strategic approach to fighting corruption in the public sector in South 
Africa can the next step - a single independent anti-corruption agency which deals 
with all aspects of corruption - be seriously considered.” 
 
As the lead consultant on this report for the Public Service Commission and having 
interviewed all of the agencies in South Africa with an anti-corruption mandate, it 
was my informed opinion at the time that strengthening existing institutional capacity 
was the way to proceed and was a way to ensure that checks and balances in the 
institutional framework would be prevail, and not be subsumed under an all powerful 
central anti-corruption agency reporting to a defensive executive. 
 
6.12 Conclusion 
 
Against the backdrop of allegations of high level corruption in the arms deal – PAC 
MP Patricia de Lille had blown the whistle in parliament in mid September 1999 – in 
October 1999 the South African government co-hosted the 9th International Anti-
corruption Conference in Durban, a meeting attended by over 1600 delegates from 
over 135 countries. This was an opportunity, one of many to come, to show the 
international community the country’s commitment to fighting corruption.  
 
In opening the conference President Mbeki hoped that the conference would “give an 
added impetus to all of us as Africans further to intensify our own offensive against 
the scourge of corruption.” Referring to the writings of international financier, George 
Soros on the flaws of the market system, Mbeki called for an end to “the unhampered 
pursuit of self interest” in societies saying South Africa’s past political and social 
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system of apartheid had led people to set their own norms of social behaviour and that 
these conditions underpinned the levels of crime and corruption present in South 
Africa now:  
“I am also convinced that, in this country, another important factor that led to 
the spread and entrenchment of corruption, was the existence for a long period 
of time of a political and social system that was clearly morally and politically 
illegitimate and considered so by the overwhelming majority of the 
people…The consequence of this was that both the legal system and the 
institutions of governance lost all possibility to provide for society the set of 
norms that would simultaneously be legally enforceable and morally 
justifiable…Of course the first thing that we had to do was to end the 
illegitimate system of apartheid and replace it with a genuinely democratic and 
inclusive political system. Hopefully this system will succeed to evolve the 
social norms that will generally be accepted as legally enforceable and morally 
justifiable. Clearly, this would have a major impact on ensuring that we reduce 
the negative tendency towards the setting of norms by individuals informed by 
the concept of ‘the unhampered pursuit of self-interest’ (Mbeki 1999). 
 
With Apartheid gone and the new rules of a democratic game in place, it appeared 
that apart from some institutional turf wars amongst various anti-corruption agencies 
fighting for resources and powers - not in and of itself unhealthy - the government 
was serious about fighting corruption. A clear national strategy to fight corruption 
was in place, based on consultation and partnership with all stakeholders, and the 
ANC had won a landslide victory on a “zero tolerance” platform, still largely blaming 
the legacy of apartheid for the country’s corruption woes. The government’s handling 
of the arms deal would however, cast shadow over these lofty commitments. This will 
be the topic of the next but one chapter. First however, it is important to take account 
of further specific anti-corruption measures taken by the South African government.  
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Chapter Seven: Designing a National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Law 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we summarized the constitutional and institutional framework 
that set the stage for anti-corruption debates and initiatives that took place after 1994. 
The further strategic measures (both policy and legislative) that were implemented 
during President Mbeki’s term in office will now be canvassed. 
 This chapter takes a more detailed look at the national anti-corruption strategy, 
including legislation emerging in South Africa. It is clear that some of the institutional 
reforms undertaken with regard to tightening accountability mechanisms were 
informed by the experience of the arms deal, documented in the next few chapters, for 
instance with regard to tightening conflict of interest and post public sector-
employment provisions (namely the case of the former minister of Defense, Joe 
Modise). This chapter also looks at the Idasa submission and subsequent court case on 
access to information regarding the funding of political parties – arguably the most 
gaping lacuna in South Africa’s otherwise impressive anti-corruption regulatory 
framework. 
7.2 Designing a National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
By early 2000, three important streams were emerging to inform the South African 
strategic approach to fighting corruption, namely the need 1) to address the moral 
malaise; 2) to bolster criminal justice capacity, and 3) to reform public administration. 
Within policy circles confusion reigned around cabinet leadership of the anti-
corruption initiative. It was unclear whether corruption was an issue being dealt with 
primarily by the Governance and Administration cluster or by Criminal Justice. 
Particularly confusing was trying to figure out who was responsible for what and how 
to make sense of certain initiatives in the criminal justice as well as public 
administration arms of government and how these tied together.  
Clearly a range of actors and approaches need to be involved in anti-corruption 
efforts, something recognized in resolutions that emerged from the two anti-
corruption summits in November 98 and April 99. During the course of 2000 it would 
become clear that the Public Service Commission, which at the April 1999 summit 
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had been tasked to drive the anti-corruption initiative forward, was not appropriate. In 
a major error of judgment that resulted in a serious delay in the implementation of the 
resolutions and a definitive anti-corruptions strategy for the public service, the Public 
Service Commission (PSC), tasked by the Constitution to conduct oversight of the 
public service, was mandated as the ‘flag carrier’ of the anti-corruption initiative. This 
was clearly based on a confusion of roles that had characterized the whole debate. As 
flag-bearer, the PSC was placed in a role that would necessitate driving policy 
reforms, thus conflicting with its oversight mandate. Only through delicate political 
maneuvering would the right locus for anti-corruption policy eventually be found. In 
future the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) would drive 
policy and by June 2000 a draft  “First Discussion Document: An assessment of anti-
corruption strategies in the South African Public Service” existed wherein short, 
medium and long-term strategies were proposed that flowed from the summit 
resolutions. For the first time it appeared that a dedicated task team with some type of 
budget was in place to tackle anti-corruption reforms. 
 
Baseline information and a review of the current situation were recognized as an 
essential element in designing the national anti-corruption strategy. In March 2001, 
following a prolonged period of negotiation, the South African government joined the 
United Nations Global Program Against Corruption. This was an international 
program that prioritized the development of certain common strategies and the 
exchange of information, experience and good practices, when it came to addressing 
corruption. In a multi-year agreement signed by Minister of Public Service and 
Administration, Geraldine Fraser-Moloketi, South Africa committed itself to 
conducting a Country Corruption Assessment Report (CCAR). A report would be 
released two years later in April 2003 and the assessment exercise repeated in 2007. 
The comprehensive country assessment would entail inter alia perception and 
experience surveys among households, public service delivery institutions and 
businesses; analyses of legislation and code of conduct; and data collection on 
criminal and disciplinary cases related to corruption, providing for the first time 
baseline data on the scourge of corruption that would “enable one to monitor progress 
in the governance environment and in the effectiveness of strategies to combat and 
prevent corruption” (CCAR 2003).  
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When it was released to parliament in April 2003, the CCAR would barely touch on 
the arms deal scandal that had played out over the two years while the assessment was 
being conducted. The foreword notes that five years into the process (since 1997 
when anti-corruption efforts had started) government’s assessment was that good 
progress was being made to implement the resolutions of the Summits and many 
departments and agencies were believed to have put in place solid systems to fight 
corruption. It noted however, that “at the operational level, problems were emerging, 
more notably the absence of clear anti-corruption legislation, insufficient co-
ordination of anti-corruption work within the public sector and among the various 
sectors of society, and poor information about corruption and the impact of anti-
corruption measures (CCAR 2003).” 
 
In April 2001 a three-day strategic planning workshop of the Public Service Task 
Team was convened by the Department of Public Service and Administration to 
design a national strategy for the public sector to fight corruption. In opening the 
workshop, Minister of Public Service and Administration Geraldine Fraser-Moloketi 
explicitly called for a “practical, effective and coherent strategy” which would be 
“workable and implementable” and “have immediate results”. Noting that much of 
the groundwork had already been done at the summits (hosted in 1998 and 1999), 
these resolutions needed to be taken forward and translated into action. There was no 
need to start from scratch, but rather to cement existing initiatives such as laws around 
public finance, whistle-blowing and access to information into a coherent strategy for 
wider use. As a follow up in June 2001 a consultative workshop was convened in 
Pretoria to discuss the draft Public Service Anti-corruption strategy. The working 
definition of corruption used in the strategy referred to corruption as: “any conduct or 
behavior in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public sector 
which violates their duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining unfair 
advantages of any kind for themselves or for others.”  
 
7.3 Mbeki Announces Reforms 
 
At a three-day cabinet lekgotla the Public Service Commission’s draft report on the 
role of various anti-corruption agencies and the draft Public Service Anti-corruption 
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Strategy was discussed. Addressing the media President Thabo Mbeki noted that 
corruption posed one of the major challenges confronting his government and 
announced a number of measures. Mbeki singled out Correctional Services as the 
hardest hit area - a senior prison official had recently been assassinated - and 
announced the establishment of the Jali Commission of Inquiry into corruption in 
correctional services.  
 
At the briefing Mbeki announced that former ANC MP, Willie Hofmeyr would be the 
new head of the Special Investigating Unit, replacing Judge Heath, something that 
had been widely speculated along with the fact that the unit would now be 
incorporated into the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions1. A report regarding 
the workload of the Special Investigating Unit had been tabled in Parliament in May 
2001 and had stressed the “urgent need” for the unit to get its house in order and deal 
with the backlog of cases and had expressed concern at the cumbersome process of 
obtaining proclamations before any investigation could be conducted.2 Hofmeyr, 
despite his struggle credentials, was widely regarded as being independent minded, 
sparing “neither friend nor foe in the fight against corruption”3 and had already 
proven himself as operationally independent and adept at using the media to show the 
use in practice of the laws against money laundering and organized crime. 
 
Mbeki also noted that the government was working on new regulations to clarify the 
role of officials involved in the negotiation of big contracts in order to limit 
corruption. As an example, he cited how currently any cabinet minister could leave 
the government to join a field in the private sector that operated in an area covered by 
the minister during his term. Such a move he noted could be viewed as corruption 
since the minister would have participated in the award of tenders to a firm that he 
later joined.  Regulations were therefore being proposed that would prevent former 
cabinet ministers from taking up private sector posts in their fields, making it 
impossible for instance, for a former defence minister to join the arms industry after 
leaving government.4 This was a clear reference to former Defence Minister, Joe 
Modise. Asked if the new regulations were being drafted in the light of the 
                                                 
1 “Lead by example” Business Day, 25 July 2001. 
2 Simphiwe Xako “Investigating unit faces challenging task” Business Day, 25 July 2001. 
3 Editorial. “War on corruption and monopoly,” Financial Mail, 3 August 2001. 
4 “Corruption is public enemy No 1, says Mbeki” The Star, 27 July 2001. 
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controversies emanating from the arms deal probe Mbeki replied “Yes…even if all of 
the allegations are not proven to be true, the issues are relevant and we need to attend 
to them.5” This admission from Mbeki clearly proves the responsiveness of the 
government to address corruption loopholes that the arms deal procurement process 
had brought to light. 
 
7.4 The Case of Joe Modise 
 
A week before the media briefing, on 20th July 2001, the Mail and Guardian had 
reported that former Minister of Defence, Joe Modise’s six bedroom mansion had 
been constructed partly at the expense of taxpayers money. The National Directorate 
of Public Prosecutions noted it would not be prosecuting Modise in this regard as he 
had agreed to repay the money spent by Denel to help build his home (apparently only 
once he realised the matter was being proposed). At no time had Modise recorded his 
interest in the residence in the parliamentary register of interests.6 After leaving 
Parliament in June 1999, Modise had become chairman of Conlog holdings, a 
company with an indirect stake in the arms deal. In July 2001 it was reported that 
Conlog had been contracted to work on the Coega industrial development zone in 
Eastern Cape, strongly tied to the R4,5billion submarine purchase that is part of the 
arms deal. Executive Director of the Eastern Cape based Public Service 
Accountability Monitor, Colm Allen commented: “…After his intense involvement in 
the policymaking process Modise ends up as chairperson of a company which has 
been awarded contracts to implement the Coega project. For Modise to benefit 
financially as a businessman from decisions that he made whilst he was a cabinet 
minister is an astounding conflict of interests. You don’t need a degree in ethics to 
recognise that.”7 
 
In October 2001 Modise would be questioned by the Scorpions for his role in the 
arms deal, but would carry any secrets he might have had to the grave, dying of 
cancer on 27th November 2001 in his home. This was not before being conferred the 
highest civilian honor, the Grand Cross (Gold) of the Order of the Star of South 
                                                 
5 “Mbeki reveals new push to combat graft” Cape Argus, 27 July 2001. 
6 Paul Kirk ,“The Modise house that Denel built”, Mail and Guardian, 20 July 2001. 
7 John Matisonn , “Modise heads company that benefits from Coega deal.”, Sunday Independent, 22 
July 2001. 
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Africa, on his deathbed by President Mbeki. Terry Crawford-Browne alleges in his 
book (2007:156) that “the spooks” came to see him about six weeks before Modise’s 
death: “Modise was, they told me, being slowly but deliberately poisoned because his 
cancer was not as advanced as would be politically convenient. Members of the 
government wanted him dead when the arms deal report came out because ‘a dead 
man could tell no tales’!” 
 
 In June 2003 The Guardian newspaper would allege that Modise had received a 500 
000 Pound bribe and that cash also went to the 1999 election fund of the ANC.8 BAe 
Systems plc would confirm funding of the Umkhonto we Sizwe Veteran’s 
Association (MKMVA) and that this was all above board and part of BAE’s social 
responsibility program:  
“We wanted to support the effort to provide training for (ex) fighters of the 
liberation (struggle). To assist in incorporating them into civilian society. The 
money was deposited into the First National Bank in Pretoria and is 
administered by a group of trustees called the Airborne Trust. The funds are 
audited by KPMG. BAe did it to be a good corporate citizen, to become 
involved in a project that was going to work towards the benefit of the 
country. And to demonstrate that we wish to be good corporate citizens doing 
business in South Africa.”9 
 
In November 2003 former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein alleged in interviews on 
Swedish radio and television stations that the partly-Swedish consortium BAe/Saab 
had bribed government and ANC officials, giving the ANC $35million to secure the 
contract to sell JAS Gripen fighter jets to South Africa.  Swedish Christian groups and 
the opposition Green Party called for an inquiry into allegations of bribery in South 
Africa’s multi-billion rand arms deal. BAe and Saab strongly denied the allegations 
saying these had been fully investigated by the Joint Investigating Team.10 The 
Serious Fraud Office in Britain is currently investigating BAe’s suspected bribery 
activities around the world, including South Africa. 
 
                                                 
8 Guardian Newspapers Limited, 14 June 2003 
9 Joy Russel .“BAE denies it paid for Modise’s cars”. Mail and Guardian online, 3 July 2003. 
10 “Probe South Africa’s arms deal, urge Swedish parties”, The Star, 17 November 2003. 
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Mbeki’s anti-corruption measures were widely praised. Later in the week Minister of 
Public Service and Administration, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi told the Pretoria Press 
Club that the issue of disclosure of public servants financial interests would in future 
not be limited to only Director Generals and their deputies and that the whole 
question of disclosure would be re-evaluated. The matter of consultants and conflicts 
of interests would also to be revisited with possible timeframes limiting contract work 
for the government after the termination of employment. There would be also be a 
review of the role of elected representatives such as Ministers “who may have served 
in particular portfolios and then also go into areas of work that could arguably be 
captured as conflict of interest.  This would be dealt with in terms of the ethics 
framework in place for parliamentarians as well as guidelines set for public servants.  
We feel that our commitment should go beyond out merely speaking about it but 
through practical actions that are taken.”11 
 
Clearly the various strands of the anti-corruption policy debate with both public 
administration and criminal justice reforms. The focus on corruption stimulated by the 
arms deal would provide an impetus for tightening anti-corruption legislation and 
reform, putting pressure on public officials to conduct themselves in a way that would 
best serve the public interest. 
 
7.5 The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
 
The government’s anti-corruption reform agenda was underpinned by research and 
from June to December 2001 the Public Service Commission undertook research into 
the functioning of hotlines, risk management, blacklisting of businesses and financial 
disclosure requirements for senior public servants. These findings and 
recommendations fed into the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy presented to 
parliament in May 2002. The new corruption legislation tabled for discussion in 
parliament in April 2002 would also try to address loopholes. But civil society in its 
submission on the bill (discussed later in this chapter) failed to persuade government 
to expand its commitment to addressing potential conflicts of interest and financial 
                                                 
11 “Stricter controls for officials mooted” The Citizen. 31 July 2001. 
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disclosure to the critical issue of the funding of the political process. Instead the 
“conspiracy of silence” between contributors and recipients would continue to hold.  
 
Following the release of the JIT report on the arms deal to parliament in mid 
November 2001 Minister of Public Service and Administration, Geraldine Fraser-
Moloketi commented that government response to the arms deal report would include 
an anti-corruption strategy with tighter laws to back it up and that this was being 
worked out between the security cluster of Ministers and herself, and due to be 
finalized by the end of the year.12 She referred to the fact that one of the lessons learnt 
from the arms procurement package was to look at employees lower than senior 
management – for example, deputy directors involved in negotiating large contracts: 
“We need to ensure we also have appropriate mechanisms to protect the employee as 
well as the government in terms of those deals to avoid abuse.”13  
 
In January 2002, Cabinet approved the public service anti-corruption strategy that not 
only built on preceding anti-corruption summit resolutions but also directly responds 
to issues raised by the arms deal, for example issues of post-public sector 
employment, conflict of interest provisions, procurement and financial disclosures by 
senior public servants. In his State of the Nation Address to the Joint Sitting of the 
Houses of Parliament in February 2002, President Mbeki noted: "In accordance with 
the government's comprehensive Public Service anti-corruption strategy, we have 
introduced measures to ensure that the code of conduct is upheld and that all public 
service managers are subject to conflict of interest disclosures. To complement this, 
legislation to fight corruption will be brought before parliament during this session 
(Mbeki 2002).” 
 
The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy document (2002) includes a summary of 
the proposals, a status report of the summit resolutions, a discussion on various 
dimensions of corruption, including impact, cost and definition and is designed to 
take a “holistic and integrated approach to fighting corruption…that requires a 
strategic mix of preventative and combative activities and a consolidation of the 
institutional and legislative capabilities of Government.” The strategy includes a 
                                                 
12 “Fraser-Moloketi to tighten screws” The Citizen, 23 November 2001. 
13 “Cabinet set to adopt anti-corruption drive,” The Star, 23 November 2001. 
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systematic implementation plan that considers time frames/target dates as well as cost 
implication. The nine inter-related and mutually supportive strategic considerations 
that comprise the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy are: 
Firstly, review and consolidation of the legislative framework: this requires 
that the existing Corruption Act be replaced with an effective and modern 
anti-corruption law. Other related legislation needs to be refined where 
necessary. 
Second, increased institutional capacity: this requires an increase in three 
areas; the courts' anti-corruption capacity, as well as increased institutional 
capacity for existing national institutions which have anti-corruption mandates 
and departmental anti-corruption capabilities. 
Third, improved access to report wrongdoing and protection of whistle 
blowers and witnesses: this focuses on improving application of the protected 
disclosures legislation, witness protection and hotlines.  
Fourth, prohibition of corrupt individuals and businesses: this proposes the 
establishment of mechanisms to prohibit corrupt employees from employment 
within the public sector. It also prohibits corrupt businesses from doing 
business with the Public Service. 
The fifth consideration is for improved management policies and practices: 
practices pertaining to procurement systems, employment arrangements, the 
management of discipline, risk management, management information and 
financial management are to be improved. Proposals include the extension of 
the system of disclosure of financial interests, screening of personnel, 
establishing mechanisms to regulate post-public service employment and 
strengthening the capacity to manage discipline.  
The sixth area that has been identified is the need to manage professional 
ethics: this requires a renewed emphasis on managing ethics, including the 
establishment of a generic ethics statement for the Public Service that is 
 153 
supported by extensive and practical explanatory manuals, training and 
education. 
A seventh consideration is the need for partnerships with stakeholders: 
partnering is envisaged as a major cornerstone of the establishment of a 
national anti-corruption strategy. 
The eighth consideration, is the need for social analysis, research and policy 
advocacy: This consideration proposes that all sectors be encouraged to 
undertake ongoing analysis of the trends, causes and impact of corruption: All 
the sectors are required to advocate preventive measures.  
Lastly, a need has been identified for awareness, training and education to 
support the above developments and launch of a targeted public 
communication campaign: It is proposed that the campaign be aimed at the 
promotion of South Africa's anti-corruption and good governance successes 
both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the campaign will be 
hinged on the promotion of Batho Pele initiatives and the development of a 
sense of pride amongst employees. 
Not all the strategic considerations will be dealt with. Clearly the references under 
strategic consideration two regarding procurement, conflicts of interest and 
mechanisms to regulate post-Public service employment (a “cooling off period”) stem 
from lessons learned from the arms deal investigation, in particular relating to the 
chief of procurement, Chippy Shaik, and the financial activities of the former minister 
of defence, Joe Modise. These were areas that the arms deal scandal had highlighted 
as weaknesses in the government’s anti-corruption program. The remainder of this 
chapter will look at the development of strategic consideration one, namely the new 
corruption law.  
 
7.6 A New Corruption Act 
 
The first step of the national anti-corruptions strategy was to support the legislative 
process underway to enact a new law that would comprehensively deal with 
corruption in all its forms. Making corruption a prosecutable offence in democratic 
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South Africa would be the main objective of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act. The adoption of the new law would see South Africa comply 
favorably with every international and regional obligation to fight corruption, and the 
South African legal framework when it came into effect would both comply with and 
exceed the requirements of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(signed by South Africa in December 2003 and ratified on the 22 November 2004).  
 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption with its 71 articles and 8 chapters 
paves the way for a more unified and international multi-sectoral response to 
corruption. For one, it requires Party States to criminalize bribery and embezzlement 
in both the private and public sectors. It also makes provision for the participation of 
civil society in the fight against corruption. The provisions on asset recovery make it 
mandatory for Party States to return the proceeds of these offences to the countries of 
origin. The agreement includes norms of conduct for public officials, greater 
transparency based on public access to information of government business, as well as 
stricter procurement regulations and measures against money laundering. The 
Convention requires State Parties to promote integrity, honesty and responsibility 
among its public officials and to adopt measures to facilitate the reporting by officials 
of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities. The provisions also make reference to 
declarations of outside activities, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits 
that may result in conflicts of interest as regards the functions of a public official.  
 
7.6.1 Background to the Legislative Process 
 
A review of the corruption act had been called for from 1997 and in both the anti-
corruption conference resolutions of 1998 and 1999. The Corruption Act 94 of 1992 
was widely regarded as ineffective, not least as it had repealed the common law crime 
of bribery and had also failed to keep pace with technological, jurisdictional and legal 
developments around the world. In October 1999, in response to the perceived delay 
on implementing the national summit resolution on reviewing the existing corruption 
legislation, Raenette Taljaard, an MP from the Democratic Party, tabled a private 
member’s bill. Taljaard would serve as an outspoken member on Scopa as it grappled 
with its oversight role relative to the arms deal investigation.  
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Taljaard called for an amendment to the existing Corruption Act 94 of 1992 to 
provide for the “criminalization of the misuse of public office” arguing in the 
accompanying memorandum that “the new offence created by this Bill will assist the 
Heath Investigative Unit with its stated intention to blacklist public officials found 
guilty of corrupt behavior. The synergies between such a system of blacklisting and 
tracking and the new offence created by this bill will contribute greatly to the fight 
against corruption and ridding our civil service from the scourge that plagues it at 
present”.  Taljaard’s action, pursuing legislative reform using the private member’s 
Bill was described by the Financial Mail as standing as good a chance as “the 
proverbial snowball in hell of getting though the ANC-dominated parliament.”14 The 
Chair of the Justice Committee, Johnny De Lange, dismissed the proposal in favor of 
a comprehensive rather than what was termed a “piecemeal approach” towards the 
anti-corruption legal framework. This comprehensive approach would take almost 
five years, from October 1999 to April 2004, to deliver the new law. 
 
In reviewing and consolidating the legislative framework, the national anti-corruption 
strategy in January 2002 had ambitiously argued that such a review would need to a) 
establish a workable legal definition of corruption; b) extend the scope of legislation 
to all officials in public bodies, corruptors and their agents; c) reinstate the common 
law offence of bribery d) create presumption of prima facie proof to facilitate 
prosecution of an offence under the revised legislation; e) establish extra-territorial 
application and jurisdiction, and compliance with international conventions to which 
South Africa is a signatory; f) improve the civil and recovery elements of the 
legislative framework, for example recovery of losses in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act, prevention of organized crime, recovery from pension provisions, 
freezing of assets and return of assets to institutions that incurred losses; g) enable the 
State and individuals to claim for damages; h) prohibit corrupt individuals from 
further employment in the Public Sector as well as prohibit corrupt Businesses 
(including principals and directors of such Businesses) from gaining contracts funded 
from State revenue; i) regulate post-Public Service employment; j) establish 
responsibility for maintaining the witness protection system; and finally k) make the 
legislation easy to understand and apply. 
                                                 
14 Ferial Haffajee, “Snowball’s chance in hell?” Financial Mail, 22 October 1999. 
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In February 2002, Justice Committee members were finally presented with a first 
copy of what was termed the Prevention of Corruption Bill, “to provide anew for the 
prevention of corruption and related offences; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. The Bill had been drafted by the Department of Justice with inputs from 
stakeholders and was accompanied by a comprehensive memorandum, including legal 
opinions on the reverse onus provisions in the Bill. Following a brief overview of 
current international initiatives against corruption, the accompanying Memorandum 
stated “it becomes clear that South Africa lacks an overall anti-corruption strategy and 
the South African legislation relating to corruption and bribery, although only enacted 
in 1992, is far behind the legislation of the major international countries.”15 The trend 
of modern international legislation is the “unbundling” of corruption, in terms of 
which various specific corruption actions and corrupt practices are defined and 
prohibited. The South African act drew largely on the Nigerian Corruption Practices 
and Other Related Offences Act that in turn had relied on legislation enacted in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Lesotho and Kenya. 
 
The adoption of the new Bill would see an unbundling of corruption in which corrupt 
practices and related offences are specified across a wide spectrum. At the time the 
head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Bulelani Ngcuka, commented: 
“Commendably, the new Act will also address the fraudulent acquisition of 
private interest, the problem of unexplained income (assets) of those living 
beyond their means, abuse of public office for gratification, the failure to 
report corrupt transactions and the corruption by South African citizens or 
public officials in connection with business or foreign states or international 
organizations. The developments if accepted and implemented represent a 
milestone in our efforts to place a regulatory straightjacket on corrupt 
activities. I hope that ultimately the legislative regime will provide clarity in 
respect of future corruption, several cases of malfeasance and some untenable 
forms of conflict of interest” (Ngcuka 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
15 Explanatory Memorandum: Prevention of Corruption Bill, 2002. 22 April 2002. www.pmg.org.za 
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7.6.2 Civil Society Responds 
 
On 18th April 2002 an explanatory summary of the new Corruption Bill was published 
for comment. The public interest NGO, Idasa convened a number of meetings with 
civil society stakeholders to discuss the draft Bill and potential submissions to the 
Committee. Idasa’s substantive submission tackled the crucial question of the 
regulation of private funding to political parties, even proposing a draft chapter for the 
Bill on this issue. Endorsed by NGOs such as the Institute for Security Studies, the 
Black Sash, The South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Social Law project at 
the University of the Western Cape, Human Rights Committee, and the Open 
Democracy Advice Center, Idasa’s argument for regulation was to minimize the 
undue influence of money on politics, while at the same time recognizing that money 
is an important feature of the modern political landscape. The argument was based on 
an argument of equality and the right of freedom of expression: 
 “To this end, various social and political practices and functions may require 
regulations to make sure that the average citizens right to expression is not 
constrained or drowned out: As a democratic right, freedom of expression 
assumes the equal opportunity to speak and be heard in order to contribute to 
political debate by providing information and opinion that will persuade. In an 
unregulated system only the wealthy are able to do this in a non transparent 
manner, and in a rights based culture like ours, this derogates from the 
principle of political equality and provides an unfair advantage to those who 
are able to donate.” 
 
Responding to Idasa’s submission the Justice Committee chair, Johnny De Lange, 
argued that the criminal offence of corruption as envisioned by the Act would 
incorporate all forms of corruption, including those involving political parties and 
elected public representatives, particularly MPs. He pointed out that the general 
clauses of the bill as it stands would apply as much to political parties as it would to 
public servants or private sector companies. Thus any official of a political party, 
involved in say, bribery, as defined in the bill, will be guilty of an offence. De Lange 
conceded that the Bill did not deal with the reporting of donations to political parties 
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and related offences and suggested it would be difficult to incorporate a code on 
political party funding, as suggested by Idasa, as this would require the agreement of 
all the parties and the introduction of a new chapter. He did not think it was practical 
to include political party funding in the Bill simply because there was nothing to hang 
offences on, i.e. because there was no system governing party political funding, it 
would not be possible to simply create a series of offences. Idasa’s Richard Calland 
said that he accepted the point made, but "we are hoping that the justice committee 
will recognise the importance of this issue and chart a way forward perhaps with a 
recommendation that it be considered in terms of other legislation".16  
 
Concern about corruption in political parties was of growing concern. In July 2003, 
Transparency International’s first Global Corruption Barometer survey polling 30 000 
people in 44 countries (including South Africa) found that in three countries out of 
four, political parties were singled out as the institution from which citizens would 
most like to eliminate corruption. 21,1% of South African respondents mentioned 
political parties, with only the police as an institution targeted for reform trumping 
this number at 23,8% (TI 2003). In late 2003 Idasa and two South African citizens, 
Judith February and Brett Davidson would take four South African political parties 
(ANC, DA, IFP and NNP) to court. In Heads of Argument Idasa sought to establish 
the principle that political parties were obliged to give details of their substantial 
private donations to those asking for that information and that disclosure of donations 
(over a certain threshold of R50 000 – substantial enough to influence a political 
party, its office bearers and its members) is required for the proper functioning of a 
multiparty system of government and to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.17 
 
In November 2003 I prepared an expert affidavit for Idasa’s court case and argued, 
based on the emerging international anti-corruption debate, the centrality of the 
regulation of the funding of political parties to the corruption issue.  Flowing from 
research conducted as part of the 2004 Global Integrity study, the affidavit noted that: 
“The most glaring omission in South Africa in relation to electoral processes 
and accountability provisions in general is the fact that there are no specific 
                                                 
16 Wyndham Hartley, “Considering crime and corruption”, Business Day, 20 August 2002. 
17 “Funds: Conspiracy of Silence” News 24.com, 10th February 2005. 
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rules around the disclosure of private funding which political parties receive. 
Indeed there appears to be a conspiracy of silence between corporations and 
political parties as well as foreign governments who fund various parties. In 
this sense accountability is eroded between political parties and citizens who 
want to know who is funding their political bosses and which policy issues 
foreign or corporate interests may determine. There seems to be an unspoken 
understanding that providing funding to a political party, particularly one in 
power, may positively influence one’s chances of securing a particular 
contract. Whilst no-one denies that political parties need funds to run an 
election, there appears no will to disclose who funds whom to the public and 
in this way open up scrutiny for potential conflicts of interests” (Camerer 
2003).  
 
The affidavit concluded with a plea for accountability based on citizen’s access to 
information: “If knowledge is power, and corruption can be defined as the abuse of 
public power for personal gain, it is crucial that citizens re-access the power that is 
being exercised in their name by politicians, in order to hold their government’s 
accountable. This they can do through information. A refusal by political parties to 
disclose information about their private funding creates the potential for abuse when 
money and power coincide. This puts into question the credible commitment of 
political players to openness and transparency. The consequent opaqueness of the 
political process favours special interests that can buy access as well influence the 
political process in inequitable, unjust and potentially criminal ways that harm the 
public interest and adversely limit the ability of citizens and the public to participate 
in democratic process” (Camerer 2003). 
 
On 20th April 2005 judgment was delivered in the Cape High Court. Idasa’s 
application to access the records of private donations made to the four biggest 
political parties in South Africa under the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
2000, was dismissed. Recognizing however that the litigation was brought in the 
public interest and the importance of the principles of transparency and openness at 
stake, Judge Griesel made no order as to costs (Idasa 2005). While not granting the 
relief sought by Idasa and dismissing the application, Judge Griesel nevertheless 
found that the applicants had made out a “compelling case – with reference to both 
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principle and to comparative law – that private donations to political parties ought to 
be regulated by way of specific legislation in the interest of greater openness and 
transparency.” Because of the complexity of the issues involved and the myriad of 
ways in which they can be dealt with by legislation, the Judge noted that it is 
“precisely because of these complexities that the court is, in my view, ill equipped – 
compared with the legislature – to perform the task that the applicants are seeking to 
impose on it.”18 
 
At a press briefing on the case, Idasa stated that having carefully considered the 
judgment of Justice Griesel, the organization had decided not to appeal. “We do not 
abandon our assertion that the public have a constitutional right to know who 
privately funds political parties – far from it – but accept that for the time being at 
least, political parties should be given a further opportunity to fill the lacuna that 
exists in the anti-corruption policy and legal apparatus by processing appropriate 
legislation through parliament.” The statement went on to note how the ANC’s 
position in court had been to either dismiss the case or alternatively call for a stay of 
the proceedings “so as to allow for the political and legislative process to follow the 
proper course necessary for the adoption of a national policy through legislation 
regulating the funding of political parties within the Republic of South Africa” stating 
in its Heads of Argument that “the question of regulation and control of private donor 
funding of political parties should be addressed and implement through a legislative 
process which will embody national policy perspectives and the balancing of the 
rights interests of all persons, including the electorate, political parties and their 
donors.”  The ANC had essentially committed itself to take the issue back to the 
legislature something Idasa noted, “We see no good reason not to accept the good 
faith of its stated position to the Court…Like the judge, we too take seriously the 
assertions made by the ANC on oath…and look forward to the parliamentary 
process.”  
 
Idasa recalled a speech made in the National Assembly in 1997 when the ANC 
introduced the bill that subsequently became the Public Funding of Represented 
                                                 
18 Case No 9828/03 in the High Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) 
Judgment Delivered 20 April 2005. 
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Political Parties Act 1997. Then Minister for Constitutional Development Valli 
Moosa had said: 
“For political parties to perform in terms of the Constitution, that is to be 
democratic, to be accountable, to be responsive to the people of this country, 
we need to ensure that parties do not act merely as fronts for some or other 
powerful financial backer. That is the danger that our democracy could face, 
as other democracies have in other parts of the world. Therefore, this Bill 
attempts to ensure that we reduce the dependency of political parties on one or 
two powerful financial backers, and thereby reduce the possibility of the 
subversion of political parties and also the subversion of Parliament itself and 
of our democracy.” 
 
Idasa noted that in the corruption trial of ANC financier Schabir Shaik, evidence was 
given that Shaik had made substantial donations to the ANC during the late 90s and 
early 90s, and that these “show the on-going danger of secret, unregulated private 
funding of political parties. In both instances, the public received this information too 
late for it to be able to evaluate the impact it may have had on policy – such as the 
golf estate development or the notorious arms deal – and only know because of the 
criminal trials.” As of April 2008 the ANC dominated legislature has yet to have a 
serious discussion on the regulation of private contributions to political parties, and 
for now the conspiracy of silence continues. In comprehensively reviewing the 
corruption related legislation in South Africa, it appears the opportunity was missed to 
tackle reform in this key area. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
Having followed deliberations around the Bill closely in parliament it is clear that this 
was one of the most conceptually challenging laws for legislators to grapple with. 
Committee chair, Adv Johnny De Lange, was clearly not going to rush the law 
through until each section had been thoroughly interrogated, clearly defined and 
teased out so as not to create a potential loophole in the law. The deliberations in the 
committee make for fascinating reading and are persuasive of the seriousness with 
which members of parliament, across the political spectrum, applied their mind taking 
into account domestic and international considerations.  
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Finally, following two years of deliberations and ten drafts, the new Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act was finally completed in December 2003 and 
came into force on 27th April 2004, on the 10th anniversary of South Africa’s 
transition to democracy. The purpose of the Act is: 
To provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat 
corruption and corrupt activities; to provide for the offence of corruption and 
offences related to corrupt activities; to provide for investigative measures in 
respect of corruption and related corrupt activities; to provide for the 
establishment and endorsement of a Register in order to place certain 
restrictions on persons and enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating 
to tenders and contracts; to place a duty on certain persons holding a position 
of authority to report certain corrupt transactions; to provide for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in respect of the offence of corruption and offences relating to 
corrupt activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
 
The significance of new law eventually being signed on the tenth anniversary of 
South Africa’s successful transition to democracy should not be under-estimated as a 
statement of political will on behalf of the executive to fight corruption. This 
comprehensive law was crafted against the backdrop of the finalization of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption and takes into account other regional anti-
corruption protocols such as those developed by the OECD, SADC and the African 
Union. It would be used by the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions to charge 
former deputy president Jacob Zuma on three counts of corruption (following his 
dismissal by President Thabo Mbeki on 14th June 2005). The ongoing criminal 
investigation into Jacob Zuma is not dealt with in any detail in this thesis. 
 
While the national anti-corruption strategy was released six months later than 
originally intended, to the extent that the findings and recommendations from the JIT 
Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages were integrated into the final 
strategy document, this delay may have been beneficial. South Africa, for the first 
time, had a comprehensive law to tackle corruption and related offences, wherever 
they might appear. Whilst the law and the threat of its impending sanctions may have 
come into effect too late to prevent any corruption and related offences relative to the 
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arms deal, it is clear that the its drafting was influenced by the backdrop of the 
criminal investigations and cases that emanated from the Joint Investigation Team and 
its report.   
 
While the new law is comprehensive, it fails to include specific provisions relating to 
the regulation of the private contributions and sources that fund political parties 
(although this was argued by civil society in its submissions to parliament on the 
legislation). Some would argue that this lacuna in the anti-corruption architecture 
seriously questions the political will address the corrupting influence of money in 
politics, a thread which weaves itself through the arms deal allegations. When it 
comes to knowing who funds the political process in South Africa, the corrupting 
nexus between power and money, thirteen years on, this remains a shocking lacuna in 
an otherwise impressive array of anti-corruption mechanisms. And it is something 
that the ruling party (as well as other parties in parliament) seemingly has no real 
interest in remedying. The area of political party contributions would come to 
dominate civil society activism around the issue of corruption as this gap would 
continue to be exploited by the corrupt across political parties. Allegations of 
corruption in the arms deal have continually harped on whether kickbacks from arms 
companies to secure lucrative contracts were possibly funneled into ANC party 
coffers, rather than purely individuals within the process who might have benefited 
from the deal. At this point there is no way of knowing. 
 
This concludes our survey of recent anti-corruption reforms in South Africa. Having 
addressed both the theory of corruption and its control (Part One) and the policy 
landscape with regards to anti-corruption measures in South Africa (Part Two), the 
stage is set to explore the practice. This will be done in Parts Three and Four that look 
at the arms deal as a case study of the effectiveness of corruption and accountability 
measures in South Africa. 
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PART THREE: THE ARMS DEAL 
 
Chapter Eight: Anatomy of the Arms Deal1 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The primary purpose for undertaking a comprehensive case study of the Strategic 
Defence Procurement Package (SDPP) or “arms deal” is to document the workings in 
practice of the institutions and mechanisms that comprise the anti-corruption 
architecture in South Africa. In particular, the following chapters of the thesis 
examine the challenging role of parliament and its committees in exercising oversight 
over the executive branch of government. This is an aspect that has not been 
particularly highlighted by any of the theories of corruption and our close attention to 
it, gives a new emphasis to the debate. The South African experience in this regard 
has implications beyond our borders. 
 
Why focus on the arms deal, admittedly an unusual case of grand corruption?  
 
As an illustration of this aspect of the corruption equation, the arms deal chose itself. 
Since allegations of corruption in the arms deal first surfaced in 1999 involving senior 
cabinet figures, no other issue has so dominated the political landscape nor so acutely 
tested the legislative, policy and institutional mechanisms in place in democratic 
South Africa to prevent abuses of power, nor the political will of the government to 
confront corruption within its ranks.  
 
While a number of other politically significant cases of corruption emerged during the 
first decade or so of South Africa’s democratic transition, it is the arms deal that has 
tested several tenets of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, and continues to. 
From challenges to the independence of the criminal justice system and the so-called 
Chapter Nine institutions such as the Public Protector and Auditor General, to 
freedom of the media, even the future presidency of South Africa has been thrown 
wide open by the ongoing criminal investigation into the deputy president of the ANC 
and former deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma. 
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, Appendix 3 gives the names of individual role-players and institutions that 
appear in the case study. 
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The arms deal case starkly demonstrates the limits of the institutions, laws and 
practices that are in place to prevent abuses of power in South Africa and points to the 
importance of taking other factors into account such as political will, political 
rivalries, political culture and context, all factors that may play a role in influencing 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies.  
 
8.2 Focus of the Case Study 
 
The case study covers the time period from the initiation of the Defence Review 
process in 1996, allegations of and investigation into alleged corruption by the Joint 
Investigation Team (JIT), through to the firing by President Mbeki in June 2005 of his 
deputy president, Jacob Zuma. It does not cover in any detail the criminal trials of 
Tony Yengeni and Schabir Shaik that resulted from the JIT investigation, nor the 
Hefer Commission of Inquiry that took place during this period. Rather the focus is on 
events that took place in parliament as the key institution constitutionally tasked with 
upholding democratic accountability, and a body meant to represent and protect the 
public interest specifically by overseeing executive powers. 
 
The case study is relayed from the perspective of an ordinary member of the public 
who may have followed the public debate and coverage of the arms deal both in the 
media and in parliament. It does not go into any technical detail of the arms industry, 
procurement processes, nor arguments around offset agreements. Rather, the activities 
of the legislative branch of government (namely the Speaker, the ruling party, 
opposition political parties and parliamentary committees, in particular the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts and the Ethics Committee) are examined telling a 
revealing story of how the South African government, with its oft-stated 
commitments to good governance, chose to respond to an actual case of alleged 
corruption. With the institutional mechanisms at its disposal, this would lay bare the 
extent to which, behind those mechanisms, there exists the political will to confront 
corruption.  
 
Lessons learned from the arms deal case study may inform the theoretical 
development of South African as well as international approaches to fighting 
corruption. The case study highlights how fiercely the political culture within the 
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ruling party, namely that of loyalty to the party, impacts on the functioning and 
integrity of various democratic institutions. This notion is alluded to in LeVine’s 
explication of political corruption, dealt with in Chapter Two. The arms deal has been 
chosen as it touches on and tests both the existence and effective functions of the 
systems that promote democratic accountability, described in previous chapters.  
 
8.3 A Test for Democratic Accountability 
 
Would the ANC led government pass the toughest test it had faced yet in terms of its 
political will and commitment to fighting corruption wherever it might appear? The 
stakes were high. 
 
The “litmus test” for democratic accountability in South Africa is how the good 
governance NGO, Idasa, described the way in which the government would deal with 
the allegations of high level corruption, implicating leading ANC politicians including 
the deputy President and a former minister of Defence. Others noted that the 
investigation into the arms deal was “set to test the country’s anti-corruption and 
oversight institutions to their limits.”2 The political will of the ruling ANC, the 
government and particularly President Thabo Mbeki faced “a decisive test of their 
integrity and will to combat corruption in the attitude they adopt to the investigation 
into the R43.8 billion arms deal.3”  
 
 Aside from upholding the country’s reputation for honoring contracts and preventing 
corruption, a proper investigation was argued to be a “defining moment in the current 
state of our democracy.”4 The credibility of the investigation was said to 
“substantially determine the extent to which South Africa can, and does, in future 
years advance good governance in the region as a whole”5.  Whatever other scandals 
South Africa may have been implicated in since the dawn of its democracy “none 
could have been as damaging to the country’s image abroad as these allegations 
involving the arms procurement”.6 Indeed, a senior source in the investigation 
                                                 
2 Mail and Guardian, 4-9 November 2000. 
3 Mail and Guardian, 5-11 January 2001. 
4 The Cape Argus, 15 January 2001. 
5 Africa News Service, 17 November 2000. 
6 The Cape Argus, 24 January 2001. 
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suggested that if the scale of corruption was as widespread as some of the evidence 
suggested the scandal “could even bring down the government”.7 
 
8.4 Arms under Review 
 
In April 1998, the Defence Review process that originated from the 1996 White Paper 
on Defence, came before parliament. Two years of widespread, transparent and public 
consultation had characterized the Defence Review whose objective had been three-
fold: to review the current defence force capabilities, determine the force size and 
equipment for a democratic South Africa and both make recommendations as well as 
provide for a vision on optimal force size and equipment.   
 
The end of apartheid had brought with it a vision of peace and stability in the region. 
Nationally, the focus was on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
that would produce internal stability and growth. For this reason both the White Paper 
and the Defence Review argued that South Africa could significantly reduce defence 
spending and rather concentrate on the establishment of a small (core) conventional 
regular force and a large part-time force, which could be mobilized when required (Le 
Roux 2004). It was anticipated that the SANDF would progressively withdraw from 
the internal policing function and that a force of about 1,000 soldiers – with air, 
maritime and medical support units – would be sufficient for the country’s 
international and regional peace support obligations. These planning assumptions, 
combined with budgetary restrictions, thus led to the approved establishment of a 
defence force of some 55,000 uniformed regular soldiers focused on the maintenance 
of a core conventional capability (Le Roux 2004).  
 
While the White Paper and Defence Review process had presented a coherent defence 
policy framework, by 2004 it was clear that the vision presented in both documents 
had not been fully realized. This was for a variety of reasons that will not be discussed 
here save to say that many of the force design assumptions had been wrong and that 
as peacekeeping on the African continent became an important focus for the SANDF, 
the final Strategic Defence Procurement Package that was agreed to in 1999 had been 
largely inappropriate.  
                                                 
7 Africa News Service, 17 November 2000. 
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During the Defence Review NGOs such as the Coalition for Defence Alternatives 
(CDA) had argued persuasively that there was no conceivable foreign military threat 
to South Africa. Rather the real threat to security and the transition to democracy was 
poverty. It would be CDA who in June 1999 received a memo via ANC intelligence 
operatives from Concerned ANC MPs of allegations of corruption in the arms deal 
(Crawford-Browne 2007). 
 
8.4.1 Parliament’s “Approval” of the Deal 
 
One of the myths of the arms deal saga is the oft-quoted notion that “parliament 
approved the arms deal when it approved the force design contained in the Defence 
Review”, a mantra used repeatedly by those wishing to defend the deal. This 
argument does not hold water. In April 1998 while Parliament approved the force 
design contained in the Defence Review, it did not however approve the final 
procurement package. Rather parliament approved a “vision” which would change 
over time, be subject to parliamentary oversight, and which the Department of 
Defence itself accepted was not affordable because of budgetary constraints (Idasa 
2001). In May 1998 Shamin “Chippy” Shaik, the recently appointed Chief of 
Acquisitions at the Department of Defence told parliament’s joint standing committee 
on Defence that South Africa could not afford the “core force” acquisitions proposed 
in the Defence Review.  
 
While Parliament’s “approval” was used to add credibility and legitimacy to the deal, 
it was not necessarily so clear-cut. The Defence Review did not motivate for an 
increase in defence spending. On the contrary, the Review stated that the Department 
of Defence expected its budget to remain constant over several years at R9.7 billion in 
1998 Rand value. Leading defence experts such as Dr Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute 
for Security Studies were surprised at the eventual size of the deal. In March 1998 
Cilliers wrote “realistically there is little, if any, chance that South Africa could afford 
the approximately R28 billion packages that are being discussed…the country can 
probably only afford to procure foreign equipment to the tune of R8-9 billion” 
(Cilliers 1998).  
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Thus, when parliament approved the Defence Review, it did not approve an increase 
in defence spending and as such parliament was never asked to approve the current 
arms package (Idasa 2001). Decisions on the final procurement package would be 
taken outside of parliament, namely by the executive ministerial committee 
(MINCOM). On the largest public expenditure in democratic South Africa, 
parliament would be precluded from the start from exercising effective oversight. 
 
8.5 The Procurement Process  
 
Once recommendations for the SDPP had been “approved” by parliament, the 
framework for procurement, in particular the evaluations systems for defence 
contracts, was established. An elaborate tender process was followed: 
• The evaluation of tenders was first considered by four committees, the first 
assessing the tender in terms of its technical merits, the second considering its 
financial details, the third considering its Defence Industrial Participation 
(DIP) benefits, and the fourth its National Industrial Participation (NIP) 
benefits.  
• These results were forwarded to the Strategic Offers Committee (SOC), which 
operated as a coordinating committee. 
• The results of SOC were forwarded to the Armament Acquisition Steering 
Board (AASB), which in turn submitted its recommendations to the 
Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC). 
• The AAC’s recommendation was forwarded to the Ministers’ Committee 
(MINCOM), which in turn reported to the Cabinet. 
 
In early July 1998 different evaluation teams met to consolidate offers with the 
highest score, according to various criteria, and recommend the preferred suppliers. 
Specific criteria for the tenders related to Industrial Participation (IP) programs, 
notorious as a negotiating strategy in the defence trade to “offset” the costs of 
unusually large arms purchases by requiring that a percentage of the contract value be 
invested in the economy of the purchasing country. This investment can include 
participation of local companies as subcontractors in the main project, export of 
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related or other industrial goods, or investment in plant, facilities, or people, thereby 
stimulating economic activity. All substantial arms purchases were subject to both 
Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) and National Industrial Participation (NIP) 
obligations (Botha 2003). The stated tender requirements for offsets set by the South 
African government were that DIP and NIP should at least equal the value of the 
purchase contract. As the interest among tenderers was so high, IP became a key 
differentiating issue, and the agreements that were eventually signed were for DIP of 
$2.4 billion (60% of the contract value) and NIP of $14 billion (350% of the contract 
value), totaling more than four times the value of the signed contracts (Botha 2003).  
 
At the end of August 1998 a Cabinet subcommittee accepted recommendations 
relating to the preferred bids. On 21 October 1998 a presentation of the Strategic 
Defence Packages was made to Cabinet where it was resolved that the committee 
dealing with procurement must have further discussions with the Finance ministry 
regarding the recommended packages and report back to cabinet. On 18 November 
1998 Cabinet approved the program costs and the preferred suppliers of defense 
equipment were announced.  
 
Supplier  Product  Cost  (Rbns)  
Investment 
(Rbns) 
Exports 
(Rbns) 
Local  
Sales Jobs  
Germany  4 frigates  6.0 2.1 2.1 11.8 10 153 
Germany  3 submarines  5.2 6.3 23.0 1.1 16 251 
Italy  40 helicopters  2.2 0.4 2.9 1.4 4 558 
Britain 4 helicopters 0.8 0.3 0.2 2.2 2 536 
Britain  24 Hawks 4.7 2.6 4.6 1.5 7 472 
Sweden 24 Gripens 10.9 14.4 26.5 7.4 23 195 
TOTAL  29.8 26.1 59.3 25.4 64165 
Source: Business Day 19 November 1998 
 
There was no indication of any additional costs being brought to Cabinet’s attention. 
The International Offers Negotiating Team (IONT) established by cabinet to negotiate 
achievable funding arrangements to finalize the contracts, sprang into action. Minutes 
from a MINCOM meeting held on 20 January 1999 note that initial discussions by the 
IONT with the project team indicate a possible increase in the overall procurement 
cost from that presented to the cabinet on 18 November 1998. The Department of 
Defence proposed that all program management costs be addressed outside the 
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approved procurement cost and undertook to ensure that all technical program related 
costs would be accommodated within the project cost.  
 
In March 1999 an Affordability Team was established within the Finance Department 
to consider and report upon the cost implications of the proposed transactions and in 
particular what negative consequences entering into the transactions might have for 
the South African economy. This report was presented to MINCOM five months later 
on 31 August 1999. The report noted the cost of the deal as being “substantially 
higher than originally presented to Cabinet” but that affordability was ultimately a 
question of political choice. This echoes a sentiment raised by a defence analyst from 
the Institute for Security Studies: “In the case of major procurement decisions, the 
final decision is taken within Cabinet and is essentially a political and economic, 
rather than a technical decision” (Cilliers 1998).  
 
8.6 The Final Strategic Defence Procurement Package 
 
On 15 September 1999 cabinet announced its decision and reasons (such as age) to 
procure the following military equipment: 
 
• Nine dual-seater Gripen and 12 Hawk aircraft from British Aerospace/SAAB 
to replace the current Cheetah and Impala aircraft. A further option has been taken 
on the balance of the 12 Hawks and 19 single-seater Gripens;  
• Four patrol corvettes from the German Frigate Consortium to replace the present 
ageing strike crafts, which are more than 30 years old; 
• Thirty light utility helicopters from the Italian helicopter manufacturer Augusta, 
which will replace the Allouette helicopters which have been in service of the air 
force for more than 30 years; 
• Three submarines from the German Submarine Consortium, which will replace 
the ageing Daphne submarines, which have been in service in the navy for more 
than 30 years. 
 
The choice of the equipment was framed by reference to the Defence Review process 
which had concluded that the specific force design required for South Africa should 
be a high technology core force, sized for peace time but which could be expanded in 
 172 
the face of any emerging threat. In addition various critical factors such as technical 
capability, the value of the equipment, the industrial and economic development 
offers made, as well as examining the affordability of the package given the socio-
economic imperatives of the country, were apparently taken into account in selecting 
the preferred suppliers.8  
 
8.6.1 The Cost of the Deal 
 
Regarding the cost of the deal, the 15 September 1999 statement read:  
“The cost of the equipment package is R21,3 billion over the next 8 years. If 
the option to procure additional equipment is exercised, the total equipment 
cost will rise by R8,5 billion to R29,9billion over 12 years.”  
These costs included “statutory cost like VAT, custom duties, freight, export credit 
guarantees and program management”, but not the actual financing of the deal. These 
additional and substantial costs would only come to light over a year later in October 
2000 when parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) quizzed 
DoD officials and the true cost of the deal would be revealed to the public. With 
regard to the full cost implications, although the nominal initial capital commitment 
was R29.992 billion, taking into account likely adverse exchange rate movements, the 
impact of escalation clauses in the contracts, and interest obligations, the ultimate out-
flow of currency from South Africa was likely to be well in excess of R50 billion 
(IDASA 2001).  
The deal had been sold to the public as generating investment worth R104bn through 
offset agreements and Industrial Participation (IP) that would create 65 000 jobs. In 
terms of affordability of the package, given the socio-economic imperatives of the 
country, the statement announcing the deal noted “Cabinet is fully satisfied regarding 
the offset arrangements attached to this package, which will benefit the economy and 
advance socio-economic interests of the country.” The press release did not state that 
the transactions were subject to any risks. However, the affordability report presented 
to MINCOM in August 1999 had foretold that the transactions would result in 
payment obligations well into the future and emphasized three important risks 
                                                 
8 GCIS press statement 15 September 1999: Cabinet decision on strategic defence procurement. 
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namely: possible adverse foreign exchange movements; the non-materialization of 
national and defence industrial participation benefits and the impact of interest 
obligations. The report had stressed that the transactions held adverse financial 
implications for the country under the best-case scenario and in relation to the latter 
two risks noted: 
“… The materialisation of either one of the two risks analysed - larger than 
expected interest rate shock in relation to the announcement, or the failure of 
the vendors to meet a significant proportion of their NIP commitments - is 
likely to lead to the macro-economic impact of the program being significantly 
negative in comparison with the baseline scenario.”    
The report concluded with two further warnings: 
“The sums involved are extremely large; they involve fixed contractual 
commitments extending over long periods with high breakage costs; they are 
heavily import-based; and their costs are off-set by a set of associated 
activities (the NIPs) which cannot be guaranteed.”   
 “These characteristics create a set of important and unique risks for 
Government … ultimately the decision about expenditure levels really 
constitutes a decision about Government’s appetite for risk.”    
In short, MINCOM was pertinently warned about the negative impact that the 
transactions would have on the economy (IDASA 2001). However, the South African 
public, it appears, were not told of these risks. 
 
8.6.2 Off-Sets and Undisclosed Risks 
 
The expression “off-sets” is used to refer to benefits intended to accrue to a country as 
a consequence of arms transactions.  Thus the main contractors were required to 
indicate in their tenders what economic benefits they would commit themselves to 
providing to South Africa, which would effectively off-set the enormous costs of arms 
procurement. Off-sets in industrial participation commitments for the arms deal were 
estimated at about R110 billion (later reduced to R104 billion) and would apparently 
create more than 65 000 jobs. The off-sets formed a major (if not the major) basis for 
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persuading Parliament and the South African public that the transactions were 
desirable (Idasa 2001). 
In the September 1999 press statement the “affordability” of the transactions were 
touted on the basis that: “Over the medium term, benefits of NIP and DIP fully off-set 
economic and fiscal costs of the procurement” and “Government will be able to cover 
expenditures required without altering its existing deficit target.” Although the 
briefing document saw implementing National Industrial Participation (NIP) and 
Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) as a critical area for attention, it gave no idea 
as to the tenuous nature of those supposed benefits. Rather Cabinet noted that it was 
“fully satisfied regarding the offset arrangements attached to this package, which will 
benefit the country and advance the socio-economic interests of the country.”9  
Idasa would describe the media briefing of September 1999 as a relatively significant 
“misdescription of the true position.” The Affordability Team’s report gave a 
generally negative opinion on the implications which the transactions would have on 
the economy while the media briefing, on the other hand, suggested that the 
expenditure was fully justified by reference to the benefit of the off-sets (Idasa 2001). 
8.6.3 The Problem with Off-Sets 
Idasa’s report had raised the legitimate question: If it is indeed possible, by spending 
R29.992 billion, to achieve economic benefits of R104 billion, why does every 
developing country in the world not spend its entire budget on arms?  
The answer seems to lie in the fact that off-sets are an internationally discredited 
manner of promoting arms transactions. Offsets are notorious as a scam used by the 
armaments industry, with connivance of politicians, to fleece the taxpayers of both 
supplier and recipient countries. They are apparently prohibited in civil trade 
agreements between European Union and North America because they are impossible 
to monitor, distort markets and are notorious for corruption.10  
                                                 
9 GCIS press statement 15 September 1999: Cabinet decision on strategic defence procurement. 
10 Terry Crawford-Browne, The Cape Times, 2 February. 
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Could the government have been taken for a ride by the international armaments 
industry? And would the South African public be footing the bill for arms that would 
never be off-set by NIPs or DIPs?  
 
Jonathon Shapiro 8-15-2002 
Four major concerns with regard to NIPs and DIPs would be neatly summarized in 
SCOPA’s 14th report on the arms deal, and are listed below:  
The first relates to their enforceability. While it is so that the contractors were 
required to commit themselves in writing to the NIPs, it is doubtful whether 
these commitments could ever be enforced in any Court.   
Second, whilst penalty provisions in the contracts should ensure that the 
successful tenderers complied with their obligations to provide the promised 
NIPs, the penalties were small by comparison to the costs of the transactions. 
In most instances the penalties were 10% of the value of the tender. It is 
additionally possible that many tenderers may have inflated their tender prices 
so as to cater for the risk of their having to pay the 10% penalties. If so, any 
defaulting tenderer could escape its obligations to provide the NIPs merely by 
paying the 10% penalty stipulated. 
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Third, in relation to DIPs it is not clear how many beneficiary companies are 
genuinely South African companies.   SIEMENS, for example, is a preferred 
sub-contractor in relation to certain of the electronic systems.   Benefits 
accruing to any local SIEMENS company may well leave South Africa in the 
form of dividends payable to overseas shareholders. 
Finally, it has been suggested that certain of the tenderers, when required to 
commit themselves to providing off-set benefits to South Africa, merely 
obtained the names and identities of companies who were in any event 
considering investing in South Africa and thereafter (after entering into 
appropriate agreements with those investing companies) claiming those 
benefits as the promised benefits under their tenders. If this is correct, then any 
benefits that may accrue to South Africa, are not causally attributable to the 
arms transactions. 
Despite the allegations of corruption that would surface in September 1999, Cabinet 
Memorandum No 14 was issued on the cost of the deal and permission was granted to 
the DoD to sign the contracts. On 3 December 1999 five main procurement contracts 
for four corvettes, three submarines, 28 Gripen fighters, 24 Hawk jet trainers and 30 
light utility helicopters - representing the largest arms procurement purchase in South 
Africa’s history - were signed for a cash price of R30,3 billion. 
 
8.7 Allegations of Corruption 
In June 1999 the Coalition for Defence Alternatives (an NGO that had participated in 
the Defence Review process) was approached by ANC intelligence operatives on 
behalf of ANC MPs who believed the weapons expenditures represented a betrayal of 
the socio-economic upliftment anticipated by South Africa’s impoverished 
communities. They declared they had knowledge and evidence of massive corruption 
involving senior politicians and government officials (Crawford-Browne 2000, 2007). 
The CDA's response had been that this would be in keeping with international 
experience of corruption relating to the armaments industry, but that the CDA was not 
competent to judge such allegations. The evidence would be handed over in 
November 1999 to the Heath Special Investigating Unit to substantiate the allegations 
of corruption (Crawford-Browne 2007.) 
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In early September 1999, Patricia De Lille, then a Member of Parliament for the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) received a briefing document full of allegations of 
corruption in the arms deal signed by “Concerned ANC MPs”. In general, the 
allegations in the memo, which has a somewhat urgent and wild accusatory tone, 
point to significant flaws in the procurement process and is highly questioning of the 
off-set agreements. The document asks: 
 “What is happening here? Who are the beneficiaries within the South African 
private sector? Are government officials involved? Are the officials of the 
negotiations involved? Why the secrecy?11” 
 
The briefing document contained a host of connections and allegations of wrongdoing 
against senior ANC members and government officials who had apparently enriched 
themselves during the arms acquisition program. The document points to actual 
instances of alleged corruption by top officials and leading ANC politicians including 
a former minister of defence, as benefiting unduly from the deal. The memo alleged 
that millions of pounds went either to senior ANC members or their families through 
a web of companies that won lucrative positions as sub-contractors, including 
speculation that some of the money that changed hands in the arms transactions found 
its way into one political party’s coffers.12 Among those accused of benefiting 
illegally from the deal are Joe Modise, defence minister at the time; Tony Yengeni, 
the ANC chief whip, and Chippy Shaik, head of procurement at the Defence 
Department, and brother of local arms industry business man and financial advisor to 
Jacob Zuma, Schabir Shaik.  
 
To give some idea of specific allegations contained in the document, under a section 
dealing with SAAB/Bae “Allegation of Corruption”, it notes: 
 
“It is alleged that Mr Tony Yengeni, ANC Chief Whip in the National 
Assembly…is involved with British Aerospace/SAAB. Therefore the joint 
Standing Committee on Defence is not playing its watchdog role on arms 
procurement. Just before government confirmed British Aerospace as a 
                                                 
11 1999 Briefing to honorable Patricia De Lille, Member of Parliament. 
12 Mail and Guardian, 2-8 February 2000. 
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preferred bidder Tony Yengeni bought a Mercedes 4x4 ML 320 Auto. It is 
alleged that the money came from British Aerospace.” 
 
The conclusion of the briefing memo (full of grammatical errors, along with the rest 
of the document) is worth quoting in full: 
 
“South African companies, interested groups, senior government officials and 
members of parliament who are involved in the arms deal are corrupting the 
democratic process in South Africa. It also appears that these companies, 
groups and individuals are using the arms deal to create and finance an 
economic and political center within the ANC to undermine the President 
Thabo Mbeki. The absence of logical explanations for the armament 
acquisition, total lack of transparency about the offset proposals, and the 
industrial’s notorious corruption makes South Africa arms purchase 
programme a matter of enormous concern. Accordingly we endorse 
suggestions of a full (public) judicial investigation into the weapons 
acquisition and offset process. Further we call on upon the cabinet to halt any 
further acquisition programme until a national consensus has been reached on 
these issues. We support the most reverent Njongonkulu Ndungane Anglican 
Archbishop of Cape Town. Annexure F. Concerned ANC MPs.” 
 
Having received the memo, PAC MP Patricia De Lille raised her concerns about the 
arms deal in parliament, an action that apparently resulted in panic by government 
ministers and officials to try and identify the “whistleblowers” with the minister of 
Defence even attempting, but failing, to browbeat Archbishop Ndungane into 
revealing their identity (Crawford-Browne 2000).  
 
In November 1999 De Lille and Crawford-Browne (co-convenor of the CDA) held a 
press conference near parliament announcing that the evidence they had received had 
been forwarded to the high-profile anti-corruption fighter, Judge Willem Heath, head 
of the Special Investigating Unit. The decision to involve Heath was apparently 
endorsed by 16 organizations, including civil society organizations such as the Black 
Sash and the South African Non-Governmental Organization Coalition (SANGOCO) 
whose endorsement had noted, “Corruption is the antithesis of good governance and 
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the allegations must be fully investigated by a competent authority, and alleviation of 
poverty must take priority over weapons of war”.13   
 
 
Jonathan Shapiro 9-16-1999 
 
How would the government, in particular the executive and parliament, respond to 
these allegations? 
 
8.8 Responding to the Allegations 
 
Following the numerous allegations regarding possible irregularities pertaining to the 
awarding of contracts raised by De Lille and others, the government was quick to 
respond. On 28 September 1999 the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa 
“Terror” Lekota, approved a Special Review by the Auditor-General into the Strategic 
Defence Procurement package. The Special Review was included as part of the 
Auditor-General’s regulatory audit of the DoD. In conducting the review the Auditor-
General’s office confirmed it was liaising with both the Office for Serious Economic 
Offences (predecessor to the Directorate of Special Operations) and the Heath Special 
Investigating Unit, as allegations of irregularities had been made to both these bodies 
                                                 
13 Press Statement by Patricia de Lille, MP, 30 November 1999. 
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that were reportedly waiting for the Auditor-General’s report before deciding on 
possible further action. 
 
8.9 The Auditor General’s Special Review  
 
The Special Review of the Office of the Auditor General - a Chapter Nine institution 
whose integrity and independence is protected by the constitution and is obliged to 
report regularly and directly to parliament through SCOPA - would come before 
parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in September 2000. 
This review, conducted under the leadership of South Africa’s first black Auditor-
General, Shauket Fakie, who assumed his position on 1 December 1999, would open 
the way for a comprehensive investigation into the arms deal allegations.  
 
In September 2000 - a year after allegations of corruption had been raised in 
parliament by De Lille - the Auditor-General, Shauket Fakie, tabled the Special 
Review of the Strategic Defence Procurement Package [RP 161/2000]. Parliament’s 
main oversight committee, SCOPA would scrutinize this document closely. Chaired 
by opposition IFP MP Dr Gavin Woods, SCOPA would respond by releasing what 
became the infamous 14th Report, calling for an independent multi-agency 
investigation into allegations of corruption in the arms deal. 
In summary the AG’s Special Review found that there had indeed been several 
irregularities in the procurement process.  
 
Serious shortcomings in the arms deal acquisition process were found in at least five 
areas, some of which will be looked at in more detail: 
1. Conflicts of interest among decision-makers 
2. The awarding of the fighter/trainer contract to BAe systems 
3. The inadequacy of the offset guarantees 
4. The disregard for personnel requirements to operate the equipment 
5. The allocation of a naval sub-contract to French interests at a very substantial 
increase in costs over a local company tender 
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8.9.1 Conflicts of Interest 
 
“Conflicts of interest” is defined “a situation in which a person, such as a public 
official or employee or a professional, has a private or personal interest sufficient to 
appear to influence the objective exercise of his or her official duties” (JIT 2001:271). 
The concern here related to Shamin “Chippy” Shaik, the head of defence 
procurement, and his inadequate recusal from discussions involving his brother 
Schabir Shaik’s company that had interests in the defence industry. Chippy Shaik 
clearly had a conflict of interest as chief of acquisitions. This was by virtue of his 
brother Schabir’s interests in the Thomson group and African Defence Systems 
(ADS) a company that he held through Nkobi Holdings, that was vying for a sub-
contract in the arms deal.  
 
On 4 December 1998 “Chippy”, as Chair had declared his conflict of interest to the 
Project Control Board, asking to recuse himself from the discussion on the combat 
suite element of the corvette and submarine requirement. However the minutes show 
that Shaik actively participated in discussions relating to the evaluation, selection and 
appointment of the main contractors and subcontractors in respects of which ADS and 
Thomson had been contenders and that led to the ultimate awarding of contracts to the 
said companies. He failed to recuse himself properly (JIT 2001:287). 
 
Jonathan Shapiro 6-3-2000 
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8.9.2 Change in Tender Evaluations 
 
The Auditor-General found with regard to the way BAe was awarded the LIFT 
contract in respect of Hawk jets:  “the fact that a non-costed option was used to 
determine the successful bidder, is in my opinion, a material deviation from the 
originally adopted value system. This ultimately had the effect that a different 
bidder…at a significantly higher cost, was eventually chosen on the overall 
evaluation.” The DoD’s explanation on this point was found to be “unsatisfactory.” 
 
The process of evaluation was changed after the tenders had been received and 
evaluated by the four evaluation committees and their results forwarded to the 
Strategic Offers Committee. In June 1998 the AAC, having been advised that a 
company other than the ultimately successful tenderer had achieved the highest marks 
in the evaluation system, had recommended that the contract be awarded to the 
second-placed tenderer, BAe. This result was apparently justified on the basis that 
BAe had performed better in respect of three of the evaluation criteria (the NIP, DIP 
and technical evaluations). It is not apparent on what basis the fourth criterion (cost) 
was ignored (Idasa 2001). 
 
On 29 June 1998 defence minister at the time, Joe Modise had asked for a “separate 
recommendation where cost is not taken into account,” a move that ultimately 
benefited BAe. A little more than a month before this meeting, BAe had donated 
R5million to the Umkhonto weSizwe (MK)Veteran’s Association – a donation earlier 
exposed by the Mail and Guardian.14 Asked for his opinion on this, Chair of SCOPA 
Dr Gavin Woods commented: “Given the failure of the government to offer 
convincing reasons for having broken its own rules by buying the more expensive 
Hawk, any suspicion regarding the BAe donation made through the previous minister 
to the MK Veteran’s Association is difficult to dismiss. My sense of proportion does 
however, suggest that this “donation” by itself would not have been sufficient to 
influence the decision.”15 Modise was under investigation for alleged corruption at the 
time he died (November 2001) and criminal investigations into corrupt payments 
made by BAe to secure its interests in the South African arms deal are ongoing.  
                                                 
14 Mail and Guardian, 2-8 November 2000 
15 Mail and Guardian, 2-8 November 2000 
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8.9.3 Off-Set Guarantees 
 
In respect of the inadequacy of the off-set guarantees, the Auditor-General’s report 
notes that while the performance guarantees required from contractors averaged 10% 
of the contract price, he was of the opinion that the guarantees, in the case of non-
performance, may be “inadequate” to ensure delivery of the National Industrial 
Participation Commitments and that this could undermine one of the major objectives 
of the strategic defence packages which was the counter-trade element of the 
armaments package deal. Risks associated with the off-sets have been referred to 
earlier in this chapter.  
 
8.9.4 The Case of C2I2 
 
The fifth irregularity pointed to in the Special Review related to “a local company that 
was at that stage performing certain technological work on behalf of the SANDF, 
which was funded from a previous technology retention project” and had not been 
awarded the contract. Richard Young’s Cape Town based company C2I2 was not 
selected for one of the subsystems of the corvette namely the Integrated Management 
System (IMS). The Special Review pointed out that while the SA Navy preferred the 
technical potential offered by the local company this was apparently “outweighed by 
prohibitive risk-driven cost implications as determined by the prime contractor. The 
prime contractor, who had to accept unlimited risk for delivery, added a risk premium 
of approximately R40million to the local product, which resulted in the acceptance of 
the French product.” The French product, it should be noted, was associated with 
Schabir Shaik’s network of companies. 
 
Since the basis of determining the risk premiums did not fall within the scope of the 
Special Review audit, the Auditor-General suggested that a forensic audit of the 
matter be considered. This was eventually undertaken as part of the Joint 
Investigating Team’s report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Package, 
discussed later. 
 
In short the Special Review highlighted “material deviations” from generally accepted 
procurement practices and recommended a forensic audit into the deals’ sub 
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contracts, an area which fell outside the scope of the Auditor General’s probe, and 
that had been the subject of repeated corruption claims.  A number of follow-up 
activities were set in motion. The first was to address how parliament would deal with 
the report, in particular the main oversight committee, namely the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). The second was to decide which of South 
Africa’s many agencies with an anti-corruption mandate would undertake this highly 
politicized investigation and reassure the public of a truly independent and credible 
investigation. The politics of investigating corruption would dominate the political 
landscape and agenda for the coming months with the ultimate consequence of 
undermining the non-partisanship of parliament’s key oversight committee SCOPA, 
ultimately questioning the integrity of the entire investigation and the political will of 
the executive to fight corruption, wherever it might appear. This at least is what will 
be argued in this thesis and is illustrated starkly by the arms deal case-study. 
 
8.10 SCOPA and the DoD  
 
On 11th October 2000, after carefully reviewing the AG’s Special Review, SCOPA 
conducted hearings with the DoD in Parliament. It was during these hearings that the 
South African public would, for the first time, hear that the cost of the arms deal had 
now risen to R43 Billion. 
 
The SCOPA meeting was attended amongst others by Chair of the Portfolio 
Committee on Defence, Thandi Modise, Director of Acquisitions, Chippy Shaik, 
Chief Negotiator of the Counter-trade Packages, Jayendra Naidoo, Armscor Chief 
Executive Officer, Sipho Thomo, Armscor Chairman, Ron Haywood, The Auditor 
General, Shauket Fakie, Judge Willem Heath, representatives from Treasury, and the 
British High Commission.  
 
The media would report that “incredulous ANC MPs took the lead in questioning 
generals, admirals, and government negotiators about whether cabinet had been 
properly informed about the full cost and wanted to know whether projected cost 
escalations had been accounted for at the time the decision to award the contracts was 
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taken.” 16 IFP chair of SCOPA Dr Gavin Woods and two ANC members on the 
Committee, namely Laloo Chiba and Andrew Feinstein, were the most tenacious in 
trying to establish the facts around the cost of the deal, the NIP and the inadequacy of 
offset performance guarantees.  
 
At the hearing it emerged that the real costs of the deal amounted at this time to close 
to R43billion, largely attributable to the depreciation of the rand as opposed to the 
previously quoted amounts of R29.8billion. Woods and Feinstein wanted to be 
assured that the economic benefits as promised by the off-set agreements would be 
forthcoming and that there were adequate monitoring mechanisms in place.  Chief 
negotiator on the deal, Jayendra Naidoo’s response was not altogether reassuring:  
“It is a highly questionable proposition that off-sets will generate economic 
development. Our exercise was to recoup some of the expenditure on the 
armaments approved by government. The acquisitions were not meant to 
generate a massive economic boom, but would be economically neutral. The 
defence industry works world-wide on the basis of offsets. If it failed to 
perform on its commitments, it would be unlikely to gain business elsewhere.” 
 
 
Jonathan Shapiro 10-19-2000 
                                                 
16 John Matisonn ,“Heath commission may probe arms contracts”, Sunday Independent,15 October 
2000. 
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At the hearing Shamin “Chippy” Shaik, DoD’s chief of acquisitions, confirmed that 
his brother Schabir Shaik was a director of African Defence Systems, one of the sub-
contractors that benefited from the corvette contract to handle the combat suites, and 
also that he had recused himself. He admitted to the committee that a “weakness” in 
the process had been not to do so in writing.  
 
8.11 SCOPA’s Fourteenth Report 
 
On 30 October 2000, having thoroughly considered the Special Review of the 
Auditor-General and heard evidence, SCOPA issued its 14th Report to the National 
Assembly. On 3rd November 2000, it was unanimously adopted. The SCOPA report 
called for a multi-agency independent investigation into the arms deal, specifically 
mentioning individual anti-corruption agencies by name, including the Special 
Investigating Unit headed by Judge Heath.   
 
For those observing parliament’s role in confronting the widespread concern and 
allegations around the arms deal, the SCOPA report was welcomed by civil society 
organizations and the media as a victory for parliamentary oversight over the 
executive and a real test of the countries democratic institutions. Idasa issued a special 
media statement: Arms Purchases – Public Accounts Committee’s Recommendations: 
A test case for accountability, noting how SCOPA’s recommendations “demonstrate 
the central role that parliament can play in ensuring that there is meaningful oversight 
of executive power.” It further noted: “The stakes are high: it is really a litmus test for 
the various institutions of democratic accountability.”17 SCOPA’s call for a multi-
pronged probe was hailed by Business Day as SCOPA asserting “its power and 
authority over the executive in a dramatic fashion” and that “the case demonstrates 
the increasing effectiveness with which the committee is performing its watchdog 
function.”18  
 
The euphoria about parliament conducting its own investigation was short-lived. 
Through an extraordinary series of interventions, parliament and its oversight role 
through SCOPA would be rendered impotent by an ANC executive that sought to 
                                                 
17  Idasa Press Statement Arms Purchases – Public Accounts Committee’s Recommendations: A test 
case for accountability, 30 October 2000. 
18 Business Day, 3 November 2001. 
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steer the investigation away from parliament, sidelining its own members on the 
committee who dared to raise objections, and eventually excluding the one dedicated 
anti-corruption agency, the Special Investigating Unit, from the probe to appoint a 
Joint Investigation Team made up of the Auditor General, Public Protector and 
National Directorate of Public Prosecutions. In the weeks following the tabling of the 
14th Report the precise interpretation and intention of the SCOPA report, particularly 
with regard to the multi-agency investigation, would cause unprecedented division in 
the ranks of the previously non-partisan oversight committee.  
 
Noting the “high incidence of malpractice” in the international arms trade and with 
this in mind considered the transactions and broader financial and fiscal implications 
pertaining to South Africa’s recent arms purchase, the 14th Report commented on the 
cost of the deal to the state, raised concerns about the offset arrangements, the 
selection of prime contractors, the selection of sub-contractors, acquisition policies 
and called for a special forensic investigation. The latter point was based on having 
received “a large amount of unsolicited evidence, of varying plausibility, from a 
number of sources” which “reflected common ground to a significant degree” on the 
basis of “the need to prove or disprove once and for all the allegations which cause 
damage to perception of the government, (that) the committee recommends an 
independent and forensic investigation.” In what became the most controversial 
section, the 14th report stated:  
“In noting the complex and cross cutting nature of the areas to be investigated, 
the Committee feels that the investigation would be best served by combining 
a number of areas of investigative expertise and a number of differing areas of 
legal competence and authority. It therefore recommends that an exploratory 
meeting, convened by the committee, be held within two weeks of the tabling 
of this report in the National Assembly. The Auditor-General, the Heath 
Special Investigating Unit, the Public Protector, the Investigating Directorate 
of Serious Economic Offences, and any other appropriate investigating body 
should be invited, so that the best combination of skills, legal mandates and 
resources can be found for such an investigation.”  
 
The report noted that once this was established SCOPA would issue an investigation 
brief to the investigating team for its input. Also that the chosen investigative body 
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would be requested to report at regular intervals to the Committee, as well as at the 
conclusion of its work, in order that this might be included in the Committee’s final 
report to the National Assembly on this matter. The Report noted that “the committee 
will continue to complete a few areas of its own investigation, which could well 
include a meeting with certain Cabinet ministers.” It noted both the commitment of 
the Cabinet to co-operate fully with the investigations and acknowledged the extent to 
which the Departments and their respective ministers had “met their accountability 
commitments to parliament” in the course of the SCOPA enquiry. 
 
In summary the 14th Report required that: certain aspects of the arms deal be 
investigated by a joint investigation team (JIT) comprising a number of specified 
investigation-type agencies; other areas be investigated by SCOPA itself (under 
Section 56 of the Constitution); a particular exercise be undertaken both by SCOPA 
and the Auditor General. According to Woods, the 14th report intended that the 
combined findings of these three investigative exercises be brought together in a final 
SCOPA report which would offer Parliament and the public, comprehensive answers 
to matters of concern in the public domain. Based on these findings, the report would 
have made recommendations covering any problems identified – both in dealing with 
these problems and in avoiding such problems in the future (Woods 2002).  
 
However, parliament’s independent investigation into the arms deal would never 
materialize. Partisan factions within SCOPA would take sides and parliament would 
find itself “side-lined” from the arms deal investigation as the executive sort to 
control it. The legislature, dominated largely by ANC loyalists, would prove impotent 
in exerting its constitutionally mandated parliamentary oversight and scrutiny over 
public expenditure  or the multi-agency investigation that SCOPA had called for it its 
14th Report.  
 
8.12 Executive Interference 
 
Following the SCOPA hearing with DoD, ANC Chief Whip Tony Yengeni, himself 
mentioned in the De Lille memo for alleged corruption, called ANC MPs Andrew 
Feinstein and Laloo Chibe to a meeting. Here he conveyed the message that the 
matter of the arms deal would be “handled in an organizational way similar to the 
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Maduna affair”. This was a reference to the way in which the ANC had exerted its 
influence in parliament to achieve a certain end. An ad hoc committee, chaired by 
ANC MP Andries Nel and loaded with ANC MPs, had unsatisfactorily dealt with the 
Public Protector’s recommendations that the Minister of Justice, Penuell Maduna, be 
censured for having verbally attacked the integrity of the previous Auditor-General, 
Henri Kluever. According to Feinstein, “Laloo (who had spent 21 years on the island) 
was shocked, broken by this.”19  
 
On 9th November 2000, a week after the 14th report was adopted by the National 
Assembly, ANC members of SCOPA were summoned to Tuynhuis, the president’s 
residence to a meeting of the ANC’s governance committee that consisted of the 
deputy speaker, speaker, deputy President, parliamentary advisors, and senior whips. 
Here, amongst other issues, the Minister in the Office of the President, Essop Pahad 
severely berated ANC SCOPA members for passing the SCOPA resolution that called 
for the joint investigation.20 They were asked to explain the 14th report, in particular 
the inclusion of Special Investigating Unit, headed by Judge Heath.  
 
As has been pointed out in Chapter Six, Heath was increasingly becoming persona 
non grata within the ANC government who felt he had overstepped the powers of his 
corruption fighting unit. Regarded as operationally independent and trusted by the 
public amongst whom the so-called “Heath Unit” through strong media relations had 
cultivated a perception of fearlessness in the face of official corruption, the 
government appeared wary of including an investigative capacity which they could 
potentially not control.  The extraordinary over-reaction and response of the ANC to 
Judge Heath would from the start raise questions about the independence and integrity 
of the investigation. 
 
At the meeting Minister Pahad spoke out against the probe, arguing that President 
Mbkei was named in allegations and that allowing the probe to continue could tarnish 
his reputation.21 According to Feinstein, Pahad screamed abuse for about an hour at 
SCOPA members saying “Who do you think you are taking on cabinet and the 
                                                 
19 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001. 
20 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001. Woods  (January 2002). 
21 “Investigators meet: Probe on arms deal starts,” Cape Times, 14 November 2000. 
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president?” No one other than Feinstein stood up to him. From then on, according to 
Feinstein, two thirds of the ANC SCOPA members started towing the line.22 This can 
be seen by the way ANC SCOPA members conducted themselves in the coming 
months, by not supporting the chair’s call for an independent investigation by 
parliament as noted in the 14th Report. While weekend papers reported that the 
Minister in the Office of the Presidency, Essop Pahad, had sought to derail the 
investigation, Pahad denied this calling it a “litany of lies”.23 Once Pahad left the 
meeting deputy president Jacob Zuma came in and took a much more conciliatory 
line.24  
 
8.13 The Investigating Agencies Meet 
 
On 13th November 2000 the exploratory meeting with the various investigative bodies  
mentioned in SCOPA’s 14th report took place at the Auditor-General’s offices in 
Brooklyn, Pretoria. ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni, himself the target of (unproved as 
yet) allegations of corruption initially refused to authorise travel expenses for SCOPA 
committee members to attend the Pretoria meeting. He had earlier sought to curtail 
the investigation by saying it was causing disunity within the ANC.25 This disunity 
would continue, reaching a crescendo with the ongoing criminal investigation into 
corruption charges against the deputy president, Jacob Zuma. According to Feinstein, 
another meeting with the executive and ANC members of SCOPA took place a day 
later, on 14th November 2000. Held at Tuynhuis this meeting was to further challenge 
SCOPA’s intended investigation and discourage ANC members on the committee 
from any meaningful involvement.26 
 
At the Pretoria meeting - whose objective according to Woods was to establish a joint 
structure within which investigators from all five units could work together - SCOPA 
members from all political parties were first briefed by the Auditor-General and then 
met with representatives from the office of the Public Protector, the Investigating 
Directorate for Serious Economic Offences, the National Directorate of Public 
                                                 
22 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001. 
23 “Investigators meet: Probe on arms deal starts,” Cape Times, 14 November 2000. 
24 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001. 
25 “South Africa faces “opaque” times ahead, Africa News Service, 17 November 2000. 
26 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001.Woods  (January 2002). 
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Prosecutions and the Special Investigating Unit. Minutes from the meeting indicate 
that there was consensus on the need for further investigation into allegations around 
sub-contractors as well as the possibility that contracts might not be valid and the 
offsets agreed to not be enforceable. Since the Auditor-General’s office had no search 
and seizure powers and also lacked the powers to scrutinize the sub-contracts, the 
respective roles of each of the agencies, including SCOPA, were discussed in relation 
to the proposed investigation. At the meeting it was decided that the Directorate of 
Special Operations of the NPA (DSO), the Auditor General, the Public Protector and 
the Special Investigating Unit would conduct a joint investigation in order to combine 
skills, resources and legal mandates, with the Auditor-General acting as coordinator 
of the investigation (JIT 2001:7).  
 
In particular, the Special Investigating Unit’s role would be to consider the legal 
validity of the contracts themselves, whether they had met certain requirements laid 
down in the law during the procurement process, in international law, and relating to 
the public interest. It was also noted how the SIU could serve notice on private 
institutions and in this way back up the Auditor-General’s weaknesses with regard to 
an investigation into primary and sub-contractors. At the meeting the Unit confirmed 
it had written to the President requesting a proclamation to conduct an investigation. 
This was in terms of the SIU Act which requires a proclamation from the president 
before an investigation can proceed. On 21 November 2000 SCOPA chair, Gavin 
Woods received a letter from the Auditor General noting that because of its particular 
skills and mandate the SIU headed by Judge Heath SIU should be involved in the 
investigation. 
 
However, on 22nd November 2000, a week after the meeting in Pretoria, the Public 
Protector wrote to Justice Minister, Penuell Maduna suggesting that a proclamation to 
the SIU was “unnecessary”: 
“With regard to the application for a proclamation by the SIU, I am of the 
opinion that such a proclamation is not necessary at the present 
juncture…There is no evidence of any unlawful appropriation or expenditure 
of public funds and accordingly no need for the SIU to recover any assets or 
public money. The application for the SIU is based primarily on the Special 
Review by the Auditor-General and does not raise any new evidence.” 
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After agreeing to the involvement of the SIU a week earlier, Gavin Woods ascribes to 
“executive interference” the abruptly revised wishes of the Public Protector to now 
exclude the SIU (Woods 2002). Baqwa’s office denied he had changed his mind or 
political pressure had been brought to bear on him to do so saying that at no stage had 
he expressed an opinion on the appropriateness of the unit’s involvement.27 The 
sexual assault charges against the Public Protector, emanating from the Ministry of 
Justice may have had something to do with Baqwa changing his position.28 The 
Auditor General also denied that he had changed his mind when the SIU was 
eventually excluded from the JIT, saying: 
“It is not correct to assume that we have changed our position with regard to 
the Heath investigating unit. Our stance has been all along that should the unit 
be granted a proclamation, they would be part of the investigation as was 
indicated during the preliminary strategy meetings. However, as time is of the 
essence and at the indication of the head of the unit, their specific participation 
would depend on them receiving a proclamation from the president. In this 
regard I urged the standing committee to expedite the finalization of a 
proclamation. If the proclamation is not forthcoming it is the view of the joint 
task team that the investigation could continue within the statutory powers 
vested in the various agencies.”29 
 
As it turned out a proclamation to the SIU from the president would not be granted 
hereby excluding the SIU from the final investigation. The report of the Joint 
Investigating Team - made up of the Auditor-General, Public Protector and National 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions - points to the formal reason for the exclusion of 
the one agency with a dedicated anti-corruption mandate: “The SIU was not formally 
instructed by Proclamation by the President, as required by law, and hence did not 
form part of the joint investigation.” (JIT 2001:7).  Events that led to the exclusion of 
the SIU from the largest corruption probe in democratic South Africa will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Nine that follows.  
                                                 
27 Farouk Chothia, Linda Ensor, Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, “International Group petitions Mbeki”, 
Business Day, 17 January 2001. 
28 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001. 
29 Barry Streek, “Why did the Auditor General change his mind about Heath?” Mail and Guardian, 19-
25 January 2001. 
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8.13.1 JIT Linkages with SCOPA 
 
Since parliament’s committee SCOPA had called for the multi-agency investigation 
in its 14th report, the accountability linkages between parliament and the JIT agencies 
in this unprecedented investigation needed to be resolved. In November 2000 Woods 
and Feinstein met with the Speaker of parliament, Dr Frene Ginwala to address her 
concerns about the accountability linkages between parliament’s SCOPA and the 
investigating agencies, especially the two executive bodies, namely the Special 
Investigating Unit and the Investigating Directorate for Special Economic Offences. 
There was also concern about handing over information SCOPA had to the 
investigating agencies. The Auditor General had requested SCOPA to forward all 
documentation and information in their possession to the his office.  
 
On 17 November 2000 Woods sought a legal opinion from Prof Fink Haysom, Nelson 
Mandela’s former legal advisor, on how best SCOPA should conduct its relationship 
with the four agencies. His letter also dealt with the questions of confidentiality in 
respect of various documents in the possession of SCOPA. Haysom’s response had 
been that whilst executive bodies have operational accountability, as organs of state in 
the constitution they are still accountable to parliament and therefore SCOPA is 
entitled to ask these agencies to account to it on the progress of the investigation etc. 
(Woods 2002). On 21 December 2000, a SCOPA press statement released jointly by 
Woods and Feinstein (drafted with the assistance of Haysom) explained SCOPA’s 
proposed interaction with JIT. It was to be an informal level of communication in 
order to monitor whether their respective investigations (SCOPA’s and JIT’s) were 
together leading to comprehensive coverage of the issues concerned. 
 
It was later established that both the Public Protector (PP) and National Director for 
Public Prosecutions (NdoPP) decided renege on their undertaking regarding the 
communication arrangements reached between JIT and SCOPA. The interventions 
that led to this can only be speculated about.  It is now public knowledge that JIT 
agencies met with the President and particular members of cabinet on more than one 
occasion and that the investigation was discussed in a meeting between the Auditor 
General and the same parties in May 2001 (Woods 2002). 
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8.14 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the largest public expenditure to date in democratic South 
Africa, namely the Strategic Defence Procurement Package. A close examination 
reveals that there were obviously blatant in-built irregularities in the procurement 
process from the start that subsequent audits would reveal, for example the link 
between Chippy Shaik as head of procurement for the DoD with his brother Schabir 
who was tendering for a sub-contract, and the interference from the late minister of 
Defence, Joe Modise to favor BAe. Also, the rising costs of the deal that government 
was warned about and chose not to tell the public, and the unconvincing arguments 
around NIP and DIP commitments to off-set the huge expenditure, raise questions 
about the necessity for such an arms purchase in the light of more pressing socio-
economic needs.  
 
Government’s initial responsiveness in swiftly approving the Auditor-General’s 
Special Review into the arms deal following allegations of corruption raised in 
parliament by PAC MP, Patricia de Lille, is noteworthy. However, subsequent 
attempts by the ANC to scupper a truly independent parliamentary investigation by 
intimidating ANC members on SCOPA to toe the party line from the start, would 
bode ill for effective oversight of the subsequent investigation.   
 
For anti-corruption agencies to work together in the first place on a joint investigation 
on the magnitude suggested by the arms deal, was new and as such there needs to be 
some leeway given to these agencies as well as other branches such as parliament and 
the executive in working out their respective roles in dealing with such a sensitive 
issue. The way in which the ANC government would “circle its wagons” and be 
incredibly defensive about the probe into the arms deal and who should be involved, 
or not in the case of the Special Investigating Unit, would raise suspicions about the 
political will to seriously fight corruption and in a sense, as in Watergate, the cover-
up and defensive reaction of the ANC to perceived criticism of its intentions, would 
be worse than the crime.  
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 Jonathan Shapiro 4-2-2001 
In this chapter I have suggested that the arms deal investigation has exposed a 
weakness in the South African government’s anti-corruption agenda. This is a 
viewpoint shared by the independent media and illustrated by the political cartoonist, 
Jonathan Shapiro (Zapiro). In the next chapter we will evaluate the plausibility of the 
government’s defence of its actions, including the highly significant exclusion of the 
SIU from the arms deal investigation. 
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Chapter Nine: The Case for Excluding the Special Investigating Unit 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The perceived reluctance on the part of the government to include the Special 
Investigating Unit - regarded by the public as the most effective anti-corruption 
agency in the country’ s arsenal – as part of JIT would continue to raise questions as 
to the independence, integrity and credibility of the arms deal investigation into 
alleged corruption.  
 
This chapter takes a detailed look at the way the government justified its eventual 
exclusion of the SIU from the JIT investigation over a two-month period from 
November 2000 to January 2001. This includes reference to the constitutional court 
judgment of November 2000 (that raised questions about the separation of powers 
between the judiciary and the executive), the intervention of the Speaker in December 
2000 that questioned the interpretation of SCOPA’s 14th report and would accuse 
SCOPA’s chair of acting “ultra vires” by requesting the president to provide a 
proclamation for the SIU, the ANC itself who undertook a “principled campaign” 
against Heath, the Cabinet’s press conference to defend the integrity of the deal, and 
finally the personal intervention of President Mbeki in January 2001, having taken 
legal advice on the matter, where in a televised address to the nation he announced 
that the SIU would not be given a proclamation  by the executive to proceed with the 
investigation. 
 
For the government not to make use of the one agency in the country with a dedicated 
anti-corruption mandate, namely the SIU, would raise suspicions as to the 
government’s stated commitments to fight corruption. Justifying this exclusion in the 
language of constitutionality and upholding the rule of law, would be even more 
sinister. The fight against corruption was becoming politicized in ways potentially 
damaging for the long-term integrity of various democratic institutions. This bears out 
proposition 4 of the original working hypothesis that argues: “formal institutions and 
mechanisms do not emerge in a political vacuum”. 
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9.2 The Constitutional Court Judgment 
 
The Constitutional Court ruling by Judge President Arthur Chaskalson in an unrelated 
matter involving Heath, would prove manna from heaven for those wishing to justify 
Heath’s exclusion from the arms deal investigation. An appeal to constitutionality 
based on the Constitutional Court’s ruling would provide the perfect cloak to silence 
those calling for the SIU’s participation and the timing of the judgment by the highest 
court in the land could not have served the ANC better. Whilst not casting aspersions 
on its integrity, the court could not have been unaware of the highly contested 
environment into which the judgment regarding Heath fell. An elegant argument 
focusing on separation of powers, this time between the judiciary and the executive, 
was a way out for the court that could be interpreted as ultimately preserving the 
integrity of the judiciary from executive interference, even if it meant that the 
executive would use the judgment to render Heath and the SIU impotent for the 
duration of the arms deal investigation. 
 
On 28th November 2000 in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers vs 
Heath and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 CC, the constitutional court unanimously held that 
the appointment of a judge to head the Special Investigating Unit violated the 
separation of powers required by the Constitution. In terms of the constitutional 
requirement that judges be independent, the provision of the Special Investigating 
Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996 that permits a judge to be appointed as 
head of the Unit (S31) and the appointment by the President of Judge Heath to this 
position (Proclamation R24 of 1997) were held to be both unconstitutional and 
invalid.  
 
In arriving at its decision the Court stressed the importance of the separation of the 
judiciary from the other branches of government in the constitutional scheme. Also 
the need for courts to be seen to be independent so that they can discharge their duty 
of ensuring that the limits to the exercise of public power are not transgressed. This 
separation of powers means that the Constitution prevents judges from performing 
non-judicial functions incompatible with judicial office, or which are not appropriate 
to the central mission of the judiciary. The fact that the head of the SIU performed 
executive functions that were ordinarily performed by the police, the prosecuting 
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authority or the state attorney,  (for instance having to undertake partisan and 
intrusive investigations and litigate on behalf of the state to recover losses it has 
suffered as a result of corrupt or other unlawful practices) rendered it incompatible 
with judicial office. The court noted that in appropriate circumstances a judge can 
preside over commissions of inquiry where, ordinarily, the performance of the 
function calls for the qualities and skills required for the performance of judicial 
functions. Thus although aspects of the head of the SIU’s functions were akin to those 
of a commission of enquiry, these functions were inextricably tied to the litigation 
functions of the unit and thus could not be severed (CC 2000). 
 
In order to ensure an orderly transfer of the leadership of the SIU to an appropriate 
functionary who was not a member of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court’s 
declarations of invalidity were suspended for a period of one year. This would mean 
that up until 28th November 2001 the unit could continue to function under the current 
arrangement. In reality, however, Judge Heath was now a lame duck having had his 
appointment declared invalid and unconstitutional by the highest court in the land.  
 
President Mbeki’s key reasons for excluding the SIU from the arms deal investigation 
would be this judgment, couching the final decision to exclude the SIU from the arms 
deal investigation in the irreproachable language of constitutionality and a 
commitment on the part of the executive to uphold the rule of law. We have reason to 
doubt, as I have suggested and as will be shown in this chapter, that upholding the 
rule of law was Mbeki’s main motivation. Rather, our sense is of a man in power not 
willing to be guided by a public wanting the inclusion of a man they had come to trust 
in the fight against corruption (namely, Judge Heath) and that Mbeki was unwilling to 
compromise the close bonds that make up the ruling party by including an anti-
corruption agency he might not be able to control, even in the face of alleged wrong-
doing.  
 
9.3 The JIT Proceeds 
 
Further meetings of the investigating agencies in late 2000 while awaiting the 
presidential prerogative to issue a proclamation decided that each agency – AG, PP, 
IDSEO and SIU – would take responsibility for a “broad area of investigation” while 
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combining skills, legal mandates and expertise of the different agencies. On 1 
December (4 days after the Constitutional Court judgment) it was decided that the 
team for each area of investigation (eight in total) would consist of members and co-
opted members from each of the four agencies with the Auditor General as the 
coordinator of the project leaders. The budget for the multi-agency inquiry indicated 
an estimated budget of R13 517200 with the SIU marked down as contributing R3 
324 550 and being involved in 7 of the 8 investigations.  
 
On 6th December 2000, in a confidential memo to the chair of SCOPA, Dr Gavin 
Woods, the Auditor General wrote to request “the special skills and experience of the 
unit” asking “the committee to make a recommendation to the president to approve 
the proclamation of the unit as the contribution of the unit to the investigation could 
be significant.” 1 It was on this basis as well as the 14th report that Woods wrote to 
President Mbeki on 8th December requesting that a proclamation be granted to Judge 
Heath, an action for which he would be publicly castigated. He wrote:  
“SCOPA’s reasons for including a role for the Special Investigating Unit 
(SIU) as one of the investigating parties, related to the SIU’s particular powers 
and areas of competence and its relevant experience. It was apparent to us that 
the comprehensive investigation advocated would be weakened by its absence 
– mainly due to its authority in civil type actions and the role which could be 
played by its special tribunal arrangement.” 
 
However, a meeting sometime in December convened between the Public Protector, a 
representative from the Auditor-General’s office, director of Public Prosecutions 
Bulelani Ngcuka, and head of the directorate for serious economic offences, Leonard 
McCarthy, would decide that the Heath Unit should not be involved. According to 
Woods it was “very strange” that they had met separately and called for the exclusion 
of the Heath unit without informing the committee of their change of view.2 
 
                                                 
1 Barry Streek, “Why did the Auditor General change his mind about Heath?” Mail and Guardian, 19-
25 January 2001. 
2 Farouk Chothia, Linda Ensor, Jonathan Katzenellenbogen ,“International Group petitions Mbeki”, 
Business Day, 17 January 2001. 
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9.4 The Speaker and SCOPA 
 
The Speaker, an ANC sympathizer, would play a somewhat ambivalent role in 
protecting parliament’s oversight and accountability functions, and safeguarding the 
role of SCOPA in exercising its mandate.  In December 2000 the investigative 
magazine Noseweek (Issue 32) would report on a meeting held at the home of Chief 
Whip of the ANC Tony Yengeni, attended by amongst others the Speaker, the Public 
Protector and the National Director of Public Prosecutions. Shortly thereafter, on the 
27th December 2000, the Speaker would issue a “surprise” statement saying she was 
not aware of any resolution of Parliament or the National Assembly instructing the 
President to issue any Proclamation regarding the work of the Heath Commission and 
that any such action would be of dubious legal and constitutional validity. In doing so, 
she effectively accused SCOPA’s chair, Gavin Woods, of acting ultra vires by writing 
to the president to request that the Special Investigating Unit be given a proclamation 
to participate in the investigation.  
 
Ginwala had apparently received legal advice first verbally, then in writing from the 
parliamentary law advisers on the interpretation of SCOPA’s 14th report with 
reference to the proposed involvement of the SIU in the special forensic investigation 
recommended by SCOPA. The legal opinion noted how whilst the report envisages a 
“chosen investigating body” that will undertake the investigation, there is no 
indication that that body should necessarily be the unit or include the unit. In their 
opinion, the lawyers argued, the 14th report does not amount to a recommendation to 
the Executive to refer the matter in question to the unit for investigation.3 
 
Ginwala further noted that while SCOPA had recommended an independent forensic 
investigation and had met with a number of investigative bodies and that the parties 
had agreed to put together a brief on how they would function, the committee had not 
tabled a report on the meeting nor any brief that might have been issued, which would 
in any event have had to be advisory or informative only. Her statement pointed out 
that a committee of the national assembly has no authority to subcontract its work to 
any of these bodies, or require them to undertake any particular activity, or to report 
                                                 
3 Memorandum to speaker from parliamentary law advisers: Fourteenth report of SCOPA dated 30 
October 2000, 8 January 2001. 
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directly to the committee. Nor are the chairpersons expected to act on major issues 
without the agreement of the committee. Such direction as the Assembly may wish to 
give would require specific referral by a resolution of the National Assembly, and be 
subject to the procedures provided in relevant legislation. The committee may 
however, meet with and discuss with these or any other bodies, or receive 
submissions from them.4 In effect, therefore, she implied that Woods had acted ultra 
vires in writing to the President in the terms that he did (Idasa 2001). 
 
The Speaker’s interpretation of SCOPA’s 14th report thus sought to distance 
parliament from any wish for the inclusion of the SIU in the JIT, a position taken by 
the Speaker without conferring with the Committee as to the intention of their report. 
Ginwala’s statement effectively suggested that SCOPA had acted inappropriately with 
regard to JIT and that parliament had no power to instruct the executive to involve the 
SIU and more significantly that SCOPA had not specifically asked for Heath’s 
involvement. This action would have the effect of splitting the committee down party 
lines as ANC members on SCOPA felt forced to adopt an interpretation of the 14th 
report which served their master’s purposes, namely the exclusion of Judge Heath and 
the SIU from partaking in the investigation.  
 
The Speaker’s statement was also significant in that Justice Minister, Penuell Maduna 
subsequently used her interpretation of the 14th report, among with the Constitutional 
Court ruling, in his recommendation of 15th January 2001 to the President not to issue 
a proclamation thereby excluding the Special Investigating Unit from the 
investigation.  
 
9.5 Pressure to Include the SIU in the Probe 
 
The weeks following the Speaker’s intervention and the delay on the part of 
government in deciding whether or not to include the Special Investigating Unit in the 
investigation were reported on vigorously by the local media who took to 
                                                 
4 Statement on Parliament’s recommendations regarding arms procurement, 27 December 2000 
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editorializing on the gravitas of the moment as a test of the government’s commitment 
to fight corruption.5  
 
Jonathan Shapiro 5-24-2001 
 
The Mail and Guardian in an Editorial “A test of integrity looms” alluded to the 
importance of the event:  
“Let there be no mistaking the moment. The ruling ANC, the government and 
particularly President Thabo Mbeki face a decisive test of their integrity and 
will to combat corruption in the attitude they adopt to the investigation into the 
R43.8billion arms deal…The government needs to dispel all doubt that it is 
committed to a full and unfettered investigation by SCOPA. Its members need 
to demonstrate unambiguous support for one of the organizing principles of 
our constitution: That parliament, in this case represented by SCOPA, 
exercises as primary representative of the people, oversight over the executive 
arm of government.”6  
 
In early January 2001 it was reported that the PAC’s Patricia De Lille was threatening 
to take President Mbeki to court if he did not include Heath’s unit. Justice Department 
                                                 
5 Editorial, “Don’t compromise war on corruption”, City Press, 7 January 2001. Editorial ,“Mbeki’s 
actions on arms probe will be a test”, Sunday Independent, 7 January 2001. 
6 Editorial, “A test of integrity looms,” Mail and Guardian, 5 – 11 January 2001. 
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spokesman, Paul Setsetse said De Lille was ill-advised to contemplate legal action as 
her threats had “no legal basis.” He pointed out the president’s discretion by the 
Special Investigative Unit and Special Tribunals Act to refer a matter to the existing 
unit, appoint a new unit or refer the matter to existing agencies such as the directorate 
for Public Prosecutions of the Auditor General.7 Indeed, the presidential prerogative 
would prevail. 
 
Opposition parties said excluding Heath would have international repercussions as it 
would appear as if something unacceptable was going on and being covered up.8 In a 
letter to the Justice Minister, the UDM appealed to the Minister not to exclude the 
unit, saying the committee had good reasons to choose all four units and the decision 
had been supported by all four parties and that he “please respect this democratic 
decision…which will defuse any speculation of undue interference by the executive 
and government.”9 
 
Apparently Richard Young whose company C2I2 was identified as the preferred 
supplier of the integrated management system for the four new corvettes but had been 
overlooked in the final deal, said he would not sue the government if Heath’s unit was 
appointed to the probe.  
 
9.6 Some Background to the Exclusion 
 
Earlier chapters have already alluded to the growing tension between Judge Heath and 
the SIU and the need expressed by the government to streamline and “rationalize” 
anti-corruption agencies. 
 
In early January 2001, a disagreement arose between Judge Heath and Bulelani 
Ngcuka, National Director of Public Prosecutions. Heath had continued to argue that 
his unit had the experience and capacity to investigate aspects of the arms deal 
package that might otherwise be bypassed. Ngcuka responded by accusing him of 
being arrogant in suggesting his unit was the only body capable of conducting the 
                                                 
7 Marvin Meintjies, “PAC ready to sue if Mbeki does exclude Heath”, The Star, 15 January 2001. 
8 Ben Mac Lennan, “Heath recommendation almost ready”, www.iol.co.za. 11 January 2001.  
9 Ben Mac Lennan, “Heath recommendation almost ready”, www.iol.co.za, 11th January 2001 
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probe and for doubting the independence and integrity of his directorate.10  According 
to Heath his words had been “misinterpreted”. “It’s not going to be easy” he said, 
“they believe Mr Ngcuka can do what we can do. He cannot, and he cannot apply the 
remedies we can (in terms of civil law). I have indicated all along that all four 
institutions should be involved because of the variety of matters that need to be 
investigated.” He added, “I’m treated as if I am an enemy of the government, when 
I’m actually a supporter in the fight against corruption. I do not see myself as an 
enemy of the government, but an ally.”11  
 
In early January Judge Heath met with President Mbeki. A press release from the 
presidency on 5th January 2001 reported that discussions had been held regarding the 
allegations the Judge had received in October 2000. Following this meeting, President 
Mbeki referred both the letters from Heath (asking for a proclamation) and Woods 
(requesting the president to issue the proclamation) to the Minister of Justice, Penuell 
Maduna to investigate and provide a recommendation to him on whether to issue a 
proclamation. Among the questions to be studied by Maduna and his legal advisers 
was on whether there was a prima facie case of corruption to be investigated; which 
agencies were best suited and equipped to investigate aspects of the case; whether the 
Department of Justice had sufficient capacity to investigate the matter thoroughly or 
whether a separate unit or entity should be created to conduct the probe.12 Maduna 
was also asked to consider Heath’s argument, based on a legal opinion, that the 
Constitutional Court decision giving the judge a maximum of one more year as head 
of the unit did not disqualify him from being involved in the investigation during the 
remaining period. 
 
Before Maduna’s recommendations to the President were made on 15th January, the 
ANC National Working Committee would meet to discuss the matter. Subsequent 
events point to a well-organised set of responses on behalf of the ANC and the 
executive to tightly control and manage the increasingly awkward matter of the arms 
deal investigation and Heath’s involvement. 
 
                                                 
10 Editorial, “An unseemly row that best serves the corrupt”, The Cape Argus, 4 January 2001. 
11 Marvin Meintjies, “Heath hangs on for Maduna’s final word”, The Star, 7 January 2001. 
12 The Star, 9 January 2001. 
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9.7 The ANC’s “Principled Decision” to Campaign Against Heath 
 
On 8th January 2001 the ANC National Working Committee met and the party’s most 
senior members decided they had had enough of being “pushed around” by the Judge. 
A decision was taken to “campaign” against Heath’s inclusion in the arms 
investigation and to fight against growing support for the judge. After a brief 
discussion on how to deal with Heath, the possible media response to his axing, and 
the political fall out, the ANC decided to turn the screws on him. A loose five member 
task team made up of Ministers Penuell Maduna, Steve Tshwete, Trevor Manuel, 
Alec Erwin and ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama was formed. The following 
week at the ANC’s National Executive Committee meeting in Kempton Park, the 
decision was endorsed. 13 
 
On 10th January 2001 in a radio discussion on SAFM, ANC spokesman Smuts 
Ngonyama defended the ANC’s rejection of the appointment of Heath’s SIU to the 
arms probe (even though this was not yet a position taken by government yet) saying 
that Heath had compromised himself by aligning himself with political parties. He 
accused Heath of arrogance and blackmailing the government, saying:  
“Why must the government feel paralysed by the Patricia de Lille and Douglas 
Gibson’s of this world hobnobbing with Judge Heath. Heath has allowed 
himself to be completely compromised by the links between Patricia and him. 
The view of the ANC is that we don’t want Heath to be part of this probe. He 
has used the information he has obtained to lambaste the government and 
blackmail the government by saying that unless you put me to work, there is a 
cover up.”   
 
Ngonyama added that the ANC would “mobilise” against the Special Investigating 
Unit’s involvement and that “we reject in the strongest possible terms that the work 
be given to Judge Heath” adding that there are a number of possible organizations 
equally equipped to investigate the matter, including the Public Protector and the 
Auditor-General’s office.14  
                                                 
13 Mawande Jubasi, Ranjeni Munusamy, Simon Zwane, “How Judge Heath’s goose was cooked”, The 
Sunday Times, 21 January 2001. 
14 Ben Mac Lennan, “Heath recommendation almost ready”, www.iol.co.za. 11 January 2001. 
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The ANC felt that opposition parties were using Heath to portray the ANC in a bad 
light and that Heath himself  had started “acting like a politician.” Ngonyama noted 
further that “the view of the ANC is that the judge was appointed by special 
legislation (on the basis that) work must be given to it by government. Now all of a 
sudden he is touting. He is putting pressure on the government and saying if you don’t 
I’ll say that you are covering up.”15 Speaking after the ANC’s four day January 
lekgotla, Ngonyama reiterated the party’s opposition to Judge Heath, questioning his 
objectivity: “The trust and confidence given to him was put to the test. He sees 
himself as not being accountable to government.”16  
 
Judge Heath rejected both the blackmail and hobnobbing claims: “I’ve most definitely 
not being playing games with political parties. It’s for the president to make a 
decision. We don’t pose a threat to anyone on the basis of politics.” 17 The PAC’s 
Patricia De Lille would also reject any suggestion she was “hobnobbing” with Heath, 
noting the only thing she had in common with Heath was wanting to see corruption 
eradicated “everywhere it rears its ugly head in South Africa.”   
“The million dollar question is, who is hiding what? Who is prosecuting 
whom? If there’s nothing to hide, why not let them continue the investigation, 
all four agencies….Heath’s unit is the only agency that can apply for the audit 
and scrutinise the agreements in this case and how they are enforced. What 
has the ANC to be scared of? If we are to get to the bottom of these allegations 
(excluding) Heath makes me suspicious that people in high places are 
corruptly involved.”18 
 
The ANC’s reaction was widely interpreted as arrogance. In an editorial - “ANC must 
curb its arrogance” - The Sunday Times warns that while Heath should not be seen as 
the country’s messiah “it is imperative that the probe be above all scrutiny…The four 
agencies were chosen specifically because they enjoy public credibility and between 
them hold a vast array of complementary power. The move to exclude Heath seems 
motivated by the ANC’s passionate dislike of the judge, rather than logic…What 
appears to be creeping into the culture of the party is a disregard for independent 
                                                 
15 “Heath unlikely to probe arms deal”, The Cape Argus, 13 January 2001. 
16 “Heath set for arms probe ban”, Cape Argus, 15 January 2001. 
17 Ben Mac Lennan, “Heath recommendation almost ready”, www.iol.co.za. 11 January 2001. 
18 Ben Mac Lennan, “Heath recommendation almost ready”, www.iol.co.za. 11 January 2001. 
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institutions and voices in society. It is no longer just the voices of minority parties that 
the ANC refuses to hear. It also ignores the voices of progressive NGOs, civil society 
formations and ordinary people…The party must not succumb to the arrogance that 
often accompanies power for therein lies dictatorship and disaster.”19 
 
9.8 Cabinet Defends the Arms Deal 
 
Cabinet was feeling increasingly defensive with growing pressure around the 
inclusion of the SIU in the investigation to ensure its credibility. On Friday 12th 
January 2001 the four Ministers of Defence, Trade and Industry, Finance and Public 
Enterprises called a press conference where they issued a media statement and 
Background Notes on the Strategic Defence Procurement Package.20 The purpose of 
the conference was ostensibly “to set the record straight and clarify questions that in 
our assessment reflect a misunderstanding of both the process and the substance of 
Defence Procurement” and to record “the firm view of Cabinet that this process was 
undertaken with the utmost integrity.” It was widely viewed as a damage control 
exercise. 
 
 
Jonathan Shapiro 1-15-2001 
                                                 
19 Editorial , “ANC must curb its arrogance”, The Sunday Times, 14 January 2001. 
20 Media Statement on the Strategic Defence Procurement Package (Ministers of Defence, Trade and 
Industry, Finance and Public Enterprises); Background Notes on the Strategic Defence Procurement 
Package for the Press Statement. www.gov.za/events/defence/statement.htm 
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The conference led to a virulent attack on SCOPA and the Auditor-General’s office 
wherein the ministers said the conclusions drawn by both the Auditor-General’s 
Special Review and SCOPA’s 14th Report were “ill-informed” and “fail to understand 
the most elementary features of the defence acquisition process”. “It is our view that 
the review and the report were too cursory to do justice to this matter and have called 
into question the integrity of the government without justification.” The press 
statement recognized that the Auditor-General and SCOPA had come to the 
determination that further investigations were necessary and promised that relevant 
departments and Ministers would “fully co-operate with such investigations” as 
“government is as eager as anyone else that the matter should be thoroughly probed,” 
reiterated the offer of cabinet to avail themselves to SCOPA (something Woods 
would deny knowledge of).  
 
An accompanying document “Background Information on the Strategic Defence 
Procurement” explained the choices made with regard to the equipment, the financial 
implications, the National Industrial Participation Programme and elements of the 
subcontracting arrangements. Responding to the cost of the package, the statement 
noted that an “erroneous view” has been propagated that the cost of the defence 
package has escalated from R30 billion to R43 billion. The cost price, which was 
calculated in 1999 Rand, is R30,3 billion. In keeping with the standard Government 
accounting practice, it is the actual payments to suppliers that represent expenditure of 
the State. Interest costs are part of deficit financing and not the cost of equipment.” 
 
Strong statements were also made regarding the allegations of corruption: “It is 
government’s firm and considered view that no concrete facts have been presented to 
suggest that there has been any corruption in the processes administered by 
government structures responsible for strategic procurement.” Also that it was 
“readily apparent” from any study of this massive and complex exercise the 
evaluation procedure and decision making process did not allow for a single 
individual to determine what should be acquired and at what cost and that such 
situations were carefully avoided in order to prevent the possibility of corrupt practice 
within the primary contracting process. Accordingly “the Government rejects with 
contempt any insinuation of corrupt practice on its part.”  
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With respect to the ongoing investigation, the statement noted: 
“The government remains committed to cooperate with any legitimate 
investigation into any elements of the defence acquisition process, but will not 
allow itself to be diverted to participate in what amounts to mere fishing 
expeditions. For its part government remains convinced that nothing was done 
in the context of the Strategic Defence Procurement suggests in any way that 
corruption occurred, we await convincing evidence to prove this otherwise. 
Whilst government is ready to cooperate with the investigation, we believe 
that it is our duty to challenge any insinuations that question the integrity of 
government’s decision-making processes in this regard. We will also not 
respond to campaigns by those who may have lost out in the bidding process 
or those who are in principle opposed to the decision to undertake the 
Strategic Procurement.” 
 
9.8.1 Responses to the Press Conference 
 
The ministerial press conference served to merely heighten concerns about the inquiry 
into SA’s R43,8bn arms deal. The minister’s statement set out to discredit both the 
Auditor General’s Special Review and SCOPA’s 14th report by attributing to it 
“inaccurate assessments”, “erroneous views”, “it being exceedingly misleading”, 
“stretching credulity”, “its ill-informed conclusions” and fuelling “unwarranted 
speculation and assertions in the public domain” etc. saying in effect that the 
proposed investigations were based on ignorance and therefore inappropriate and 
unwarranted (Woods 2002). 
 
In his response SCOPA chair Gavin Woods prepared a detailed memorandum 
disputing many of the minister’s criticisms of SCOPA’s report as “untrue and unfair.” 
He noted it was “more than apparent that the ministers are not in possession of the 
extensive information….and have little knowledge of the process SCOPA followed in 
producing its report. The degree of inconsistency between the minister’s arguments 
and the documented arguments and evidence made available by very senior officials 
in their departments are considerable.” The suggestion, that a meeting with the 
ministers would have led to a more informed report, “discredits the vast information 
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the committee received from their departments.” 21 Woods reiterated that the public 
was not properly informed on the rising cost of the arms packages “and (the 
committee) has sufficient evidence to show that there can be no excuse for this”. He 
also accused the ministers of failing to comment on the issues of “conflicts of 
interests” which were vital to the public interest.22 
 
The Auditor-General responded saying he would refrain from commenting on the 
veiled attack on his office until the government announced whether Heath would be 
included.23 A few weeks Business Day reported that the Auditor-General rejected 
ministerial allegations that his special review of the R43bn arms deal was based on 
misunderstanding and ill-informed and wrong conclusions. The review found that 
there had been material deviations from generally accepted procurement practices and 
recommended in the light of the many allegations of possible irregularities in 
contracts awarded to subcontractors that a forensic audit be conducted. Fakie stood by 
the special review’s conclusions and its recommendation of a forensic investigation 
noting that his “constitutional mandate to strengthen constitutional democracy by 
auditing and reporting has never been and will never be jeopardised.”24 
 
Following the cabinet press conference ANC members on SCOPA would not support 
the Chairperson’s call to defend the integrity of the Committee’s report and thereafter 
refused to engage any further work on the arms deal. Notwithstanding that the 14th 
report had been adopted as a report of the National Assembly, the Speaker too chose 
not to take up this extraordinary attack by the executive on the work of Parliament.  
 
9.9 The Recommendation to Exclude the SIU 
 
On 15th January 2001, the Minister of Justice wrote to President Mbeki regarding the 
matter of the SIU.25 Citing the Speaker’s arguments in her statement of 27th 
                                                 
21 John Matisonn and Sam Sole, “Row over arms probe turns nasty”, Sunday Independent, 14 January 
2001. 
22 Bomile Ngqiyaza ,“Collision course on inquiry possible” ,Business Day, 15 January 2001. 
23 John Matisonn and Sam Sole, “Row over arms probe turns nasty”.,Sunday Independent, 14 January 
2001. 
24 Linda Ensor ,“Fakie stands by arms deal review”, Business Day, 26 January 2001. 
25 Letter from Penuell Maduna to Thabo Mbeki: 15 January 2001: Request for a proclamation under 
the Special Investigating Units and the Special Tribunals Act 1996. 
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December, Maduna argued there has “hitherto been no request from Parliament or the 
National Assembly that the President should consider issuing a proclamation either 
establishing a special investigating unit or extending the mandate of the existing unit.” 
In other words the Speaker’s position was used in this instance to advise the President 
that he would not be in disagreement with Parliament if he were to refuse the SIU a 
proclamation. The letter from Maduna advised the President that “the matter should 
not, at this stage, be referred to the Unit headed by Judge Heath, and that no other unit 
should be constituted for the purpose of pursuing this matter.”  
 
Maduna’s recommendation rests on four main points. First he relies on the 
constitutional court decision of 28 November 2000 arguing that “to continue referring 
new matters to the Unit would in my view fly in the face of the Constitutional Court 
judgment, therefore undermining its spirit and essence”. Secondly, he argues neither 
Judge Heath nor any person has provided him with any information whatsoever that 
suggests an unlawful appropriation of public funds or assets has occurred, which 
funds or assets have to be recovered by a special investigating unit as envisaged in the 
act. Since the Justice Department was “not given access to any documents or 
information upon which all manner of allegations and innuendo have been made with 
regard to this matter” this has not assisted him in doing the work required. (This lack 
of information would lead to the President furnishing himself with further 
information, including documents obtained from intelligence operatives from the SIU, 
before making his final announcement on the SIU’s fate on 19th January.)  
 
Thirdly, the Minister points out that the Public Protector is of the view that “at present 
there is no evidence of unlawful appropriation of expenditure of public funds” and 
that the offices of the Auditor-General, Public Protector and NDPP through IDSEO 
“can adequately deal with the present allegations and issues” and “that such a 
proclamation by the President, is not necessary at this stage and that the application be 
pended for consideration by the President, at a later stage, if necessary.” Finally he 
notes that because of the current workload of the unit “it would have been absurd and 
illogical for me to recommend that the President should give additional work to Judge 
Heath’s unit that is already so over-laden, when Judge Heath will cease being the 
head of the unit and will have to hand over to a non-judge replacement within the 
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one-year period of grace granted us by the Constitutional Court.” 26 Judge Heath’s 
“successes” were coming back to haunt him. 
 
The Minister points also out that a joint investigative body would have no status in 
law, cannot issue enforceable subpoenas and cannot compel witnesses to answer 
questions among other things. Rather each separate investigative body only has the 
powers conferred upon it in terms of its founding legislation. He also suggests that in 
view of the allegations that have been made about possible criminal conduct, the 
SAPS should be brought into the suggested inquiry and requests the President to 
invite any person who may be in possession of any information that warrants a 
criminal investigation to lay charges.  
 
9.9.1 Responses to the Recommendation to Exclude Heath 
 
News of Maduna’s recommendation to the President not to issue a proclamation 
hereby excluding the SIU from the probe caused a furious outcry amongst civil 
society groups, the media and opposition parties. Whilst many disputed the reasoning 
and grounds upon which he made his decision, others pointed to the ANC’s “blind 
spot” when it came to Heath suggesting it was his personality as much as the unique 
powers of the unit that led to Maduna’s exclusion of him from the probe. 
 
In its response, the SIU rejected Maduna’s reasons saying it would make its own 
representations to the president. In a statement it said that Maduna had misinterpreted 
a Constitutional Court ruling (that did not prohibit new referrals to the unit) and relied 
on outdated information in making his recommendation. “The SIU is of the opinion 
that it could have made a valuable contribution to the multi-agency probe, as we have 
the powers to both investigate and institute civil action arising out of the 
investigation.”27 The SIU also noted that neither the minister nor the Justice 
department had ever asked for the De Lille documents and that its units were not 
limited to recovering misappropriated public funds but also the investigation of 
improper conduct or irregular acts by state employees, negligent loss of public 
                                                 
26 Letter from Penuell Maduna to Thabo Mbeki: 15 January 2001: Request for a proclamation under 
the Special Investigating Units and the Special Tribunals Act 1996. 
27 “Mbeki expected to decide on Heath in a day”, Sapa, 16 January 2001. 
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money, and any corruption in connection with the affairs of a state institution. 
Whether or not there was unlawful misappropriation of public funds could only be 
established after an investigation had been conducted. A civil investigation of this 
nature was highly technical and dealt with policy, procedure and legal aspects of 
procurement, contracts and tendering.  
 
Dr Gavin Woods, Chair of SCOPA expressed concern, disappointment and alarm at 
the government’s move to exclude the Heath unit. One of the aspects that alarmed 
him most was Maduna’s implication that his formal request, as a committee chair to 
the president in December last year, for a proclamation clearing the way for Judge 
Heath’s involvement, did not reflect the wishes of parliament. The committee report 
adopted by parliament indicated quite clearly the wish that Heath be involved. “On 
that understanding, I wrote to the president”. The greatest discrepancy was Maduna’s 
statement that to refer new matters to the unit would be contrary to the spirit of a 
recent judgment on the constitutionality of Heath’s position as unit head. The 
Constitutional Court has given a year’s grace for the appointment of a person who 
was not a judge. “No one has suggested that, in the final year, Heath should not be 
given further work to do”.28  
 
Woods further rejected Maduna’s statement that there was no evidence of unlawful 
appropriation of public funds or assets in the arms deal. “To us and other parliaments 
around the world the hard facts of wrongdoing are not necessarily what stimulates an 
investigation”. The committee had called for the probe after the Auditor-General 
pointed out procedural weaknesses in the procurement process. And SCOPA’s 
hearings confirmed that after officials involved were unable to answer questions 
satisfactorily. International experience was that these sort of weaknesses were most 
likely to lead to irregularities and wrongdoing. He said it was “quite alarming” for a 
government minister to demand proof of wrongdoing before accepting the need for an 
investigation. If there was reason for doubt it needed to be checked out. SCOPA had 
included the unit in the probe because of the legal mandate and specific skills the unit 
offered. “So, when we now find that he has been excluded, we have a sense of there’s 
a gap. That is the basis for our concern.” Woods believed SCOPA would have to 
                                                 
28 “Woods alarmed at Maduna’s move on Heath”, Sapa, 15 January 2001.  
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focus on ways of filling that gap and ensuring that the investigation was 
“comprehensive and thorough” and that the members of SCOPA were aware of their 
role as perhaps the most important oversight body in parliament. However, the law 
said the president had the final decision, and nothing in law allowed the committee to 
override him. “At the end of the day he has to decide what is right and what is 
wrong”. “One doesn’t have to react emotionally. We are a committee that tries not to 
be party political.”29 
 
Unsurprisingly opposition parties criticized the announcement by Maduna. Tony 
Leon, leader of the DA said Mbeki would be “well advised to ignore” Maduna’s 
recommendation. Maduna had “become notorious for his bad judgment” and that his 
reference to a Constitutional Court finding was “spurious” adding “the court judgment 
allowed a year for the situation to be corrected – for the head of the unit not to be a 
judge, and while Judge Heath is still head of the Unit he must be allowed to do his 
work”. The importance of the inclusion of the unit was due to its perceived 
independence of the government and excluding the unit diminished the legitimacy and 
transparency of the investigation. “If everything is above board in the arms deal, if 
there is nothing to hide, why is the ANC so nervous? Are they suggesting that Judge 
Heath would manufacture evidence that does not exist”.30  
 
The Democratic Alliance argued that the reasons given by Maduna were 
“fundamentally flawed” and his argument that the Units workload was already too 
high, a smokescreen: “South Africa cannot afford a perception of a corruption-
complicit executive to take root in the mind of the prospective foreign investor when 
they consider us an emerging market, foreign direct investment destination. No 
amount of spin-doctoring will be able to undo the damage done if the arms probe 
smacks of a cover up.”31 According to PAC MP Patricia De Lille, “At issue is the 
constitutional accountability of the executive to parliament”.32 “The investigation will 
not stand or fall by the inclusion or exclusion of the SIU but will stand or fall by the 
principles being violated by the government – that is transparency and accountability” 
                                                 
29 “Woods alarmed at Maduna’s move on Heath” , Sapa, 15 January 2001.  
30 “Mbeki advised to ‘ignore’ Maduna’s advice” ,Sapa, 15 January 2001.  
31 Robert Brand ,“Unit takes arms probe bid to Mbeki in last ditch pleas for inquiry role.” Argus, 15 
January 2001. 
32 “Mbeki advised to ‘ignore’ Maduna’s advice”, Sapa, 15 January 2001.  
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De Lille said. It was unfortunate that the ANC had “personalised the matter of Judge 
Heath’s inclusion rather than looking at the competencies of his unit.” To exclude him 
now will signal to the international community that democracy is under threat and that 
corruption is rampant in SA”.33  
 
IFP defence spokesperson, Velapho Ndlovu said he was “outraged and very much 
concerned because the executive is not running parliament. I don’t know why Maduna 
wants to exclude Heath’s unit from the investigation. If Heath’s unit is needed the 
government should not stand in the way where public money has been misused or the 
investigation of public money concerned…Now the executive which is the second 
arm of government, is overruling what parliament has agreed upon, and in doing so it 
means parliament has no power whatsoever”.34 
 
UDM leader, Bantu Holomisa released an open letter to President Mbeki saying that 
if the Heath Unit was excluded from the probe, he was under a “compelling 
obligation” to set up a judicial commission with the same powers as Heath. Without 
such a commission, the remaining state agencies involved in the probe lacked the 
capacity to carry out their mandate from parliament. There were strong perceptions 
and suspicions of a cover-up as a result of the ANC and hostility to Heath from “some 
government ministers.”35 
 
Civil society groups expressed similar concerns. Idasa said it “deeply regrets this 
decision because it undermines the constructive role that parliament through SCOPA 
had defined for itself in giving life to the constitutional obligation to hold the 
executive to account.” It further noted that part of SCOPA’s clear recommendation 
was that the SIU be included in the investigation on the basis that is has unique 
powers of investigation that would be useful in such a complex case, especially given 
the range of possible improprieties they had identified. Idasa noted that the 
constitution makes it clear that the executive is accountable to parliament, however, 
“this does not mean as Minister Maduna rightly argues that the executive must do 
what parliament tells it”: 
                                                 
33 Marvin Meintjies, “PAC ready to sue if Mbeki does exclude Heath” The Star, 15 January 2001. 
34 “Mbeki advised to ‘ignore’ Maduna’s advice” ,Sapa, 15 January 2001. 
35 Troye Lund ,“Heath verdict sparks fears of investor flight”, Cape Argus, 16 January 2001. 
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“However, in our view it does mean that the executive should take full 
account of parliament’s view and be able to explain and justify to parliament 
any decision taken. The decision taken to not grant the Heath Unit a 
proclamation is a legitimate exercise of discretion and not a defiance of 
parliament; the question is whether it was wise to choose to ignore 
parliament’s view. Rightly or wrongly the involvement of the Heath unit is 
seen as a test of government’s commitment to a full and comprehensive 
inquiry. Excluding it may well, therefore, be interpreted as being soft on 
corruption and weak on the rule of law and may thus undermine international 
investor confidence. In this way the President runs the risk of underestimating 
the symbolic nature of the case and the weight that markets, the public and 
international opinion are attaching to it.”36 
 
Even the local chapter of Transparency International wrote to President Mbeki urging 
him to include the SIU in the arms probe. According to TI SA “the perception locally 
and internationally is that the integrity of the government is in question.” SA could 
not afford to exclude any anticorruption agency that could contribute to the 
investigation. Speaker Ginwala, herself a patron of TI-SA hit back at the body for 
intervening saying its remit was not to say to the country that this is the way to do it... 
It should focus on ensuring a proper investigation took place, rather than who was 
doing it.  She said the unit had a huge workload and “maybe” another unit with 
similar powers should be formed to assist the investigation. 37 
 
Anglican Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane appealed to Mbeki to put the country 
and its future first by implementing parliament’s recommendation that the deal be 
properly investigated: “We call on the government to honour the recommendations of 
parliament without delay. A failure to do so would pose a very serious threat to the 
country’s fragile democracy. Were the executive to override parliament and set up its 
own terms of reference for this investigation as the apartheid government used to do, 
                                                 
36 Idasa Media Release, “Arms deal inquiry: Government decision to exclude Heath is a missed 
opportunity.” 14 January 2001.  
37 Farouk Chothia, Linda Ensor, Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, “International group petitions Mbeki”, 
Business Day, 17 January 2001. 
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South Africa would enter into the downward, slippery road to becoming a banana 
republic”.38 
 
A range of editorials hinted at the negative impact excluding Heath from the 
investigation would have on the country and alerted the government that the 
consequence of Heath’s exclusion would raise questions of a cover-up.39 In a 
particularly strong editorial, the Mail and Guardian questioned the government’s 
political will to fight corruption, saying that the truth will come out: 
 “Like the leaders of the apartheid regime before then, leaders of the ANC will 
find that the truth will come out – if not now, then next week, in five years or 
even in 50 years. Without a well-resourced and conspicuously independent 
investigation that enjoys the public’s confidence this arms deal will, we fear, 
haunt the ANC for the rest of its days in power…The issues are clear: The 
government and the ANC stand accused of trying to squash the probe into the 
arms deal… Their actions undermine their own calls for accountable 
governance and the constitutionally assigned oversight responsibilities of 
parliament. A government that has conferred on itself the status of being a 
champion of moral renewal for the entire continent should lead by example. 
Given the prevalence of corruption and incompetence in government and the 
magnitude of the money involved, the government’s reluctance to act 
effectively in this case invites justifiable suspicion.”40  
 
How correct the Mail and Guardian’s prediction would turn out to be. As of April 
2008 criminal investigations into the arms deal continue. 
 
9.10 The President Requests Further Information  
 
The widespread negatives reaction to Maduna’s recommendation appeared to give 
President Mbeki food for thought and also indicated his characteristic indecisiveness 
                                                 
38 Troye Lund, Andre Koopman and Sapa, “Heath set for arm probe ban”. Cape Argus, 15 Janaury 
2001. 
39 Editorial, “The Arms deal must be probed properly ,Cape Argus, 15 January 2001; Editorial, 
“Transparency an economic fundamental”, Business Day, 16 January 2001; Editorial, “Corruption?” , 
Natal Witness, 16 January 2001; Editorial, “Perceptions of a cover-up”, Cape Times, 18 January 2001; 
Editorial, “ANC’s risky gambit on the Heath Commission”, Financial Mail , 19 January 2001. 
40 Editorial , “Mbeki’s Trademark Failure”, The Mail and Guardian, 19-25 January 2001. 
 218 
on moving forward on tricky issues. President Mbeki delayed the decision on whether 
or not to issue a proclamation to the SIU until Friday the 19th January requesting his 
Justice minister to gather more information on the issues from all investigating 
agencies including Heath’s unit. In a way that was bound to have repercussions Judge 
Heath refused to cooperate with Maduna’s request, instead writing a letter saying 
“The information that the Unit has is extremely sensitive and any disclosure of this 
information could jeopardize the investigation, lead to victimization of 
whistleblowers, and place potential witnesses at risk. As a result of the possible 
consequences the Unit is not in a position to disclose its information to your office. I 
trust you understand the position.”41 This response, wherein Heath basically said he 
did not trust his principal with sensitive information relating to the arms deal, would 
prove to be the final straw for the executive. 
 
Before making his final decision whether or not to issue a proclamation President 
Mbeki sought an additional legal opinion on the issue from two experienced senior 
counsel, Western Cape Public Prosecutions Director Frank Khan and Adv Jan Lubbe 
SC (Heath’s legal adviser). On 18 January 2001 what came to be known as the Khan 
Lubbe report was sent to the Minister of Justice. The full opinion would only come 
into the public realm a week later (in a speech given to the National Press Club by the 
Minister of Justice) by which time the President had quoted selectively from it.  
 
Lubbe and Khan’s opinion notes:  
“We are of the view that the preparatory criminal investigation being 
conducted by IDSEO in terms of Section 28 (13) of the National Prosecuting 
Authorities Act no 32 of 1998 is warranted and justified. In addition there are 
sufficient grounds in terms of the Special Investigating Units and Special 
Tribunal’s Act  No 74 of 1996, for a Special Investigating Unit to conduct an 
investigation, and in our opinion, such an investigation is warranted. We agree 
with the conclusions of the Special (sic) Committee on Public Accounts, 
namely that a multi-disciplinary team consisting of the Investigating 
Directorate would best conduct the investigation: Serious Economic Offences 
(under the authority of the NDPP) the Auditor General, the Public Protector, 
                                                 
41 Speech by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr Penuell Maduna, at the 
Pretoria Press Club, 25 January 2001. 
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and the Special Investigation Unit. Due to the scope of the investigation, it is 
in our opinion imperative that all the agencies referred to above be involved in 
the earliest possible stage.” 
 
The opinion goes on to note that cognizance has been taken of the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in the case of SAPIL versus Heath and others (CCT27/2000) in 
which the court declared section 3 (1) of Act 14 of 1996 and Proclamation R24 of 
1997 invalid and “in the light of this judgment, we recommend that the Act be 
amended as a matter of urgency to meet the constitutional defects.” Given the 
magnitude and complexity of the investigation, and that a change of the head of the 
unit during the investigation might practically hamper the investigation, Lubbe and 
Khan ask that consideration be given to appointing another Special Investigating 
Units under an Acting Judge who could then be place in a position to continue with 
this investigation by reverting to his personal status after the act is amended. Some 
existing members of the present unit could be appointed to the new unit, thereby 
retaining experience and expertise gathered by the present Unit and such a step would 
ensure continuity and be in accordance with good governance expected of the 
President in view of the above-mentioned Constitutional Court judgment.”42  
 
From the full legal opinion it is clear that the SIU’s inclusion in the JIT investigation 
into the arms deal is warranted, if not essential. However, in making his 
announcement to exclude the SIU on 19th January, President Mbeki would quote 
selectively from the Khan Lubbe opinion in order to justify his decision not to issue a 
proclamation. 
 
 
9.11 The Presidency Decides Judge Heath’s Fate 
 
 
On 19th January 2001 the Government Communication and Information Services 
(GCIS) issued a statement from the Director General, Frank Chikane on behalf of the 
Presidency. The statement noted that having taken full account of all the information 
at his disposal including further information from the Auditor-General, Public 
Protector, National Directorate of Public Prosecutions, Judge Heath, NGOs and 
                                                 
42 Speech by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr Penuell Maduna, at the 
Pretoria Press Club, 25 January 2001. 
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private persons, “the President has decided not to issue a proclamation to authorize 
the SIU headed by judge Heath to investigate the Strategic Defence Procurement 
Package.”43 
 
Reasons given in Chikane’s press statement for denying the proclamation to the SIU 
refer to the November 2000 Constitutional Court judgment which found that an SIU 
headed by a judge was “unconstitutional and invalid” as it held that to have a judge 
performing executive functions serves to corrupt the noble principle of the separation 
of powers…and that to require a judge to perform these functions clearly 
compromises the independence of the judiciary. The government cannot be party to 
acts which compromise the judiciary”. In compliance with the Constitutional Court 
therefore the President asked the minister to attend urgently to the matter of ensuring 
the SIU be properly constituted and “in the meantime, and in deference to the 
Constitutional Court ruling, the President will not be referring new matters to the 
SIU.” 
 
The Statement noted that whilst cabinet, after a “thorough assessment”, was of the 
firm view that the procurement process was undertaken with the utmost integrity, it 
respected the opinion of the Auditor-General and SCOPA that further investigations 
are necessary. In this respect the statement noted that “the Auditor-General, the Public 
Protector and the National Director of Public Prosecutions are engaged in preliminary 
assessments of the allegations made regarding the Strategic Defence Procurement 
Package” and that “government believed that these agencies, together with our courts, 
have the legal capacity and the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, to deal with all 
aspects of the investigation.” Noting that these agencies would “receive the 
government’s full cooperation in their investigations” the statement reaffirmed its 
“commitment to the eradication of corruption from our national life and to transparent 
and open practices.” 
 
On the same day a letter from the President to Judge Heath was made public. In the 
letter the Constitutional Court judgment is cited relating to the separation of powers, 
pointing out that Heath’s appointment was “inconsistent with the Constitution and 
                                                 
43 Statement from the Presidency, 19 January 2001. 
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invalid.” Referring to the judgment on the timing and replacement of Heath which 
notes “there are good reasons for the first respondent’s position as the head of the SIU 
to be regularized without undue delay,” the President’s letter says “I am certain you 
will agree with me that the “spirit and essence” of the ruling of the Court is that you 
be removed without delay.” Appealing to Heath as a member of the judiciary, he 
hopes that he would “appreciate the sentiments of your colleagues on the 
Constitutional Court that we all act urgently to ensure that the principle of the 
separation of powers, a principle that is critical to our nascent democracy, is not 
further compromised.” 
 
President Mbeki reminds Heath vigorously that the “SIU that you head is an 
instrument of this government. You, as head of the SIU, are therefore accountable to 
this government.” Reference is also made to the fact that the government was brought 
into power by more than two thirds of South Africans. Heath is told he therefore has 
“an obligation to provide this government with whatever information he has which is 
relevant to a consideration of whether to issue a proclamation of not” and that he 
“does not understand on what basis you would reach the conclusion that information, 
about this country, is more protected in your hands, than in the hands of the President 
of this country.” Reference is made to the letter of 16 January and Mbeki contends 
these are “very serious charges that you will have to substantiate”, namely to suggest 
that “that this democratic government, elected by an overwhelming majority of our 
people, a government that is responsible for creating the SIU as an instrument to root 
out corruption that was endemic during the tenure of the apartheid regime, is a 
government that is prone to “cover-up.”44  
 
With regard to Heath’s contention that “vital civil aspects” of the investigation might 
be overlooked if the SIU is not involved, the President notes the Public Protector’s 
powers to investigate “any conduct” in state affairs where no distinction is made 
between matters of a civil or criminal matter, that the Auditor-general has extensive 
powers to investigate state institutions and that every person has access to the courts. 
Finally, he writes: 
                                                 
44 President Mbeki letter to Judge Heath, 19 January 2001. 
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“Judge Heath, I am led to believe that you know that you do not have even 
prima facie evidence that, in law, any person or persons committed a criminal 
offence in connection with the matter under discussion…Instead you 
embarked on an unseemly campaign to tout for work, with a level of 
desperation I am still trying to understand.”45 
 
The personal sentiments expressed in the open letter to Judge Heath were expressed 
even more vehemently in an unusual public broadcast by the president on television 
later that day. At 6pm on Friday 19th January 2001, President Mbeki addressed his 
fellow South Africans “openly and honestly” for almost an hour on the matter of the 
Special Investigating Unit’s involvement in the arms deal investigation.46 In his 
address Mbeki wanted to make a number of matters “absolutely clear”, the first being 
that “precisely because we are committed to the fight against corruption, the 
Government fully supports all lawful investigations into any matter pertaining to the 
defence acquisition” and that and is “firmly committed to root out corruption in our 
society and… fully supports all lawful investigations into any matter pertaining to the 
defence acquisition and will continue to cooperate with and assist all those charged 
with this task.”  
 
The second point Mbeki wanted to emphasize was this: “at all times, the Government 
will act strictly according to our Constitution and our laws. We will insist that on this, 
as on other matters, we must be absolutely loyal to the principle of the rule of law.”  
This matter bears especially on the issue of the involvement of the Special 
Investigating Unit in these inquiries.  
 
The third point he emphasized was that the government would not break contracts it 
has legally entered into, reminding fellow South Africans, “that when you elected us 
into Government in 1994, we honored all lawful contracts entered into by the 
apartheid regime.” As such “we will not submit to any demand being made with 
regard to the contracts we have entered into with other Governments and major 
international companies, that we default on our contractual obligations, simply 
                                                 
45 President Mbeki letter to Judge Heath, 19 January 2001. 
46 President Mbeki’s public address to the South African public, 19 January 2001. 
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because some people find it in their interest to spew out a flood of unsubstantiated 
allegations.” 
 
Mbeki referred to the reports of the Auditor-General and SCOPA, noting how on the 
12th January, a number of our Ministers, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, issued 
documents to the public contested all the points made in these Reports.   
“The conclusions drawn by the Auditor-General and SCOPA are wrong. In 
good measure, this has happened because neither the Auditor-General nor 
SCOPA spoke to the people who took the decisions about the defence 
acquisition, namely, the Cabinet and a Cabinet sub-committee that was 
chaired by me as Deputy President of the Republic. We have found it strange 
that the Auditor-General and SCOPA came to conclusions about various 
decisions without asking the decision-makers to explain any matter they felt 
needed to be explained.” 
 
Mbeki notes he would therefore “not be issuing any proclamation mandating the 
Special Investigating Unit to be involved in the inquiry. The Director General has 
released my letter to Judge Wilhelm Heath to the public. “ Mbeki mentioned he had 
released a letter to the Chairperson of SCOPA, Dr Gavin Woods, written by Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma, in his capacity as Leader of Government Business, in which he 
raises various serious matters related to the Report of SCOPA and other issues. This 
letter would form an important part of the criminal case of corruption involving 
Schabir Shaik’s “generally corrupt” relationship with Jacob Zuma. It would later 
emerge that it was Mbeki, rather than Zuma, who had written this letter. 
 
Thanking Advocates Jan Lubbe S.C. and Frank Kahn, S.C., Director of Prosecutions 
in the Cape of Good Hope, for the assistance they gave the Minister to correct the 
above weakness by focusing precisely on the documentation that is in the hands of 
Judge Heath, to establish whether they indicate any criminal offence, President Mbeki 
quoted the same statement twice from a letter to the Minister of Justice dated 18 
January, 2001:  
"Further to your enquiry we advise as follows that at this stage there is no 
prima facie evidence in law that any person or persons committed a criminal 
offence."  
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Mbeki also reacted to Judge Heath’s response not to release information to the Justice 
Ministry as it might threaten potential witnesses. At this point in the live broadcast the 
President held up two documents (organograms) allegedly found in the possession of 
Judge Heath pointing to President Mbeki and former President Mandela and others’ 
alleged involvement in arms deal corruption. Mbeki continued saying we cannot 
allow the situation to continue where an organ appointed by and accountable to the 
executive refuses to accept the authority of the executive. Further, the Constitutional 
Court has directed that we act "without undue delay" to replace Judge Heath with 
somebody else who is not a judge. This directive of the Constitutional Court will be 
carried out as soon as parliament reconvenes at the beginning of February. The 
Government will not be party to anything that seeks to defy the decisions of our 
courts as some have suggested with regard to the matter of the Heath Unit, so-called.  
 
The President ended on a conspiratorial note: 
“Our country and all our people have been subjected to a sustained campaign 
that has sought to discredit our Government and the country itself by making 
unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations of corruption. Among other things, 
this campaign has sought to force us to do illegal things, to break important 
contractual obligations, to accuse major international companies of corrupt 
practice and to damage our image globally, arguing that if we did these things, 
we would, inter alia, strengthen international investor confidence in South 
Africa. Nothing whatsoever, will force us to do any of these absolutely wrong 
and unacceptable things. We know that various entities have been hired to 
sustain this campaign to create a negative climate about our country and 
Government. I would like to assure you that the campaign will not succeed. 
We will leave no stone unturned in the effort to ensure that you, the people, 
know everything that needs to be known about this matter. All lawful 
investigations will continue. All wrongdoers, whoever they may be, will meet 
their just deserts.” 
 
According to a Sunday newspaper, a phone call by Judge Heath to former President 
Mandela was behind Mbeki’s angry public attack on the judge on Friday. Heath 
confirmed he had indeed called Mandela on the Thursday asking him for a 
testimonial:  “I did speak to Mr Mandela and we agreed that the discussion would 
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remain between us. But even if I asked Mr Mandela for a testimonial why should 
(Mbeki) be angry? If I had to ask him for one, what would he say?” Mandela is said to 
have agreed to write a reference but became suspicious when Heath asked him instead 
to testify to his abilities by phone to all who called. Mandela then informed Mbeki of 
the Judge’s call.  Two of Mbeki’s close advisers said the president was so incensed 
that he urgently discussed the issue with Maduna and decided to publicly censure 
Heath and expedite his removal from the unit.47 
 
Jonathan Shapiro 1-23-2001 
 
9.11.1 The Organograms 
 
Heath strongly denied that the unit had drawn up the organograms President Mbeki 
had shown on national TV.  Obtained by intelligence agents these allegedly linked 
Mbeki, Mandela, Zuma, Pahad and Modise to various companies involved in the deal. 
He said he had never set out to prove Mbeki or Mandela had been involved in 
corruption regarding the arms deal and that Mbeki had been “wrongly advised” about 
excluding his unit from the arms probe and that the government had a “complete 
misconception” of the issue when it claimed there was no prima facie evidence of any 
criminal wrongdoing.48  
                                                 
47 Ranjeni Munusamy, “Heath’s secret call to Mandela”, The Sunday Times, 21 January 2001. 
48 John Matisonn and Xolisa Vapi, “Shocking arms deal allegations”, Independent on Saturday, 20 
January 2001. 
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A few days after the Mbeki broadcast, Martin Welz, editor of investigative magazine 
Noseweek which in August 2000 was the first publication to highlight the arms 
industry interests of family members of the SANDF procurement chief Chippy Shaik, 
said he was shocked to see Mbeki dangle organograms on SABC TV news. He 
admitted he had personally drafted the diagrams – linking Mbeki, Mandela, Modise 
and other private people with close ties to top politicians – as a “hypothesis that could 
form the basis of an investigation” into the arms deal. “They are just a theory which is 
not based on fact”. “The president was misinformed. The people who informed him 
did not understand what the documents meant.  They just sketched the power 
structure and did not prove anything”. Welz fully believed Heath when he said he had 
never seen the sketches before. Whilst he had shared the documents with some 
government investigators he had certainly not done so with Heath. Patricia De Lille 
confirmed that she too had never seen the sketches and these were not part of the 
dossier she had initially submitted to Heath as a basis for his probe.49  
 
Presidential aides moved swiftly to prevent an apparent embarrassment over the 
matter. On 23 January a statement by the Director General of the presidency, Frank 
Chikane reiterated that the organograms were among the documents that Judge Heath 
refused to make available to the Minister of Justice. “The deliberate propagation of 
untruths about this matter will not change this reality.”50 
 
9.11.2 Responses to the President’s Announcement 
 
Following president Mbeki’s announcement, Judge Heath who had not been 
individually informed that he would be excluded from the arms probe said: “Of 
course I am disappointed. I know many other people in the country are disappointed. 
We were merely trying to protect the interests of the country as well as that of 
government.” Heath also said he had complete confidence in the expertise of the other 
agencies involved in the probe but that the exclusion of his unit affected exploring the 
maladministration aspect of the deal.51 
                                                 
49 Khathu Mamaila , “President’s sketchy TV evidence uncovered”, Cape Times, 23 January 2001. 
50 Statement from Presidency on the matter of the Heath “organograms”, 23 January 2001. 
51 John Matisonn and Xolisa Vapi, “Shocking arms deal allegations”, Independent on Saturday, 20 
January 2001. 
 227 
Within the Heath Unit the falling of the axe was no surprise. “We have been 
expecting both the replacement of Judge Heath and the exclusion from the 
investigation”. Staff at the SIU wrote to President Mbeki and Justice Minister 
Maduna, imploring their loyalty to the president: “We accept the unit is an organ of 
state that only act in accordance with provisions of Act 74 of 1996. We further accept 
that the unit was created by the government as an important tool in the fight against 
corruption. We trust that we will be able to continue this important function. We 
respectfully ask you to distinguish between the position of Judge Heath as head of the 
unit and the position of members of the unit.”52 
 
Opposition parties expressed disappointment at the decision to exclude the SIU.  
 
The PAC’s Patricia De Lille who had received death threats regarding her stance on 
the arms deal accused the ANC of placing their interests before that of the country. 
“We are not fighting government, we are not fighting the president, we are not 
fighting the minister of justice, we are fighting corruption. We want to help the 
government in rooting out corruption within the government. The credibility of this 
investigation will not stand or fall by the inclusion or exclusion of the investigative 
unit, but by the principle of accountability of the executive to parliament which the 
government is violating.”53 According to De Lille the SIU is the only unit that could 
effectively investigate the allegations. “It is a special unit with special powers and that 
is why it was first established. Firstly it has the ability to set aside contracts signed by 
parties in the event of corruption, and that is why we need Judge Heath to be involved 
because we want the contracts in the arms deal to be declared null and void. And 
secondly it has the power to investigate the validity of the contracts. The executive 
has personalized the issue. I don’t know what the Judge did to them but I saw this 
coming six months ago.”54 
 
The Democratic Alliance questioned why President Mbeki and the government had 
allowed the controversy around the arms programme to escalate to crisis level before 
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taking action.55 Leader of the UDM, Bantu Holomisa said “this indicates that the 
existing heads of the so-called independent institutions survive at the executive’s 
pleasure and do so as long as they are seen by the executive to toe the line.”56 The IFP 
commented “we thought the president would be above party politics but it is clear that 
he has listened to Maduna his minister and party colleagues…The allegations that the 
Heath unit is siding with the opposition are things that should have been investigated 
separately. Heath should have formed part of the investigation if it is to have any 
credibility.  Many names have been mentioned in the newspapers. Who is going to 
clear those implicated?”57 
 
A range of editorials expressed dismay at the SIU’s exclusion from the probe and the 
consequences this would have58. Political analysts tried to make sense of the SIU 
exclusion. Principal of Vista University, Sipho Seepe, commented “Heath was seen as 
a threat to the government because of his independence. The problem with this 
government is that they think they have a monopoly on what is best for South Africa.” 
Richard Calland from Idasa said, “This has been really badly handled. This 
government does not seem to want to learn from its experiences. There was 
Zimbabwe, then Aids and now this…The government is showing itself incapable of 
managing crises and in fact is exacerbating them.”59  
 
Political analyst Xolela Mangcu provided a possible solution to the resolution of the 
controversy: “What is at stake it the integrity of parliament, the presidency and the 
unit itself. We could preserve the integrity of parliament by involving the unit in the 
investigation, without Heath…Parliament’s integrity could also be maintained by 
appointing an equally vigorous individual who is seen to be neither a government 
apologist not a hack with an axe to grins. Appointing an independent black person 
would be even better. It would demonstrate to the world, and even more importantly 
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to ourselves, that we can hold ourselves accountable.  With Heath out of the way, the 
executive would then co-operate with the very unit it set up to investigate corruption. 
And voila, the investigation proceeds with the unit’s involvement, albeit without 
Heath.”60 
 
Kaizer Nyatsumba noted how the issue had divided the country almost neatly along 
racial lines: “Most whites argue for the inclusion of Heath in the team which will 
investigate alleged corruption in the arms procurement process. Meanwhile many 
blacks have publicly argues that Heath’s involvement is not paramount… For the 
country’s sake it is vitally important therefore that the investigating agencies conduct 
as thorough a probe into the alleged arms malfeasance as possible…That investigation 
should go on without Heath who, his protestations notwithstanding, has repeatedly 
come across as a man with an agenda to bury the government, at the behest of certain 
political players and parties. Heath, who should be replaced swiftly as the head of the 
SIU, is now damaged goods, after having performed so spectacularly at political hara-
kiri. It is important that parties whose only interest is the unearthing of the truth 
should accept that Heath cannot be part of that probe. Those charged with such an 
important a job should be men and women whose integrity is accepted without 
reservation by everybody, including the government and the opposition parties 
involved.”61  
 
Jonathan Shapiro 1-25-2001 
                                                 
60 Xolela Mangcu, “Intellectuals have a noble role to play but they’re not playing it”, Sunday 
Independent, 21 January 2001. 
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January 2001. 
 230 
9.12 Conclusion 
 
So, in the final analysis, how convincing are the state’s reasons for excluding the 
SIU? They are not convincing at all. The overtly personal reaction to Judge Heath by 
members of the ANC would come to haunt the presidency as a question mark would 
hang over the credibility of the high profile corruption investigation. The exclusion of 
Heath brings to light a factor whereby a high-ranking official belonging to the 
previously advantaged group, and in this case white, was seen to be challenging the 
new black regime. Racial and personal politics would prevail above principle. 
 
In an interview conducted in September 2002, with Willie Hofmeyr, previously and 
ANC MP who succeeded Judge Heath to head the Special Investigating Unit, 
Hofmeyr conceded that on the question of Heath’s involvement, the issue “got sort of 
involved with the whole debate of the SIU and my sense is that it was mainly overlaid 
with all sort of personal dynamics rather than any great issues of principle.” The issue 
became “very mess.” His sense was that “even if the SIU had been involved (in the 
investigation) and the same result had been achieved perhaps the results would have 
had more credibility than it does have at the moment.”62 
 
This completes our outline of the government’s initial response to the irregularities 
involved in the arms deal. In the final section of this thesis, Part Four, the focus will 
be on evaluating the quality of this response. As the arms deal is a test case for the 
anti-corruption capacity of various institutions as well as political will to deal credibly 
with corruption in South Africa, it will be necessary to go into some detail of further 
developments in the case. In this regard the unique challenges facing SCOPA in 
exercising parliamentary oversight of the executive and ensuring that the investigation 
proceeds, will be closely examined as will the case of two ANC MPs involved in the 
arms deal investigation, namely Tony Yengeni and Andrew Feinstein, in order to 
further tease out and test our thesis propositions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Interview with Willie Hofmeyr, 3 September 2002. 
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PART FOUR: ARMS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Chapter Ten: Parliamentary Oversight Under Pressure 
 
10.1 Introduction 
  
How have the anti-corruption mechanisms in South Africa fared with respect to 
handling allegations of corruption in the arms deal? In brief, the demands of loyalty to 
the party have, as we have already seen, come into conflict with the elements of strict 
impartiality required if anti-corruption bodies are to be successful. This conflict in the 
final analysis is best articulated by the words and especially actions of the ANC MP 
Andrew Feinstein.  
 
This chapter simply allows Feinstein’s action to speak for itself. His resignation, in 
September 2001, is the most eloquent way of pointing to a structural problem in the 
politics of loyalty as opposed to accountability, and the impact this limited and 
partisan form of accountability has on the effectiveness of anti-corruption safeguards 
such as parliament, in South Africa.  A further element which comes to the fore here 
is the critical role of the media. The government’s accusations of the press as being 
racist, alongside opposition parties’ views on the handling of the arms deal, points 
again to the fact, as far as senior members of the government are concerned, loyalty to 
the party’s position, even if misguided, is everything.  
 
Following the president’s announcement on public television to exclude the SIU from 
the investigation, parliament’s main oversight committee, the Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts (SCOPA) would come under increasing pressure from the executive. 
The process is encapsulated firstly in the highly critical letter signed by the Leader of 
Government Business, Jacob Zuma, to the chair of SCOPA, the response and counter-
response; and secondly (in Chapter Eleven) how the government dealt with the case 
of ANC Chief Whip Tony Yengeni, exposed in the media for having accepted a 47% 
discount from a company tendering for part of the arms deal. We will examine the 
Zuma letter controversy first.  
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10.2 Zuma’s Letter to the Chair of SCOPA 
 
In the statement on 19th January 2001 the Presidency had referred to a 12-page letter 
from Deputy President Jacob Zuma (in his capacity as Leader of Government 
Business) to SCOPA chair, Dr Gavin Woods. This letter would have continuing 
importance in the criminal trials that emanated from the arms deal investigation – not 
dealt with in any detail in this thesis - and it is important to discuss it as it shows the 
strategy of dealing with parliament (in particular SCOPA) from the perspective of the 
executive. 
 
While Zuma had signed the letter, the true author of the letter was always in question 
and it was widely suspected that it originated from the Office of the Presidency, since 
Zuma was out the country at the time and the style was “very hostile and improper” 
(Woods 2002). Mbeki would admit to writing the letter himself five years later1. What 
was the true intention of this extraordinary letter? Was Zuma being used to discredit 
SCOPA? Was Zuma himself being set up as part of a wider conspiracy within the 
ANC to get rid of him as a potential presidential candidate? The answers to these 
questions can without further evidence only be speculative. 
 
The letter discredits SCOPA’s 14th report and in particular the investigation it 
recommended. Noting that “the executive has no desire to fuel controversy, however 
is obliged to defend the integrity of government,” the author drew Woods’ attention to 
both the 12 January 2001 government statement on the defence acquisitions and 
Justice Minister Maduna’s letter of 15 January which “contest the conclusions arrived 
at by the Auditor-General and SCOPA.”2 
 
In respecting the decision of the Constitutional Court, it stated: “there is no need for 
the “Heath Unit” to be involved in any “investigation” of the defence acquisition” and 
“we do not understand why you, presumably on behalf of your parliamentary 
committee, suggest that we should ignore the decision of the Constitutional Court on 
                                                 
1 Angela Quintal, “Mbeki admits he was behind Zuma’s letter to Woods”, Sunday Tribune, 26 
February. 2006. 
2 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
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the “Heath Unit.” The letter then proceeded to quote the President of the 
Constitutional Court, speaking on behalf of the court saying, “Although there may be 
reasons for allowing sufficient time for all matters to be dealt with simultaneously, 
there are good reasons for the first respondent’s position as head of the SIU to be 
regularized without undue delay.” The case-load of the unit would make it as Minister 
Maduna noted “absurd and illogical for additional work to be given to the unit.” As 
such “we find it very odd indeed that the Auditor General, according to your letter, is 
keen that we act without reference to the decision of the Constitutional Court”.3  
 
The letter noted that it was also “strange” that SCOPA considers expenditure for the 
acquisition of defence equipment as a “major diversion of public resources,” 
particularly because of the constitutional obligation to maintain a national defence 
force and the fact that the expenditure was considered by the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee and approved by parliament.”4 As we have seen earlier, the “approval” by 
parliament, was not so clear-cut. 
 
Other “matters of grave concern” referred to in the letter arose from the 14th Report 
where SCOPA stated it was interested in carrying out an investigation “because our 
government, foreign governments and the prime contractors, major international 
companies, are prone to corruption and dishonesty. If this is the starting point for 
SCOPA, it seems the investigation is tantamount to a fishing expedition to find the 
corruption and dishonesty you assume must have occurred.” The letter questioned the 
14th report’s accounts of corruption in the international arms trade industry and 
asked, “what work was done by SCOPA to establish that there was a possible role by 
which influential parties? Do these include members of the government? Which prime 
contractors and which subcontractors would have been influenced by these influential 
parties?”5 The letter further questioned the concerns raised by the 14th report about 
the NIP agreements: “The seriousness with which you take your assumption that our 
government, the trans-national corporations and foreign governments are prone to 
corruption and dishonesty, is illustrated by the steps you have taken to ensure that 
                                                 
3 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
4 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
5 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
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investigations take place.”6 The letter went on to observe that “natural justice 
demands that you both substantiate the allegation that the persons, governments and 
corporations…are prone to corruption and dishonesty and provide even the most 
rudimentary or elementary evidence that any or all of these acted in a corrupt or 
dishonest manner…it is a most serious matter indeed for our parliament or any section 
of it to level charges of corruption against foreign governments and corporations 
without producing evidence to back up such allegations.”7 The letter continued “it is 
clear from your report to parliament that you have a significant amount of written 
information…and presumably other evidence” and that it should be handed over to 
the Police Service and brought to the attention of the Speaker. “The rules, I believe, 
prescribe that any investigation pursuant to this information would not fall within the 
competence of SCOPA.” 
 
The letter then addressed the “interaction between SCOPA and the Executive on the 
issue of the defence acquisition” observing that SCOPA had reached conclusions 
without having heard cabinet, despite the request the ministers made to meet SCOPA. 
Because this meeting did not take place, “SCOPA has seriously misdirected itself and 
thus arrived at conclusions that are not substantiated by any facts.” “We hope this 
strange manner of proceeding was not driven by a determination to find the Executive 
guilty at all costs, based on the assumption that the Executive is prone to corruption 
and dishonesty.”  There was a need to ensure that “we do not repeat the obviously 
wrong things that have happened during the handling by parliament of the defence 
acquisition issue.”8 
 
In this regard reference was made to the Speaker’s letter of 27th December noting 
SCOPA “has no authority to subcontract its work to any of these bodies or require 
them to undertake any particular activity, or to report directly to the Committee. From 
the statement of the Speaker it is clear that your letter to the President (8 December) 
was ultra vires. This is true of any action you might have taken to cause any 
investigative unit to carry out any investigation. This has put the Executive and its 
organs in an embarrassing situation, to the extent that you and others have conveyed 
                                                 
6 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
7 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
8 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
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the false information that the National Assembly requested that various organs should 
carry out an investigation. It is therefore necessary that specific steps be taken to 
correct this situation, to ensure that all of us, including SCOPA and you, respect the 
rule of law.”9 
 
The letter also referred to Woods communication of 21 November to the Joint 
Investigating Initiative where Woods had referred to “uncertainties created through 
the media of possible interference in the investigation by government, it was felt 
appropriate to mention this offer (from some “international facility”) as a possible 
means through which SCOPA could assure the public of a comprehensive 
investigation.” Zuma or the letter’s author maintained “you felt that they did not enjoy 
sufficient credibility with “the public” to be able to reassure “the public” of the 
integrity and honesty of the investigation if the foreign “facility” was not involved. 
On what information do you base this assessment of the AG, PP and NDPP who have 
all been confirmed in their positions by parliament? “I am not raising these questions 
so that you should report to the Executive. I mention them because they cause grave 
concern to the Executive which is keen to hear straightforward answers. Parliament 
will have to deal with these and other questions as we have to respect the principle 
contained in our constitution of the separation of powers.” 
 
Referring to Wood’s 8 December letter and the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
the letter noted “it is clear that you disagree with the views both of the Public 
Protector and the Constitutional Court, believing that there are public funds to be 
recovered and that neither the police, nor the Prosecuting Authority nor the state 
attorney have the same competence to act as does the SIU.10  
 
Woods was then asked to favour the executive with a response to the following 
questions: 
• What are the particular powers, areas of competence and relevant experience 
to which you refer, distinct from the powers, area of competence and relevant 
experience of our judiciary? 
                                                 
9 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
10 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
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• In what way are the competencies mentioned under (a) especially relevant to 
the determination of the truth about the defence acquisition, which 
determination of the truth would be weakened by the absence of the SIU? 
 
The letter requested SCOPA to indicate “the specific matters it wants investigated and 
why, providing the prima facie evidence which it believes justifies this investigation. 
As of now we do not have this prima facie evidence and are completely at a loss as to 
what the loudly proclaimed wrongdoing consists in.” The letter stressed that 
parliament is, of course, at liberty to interact with the Public Protector and Auditor-
General as it wishes.  The letter reiterated the Executive willingness to co-operate 
fully with any investigation necessitated by information that suggests that corruption 
might have occurred in the process of defence acquisition. Finally “the government 
will also act vigorously to defend itself and the country against any malicious 
misinformation campaign intended to discredit the Government and destabilize the 
country.”11 
 
10.2.1 Responses to Zuma’s Letter 
 
The upshot of Zuma’s letter was to force ANC members on the committee to choose 
between their role as members of the ANC and of the committee. It also indicated a 
wish for government to take responsibility for the investigation out of the committee’s 
hands and thereby exclude it from any oversight of its findings. Woods said if this 
was indeed what government intended it was “chilling”. He believed that “prima 
facie” evidence existed for a probe and would propose that ministers who rejected the 
committee’s findings appear before it to explain themselves.12 
 
Ten days later, on 29th January 2001, the Speaker of the National Assembly Dr Frene 
Ginwala would write to the Deputy President on the matter seemingly as a damage 
control exercise, in a response that was seen as “inappropriate” by SCOPA members 
such as Gavin Woods. On the same day she appeared before the SCOPA saying the 
committee’s investigation must continue. She outlined the different requirements of 
accountability of the institutions involved in the JIT and the responsibilities of 
                                                 
11 Letter from Jacob Zuma to Gavin Woods, 19 January 2001. 
12 Linda Ensor, "Battle lines drawn over arms probe", Business Day, 22 January 2001. 
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SCOPA and those of Parliament in terms of the investigation noting that while a 
Committee can engage researchers or other resources, it cannot “subcontract” its 
work. The meeting closed after Chairperson Woods expressed on what points he took 
issue with the Speaker, namely disputing her suggestion that SCOPA had 
subcontracted its work and, most particularly, the Speaker’s suggestion that he had 
exceeded his authority.  
 
In Ginwala’s letter of 29th January to Zuma she acknowledged the letter of 19th 
January written to Gavin Woods, the chair of SCOPA, which had raised issues of 
procedure on the conduct of relations between the legislature and the executive as 
well as specific concerns of substance. She noted expressions of support for 
parliament’s constitutional responsibilities in the president’s public broadcast as well 
as his letter but is “perturbed” by the concerns raised noting, “the National Assembly 
will need to consider them very seriously and rectify any problems.”13 Ginwala then 
responded systematically to the various points raised by the Deputy President in a 
way that Woods would later describe as “ominous and wholly inappropriate” (Woods 
2002).  
 
While the 14th Report adopted by the assembly “explicitly recommends an 
independent and expert forensic investigation for which the committee will prepare a 
brief as well as a exploratory meeting to which the four named “and other appropriate 
investigative bodies” should be invited, the Speaker argued that the report did not 
recommend that any or all of these bodies should be included, nor does it refer to the 
procedural and constitutional issues that would arise should Parliament wish to 
involve or instruct either independent or executive agencies or organizations in its 
inquiries. “Had there been a recommendation that the Executive authorize the SIU or 
any other organ of the Executive, I would have immediately drawn the attention of the 
relevant Minister as has been our practice for over a year.” 
 
She noted how it was now evident that there are differences among SCOPA on what 
the report was intended to convey…”I want to take the opportunity to express my 
view that it is within the competence of the Legislature after due consideration to 
                                                 
13 Letter from the Speaker to Jacob Zuma, 29 January 2001. 
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make a recommendation to the Executive on areas within its jurisdiction which the 
Executive may choose to accept or reject. Parliament’s authority is persuasive. The 
legislature cannot instruct the Executive, except to the extent that legislation it enacts 
defines and sets the legal framework within which the executive undertakes its 
constitutional responsibilities. Parliament retains oversight over the manner in which 
the Executive and state organs perform their function.”14  
 
In order to facilitate communication with the executive and ensure that 
recommendations of the committee are considered timeously she noted that “I have 
for the past year been writing to specific members of the Executive drawing attention 
to report and particular recommendation concerning their portfolios and requesting 
that the assembly be advised of action that is taken.”  She concluded the letter by 
saying: “We are all still developing our understanding and trying to give effect to the 
constitutional relationship between the Executive and the Legislature….as recent 
events have emphasized, much still remains to be done, and we need to continuously 
review and improve the communication and relationship between the Executive and 
the Legislature.”15 
 
Defining the relationship between the executive and legislature would form a major 
theme of a debate held six months later, in June 2001, in support of the speaker and 
her role. This is discussed later in this chapter. Feinstein would refrain from voting in 
this debate, signaling his growing alienation from the ANC. 
 
On 31st January, Zuma would acknowledge the speaker’s letter, thanking her for her 
“efforts to guide SCOPA in the process of finalizing this matter ” and hoping that 
SCOPA would respond to matters raised in the first National Assembly report with 
more clarity in their second report to Parliament as this would assist the National 
Assembly in its “earnest search for the truth in this matter.”16 His letter raised the 
following questions that clearly perturbed the executive: 
                                                 
14 Letter from the Speaker to Jacob Zuma, 29 January 2001. 
15 Letter from the Speaker to Jacob Zuma, 29 January 2001. 
16 Letter from Jacob Zuma to the Speaker, 31 January 2001. 
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• What evidence was gathered by the committee upon which it based its 
assertions that defence acquisitions are usually attended by malpractice, with 
the purchasing countries being victims of such malpractice? 
• What evidence does the committee have that in this specific instance, such 
malpractice occurred, as well as evidence of the resultant harm to South 
Africa? 
• On what information does SCOPA base its conclusion that improper influence 
might have been exerted in “certain of these (subcontractor) selections?” 
• Which of these selections are being referred to and who are the influential 
parties? 
• What evidence caused SCOPA to reach for the conclusion that influential 
parties might have influenced the choice of subcontractors? 
• Why did SCOPA omit to invite the Ministers who were involved in this 
process to clarify and answer questions, prior to the finalization of the 
National Assembly’s preliminary report?17  
 
Whilst the correspondence to Gavin Woods from the Deputy President and the 
Speaker’s subsequent intervention were clearly attempts to undermine the proposed 
SCOPA investigation on procedural issues, executive intervention by the ANC was 
also occurring at committee level in parliament. 
 
10.3 SCOPA and the ANC 
 
The meeting of SCOPA on Monday 22nd January 2001 was watched keenly. Would 
ANC MPs still stand by their decision of the past year to support the call by SCOPA 
for SIU as one of the investigating agencies to be involved in the probe? The meeting 
would also determine whether the non-partisan approach maintained by the 
committee had survived the intense criticism from the executive. The meeting and its 
outcome was reported by the local press as one that “could determine whether the 
country faces a crisis of public confidence in the government’s will to deal with 
corruption... …the trend-setting meeting of SCOPA which will determine whether 
                                                 
17 Letter from Jacob Zuma to the Speaker, 31 January 2001. 
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parliament and its committees will assert their independence and critical role or 
whether they will be cowed by pressures from the executive.”18 
 
SCOPA was considering calling Ministers Erwin, Manuel, Radebe and Lekota to 
appear before it. However inviting the ministers to appear before the committee 
would place the ANC in the difficult position of having to question and possibly 
challenge the party leadership. The day before, ANC members on SCOPA had been 
called to an emergency session in Cape Town to discuss their strategy. Senior 
members of the ANC apparently gave the members instructions on their short-term 
involvement in SCOPA and the arms deal. Both the Speaker and Chairperson on the 
National Council of Provinces were present with the latter participating actively in the 
drafting of an ANC press statement released on 22 January after the SCOPA meeting 
that rejected the inclusion of the SIU in the JIT (Woods 2002). 
 
There were also reports of ANC committee members coming under strong pressure to 
back down on the inquiry. The first cracks in SCOPA unity appeared when ANC 
member Don Gumede said “the language of the committee report was quite 
unfortunate. That resolution was taken with undue haste” and that the committee 
would have to re-examine its position on Heath in the light of the Constitutional Court 
decision.19 
 
At a press conference in parliament later that day the ANC said that SCOPA had not 
singled out the Heath anti-corruption unit in its recommendations in the 14th Report 
that allegations of serious irregularities should be investigated. Andrew Feinstein, 
chair of the ANC study group said that this did not mean that all four agencies had in 
fact been mandated to be part of the probe. At the time of drafting the resolution “it 
wasn’t clear which units we wanted involved.”20 The ANC group denied that it had 
reneged on its original position and reaffirmed its strong support for a comprehensive 
investigation saying that calling for an exploratory meeting did not mean giving them 
                                                 
18 Boyd Webb and Andre Koopman, “Crying De Lille tells of threats in arms saga”, The Mercury, 21 
January 2001. 
19 Mawande Jubasi, "When flawed Heath calls himself the only saint, he sullies other corruption-
busters", Sunday Times, 21 January 2001. 
20 Robert Brand, Andre Koopman and Sapa, “Parliament watchdog split on Heath”, Cape Times, 23 
January 2001.  
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a mandate.21 Feinstein would recall that he had been forced to read the statement and 
that “Gavin had been devastated.”22 
 
Woods would however, stick to his guns insisting all parties including the ANC 
members on SCOPA had wanted the Heath unit involved in the probe: “It is quite 
clear in my mind that every member of the committee was of the opinion that the 
report expressed the need and desire of all four of the agencies to be involved in the 
investigation. Any deviation from that position would be incorrect.” He said the 
exploratory meeting was to ensure all four agencies were brought together to see how 
best they could co-operate.23 Woods said he had staked his reputation on this 
interpretation and had been attacked by the executive for it. He had done so on the 
basis that all committee members had voted individually in favour of the involvement 
of all four agencies.24 
 
Opposition parties charged ANC members with submitting to pressure from the 
executive for the unit’s exclusion. DA MP Raenette Taljaard described the ANC view 
as a legalistic interpretation of SCOPA’s recommendation: “We all know what was 
intended…the ANC has missed a wonderful opportunity to call the executive to 
account”.25 
 
10.4 The ANC’s Response to Accusations of Backtracking  
 
In a section entitled “The REAL Arms Scandal”, an ANC statement on arms 
procurement released on 23 January would attack the media noting it “has almost 
without exception acted as uncritical participants in fuelling this so called crises” and 
propagated the following myths: 
• The involvement of the Heath Unit was a test of government’s commitment to 
fight corruption (sufficient permanent institutions with a proven track record – 
also constitutional court ruling) 
                                                 
21 Editorial, “Watchdog cleaved along party lines”, Business Day, 23 January 2001.  
22 Interview with Andrew Feinstein, 21 August 2001, 
23 Robert Brand, Andre Koopman and Sapa, “Parliament watchdog split on Heath”, Cape Times, 23 
January 2001. 
24 Editorial, “Watchdog cleaved along party lines”, Business Day, 23 January 2001.  
25 Editorial, “Watchdog cleaved along party lines”, Business Day, 23 January 2001.  
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• The President did not respect the oversight role of Parliament (Presidential 
prerogative to issue proclamation, PAC should desist from “creating confusion 
and making unnecessary noise) 
• The ANC was trying to prevent a thorough investigation (media have no 
confidence, only in Heath – what is so special about this individual?) 
• The arms procurement process was riddled with corruption (no evidence to 
support this sweeping conclusion, bring information forward, executive 
support to the investigation, conviction of integrity, availability to committee.)  
 
It further noted that the ANC viewed this as “a crisis of trying to make a serious issue 
out of nothing” and  “part of a sustained campaign to try and destabilize the 
government, the ANC” and “yet another desperate attempt to create another banana 
republic out of our beloved South Africa”. The statement warned that “the ANC 
would like to condemn in the harshest terms, the role that some members of the media 
in conjunction with the opposition are playing, in trying to deviate the attention of the 
public from matters of national importance.” The statement continued to say that the 
debate had now moved from the investigation of possible fraud and other 
irregularities, to the need to the involvement of Judge Heath and finally to the 
meaningfulness of the arms deal. “The fact is that there is not prima facie evidence of 
criminal misconduct.”  
 
Finally, the ANC believed “no sinister forces” would succeed in changing the 
president’s politically and legally informed position. The statement ended: 
 
Forward to Democracy and the Liberation of the People of South Africa 
Down with Corruption! 
Down with the destabilization of our Democracy! 
 
It was clear that the ANC’s leadership perceived the proposed SCOPA investigation 
into corruption as a serious political challenge.  
 
SCOPA Chair, Dr Gavin Woods would try and get the committee back on track, 
expressing the sentiment that the committee must rise above political differences in 
dealing with the arms deal issue and continue the proud tradition of SCOPA that 
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operated along consensual, non-partisan lines, a position strongly supported by ANC 
MP Andrew Feinstein and Raenette Taljaard from the DA. This stance ultimately 
failed as the committee’s Second Report on the arms deal would not be accepted 
unanimously by the committee but pushed through by the ANC majority. 
 
10.5 Further Executive Justifications for the Exclusion of the SIU 
 
At the Pretoria Press Club, Justice Minister Penuell Maduna added his justification for 
excluding the SIU from the arms deal investigation. He first warned the media 
“against sensational reporting” before firmly rejecting any suggestion that 
government had been “attempting to conceal alleged corruption regarding the arms 
deal” and that excluding the SIU was “proof of the fact that Government has 
something to hide.”  
 
Maduna cited five reasons for the exclusion of the SIU including: the constitutional 
court decision; the limited human resource capacity of the unit; the fact that various 
other agencies were investigating the matter and believe they can adequately deal 
with the present issues; the wide mandate required by Heath which raises questions 
about duplication or overlapping and the creation of possible tension between 
agencies; and the powers of the existing Unit to approach the Special Tribunal for the 
cancellation of contracts, indicating the Public Protector’s opinion of lack of evidence 
of any unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money. 
 
Maduna referred to the Annual Report (1999/2000) of the SIU that had been 
submitted to parliament. In it Judge Heath had said, “…the Minister of Justice has in 
the past year since the 1999 elections, save for a few amendments to proclamations 
and a few already in process, refused to process proclamations to the President’s 
Office. The Minister has unilaterally informed the Unit on several occasions during 
the financial year that he had decided to refer matters to the NDPP, the PP and lately 
referred matters back to the Premiers who have already requested that the Unit 
investigate matters which originated in their Provinces.” 
 
Objecting to this Maduna said a number of factors were taken into account in 
decisions whether or not to refer a particular matter to the unit and that in terms of the 
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Act there was no obligation that each and every matter submitted to the department 
should be submitted to the Unit for an investigation, noting the range of other anti-
corruption bodies: “The Act provides for the establishment of SIUs for the purpose of 
investigating serious malpractices or maladministration in connection with the 
administration of state institutions, state assets and public money as well as any 
conduct which may seriously harm the interests of the public. The investigations 
contemplated by the Act should be of an involved nature which require investigations 
normally done by a commission of inquiry.” Also as there was  a cost factor where 
“one should determine whether it is financially justifiable to refer a particular matter 
to a SIU which is a very costly instrument, in circumstances where the responsible 
Department has indeed a mechanism or structure to adequately deal with that 
matter.”26 
 
Finally, he reiterated the important role of the press in an open and democratic society 
as one of the watchdogs of government, which had a moral obligation to bring facts to 
the attention of the public. The media should ensure that the facts that are brought are 
accurate and it must guard against the tendency to draw inaccurate conclusions from 
such facts. 
 
Maduna assured his audience that “the government will do anything in its power to 
investigate the arms deal and if certain irregularities are exposed, the government will 
ensure the law takes its course. For these purposes the investigation of the matter is 
entrusted to three constitutional legitimate structures, namely the Public Protector, the 
Auditor-General and the NDPP.”27 
 
In what would raise a political storm, Maduna quoted from the Lubbe and Khan 
opinion, made public in its entirety for the first time. Here it was revealed that their 
opinion had in fact called for the SIU to be involved in the investigation. This is 
something the President had conveniently ignored in his decision of 19th January 
when on national television he refused a proclamation to investigate to the SIU (see 
chapter nine). Maduna’s reasons for doing this are unclear; possibly he was naïve in 
                                                 
26 Speech by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr Penuell Maduna, at the 
Pretoria Press Club, 25 January 2001. 
27 Speech by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Dr Penuell Maduna, at the 
Pretoria Press Club, 25 January 2001. 
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believing the public would not pick up on this inconsistency, or perhaps the executive 
was confident that it could ride any further controversy this revelation of the full legal 
opinion might bring.   
 
10.5.1 Responses to Maduna’s Reasoning 
 
The following day, in a headline story “Mbeki ‘ignored’ plea for Heath role” and an 
editorial “Cynical manipulation” Business Day reported that the legal opinion 
requested and handed to Minister Maduna on 18th January and used by President 
Mbeki on 19th January in excluding the Heath Unit had in fact strongly recommended 
the inclusion of the unit, or one with the same powers! Sunday newspapers took up 
the President’s misrepresentation of the Khan/Lubbe opinions in editorials entitled 
“Explain yourself, Mr President” and “Mbeki spares truth, cedes public faith”.28  
 
In a letter to the editor of Business Day, Director General in the Presidency, Rev 
Frank Chikane said the headlines and editorial “do not correctly represent the 
President’s reference to the views of Advocates Frank Khan and Jan Lubbe.” He 
noted that “the President referred to what they had to say in response to a request for 
an assessment of the nature of the information in the documents in question so that he 
could apply his mind to the question of whether to issue a proclamation. You report 
that Khan and Lubbe said that “at this stage” there was no prima facie evidence that 
anyone had acted unlawfully.  This is what the President said. That was the nub of the 
issues and the fact that he did not refer to other matters in his address does not 
constitute his “ignoring” them...The President’s powers are constrained by the law 
and the constitution and thus the President carefully considered all views presented to 
him and made his determination within the constraints of the law…It was none other 
than the government that released the full Khan-Lubbe assessments, offering the 
public maximum information. That is not manipulation, neither is it cynical or non-
transparent.29 
 
In response, Adv Khan said Mbeki had not “misrepresented” him but that he would 
normally determine whether there was a prima facie case at the end of an 
                                                 
28 Editorial, Sunday Times, Sunday Independent, 28 January 2001. 
29 Frank Chikane , Letter to the Editor of Business Day, January 2001. 
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investigation and after sworn statements had been taken. “The second memo must be 
read with the first one”. Later he said that he had not meant that the Heath unit should 
be involved but another unit of the same kind.30 Maduna in response said he did not 
know how Khan and Lubbe had reached their conclusions, that there was no legal 
basis to send the case to the unit and that the unit would be shut down once it had 
completed its investigations.  
 
During the following week, a more sinister crackdown on independent minded ANC 
members of SCOPA occurred, with the party bringing in loyalists to the committee 
and putting in place structures to ensure “political control”. 
 
10.6 The ANC’s Replacement of Feinstein on SCOPA 
 
On Monday 29 January 2001, a meeting chaired by Chief Whip Tony Yengeni, whose 
name had come up in connection with some of the allegations being probed, was 
attended by 17 MPs. It’s purpose was to reshuffle ANC members serving on SCOPA. 
In particular Yengeni stressed the need for the party’s leadership to guide the work of 
the ANC’s study group on SCOPA, indicating that from now on he would attend all 
study group meetings to provide “political authority and guidance” to their 
deliberations since there was a need for the ANC from the president downwards to 
exercise control over the committee. This intervention followed earlier reports of 
party heavyweights putting pressure on MPs like Feinstein who had backed the 
probe.31  
 
At a press conference later that day, the Chief Whip of the ANC Tony Yengeni said 
“that as it was the ANC government that was under attack, it was imperative that the 
lines of accountability between the ANC members on SCOPA and the ANC 
leadership be strengthened.” He also announced that the ANC component of SCOPA 
was being strengthened so that “the ANC from the President downwards, could 
exercise political control”. From now on nothing would go from the Committee to the 
plenary of the National Assembly without first going through the ANC caucus, and all 
leaks would be investigated. Making the announcement Yengeni said “ I don’t want 
                                                 
30 “Mbeki ‘ignored’ plea for Heath Role”, Business Day, 26 January 2001.  
31  “ANC axes top MP in arms deal fallout”, Mail and Guardian, 2-8 February 2001. 
 247 
to cast aspersions. We really wanted to improve our capacity but also wanted people 
who are going to be the political link with ANC structures so that the ANC from the 
president down could exercise political control.” “I know of no committee in respect 
of the ANC which is above party political discipline.”32 
 
Andrew Feinstein whom with Woods had led the charge to ensure that the executive 
was accountable to parliament, was replaced as chair of the ANC study group on 
public accounts by ANC Deputy Chief Whip, Geoff Doidge. This was a move 
ostensibly aimed at “strengthening the study group because it has important matters to 
consider.”33 As the ANC’s official spokesperson for public accounts Feinstein had 
incurred the wrath of Essop Pahad last year for his views on the arms deal but was 
reportedly defended by Zuma. He would remain an ordinary member of SCOPA.  
 
In his response, Feinstein said he was “saddened by the ANC’s lack of confidence in 
his leadership” of the study group, adding that he had considered resigning but that 
the issues at stake were “far bigger than my own position. They run to the heart of our 
democracy, specifically to the issues of good governance and the accountability of the 
executive to the legislature.” It was crucial a “comprehensive and thorough 
investigation take place that will determine the veracity of the myriad of allegations 
made”.34 “It is essential that the investigators and MPs involved in the probe are free 
of any influence or pressure. The integrity of this process will be a touchstone of our 
new democracy”. By staying on he was honoring the principles of the party he joined 
seven years ago and that “defending the ANC does not imply defending possible 
corruption by any individuals within the party”.35 
 
Here Feinstein was expressing a sentiment that goes to the heart of this case-study 
which is attempting to illustrate the challenges of fighting corruption credibly in the 
context of a dominant party democracy. According to Woods, the ANC’s introduction 
of new “political players” into the committee was precisely in order to thwart the 
Committee’s oversight activity over the arms deal. Woods’ view seems correct, as 
                                                 
32 Simphiwe Xako, "Feinstein calls on committee to rise above party politics", Business Day, 7 
February 2001. 
33 Sapa www.iol.co.za, 29 January 2001. 
34 “ANC axes top MP in arms deal fallout”, Mail and Guardian, 2-8 February 2001. 
35 “ANC axes top MP in arms deal fallout”, Mail and Guardian, 2-8 February 2001. 
 248 
from then on existing members became far more politically partisan and aggressive in 
the way they conducted themselves in SCOPA meetings showing little initiative 
regarding matters of public finance but were very conspicuous in the ANC’s political 
management of the Committee.  Understandably, the leadership instruction to the 
ANC members of SCOPA to defend the party’s interests almost immediately spilt 
over to Committee work areas which did not concern the arms deal. 
  
At an Idasa seminar on parliamentary oversight a week later Feinstein called on 
SCOPA to rise above party politics if it was to perform its oversight role successfully. 
There was a need to “insulate” SCOPA members from party political influence. He 
said that government could have avoided the controversy surrounding the arms 
procurement deal had it played its cards openly from the outset. “My own plea is for 
the development of a framework of understanding of what role a public accounts 
committee should be playing in a democratic parliament. This could be written into 
the rules.”36 Feinstein said he believed a public accounts committee needed to be 
nonpartisan, and chaired by an opposition MP.37 
 
Feinstein’s conclusions point to the gap in the anti-corruption architecture in South 
Africa and which further analysis of these events will prove correct. SCOPA would 
be seriously weakened as a non-partisan oversight committee of parliament and 
Feinstein would submit his resignation. 
 
10.7 The JIT’s Report Back to SCOPA 
 
On 7th February 2001, the Auditor-General’s office, as co-coordinator of the proposed 
investigation in order to facilitate the combination of skills, legal mandates and 
resources of the different investigating agencies, would report back to SCOPA. 
Speaking on behalf of all three agencies involved in the JIT (the Auditor General, 
Public Protector and National Director of Public Prosecutions), deputy Auditor-
General, Terence Nombembe told SCOPA the agencies were “co-operating and 
working very closely together” and that “in view of the nature and extent of the 
investigation we have agreed to produce a joint report to SCOPA towards the end of 
                                                 
36 Business Day, 7 February 2001. 
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July 2001.”38 This report would be delayed (and edited by the executive) and never in 
fact come to SCOPA. Eventually it would be released to an extraordinary joint sitting 
of the National Assembly on 15th November 2001.  
 
Following a meeting on 10th January 2001 and taking into account the President’s 
decision (on the SIU on 19th January 2001 not to issue a proclamation), the following 
division of labor was agreed by the JIT agencies39: that the DSO would focus on the 
allegations and suspicions of criminal conduct, the Office of the Auditor-General 
would conduct an extensive forensic investigation and the Public Protector would 
look into the quality of the contracts and unethical conduct by any of the public 
officials (JIT 2001:8).  
 
In summary, the broad framework of the investigation included: 
• Alleged irregularities  
• Cost to the state of the Gripen and Hawk deals 
• Selection of prime contractors for the LIFT programme (Hawk) 
• Selection of subcontractors for all programmes 
• Review of the arms procurement process and system 
• Review of all final contracts (both NIP and DIP). 
 
Nombembe assured SCOPA that the three agencies were confident they had the 
necessary powers and competencies to undertake the investigation without the Heath 
unit and that outside audit firms would be brought into assist “with respect to the 
compilation of company structures, the flow of funds between bank accounts and the 
capacity of the entities”.40  
 
Following this briefing, the Auditor General apparently forbade his staff from 
communicating with SCOPA on the arms investigation, even telling SCOPA’s most 
senior members (Gavin Woods and Andrew Feinstein) not to communicate with key 
officers on the matter. It is also worth noting that the two key staff members in the 
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39 See Appendix 4: Joint Investigation Team (JIT) Scope of Investigation 
40 Linda Ensor, “Advocates to take part in arms probe”, Business Day, 8 February 2001. 
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Office of the Auditor General were removed from the investigation for reasons that 
have never been adequately explained (Woods 2002). 
 
At the meeting SCOPA chair, Dr Gavin Woods, noted he had received a letter from 
the chief procurement officer in the Department of Defence asking for the return of 
confidential documents given to the committee, accusing it of holding onto them 
illegally. The nature of the documents included NIP and DIP arrangements 
(Armscor), cabinet minutes, minutes of the cabinet sub-committee, copies of 
documents relating to affordability studies done by treasury, documents relating to 
tendering and the submission of offers. Woods - who apparently had the documents in 
his bedroom - had taken legal advice and discussed the issues with the Speaker, 
following which it had been decided that the Speaker would keep the documents in 
safekeeping on behalf of parliament.41 
  
Following the presentation by Nombembe the committee attempted, once again, to 
interpret whether the intention of the meeting with the four agencies on 13th 
November in Pretoria had been merely exploratory or if the intention for all four 
agencies mentioned in the 14th Report to investigate the defence procurement 
programme was clear. ANC and opposition parties agreed to disagree on the 
interpretation of this point. Woods stated that this means both hold legitimate 
interpretations of the intention of the report. He invited further reflection on the 
transcript of the meeting.  
 
While failing to reach a conclusive view on the Heath question, the meeting of 7th 
February 2001 was significant in that even though opinions remained sharply divided, 
the consensual nature of the committee did not rupture. Woods noted that he had 
consistently and publicly stated that the committee was of the opinion that the Heath 
unit should be among the unit’s investigating the deal and questioned why there had 
been no response from the ANC members of SCOPA at an earlier stage if they were 
so set against having the Heath unit as part of the investigation. ANC members 
                                                 
41 Linda Ensor, “Advocates to take part in arms probe”, Business Day, 8 February 2001. 
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effectively told Woods that if he persisted with this line of questioning his 
competence would be called into question.42 
 
10.8 Divisions in SCOPA and Challenges to its Oversight role 
 
The following week, on 14th February 2001, SCOPA met to deal with a number of 
issues. At this critical meeting of SCOPA Woods led the discussion around the 14th 
Report noting that follow up was required on certain key areas:43 
• Regarding “cost to the state” of the deal (which had escalated from R30,1 Billion 
to R43 Billion) he noted that SCOPA’s mandate deals with both under and over 
spending of the public purse and that the committee needs to decide how to 
monitor this. It was agreed to arrange a meeting with the Finance Committee and 
Treasury to be regularly briefed on the costs of the deal. 
• Regarding the Gripen and Hawk deals there was a concern regarding the costings 
namely that whilst the unit price was initially R15m, R30m had been paid and that 
clarity would be sought from the department of defence on the difference. 
• Regarding the offset arrangements and the economic benefits from the NIPs the 
committee in the 14th Report had asked to receive bi-annual reports and would 
communicate with the Department of Trade and Industry to this effect. 
• The concern about the optimistic estimates regarding jobs was raised and the 
committee of trade and industry was asked to express its view on this regard with 
a meeting of the two committees suggested. 
• In terms of the acquisition policies it was noted that a review of arms 
procurements policies and practices was taking place under the Auditor General’s 
team who would report back on “best practices”.  
 
As an oversight committee of the public purse, SCOPA was playing a key role by 
asking questions that needed to be asked about the largest public expenditure ever 
undertaken by the South African government. Woods was clearly intent on SCOPA 
conducting its own investigation on behalf of parliament into the deal. This was not a 
role that ANC members of the committee were comfortable with. 
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The relationship of SCOPA with other committees of parliament was also raised, 
whether other parliamentary committees should report to SCOPA or rather the 
National Assembly, for SCOPA, in their words, was not a “super committee.” Woods 
suggested that it would be important to check the parliamentary rules in this regard 
and that he hoped there could be horizontal interaction with other committees around 
issues of public accounts. In terms of accountability to SCOPA this was a “tricky 
area”. For one, it was ground breaking to be asking a Chapter 9 institution other than 
the Auditor-General as well as executive bodies, to account to a parliamentary 
committee.  
 
The DA noted that SCOPA should not abdicate its responsibility to interrogate the 
costs of the deal. At this meeting the DA argued that in order for SCOPA to exercise 
its oversight function with respect to the executive it would need to prepare for the 
meeting with the ministers and therefore have access to certain information. It was 
eventually agreed that SCOPA members would be allowed limited access to certain 
confidential documents in the safekeeping of parliament in order to prepare for the 
meeting with the ministers, although ANC members who questioned the necessity and 
usefulness of committee members having access to these documents, initially resisted 
this.  
 
A meeting was convened with the Speaker’s office to spell out the access procedure. 
The number of hours spent by individual members of SCOPA looking at the specific 
documents in order to prepare for the briefing with the ministers is instructive.  Of 12 
SCOPA members who made use of the opportunity to access the documents, 7 ANC 
members spent a total of 7 hours 5 minutes looking over the documents (an average of 
one hour each), while two opposition DP members clocked up a total of 17hrs and 50 
minutes.44 This alone clearly illustrates a lack of will to of ANC SCOPA members to 
conduct proper oversight of the public purse through serving on SCOPA. 
 
SCOPA members disagreed about whether or not to summon deputy President Zuma 
to appear before SCOPA to explain his criticism of the proposed corruption 
investigation. As a way forward UDM leader Bantu Holomisa proposed that SCOPA 
                                                 
44 Letter from the Speaker to Richard Calland, 11 May 2001. 
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should express reservations about the tone of the letter, that matters in it be referred to 
the investigating bodies or National Assembly where necessary, and that the 
correspondence between the deputy president and the speaker be ignored to send a 
signal that the executive not intervene in parliamentary committees. This was a 
position that ANC members agreed with. They noted that mistakes had been made in 
the past on both sides (citing that it was neither correct for the chair to write to the 
president – Woods disagreed with this - nor the deputy president to write to the chair).  
 
In response the DA’s Raenette Taljaard disagreed: “The letter to us is from the 
Deputy President, and it goes to the role of Parliament. We cannot disengage from 
these issues. The fault line will continue to plague SCOPA unless we stop brushing 
these issues aside. Resolving it will not be dealt with by General Holomisa’s 
proposal.”45 She noted that the committee’s role was that of oversight and that the 
speaker was merely an interlocutor between the legislature and the executive and 
could not be relied on to defend SCOPA.  
 
Regarding oversight, ANC members felt matters of oversight should be referred to the 
correct committee, and that this was not SCOPA. In response the DA noted that the 
committee on Oversight and Accountability had not yet adopted a conclusive report 
on these issues and that SCOPA’s experience could provide a case study. DA MP 
Nigel Bruce said: “We have not had a previous occasion when four ministers said this 
committee did not understand its work. Plus the President, the deputy President and 
the Speaker. This is an unprecedented onslaught on a parliamentary committee. This 
cannot be fobbed off onto the rules committee. Four ministers have offered to explain 
themselves and the Speaker’s letter was helpful. The Deputy President says that he is 
writing with the authorization of the President. This Committee must deal with it. The 
Democratic Alliance has gone out of its way to be helpful, but executive interference 
remains the sticking point.”46 
 
At this point Woods as the chair of SCOPA was asked to take the discussion forward. 
He noted that the situation was unprecedented in that no other committee had had to 
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deal with such a situation before. Also that SCOPA had not created the issues. 
Possibly the meeting with the four ministers would create a way forward. “As regards 
to the Deputy President, what is right? Our work is under question. Do we defend our 
work, when all parties say that they support the 14th Report? Was our work 
misguided: even my integrity is attacked. The dismissive approach of General 
Holomisa would be one approach. But what of the criticisms of our work? On at least 
eight occasions the Committee is accused of saying that the government and foreign 
governments are corrupt. Do we ignore these accusations, or do we defend our work 
and out intentions? What is our responsibility to Parliament, and to the people of 
South Africa? How do we check out whether the Deputy President’s accusations may 
be right?”47 
 
The ANC suggested that “we must take collective ownership of what has transpired” 
(something Woods questioned saying “I do not yet see where SCOPA has gone 
wrong”) and that “the vindication will be when the report is made…We must hope 
that the delay will be short, and that the report is as comprehensive as possible.”48 The 
UDM suggested a meeting with the deputy president with a multi-party delegation. 
Woods liked this idea and suggested it might result in a joint statement with SCOPA 
and the deputy president. The ANC rejected this approach saying it would create 
further confusion and that SCOPA needs to report back to parliament through SCOPA 
reports.  
 
Woods was still concerned that the specifics of the deputy president’s letter would 
remain unchallenged. The ANC felt that the ministers would elaborate on some of the 
issues at the briefing, which could then be integrated into a report. The chair agreed to 
capture the different opinions on the way forward which the subgroup would consider 
and then propose a way forward.49 
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10.9 SCOPA and the Ministers 
 
 
On 26th February 2001, SCOPA members had the opportunity to question the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel 
and the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, on the controversial strategic arms 
procurement package. Also present was the Auditor General, Mr Shauket Fakie.50 
Apparently an hour before this meeting the ministers met with ANC members of the 
Committee and it was decided which questions they would be asked.51 The strategy, 
as was then played out, was for ANC committee members to ask questions proposed 
by the Ministers and to attack the Chairperson and any opposition member who 
voiced any criticism of the arms deal (Woods 2002).  
 
In this regard Idasa would later comment that it would be naive to think that Ministers 
of the ruling party should not communicate with and strategize in relation to political 
issues… “It would be surprising if this had not happened. That is the nature of party 
politics. But the fundamental system flaw that lies behind it gives rise to some 
important constitutional questions. Should a ruling party be able to use its majority to 
protect its political issue when performing an oversight function? For a party to 
exercise discipline and loyalty when pushing through policy or law is one thing – 
giving effect to its electoral mandate one could say – but is there a distinction to be 
made in the case of oversight?”52 
 
Opening the meeting SCOPA chair, Gavin Woods noted that the purpose of the 
meeting was to ascertain where the Ministers disagreed with SCOPA’s 14th Report. 
Responding, Minister of Trade and Industry, Alex Erwin, said while it had been 
Cabinet’s intention to await SCOPA’s hearings before expressing the government’s 
concern, extreme speculation and debate regarding the arms acquisitions had led to 
the public statement of 12 January and that it was  “not an attempt to stop a proper 
investigation.”53 Rather the Ministers concerns were that SCOPA’s 14th report did not 
understand how the decisions were made. They asserted the government was 
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responsible for prime contracts only and could not be held responsible for sub-
contractors.54  
 
This would prove to be a recurrent theme in defence of any wrongdoing or corruption 
in the arms deal, namely that the government’s contracting position could not possibly 
be flawed as responsibility for corruption in sub-contracting was not something for 
which the government was liable. The reality is that prime-contractors were only able 
to secure contracts if they could demonstrate BEE partners as sub-contractors, a 
position the Shaik brothers exploited for their own personal interests. As Feinstein 
would put it, “pressure on the companies bidding for the main contracts compelling 
them to appoint favoured (BEE) sub-contractors before they would be awarded the 
main contracts was a crucial flaw in the procurement process.”55 
 
ANC MP Bruce Kannemeyer asked the Ministers to explain the apparent rise in the 
cost of the deal from approximately R30 billion to R43 billion.  Responding, minister 
of Finance Manuel noted that the increase in cost was due to exchange rate 
fluctuations and future values, among other things, apparently normal in contracts of 
this nature. ANC MP Andrew Feinstein noted however, that “the cost is going to be 
considerably more than R30,3 billion” and that “the government should have 
considered the rand escalations.”56  
 
Minister Manuel also asserted that the government had a mandate from Parliament to 
purchase equipment for the South African Defence Forces and had done so.57 Once 
again parliamentary approval of the deal was used as a defence to justify the cost of 
the deal. He also added that it was the Minister of Defence who had initiated the 
investigation by asking for the review by the Auditor General, wanting to claim 
executive credit for the fact that there was an investigation underway at all. This 
statement was strongly refuted by Auditor-General, Shauket Fakie who said “No, the 
Auditor-General’s office and SCOPA took it upon themselves given the implications 
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for democracy. We initiated the review. We later got co-operation from the 
Minister.”58 Fakie was under increasing public pressure to show his own probity in 
the handling of the deal, which would come increasingly into question. 
 
The aspersions cast on the integrity of the international armaments industry by 
SCOPA was an issue raised by two ministers who took offence to statements made in 
the 14th report. Minister Erwin said the fact that the report had declared that the 
armaments industry has a reputation for corruption “is a judgment call which colors 
the Fourteenth Report”. The ostensible naiveté of the government in this regard was 
surely disingenuous given widespread reporting that would emerge of British and 
German investigations of more than $200 million (R1,4billion) in bribes that were 
paid by just three of the successful arms companies (including BAe) in the deal.59 
 
Defence minister Lekota also felt the Committee was wrong to begin its investigation 
with the premise that the international arms industry was corrupt, whatever the World 
Bank or Transparency International might have said: “It is wrong for this Committee 
to start from such a premise. The assumption is that anything to do with Africa and 
Africans is corrupt. It does enormous damage to this country.”60 This defensive stance 
and resort to racist assumptions underlying accusations of corruption, legitimate or 
otherwise, would reoccur both in statements by ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni and 
by Thabo Mbeki. 
 
Responding to the ministers’ concerns, DA MP Raenette Taljaard noted “We would 
be deluding ourselves if we thought that South Africa’s arms deal could isolate itself 
from malpractice in the arms industry.”61 ANC MP Andrew Feinstein conceded, 
“Perhaps we might have been more judicious in our drafting, but the history of the 
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arms industry must be considered.”62 Feinstein’s current book project is to examine 
corruption in the international arms industry. 
 
Indeed, there is a strong feeling that the South African government was somewhat 
naïve, particularly in negotiating the terms and offsets agreements of the arms deal 
with experienced international arms dealers who recognized the opportunity to sell 
billions of Rands of arms to a country who was for the first time at peace with her 
neighbors, when clearly other more pressing socio-development needs prevailed.63 
 
10.10 The Second Report on the Arms Deal 
 
Two days later, on 28th February 2001, SCOPA met to prepare a second committee 
report on their investigation into the Defence Procurement Package. At this meeting, 
buoyed by their interaction with the ministers, the ANC passed a majority resolution 
that stated “…interpretation and understanding of the 14th Report of SCOPA, as 
adopted by the National Assembly on 3 November 2000, nowhere provides for the 
definite inclusion of the special investigative unit headed by Judge Heath”.64 
Opposition members walked out of the meeting, objecting to what they called the 
non-adherence to rules, and the politicization of SCOPA. 
 
The drafting of a second report to the Fourteenth Report was discussed at further 
SCOPA meetings from March through May 2001. While the ANC invited minority 
parties within SCOPA to provide their views and input into the second report, they 
would not entertain a minority report (even though this was allowed by the rules of 
parliament), with ANC MP Vincent Smith saying the ANC would “defend the report 
to the death” and not agree to the attachments of minority reports since these opposed 
the ANC report. 65  
 
The report that was eventually tabled completely exonerated the executive of any 
responsibility, was silent on its attacks on SCOPA, implicitly criticized Woods for 
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asking President Mbeki to include the SIU in the probe without the committee’s 
mandate and reiterated a committee resolution passed with its majority vote that the 
committee did not intend the SIU to be involved. The executive’s position on the 
contract price was accepted for “any attempts to affix any possible future costs would 
be merely one of a number of projections.”66 
 
Woods, as the embattled chair of SCOPA, could not agree to this second report that 
was, in his view, a capitulation to the executive - making apologetic reference to the 
14th report as having been “unintentionally” offensive towards the executive - as it 
rejected the interpretation of the original resolution. Woods felt it imperative the 
committee defend its work and integrity and that its accountability role would be 
undermined if this were not done. He objected to the ANC apologizing to the 
executive for the committee’s supposed accusations of corruption and dishonesty, 
which he said were never made.67  
 
UDM MP Bantu Holomisa proposed an amendment that would reflect the lack of 
unanimity in the committee when it came to adopting the second Report, a suggestion 
agreed to by the ANC, UDM and IFP. The DA dissented: “We are of the view that the 
majority report is an inadequate response to unacceptable criticism and an attack by 
the executive on the integrity of Parliament’s key watchdog committee.”68 “By 
adopting a meek and apologetic report on the actions of the executive, ANC members 
on the committee deferred to the interests of their party leadership and failed to put 
the interests of Parliament and the people first.”69 
 
At the end of May 2001 the second SCOPA Report as favored by the ANC was 
adopted by SCOPA, with voting, as had now become the norm, along party lines.  
 
In a letter to SCOPA members on 6th June 2001, Woods continued to argue that the 
committee was obliged in terms of its 14th report approved by the National Assembly 
to continue its own investigation into the deal, and that the Speaker had in fact 
enjoined it to do so. Woods asked the committee for a mandate to request documents 
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from the Department of Defence in an attempt to revive parliament’s oversight of the 
deal.  ANC committee members however, argued that SCOPA did not have the 
capacity or time to further investigate the government’s arms deal although this 
should not stop individual members requesting and studying new information on the 
deal. The ANC said SCOPA should concentrate on its own work and leave the probe 
to the three agencies.70  
 
From this attitude amongst ANC SCOPA members it is clear that no further 
independent oversight role for SCOPA as a parliamentary committee protecting the 
public purse was foreseen. Instead, the investigation into the arms deal was now up to 
the three agencies making up the JIT. An independent investigation had effectively, 
through a range of executive interventions, been taken away from parliament, and in 
the process undermined the integrity and non-partisan functioning of SCOPA. Trust 
in parliament and the Speaker herself had also been called into question by the range 
of events that started when SCOPA’s 14th Report had called for an independent 
investigation into the arms deal. The challenge for a dominant party democracy to 
oversee itself and uphold accountability in the public interest, was clearly taking its 
toll. 
 
10.11 The “Side-lining” of SCOPA 
 
The steam-rolling by the ANC of the Second Report on the arms deal through 
SCOPA was precipitated by a comment made to a newspaper on 6th May 2001 by 
SCOPA chair Gavin Woods. He stated that the committee was “pretty much in the 
dark regarding the investigator’s plans…We have been sidelined. We had 
interventions by the Speaker which by design created uncertainty about 
accountability. That uncertainty has been exploited to the point where we are in the 
dark.” While Woods had written to speaker to clarify the accountability arrangements 
he had yet to receive a response.71 
 
At a special meeting on 9th May requested by the ANC members of SCOPA, the party 
said Woods had commented on the arms deal without first consulting the committee 
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members and the ANC members wanted to dissociate itself from the chairperson’s 
recent remarks that the committee appeared to be kept in the dark about the probe into 
the deal. ANC MP Vincent Smith warned Woods not to speak on behalf of the 
committee without consulting members first.  Woods rejected this saying he was 
“quite entitled to” his personal views and challenged the ANC to make a decision 
about his position as chairperson if they did not agree with his position. ANC MP 
Andrew Feinstein left the committee meeting in apparent embarrassment as his party 
colleagues launched an attack on the chair.72 
 
On Sunday 13th May 2001, the Speaker, in a letter to Woods (made public) called on 
him to apologize for remarks he had made in the press. Failing this SCOPA should 
table an official report on Woods’ claim that she had influenced moves to keep the 
committee in the dark on the investigation.  
 
A day later, in an open letter to the Speaker, UDM leader Bantu Holomisa would echo 
Woods comments that SCOPA was being “systematically side-lined”. For Holomisa, 
the Speaker’s public pronouncements on the arms deal probe “both inside and outside 
parliament leave much to be desired and have cast more shadow on the credibility of 
the investigation. It can be inferred that you and the executive are monitoring and 
directing the investigation.”73 He claimed her conduct in relation to parliament and the 
arms deal investigation involved dereliction of duty, intentionally obstructing the 
parliamentary processes, stalling the report by SCOPA and improper interference in 
the committee’s function.  
 
Now the Speaker, meant to protect the integrity of parliament and its committees, was 
herself being attacked by members of SCOPA, with her personal integrity as to how 
she had handled herself regarding the arms deal investigation, brought into question. 
How would she, and the ANC, respond? 
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10.11.1 The Speaker Responds 
 
On 21 May 2001, the Speaker held a news conference regarding Holomisa’s 
allegations that she had abused her office in her handling of the arms deal 
investigation by Parliament.  She attacked both Woods and the media saying they had 
failed to give her credit for standing up to the executive.74 In her defense Ginwala 
pointed out several rulings she had made against the executive, including her rejection 
of the executive’s demand that all the arms contracts be returned to them and her 
letter to Deputy President Jacob Zuma declining some of his requests for information 
from parliament. Ginwala also reacted to charges that her continued membership of 
the ANC’s National Executive Committee and the national working committee 
compromised her ability to represent the National Assembly in a neutral way. She 
said she had not been present at meetings where the alleged arms scandal was 
discussed. In reference to the discussion that was ongoing in SCOPA with regards to 
the second arms deal report, she said it was her personal opinion that opposition 
parties should be entitled to have their minority views reflected in SCOPA reports to 
parliament.75 
 
Clearly the Speaker’s statement of December 27th 2000 had aroused suspicion and 
indicated that she did not seem to be acting on parliament’s wishes to conduct an 
investigation involving the SIU. Her interpretation of the intention of the 14th report 
was seen by some commentators as “the razor’s edge which has sliced SCOPA into 
party factions and been systematically used by ANC members to undermine Woods’ 
standing” with the civil society organization Idasa asking why Ginwala had been so 
emphatic in her interpretation of the 14th Report even as the ANC study group still 
believed it was open to different interpretations.76 
 
When she took over as Speaker and retained her ANC positions Ginwala had argued 
that this was a world trend. However the question could be asked: “How easy is it to 
sit on the inner counsel of the party, to hear and take part in its most sensitive strategy 
                                                 
74 Clive Sawyer , “Ginwala defends her actions on arms deal probe”, 22 May 2001. 
75 “Let MPs decide my future”, Business Day, 20 May 2001. 
76 Drew Forrest. , “Frene Ginwala grapples with conflict of interests”, Business Day, 24 May 2001. 
 263 
debates and remain impartial in Parliament?”77 Some answers to this can be gleaned 
from the debate called for by the ANC on 7th June 2001 in support and appreciation of 
the Speaker. 
 
 
10.12 Debate on the Role of the Speaker 
 
 
The debate on the Speaker is important to record in some detail as it points to the 
relationship between the legislature and the executive as understood at this point in 
South Africa’s democratic history.78  
 
In the debate opposition parties raised concerns that the ANC had not dealt with the 
allegations concerning the Speaker, as had been suggested by the Speaker herself, in 
an all-party committee of parliament, but had rather chosen to debate the issue in 
parliament. This would almost certainly lead to the ANC pushing through a motion of 
confidence with their substantial majority, which is indeed what happened. The DA 
noted “It is clear that the ANC decided to demonstrate to the Speaker that she does 
not have an independent power base in Parliament of among the minorities. They 
want to show her that she is beholden to the ANC…A motion of confidence is an 
entirely inappropriate way of dealing with this crisis.”79  
 
Opening the debate, the ANC MP Pallo Jordan said: “The Speaker is accorded that 
title because the holder of that Office speaks on behalf of Parliament. An attack on the 
Speaker is therefore an attack on Parliament as an institution… Honorable members, 
what is at stake in today’s debate is not merely the integrity and dignity of one person. 
I consider the unsubstantiated, reckless accusations made against our Speaker as an 
attack on the dignity and the integrity of this Parliament.”80  
 
UDM leader Bantu Holomisa commented that the Speaker had “created the conditions 
in which one day the moment would arrive when she would have to withstand intense 
political pressure from within her own party to exercise judgment in a way that would 
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serve its short term interests,” something that had occurred in his view when the 
Speaker offered only one interpretation of the 14th Report that was “expedient and 
useful to the executive.” 81 Holomisa went on to say “For Parliament to operate as an 
institution of independent accountability over the executive requires that members of 
the ruling party exercise oversight over colleagues of their own caucus, especially 
those comrades who always shout “Viva!” on a Saturday and on Monday change and 
receive motorcars from companies.”82 This was a direct reference to the allegations of 
corruption hanging over the head of the chief whip of the ANC, Tony Yengeni, whom 
had received a discounted vehicle from a company bidding in the arms deal.  
 
The Democratic Alliance noted that while Ginwala had made a “great contribution to 
the establishment of democratic parliamentary traditions” and had “created a 
democratic tradition of being prepared to listen to the voice of minority parties” but 
that this “does not mean that the Speaker is above criticism” her “duality of roles” (as 
a Speaker and as an ANC politician) has “led to very unfortunate consequences.”83 
Regarding the handling of the arms deal saga, DA MP Douglas Gibson noted: “This 
has not been a credit to Parliament or to the ANC. There is a suspicion right around 
the country that it has been poorly and ineptly handled by the executive – and 
controversially by the Speaker – and the reason is that substantial donations were 
made to the ANC election fund by many of those who have benefited from the arms 
deal.”  
 
Allegations that it was not just individuals, but also the ANC as a political party that 
had received millions of rands from successful bidders, would continually surface, 
and is something that subsequently ousted ANC MP Andrew Feinstein would note as 
a reason for the party’s unwillingness to comprehensively investigate the deal, and 
indeed scupper any independent investigation such as that proposed by SCOPA, that 
they could not control (Feinstein 2007). However, because of no laws currently 
regulating disclosure of private contributions to political parties in South Africa, it is 
impossible to confirm such allegations.  
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The DA noted how the Speaker’s conduct “left much to be desired and has raised 
legitimate questions about her balancing party loyalty with parliamentary 
responsibilities. With us it created the impression that her conduct in this regard was 
part of the suspected wide cover-up regarding the arms deal. Secondly, in too many 
instances the Speaker is seen not to defend the interests of Parliament against the 
interests of the executive. She too easily abandons the protection of the rights of 
members of Parliament vis-à-vis members of the executive, or overly protects 
members of the executive in this house. The Speaker’s responsibility is to defend the 
rights of Parliament, not the members of her own party in Cabinet.”84 The IFP pointed 
out how the Speaker had become involved in the functional work of SCOPA by 
unjustifiably challenging the committee’s work, imposing her will in ways in which 
have weakened the committee in it’s arms deal related work, actions leading to very 
damaging conflict within the committee and effectively hampering the oversight 
function and accountability of the committee.85  
 
10.12.1 Separation of Powers 
 
Speaking in support of the motion was Minister of Public Service and Administration, 
Geraldine Fraser-Moloketi who drew attention to the constitutional dimensions of the 
debate as being about separation of powers where the constitutional preamble 
determines there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive 
and judiciary, with the appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.  
 
While arguing that the liberals in our midst persist in interpreting the separation of 
powers as an “absolute divide” Fraser-Moloketi held that they ignored a court 
judgment in this matter, as handed down in 1996 by the Constitutional Court when it 
concluded: “No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers. 
The scheme is always one of partial separation.” I will extract her argument at length 
here, due to its importance for our theme on the efficiency of anti-corruption 
institutions to prevent abuses of power.  
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Fraser-Moloketi quotes the Constitutional Court from 1996, when it certified the 
Constitution: 
The separation-of-powers doctrine is not fixed or is not a fixed or rigid 
constitutional doctrine. It is given expression in many different forms and 
made subject to checks and balances of many kinds. It can thus not be said 
that a failure to separate completely the functionaries of the executive and the 
legislature is destructive of the doctrine.  Indeed the overlap provides a 
singularly important check and balance of the exercise of executive power. It 
makes the executive more directly answerable to the elected legislature. 
Cabinet members are compelled to provide Parliament with full and regular 
reports concerning matters under their control, and, finally, the legislature has 
the power to remove the President, and indirectly the Cabinet. 
 
The minister notes that “the paranoia with complete separation comes when we 
attempt to see our constitutional democratic system as made up of separate parts, 
instead of seeing the very dynamic relationship between the parts, looking beyond the 
structures and concentrating on the various checks and balances.” She goes on to 
explain:  
“When we drafted the South African constitution, we consciously opted for a 
model that would take cognizance of our historical circumstances. We opted 
for a system that would allow the executive to actively lead, yet keep them 
answerable and accountable. We designed the legislative process in which the 
executive provides impetus for new policy and legislation, but through 
deliberative process in Parliament, and particularly in the committee system, 
the legislature shapes and moulds the contents thereof. In the end, it is only the 
legislature that can pass legislation and formally adopt policy. Obviously, the 
legislature can also initiate its own legislation separately from the executive 
and the constitutional right remains. However, nowhere does the Constitution, 
which is supreme in this country, dare I remind the House, allow the 
legislature to give instructions to the executive through any other avenue other 
than passing an Act… The executive still has the choice and the responsibility, 
after having weighed up all the information at its disposal and having taken 
into consideration a broad range of dynamics to make the decisions. Any 
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attempt to have it differently is unconstitutional and the Speaker, justifiably 
and rightfully so, rules on such matters accordingly.” 
 
Specifically relating to the composition of the JIT, she noted that even Idasa, in its 
review on democracy and the arms deal, stated: “As the Speaker rightly pointed out 
on 27 December, for Parliament to instruct the executive to grant the SIU a 
proclamation, this would be of dubious legal and constitutional validity.” 
 
Focusing on the oversight role of the legislature the Minister noted: “The 
parliamentary system we have in place provides for abundance of mechanisms that 
fulfill this role and strengthen it. The committee system, where a commensurate 
parliamentary portfolio committee accompanies every Cabinet portfolio, is a very 
powerful mechanism. In addition, the question-and-answer sessions in Parliament 
have been reformed to allow more access for smaller parties, who cannot spread 
themselves adequately across the various portfolio committees to exercise some 
democratic oversight. The Constitution also provides for another category of checks 
and balances, these being the Chapter 9 institutions.” 
 
In his remarks defending the Speaker ANC MP Pallo Jordan pointed out the 
distinction between partisanship and partiality and that “impartiality does not imply 
that the Speaker should play a passive role. A Speaker is expected to be active… A 
Speaker is expected to make judgment calls….It was in the exercise of that discretion 
that Madam Speaker referred the Auditor General’s report to the Public Accounts 
Committee of this Parliament. It was Madam Speaker who directed SCOPA to 
examine that report. But it was equally her duty to offer guidance to the committee 
and its chairperson regarding the limits of its powers.”86  
 
Offering guidance to SCOPA, was very different from what Holomisa in his letter had 
accused the Speaker of, namely “dereliction of duty to prioritize the integrity of 
parliament...intentionally obstructing parliamentary processes on behalf of the 
Executive and improperly interfering in the committee’s functioning.” With regard to 
Holomisa’s letter ANC MP Jeremy Cronin responded: “But who referred the Auditor-
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General’s report, which had been requested by the Defence Minister in the first 
place87, to SCOPA? It was the Speaker. It was the Speaker who sought to protect 
SCOPA in a letter to the parliamentary leader of Government Business and the 
Deputy President, and it is the Speaker who has consistently offered extra resources to 
SCOPA for the arms procurement follow-up.”88 
 
This view was disputed strongly by ANC MP Andrew Feinstein who would abstain in 
the vote at the end of the debate on the Speaker, an action for which he would be 
disciplined, and resulted eventually in him resigning from parliament. In his book he 
strongly supports Woods and Holomisa’s assertions of the Speaker’s failure to protect 
parliament and SCOPA’s key oversight role:  
“Sadly, I had seen at first hand how she had done this, changing her tune from 
a crusading defender of Parliament to a calculating accomplice of the 
Executive. This proud, intelligent woman who had served the struggle so 
courageously for decades and who had guided the democratic parliament 
through its first difficult years, had capitulated in the face of pressure from the 
Presidency. In the final reckoning she had chosen the party over the nation, the 
President over Parliament” (Feinstein 2007: 202). 
 
10.13 At the Crossroads, Feinstein Resigns 
 
In an article written shortly before the Speakers’ debate in June 2001 for a Cambridge 
university alumni publication and later published in the Mail and Guardian89, ANC 
MP Andrew Feinstein would articulate the challenge of being a loyal member of a 
political party and a committed parliamentarian fulfilling a constitutionally mandated 
oversight role.  
 
His article provided insight into the more general context surrounding the arms deal 
investigation noting how besides concerns at the spiraling costs of the deal expressed 
by many in civil society, allegations were made that there had been serious procedural 
problems in negotiating the deal. SCOPA had received a report from the Auditor 
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General that also expressed concern about the procedures and following public 
hearings SCOPA had particular concerns about “lack of measures to deal with 
conflicts of interest, changes to decision making procedures and possible irregularities 
with respect to the allocation of sub-contractors which might have influenced 
decisions of the prime contractors.”90   
 
Feinstein noted that he was critical of a decision taken by Mbeki not to grant the SIU 
a proclamation to participate and of other aspects of his party’s approach to the issue 
and that soon thereafter the ANC leadership took the decision to replace him both as 
chairperson of the ANC component of SCOPA and party spokesperson on public 
accounts. “While this was disappointing to me personally the issues at stake were far 
more important than my situation. They run to the heart of our democracy specifically 
issues of good governance and the accountability of the executive to the legislature.” 
Reference  
 
Feinstein wrote that he decided not to resign but hoped he could still contribute to 
“ensuring that a comprehensive and through investigation takes place that would 
determine the veracity or otherwise of the myriad of allegations.” Stressing the 
importance of investigators and parliamentarians not to be pressured politically, 
Feinstein wrote: “I must acknowledge that it is not easy attempting to operate as an 
independent-minded MP within a party in the context of our restrictive constitutional 
environment. However, I believe that it is important that individuals in public life act 
according to their conscience. Considerations of a long-term political career should be 
subservient to matters of principle and public interest.”  
 
The space for the independence MPs such as Feinstein demonstrated to exercise their 
conscience was further restricted by changes in the modus operandi of SCOPA in the 
wake of the arms deal where both the ANC and DA have deployed senior politicians 
to SCOPA issues resolved by voting along party lines. “I feel strongly that these 
developments are a tragedy for good governance as they could be enormously 
damaging to the accountable management of public finance in South Africa. I do 
believe that the integrity of the arms deal investigation – and the future functioning of 
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the public accounts committee in its wake – will be a touchstone of our new 
democracy. Our commitment to real accountability of elected representatives and 
public officials, of the oversight role of the legislature over the executive, and of the 
primary of the national interest over party interests is at stake. We are at a crossroads: 
we can threat the path of a politics of principle and truth, or we can begin the slide 
into politics of expedience and deception.”91  
 
Feinstein noted in an interview I conducted with him before he resigned how 
meaningful oversight was weakened by the system of Proportional Representation 
(PR) in South Africa where party bosses and their lists rule. Whereas in a majority 
context committees need to be insulated from party politics, need more resources to 
do their jobs properly and have specific rules “under the present leadership this won’t 
happen. The ANC is a family and operates with primary loyalty to the party. The 
national interest, unless it coincides with the party interest is nonsense. There is a 
small group of people running the country, and not all are in government. It is a 
responsibility on the part of individuals to raise concerns, and organizations to be 
accountable. The ANC list plays a big part in speaking out or not.”92 
 
On 1st September 2001 Andrew Feinstein, who had become increasingly isolated from 
ANC members in Parliament, took the painful decision to resign as a Member of 
Parliament citing his party’s handling of the arms deal investigation: 
 “I have realized over the past few months that I can no longer play a 
meaningful role in Parliament under the present political strictures. I have 
been saddened by the manner in which government and the ANC in 
Parliament has handled the controversial armaments deal and the subsequent 
investigation thereof.”  
 
Apparently the final straw was proposed disciplinary action by the chief whip, Tony 
Yengeni, for abstaining in the Speaker’s debate. “I said it was not appropriate if the 
chief whip oversaw the process, because he had a potential conflict of interest.” At the 
time Yengeni was being investigated for the discount he received on the 4x4 from one 
of the companies seeking an arms sub-contract. Feinstein then met with Kgalema 
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Motlanthe ANC Secretary General: “I told him my position was untenable. I said my 
position and behavior wouldn’t change.” At this meeting there was “mutual 
agreement” that he should resign from parliament.  “My political home is still the 
ANC.”93 
 
In an interview conducted ten days before his resignation, Feinstein stressed there was 
a “critical role” for parliament as part of the institutional fabric in terms of the 
legislature providing oversight over the executive in terms of the constitution. The 
misuse of abuse of public money for private ends falls under this, hence the role of the 
public accounts committee. However, since 1994 he believed that parliament had not 
grappled meaningfully with its role, pointing out that at the various anti-corruption 
summits held in parliament, the public accounts committee had not been invited. 
“There is ambivalence in the ANC towards these issues.” Whereas the first parliament 
had bought into the idea of an opposition chair of SCOPA – “what was crucial was 
the protection and support of the chief whip, Max Sisulu for SCOPA” – with the arms 
deal things went “awry.”94 
 
According to Feinstein the arms deal allegations were seen by the ANC as “a 
conspiracy against the government by forces wanting to undermine it” and as such, 
the ANC strategy was three-pronged 1) get rid of Heath, 2) weaken SCOPA and 3) 
weaken the investigation. By September 2001 these objectives had largely been 
achieved with the exclusion of the SIU from the investigation and SCOPA’s proud 
tradition of non-partisanship in tatters.  
 
10.14 Conclusion 
 
In November 2001 the final JIT report would come to parliament, discussed in 
Chapter Twelve. Before then however, in October 2001, another ANC MP would be 
forced to resign from parliament. This time the resignation was not for speaking out 
against the party’s handling of the arms deal investigation, but rather because of being 
criminally investigated for corruption in the arms deal. The case of ANC MP Tony 
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Yengeni, discussed in Chapter Eleven, is instructive to look at in some detail. It 
confirms the increasingly impotent role of parliament and its committees – in this case 
not just SCOPA but also the Ethics Committee – and the failure of parliament in a 
dominant party democracy to exercise any real oversight over an all-powerful 
executive. 
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Chapter Eleven: Executive Intervention and the Case of Tony Yengeni 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the specific allegations of corruption in the arms deal involving 
ANC chief whip, Tony Yengeni. The handling of the Yengeni case is illustrative in 
that once again a parliamentary committee, this time the Ethics Committee, would be 
prevented from exercising its constitutionally mandated oversight role by conducting 
an independent parliamentary investigation, with the ongoing JIT investigation 
increasingly controlled by the executive, taking precedence.  
 
The events around Yengeni illustrate the role of the independent media in exposing 
corruption, the increasingly impotent role of the opposition parties and parliament to 
exercise meaningful oversight, and how what should have been a relatively simple 
parliamentary investigation, was “hijacked” by the ANC. A consequence of this 
intervention was a drawn out criminal investigation and multi-year jail sentence for 
Yengeni, for what was essentially a breach of the parliamentary code. 
 
Yengeni would maintain his innocence all the way to Pollsmoor prison, declaring he 
was the victim of both abuse of power by the National Prosecuting Authority and a 
larger political conspiracy.  
 
11.2 The Sunday Times Report and Responses 
 
Towards the end of March 2001, an eight month long investigation by the Sunday 
Times revealed that former struggle hero and ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni, had 
allegedly received a hugely discounted luxury motor vehicle - a Mercedes Benz 
ML320 4X4 - from Daimler Chrysler aerospace, a company which later became 
known as EADS, and was competing for a share of the defence contract. In terms of 
the parliamentary rules, the 47% discount Yengeni received on the R350 000 vehicle 
in October 1998 while still chairman of the joint standing committee on defence, 
should have been disclosed as a gift to the Registrar of Member’s Interests. The 
Sunday Times also revealed that the vehicle had been used free of charge by Yengeni 
for seven months prior to the first payment.  
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On 26th March 2001 Daimler Chrysler confirmed that a senior employee, Michael 
Woerfel, had bought the car which was later registered in Yengeni’s name, and that 
the matter was the subject of an internal investigation.1 
 
Responding to the report, ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama, warned against a 
“witch-hunt” by the media, saying that the allegations against Yengeni were already 
part of the official probe into the arms deal (namely the ongoing JIT investigation). In 
a statement to parliament on 27th March 2001, Yengeni echoed this saying that while 
he would fully cooperate with parliament and the JIT investigators, he would not 
submit himself to a “witch-hunt” by the Sunday Times.2 Committing himself to the 
legal process would, he said, afford him a fair process during which his rights and 
dignity would be protected and “not the trial by the media that I am currently 
subjected to.” He added, “the spotlight over public representatives by a vigilant media 
is important and helps to expose wrongdoers and more importantly acts as a deterrent 
to those who are contemplating wrong doing.”  
 
In his statement Yengeni reiterated that the motor vehicle in question had been 
legitimately purchased, did not in any way amount to a gift or donation and more 
importantly, the acquisition of the vehicle did not in any way whatsoever, influence 
the award and/or is related with the award of any contract in the Arms Procurement 
under investigation. He was at pains to stress that the arms procurement process and 
the ultimate decisions relating to the award of the contracts were taken by cabinet and 
that “neither the Chairperson nor the Committee has any part in these decisions.”3  
 
The opposition Democratic Alliance lodged a complaint with the chair of the Joint 
Committee on Ethics and Members’ interests calling on Yengeni to explain the 
circumstances surrounding the luxury vehicle and financing agreement. On the face of 
it, and at the very least, the DA argued that Yengeni appeared to have had the free use 
of an expensive motor vehicle for a lengthy period without that benefit being 
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2001. 
3 Statement by Tony Yengeni regarding media reports in respect of his motor vehicle and the arms deal 
procurement investigation. March 2001. 
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disclosed. In terms of the regulations, members are required to declare all benefits in 
excess of R350 received by them and the use of a vehicle, reportedly worth in excess 
of R350 000, would, require therefore disclosure.4 
 
DA Chief Whip Douglas Gibson, said Yengeni should withdraw as chief whip 
“because he is in an impossibly compromised position.” He also noted that Yengeni 
had put his own deputy chief whip into office at the public accounts committee 
(SCOPA), thereby exercising a decisive influence over the investigation into the arms 
deal.5  
 
11.3 Parliament Tries and Fails to Assert Itself 
 
A day after Yengeni’s statement to parliament, on 28 March 2001, the Joint 
Committee on Ethics and Member’s Interests met to determine whether there was 
cause to open a parliamentary investigation into the allegations concerning Yengeni. 
ANC MP Jeremy Cronin suggested that the Registrar of Members Interests be 
instructed to direct a letter to Yengeni asking for an explanation of the apparent 
breaches of the parliamentary code. On 30 March 2001 a letter was sent to Mr 
Yengeni detailing the allegations.6 In terms of the code, Yengeni had seven days to 
respond to the letter, following which the committee would decide whether to launch 
an investigation into the matter. 
Yengeni’s reply to the Registrar’s letter on 6 April 2001 failed to address the 
substance of the complaints but instead questioned whether the relevant rules and 
procedures of the Committee vis a vis the code had been applied in terms of lodging 
the complaint.7 A further letter from the Registrar informed him he was required to 
respond to the letter. In a snub to the Committee, Yengeni's personal assistant 
responded saying that as Parliament was in recess the Chief Whip would only be in a 
                                                 
4 Letter from Douglas Gibson to chairperson Joint Committee on Ethics and Members’ Interests, 26 
March 2001. 
5 Wyndham Hartley and Sapa, “Yengeni defiant in face of arms furore”, Business Day, 26 March 
2001. 
6 Letter from Fazela Mahomed, Registrar of Members Interests to Chief Whip of ANC, Tony Yengeni,  
30 March 2001. 
7 Letter from Chief Whip of the Majority Party, Tony Yengeni, to Fazela Mahomed Registrar of 
Members’ Interests, 6 April 2001. 
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position to respond after the 2 May 2001.8 This did not go down well with the 
committee. 
Finally, on 18 April 2001 the Registrar received a response from Yengeni to the 
“alleged complaints. In the letter he reiterated his statement made in parliament that 
“the motor vehicle in question has been legitimately purchased by me, its acquisition 
does not in any way amount to a gift or a donation and therefore there was no interest 
to be declared to your office. Anyone disputing this must substantiate his or her 
allegations.”9  
 
The Registrar of Members Interests, Fazela Mohamed would confirm from a 
preliminary investigation that Yengeni had not included the car in his annual 
declaration in November 1998, that he appeared to have received free use of a motor 
vehicle for a period of seven months and that the benefit was not disclosed. In the 
light of this, and noting significant public interest in the matter, she recommended that 
the Ethics Committee authorise an investigation and that the final report be presented 
to the National Assembly as soon as possible.10 Events would reveal how once again a 
committee of parliament would be divided along party lines as the ANC asserted its 
majority to prevent a parliamentary committee from conducting an independent 
investigation. 
 
Speaking on behalf of the ANC, Cronin argued that a forensic investigation was 
already underway (the JIT) and that its wide ranging scope would cover the 
information contained in the Sunday Times report. As such, he argued, it would be 
redundant to institute a parallel investigation and would have many negative 
consequences for the effectiveness of the major investigation, which Parliament had 
already instituted.11 While it is true that SCOPA proposed the investigation, knowing 
how the ANC intervened to control the composition of the JIT to exclude the SIU and 
the subsequent side-lining of the committee from the investigation (documented in the 
                                                 
8 Letter from Michelle McMaster PA to the Chief Whip to Fazela Mahomed Registrar of Members’ 
Interests, 10 April 2001. 
9 Letter from Chief Whip of the Majority Party, Tony Yengeni, to Fazela Mahomed Registrar of 
Members’ Interests, 18 April 2001. 
10 Report No 1 to the Joint Committee on Ethics and Members’ Interests with regard to the complaint 
against Mr T. Yengeni 
11 Joint Committee on Ethics and Member’s Interests, Continuation of deliberations, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 9 May 2001. 
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previous chapter), Cronin’s reference to SCOPA and parliament, is disingenuous.  
 
Opposition members disagreed with Cronin’s proposal saying that the investigation 
by the Registrar should be focused solely on a breach of conduct of the code, a 
separate issue as compared to the full arms deal investigation. Otherwise the 
Parliamentary Code of Ethics would cease to exist in any meaningful terms and that 
this would enable MPs to say they were not making a declaration until the police 
investigate. Gibson stressed that the committee was not investigating corruption nor 
criminal conduct but rather whether the code - that requires Members to make a 
disclosure if they've received a benefit in excess of R350 - had been breached or not.12 
A breach would result in a penalty fine of not more than R15 000.. Interestingly 
Yengeni’s notice of appeal against his criminal  conviction in February 2005 would 
make this very same argument. On entering prison he would tell his supporters: “An 
issue that was blatantly a parliament issue was hijacked and criminalized.”13 
 
Cronin argued that while the Registrar had rightly recommended that there should be 
an investigation process to establish all the relevant information it was the ANC’s 
belief that "this extensive, competent, professional and tri-pronged" investigation 
currently underway, is dealing with all of the matters that the Ethics Committee is 
interested in. As such, to achieve an effective outcome would be to allow the 
investigating process that Parliament has put underway - and to reconvene (the Ethics 
Committee) after the investigation has produced a report to see what facts could assist 
the committee so that it may move forward. This was not a matter of abrogating 
responsibility or authority but a matter of waiting for a few months, and then 
parliament could continue its investigation.14 
 
The Ethics Committee was thus divided between those who contended that the 
investigation must be conducted by the already established JIT into the arms deal and 
those proposing a separate investigation of a possible breach of the code by the Ethics 
                                                 
12 Joint Committee on Ethics and Member’s Interests, Continuation of deliberations, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 9 May 2001. 
13 Ethel Hazelhurst. “Stakes have been raised since Yengeni sentence”. The Star. 25 August 2006. 
14 Joint Committee on Ethics and Member’s Interests, Continuation of deliberations, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 9 May 2001. 
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Committee. A vote was finally taken, along party lines that saw the ANC dominated 
committee adopt the following resolution: 
"In respect of the motor vehicle the committee recommends that this 
committee should await the report of the Joint Investigating Team. Should this 
Report show wrongdoing on the part of any Member of Parliament, including 
Mr Yengeni, the Joint Standing Committee on Ethics would then be in a 
position to take appropriate action on the basis of such Report".15 
 
Once again an oversight committee of parliament had been undermined. Earlier in the 
meeting Douglas Gibson had noted that when the committee was established its 
founder chairperson ANC MP Kader Asmal said that the people who sat on the 
committee did not sit primarily as party representatives but as representatives of the 
whole of parliament. Asmal had said that when he would have to take instructions 
from a party he would cease to be a member of the committee. 
 
11.4 Yengeni’s Defence and the JIT Investigation 
 
Yengeni’s defence, given under oath at the end of June before the Directorate of 
Special Operations (DSO, aka “The Scorpions”) was that the price of the vehicle was 
R230 052; the vehicle was damaged (resulting in a discount); he had paid a deposit of 
R50 000 for the vehicle. These points, it turned out, were not entirely true for the 
vehicle was neither damaged, nor did he pay a deposit for it. As for the price, he had 
only  paid R182 563,63. Yengeni was reportedly very angry that the panel that 
interviewed him at the NPA had been all white and included someone who had been 
involved in investigating him when he was charged with treason in 1987.16 
 
In mid-July 2001 several Sunday newspapers featured a full page advertisement 
placed by Yengeni denying all allegations against him and accusing his detractors of 
engaging in a racist “witch hunt”.17  
 
                                                 
15 Joint Committee on Ethics and Member’s Interests, Continuation of deliberations, Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 9 May 2001. 
16 John Matisonn and Estelle Randall, “In future I’ll be careful, says Yengeni,” Sunday Independent , 
7 October 2001.  
17 Statement by Tony Yengeni Regarding Media Report, Sunday Independent, 15 July 2001. 
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Opposition parties said Yengeni was in contempt of Parliament by defending himself 
in the ad instead of appearing in front of the Ethics Committee. He had as yet failed to 
provide details regarding the purchase of the vehicle even after several formal 
requests from the committee. The DA wanted Yengeni to explain how he paid for the 
ad in four Sunday papers at an estimated cost of R250 000.  PAC MP Patricia De 
Lille commented that the ad seemed a “belated, expensive damage control exercise.”18  
 
11.5 The Broader Context  
 
Meanwhile the Joint Investigation Team into the arms deal continued its probe. Now 
both of parliament’s key oversight committees, namely SCOPA and the Committee 
on Members Ethics, having ceded authority to this external investigation by the ANC 
exerting its majority, awaited the much-anticipated report, allegedly to be completed 
by the end of July 2001. It would only come before parliament in mid November. 
Chapter Twelve discusses the JIT Report’s findings and recommendations in detail. 
 
                                                 
18 Christelle Terblanche , “Yengeni faces backlash over advert” The Star, 16 July 2001. 
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The March 2001 revelation in the Sunday Times about Yengeni’s discounted 
Mercedes was further compounded by revelations towards the end of June and early 
July 2001 that the defence company EADS had supplied 30 other key stakeholders 
with luxury cars. These included amongst others, the chief of the SANDF Siphiwe 
Nyanda and former Trade and Industry director, Vanan Pillay, part of chief negotiator 
Jayendra Naidoo’s international-offers negotiating team who had also participated in 
critical aspects of the procurement process. 
 
Daimler Chrysler distanced itself from EADS, which admitted it had facilitated 
special deals on Mercedes-Benz motor vehicles to at least 30 prominent South 
Africans. The company said that an internal investigation into the company’s record 
of motor sales to EADS had revealed “absolutely no connection” to the arms deal. 
“What happens beyond the sale is not something Daimler would get involved in. We 
have no knowledge of the involvement of our client company in the sale of our 
product to the company.”19 “There is a world of difference between corruption and 
buying a car at a discount….We will not allow superficial, selective and deliberately 
destructive reporting based on distortion of facts, untruths and bias to deter us from 
our commitment to the growth of the South African economy.”20 
 
In terms of the Public Service Act, regulations provides that all senior public servants 
from director level up have to declare the gifts and benefits they receive through a 
system of financial disclosure. Most major vehicle manufacturers offer a special 
discount to all public servants over and above the discounts offered to the general 
public and this would not normally have to be declared. However if a public servant 
received a “special privilege as a result of some contract that might be in the pipeline” 
he was obliged to declare it. The code of conduct for public servants says: “An 
employee does not use his/her official position to obtain private gifts or benefits for 
themselves during the performance of his/her duties. Nor does he/she accept any gifts 
or benefits when offered as these can be construed as bribes.”21  
 
                                                 
19 “”DaimlerChrysler distances itself from company that arranged Mercedes deals”, The Star, 9 May 
2001. 
20 “DaimlerChryselr and EADS separate companies”, The Star, 3 July 2001. 
21 “Nyanda has until end of July to declare gifts, benefits” Sapa, 27 June 2001. 
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11.6 Tony Yengeni is Arrested 
On the morning of 3 October 2001 former ANC chief whip and chairperson of the 
parliamentary defence committee Tony Yengeni, handed himself over to the National 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions. According to Spokesperson Sipho Ngwema there 
was “absolutely no deal” struck between the Scorpions and Yengeni’s lawyers nor 
any political pressure. “We only appreciated the co-operation.”22 The reference to 
political pressure is significant, showing that the NDPP was aware of ongoing 
allegations that its investigations into corruption in the arms deal might be construed 
as an abuse of state institutions and a way to target political enemies, something 
President Mbeki would be accused of with regard to his deputy Jacob Zuma. 
Yengeni was arrested and charged by the Scorpions with corruption, fraud, statutory 
perjury and forgery arising from the arms deal23. According to the charge sheet he had 
violated the Corruption Act by illegally receiving “a benefit” (the R167 000 discount 
on the Mercedes-Benz) in return for undertaking to influence the arms acquisition 
process in favor of DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, and to facilitate introductions for Mr 
Woerfel and other defence company representatives involved in the process. Yengeni 
was also charged with fraud for giving an undertaking to Mr Woerfel that he would 
influence the arms deal when he had no intention of doing so. Regarding the charge of 
statutory perjury for “giving information under oath that was not true” this related to 
fabricated evidence he had given to Scorpions officials investigating the acquisition of 
his vehicle.   
After a brief appearance in the Cape Town magistrate’s court he was granted bail of 
R10 000 and the case was set for 25 January 2002. A warrant of arrest – later 
withdrawn - was issued for EADS official Michael Woerfel who had been suspended 
by the company in late September 2001.24  
 
Following his arrest Yengeni would say that while people had called him arrogant in 
his handling of the parliamentary ethics committee it was the ANC that had said he 
should not work through the committee process and rather advise them that he would 
                                                 
22 Vuyo Mvoko, “The law stretches its long arm”,  Business Day, 4th October 2001. 
23 Marvin Meintjies, “Charges facing chief whip”, The Star, 4th October 2001. 
24 Bonile Ngqiyaza and Sapa, “Woerfel promises to be in court”, Business Day, 2001. 
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wait for the bigger investigation into the arms deal to take its course. “I have no 
regrets about the ethics committee or the ads I placed in the newspapers. I think what 
I did was right.”25 In a further comment Yengeni said: “I’m not saying that it was 
wrong. I always want a nice discount on anything I buy. But with the public concern, 
in retrospect, I should have done it differently. In future I will be cogniscant of the 
impact of certain things I do. I’ll be more careful.”26  
 
This statement by Yengeni underscores the political culture of the ANC leadership to 
control the investigation into the arms deal and so doing undermine parliament and its 
committees from exercising any meaningful oversight in terms of probing alleged 
corruption and lapses of accountability. Yengeni, as a loyal cadre, was essentially 
following the ANC line both in terms of putting political pressure on SCOPA and in 
terms of ignoring the Ethics Committee. As seen in the previous chapter, Feinstein’s 
loyalty to the party over and above principle was found wanting. As such, his own 
position as an ANC MP became untenable within parliament forcing him to resign. 
 
11.6.1 Reactions to Yengeni’s Arrest 
 
What is the significance of these events for our thesis? In order to gauge this I will 
trace reactions from both the government and opposition political parties.  
 
A number of reactions followed Yengeni’s arrest: the government vehemently denied 
his arrest had anything to do with corruption in the arms deal; a widespread concern 
was raised that on the eve of the release of the watered down JIT report, Yengeni was 
a scapegoat when others such as Schabir Shaik and Joe Modise possibly had more to 
answer for; other analysts said the arrest reaffirmed that the law enforcement and 
investigative capacities of the land were independent from the ruling party.27 
 
The government moved swiftly to calm domestic and international concerns over the 
fate of the arms deal issuing an official statement that there was no corruption 
                                                 
25 John Matisonn and Estelle Randall, “In future I’ll be careful, says Yengeni,” Sunday Independent , 
7 October 2001. 
26 John Matisonn and Estelle Randall, “In future I’ll be careful, says Yengeni,” Sunday Independent , 
7 October 2001. 
27 “Yengeni takes some heat off the ANC” , Cape Argus, 5 October 2001. 
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involved in the arms deal: “We remain confident…that the process of primary 
contracting, which was the core function of government, was water-tight enough to 
obviate the possibilities for corruption.” It was awaiting a report from the three 
agencies investigating the deal and only then would it determine “appropriate 
responses.”28  
 
The ANC issued a statement – echoed in a parliamentary motion – that Yengeni 
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The party recognized the 
independence of the judiciary and that the law should take its course. “Should there be 
any truth in the allegations against Comrade Yengeni, the ANC will not hesitate to 
take action. 29 The ANC’s alliance partner Cosatu said “we cannot afford to have 
anyone remain in a position of political leadership who is tainted with corruption, no 
matter how worthy his past.”30  
 
Justice Minister, Penuell Maduna, commented that Yengeni’s arrest had nothing to do 
with the arms deal telling the Sunday Times: “the state has no evidence connecting 
Tony to the arms deal. There is no suggestion in the charge sheet that Tony influenced 
any person about that deal. He was never part of the decision makers at any level and 
he was never part of the executive. On the contrary, the charge sheet says that he 
allegedly pretended to be able to influence the outcome of the deal. But there is no 
nexus whatsoever between what he did and the arms deal.” There was Maduna said 
“no evidence of impropriety around the arms deal.”31 
 
Suggestions were raised that the government was keen to avoid implicating more 
senior politicians and officials involved in the deal, fearing this could result in the 
cancellation of the arms contract. A clause in the contracts labeled “remedies in case 
of bribes” suggests that if a link can be shown between anyone found guilty of 
corruption and the decision to award a contract, then that contract can be cancelled. 
Many believe the government’s grim determination to exclude the SIU from the arms 
probe had the same roots, for of all the investigating agencies the SIU was the only 
                                                 
28 “Yengeni sparks crisis for ANC”, Cape Argus, 4 October 2001. 
29 Wyndham Hartley. , “Yengeni’s future in the hands of ANC committee”, Business Day 4, October 
2001. 
30 Natal Witness, 5 October 2001. 
31 Maduna. Ranjeni Munusamy , “Yengeni must explain arms link,  Sunday Times, 7 October 2001. 
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one with the legal power to rescind contracts.32 Also, as Feinstein points out in his 
book (2007:181) “Heath was the only actor in the drama who had little connection to 
or sympathy with the ANC.” 
 
Commenting on Yengeni’s arrest former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein said, “This is 
extraordinarily good news for South Africa, for all South Africans, except for anyone 
who benefited inappropriately (from the arms deal).”33 “I sincerely hope this is the 
first of a series of arrests of others far more directly involved in the deal who have 
allegedly benefited from it. It places in sharp relief the ANC’s efforts to undermine 
SCOPA’s investigation. I hope that now the committee is given the space to work in a 
fearless and non-partisan manner.” But he noted, “Yengeni was always on the 
periphery”. The crucial question is whether the investigators take on the “big 
decision-makers in the deal.”34 This was a reference to the former minister of 
Defence, Joe Modise and arms dealer, Schabir Shaik. One ANC member however 
said that with the imminent release of the report on the arms deal to parliament, it was 
possible Yengeni had been prosecuted to “improve the response to a flaccid report. It 
appears that (the ANC leadership) have finally taken the decision to scapegoat 
Tony.”35 
 
SCOPA Chair, Gavin Woods said the arrest, while hugely disappointing for 
parliament as an institution, showed that the investigators were taking the allegations 
of irregularities seriously: “We have been aware for some time that there were 
unanswered questions about Yengeni’s involvement and the need for further 
investigation. The fact that criminal charges have been laid means there must be some 
substance to the allegations.”36 Woods said the arrest was good for the credibility of 
the probe and predicted there would be more arrests soon. It showed investigators 
were serious about getting to the bottom of the allegations. “I am encouraged that the 
investigation has led to action that will obviously not be popular, politically 
speaking.”37 
 
                                                 
32 Editorial, “Bigger fish to fry”, Mail and Guardian, 5-11 October 2001. 
33 “Yengeni sparks crisis for ANC”, Cape Argus, 4th October 2001. 
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PAC MP, Patricia De Lille, who had first raised allegations of corruption in 
connection with the arms deal, called for the ANC to suspend Yengeni: “At last! I 
think it is a commendable move by the Scorpions and we must now wait for the law 
to take its course…I hope that in the future when allegations are made against high 
profile people, our government should be more proactive and should not be lenient 
because it is one of their representatives.”38 While praising the work of the multi-
agency probe, de Lille again called for the inclusion of the SIU, which “by law” has 
the capacity to thoroughly investigate civil aspect of the arms deal, such as the 
validity of contracts.39  
 
UDM leader Bantu Holomisa said “We must guard against a situation where Yengeni 
and Woerfel are made the expedient fall guys whilst others are protected. In the end 
everyone, regardless of rank or position, must be equal before the law.40 The DA’s 
Raenette Taljaard was also cynical: “One swallow does not make a summer. One 
court appearance by Mr Yengeni on tough charges must not deflect attention from the 
serious allegations against others.”41 DA leader Tony Leon took the opportunity to 
call on the Heads of Mission of the European Union to investigate the arms deal and 
“put pressure on their government and on EU structures” to investigate allegations of 
bribery and kickbacks involving European armaments companies awarded contracts 
where in terms of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials it is a crime to offer, promise, or give a bribe to a foreign public official in 
exchange for favourable terms of business.42 
 
11.6.2 Yengeni Goes to Prison 
Yengeni was sentenced to four years in prison in 2003. After a lengthy and ultimately 
unsuccessful appeal process he eventually started his prison sentence on 24 August 
2006. His send off party and accompanying entourage of senior ANC officials to the 
gates of Pollsmoor prison were seen as fitting tribute to a loyal comrade prepared to 
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martyr himself for the party that would “let the law takes its course”. In mid January 
2007 he was released on parole having served a sixth of his prison term. 
In his book, Feinstein (2007:243-244) notes in relation to both Allan Boesak and 
Tony Yengeni, heroes of the liberation struggle jailed for corruption, that “both broke 
the law for personal gain and were, quite correctly, sent to jail after exhaustive appeal 
processes. Both men were borne to and from jail with the endorsement of senior ANC 
leaders ringing in their ears. Not one ANC functionary criticized what they had done. 
It is quite legitimate, in fact humane, to provide private, personal support to a friend 
or comrade who has erred. To fete them publicly, and not even admonish them for 
their crimes, is foolhardy. To do so in such a crime-ridden country is grossly 
irresponsible.” 
Officially the ANC said that the Appeal Court’s decision is sad and unfortunate, but 
the organization nonetheless accepted the decision – “which is demonstration of an 
unflinching adherence to the rule of law on the part of the organization”.43 
In a further twist, the new Speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete, said she did not 
believe comrade Yengeni had defrauded parliament. Commenting on Yengeni’s case 
in an interview with the Sunday Times she denied she had diminished the image of 
parliament by seeing Yengeni off to prison. “If you approach Tony as a fraudster, of 
course you would then have that view. I don’t…But I saw a comrade who is being 
locked up at a time when (Dr Wouter) Basson is all over the place and I’m 
wondering: what the hell is this?” she said. She had checked with colleagues and 
officials and was convinced that Yengeni had not broken any parliamentary regulation 
when he accepted a discount on the car.44  
11.7 Further Criminal Investigations 
 
11.7.1  Schabir Shaik 
 
The criminal investigations into the arms deal did not stop with Yengeni. On 9th 
October 2001 having obtained a court order and mutual legal assistance from the 
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French government to carry out simultaneous raids on companies linked with Durban 
based businessman, Schabir Shaik of Nkobi Holdings in South Africa and Thomson 
CSF (since renamed Thales) offices in France and Mauritius, the Scorpions carried 
out raids in France, Mauritius and Durban. The objective was to obtain documentary 
evidence of corruption in the arms deal, evidence that would link the deputy 
president, Jacob Zuma to the growing scandal. 
 
On Friday 16th November 2001 (a day after the release of the JIT report in parliament, 
discussed in the next chapter) financial advisor to deputy president Jacob Zuma, 
Schabir Shaik, was arrested for allegedly being in possession of Cabinet minutes at 
which the arms deal was discussed and other classified documents and faced charges 
of theft under the Protection of Information Act. After being released on R1000 bail 
Shaik said that investigators had made him into a scapegoat: “I am rather surprised 
that I’m the first to be arrested. It came to me as a total shock. I was not directly 
involved in the arms deal, yet I’m the first to appear in court. I think I’m caught in the 
cross-fire of certain political interests.”45  
 
The mention of political interests is significant. This observation would find traction 
as Shaik’s eventual criminal trial that led to the dismissal of the deputy president of 
the country, Jacob Zuma by President Mbeki, throwing wide open the succession 
debate on the future presidency of South Africa. Charges of abuse of power by the 
NPA and a political conspiracy would be rife amongst the Zuma camp.  
 
Shaik’s legal battle to resist prosecution, his indictment in August 2003 on charges of 
fraud and corruption, his trial that would start in October 2004 and conclude in June 
2005 with a guilty conviction of fraud and corruption relating to the arms deal, would 
result in a 15-year jail sentence. His unsuccessful appeal against these charges would 
see him enter South Africa’s prison system in October 2006. 
 
In his 160 page judgment, read over three days in May 2005, Judge Hilary Squires 
found “convincing and really overwhelming" evidence that Shaik, from whom Zuma 
had received directly to or for his benefit 238 payments totaling some R1.2million 
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from October 1995 to September 2002, were party to a generally corrupt relationship. 
In his judgment Squires argued Zuma was aware of Shaik’s efforts to facilitate a 
yearly payment, argued to be a bribe, of R500 000 from the French arms 
manufacturer Thint Holdings – formerly Thomson CSF. This was allegedly in 
exchange for deflecting the multi-agency probe into the multi-billion rand arms deal.  
 
11.7.2 Jacob Zuma 
 
On 14 June 2005, President Thabo Mbeki announced that he would be relieving his 
deputy president, Jacob Zuma, of all official duties. The reasons for firing Zuma 
related to the fact that a few days earlier, Zuma’s financial advisor, Durban 
businessman and struggle comrade Schabir Shaik, had been convicted and sentenced 
to 15 years on fraud and corruption charges relating to his role in the arms deal.  
 
Following Shaik’s conviction and Zuma’s dismissal, the National Prosecuting 
Authority, whom two years previously, in August 2003, had decided not to charge 
him, would now charge Zuma on two counts of corruption, as well as his co-accused, 
Thint. The NPA under the leadership of Bulelani Ngcuka, an Mbeki ally, argued then 
that whilst they had a “prima facie” case of corruption against Zuma, it was not in the 
interests of the country to pursue the charges and it was questionable whether the state 
had a winnable case.46  
 
Zuma, his defence lawyers and supporters would argue that the charges being brought 
against him were part of a “political conspiracy”. In a 2006 affidavit submitted to 
oppose a prosecution request for a postponement in his corruption trial, Zuma argued 
that the investigation was “designed solely or mainly to destroy my reputation and 
political role... My conviction on any possible type of offence is being pursued at all 
costs…I have been touted as a potential presidential candidate…Just as there 
are…ANC members who have come out in support of me being the next president, so 
there are those in public and in government who are very much opposed to me being 
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president and indeed some who wish me not to have a role to play in the politics of 
this country…The charges against me have been initiated, and certainly fuelled, by a 
political conspiracy to remove me as a role player in the ANC.”47 
 
11.8 Disbanding the “The Scorpions” 
 
Despite corruption charges hanging over his head, in December 2007 Jacob Zuma 
became the ANC’s new president in a humiliating defeat for Thabo Mbeki who had 
run for a third term as president of the party. One of the first resolutions taken by the 
new ANC leadership at the party’s conference in Polokwane was to disband the 
Directorate of Special Operations, aka “The Scorpions”. This decision was met by 
huge a huge outcry from opposition parties who accused the ANC of dissolving the 
Scorpions solely to protect its members against prosecution. 
 
At an ISS seminar organized in April 2008 to debate the decision, ANC national 
executive committee member and former defense force chief, Siphiwe Nyanda, cited 
five reasons for closing the Scorpions down: 
• It is important to separate investigators from prosecutors to prevent an "abuse 
of authority" that may occur when prosecutors are also involved in 
investigations from the start. 
• The Scorpions "illegally" gathered intelligence without being accountable to 
Parliament. 
• The ANC has information that shows the Scorpions were going to prosecute 
five apartheid security operatives as well as five ANC leaders who were 
denied amnesty by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. "This is not the 
fair and just manner in which we want our country to reconcile. The ANC 
doesn't think that the actions of apartheid operatives can be compared to the 
just war of the struggle." 
• The Scorpions were "dabbling in politics" by holding a meeting of executives 
to discuss ways in which to "undermine" the ANC's resolution for dissolving 
the unit. 
• There is unhealthy competition between the country's crime-fighting agencies, 
                                                 
47 “Twist in tale of victims and villains”. Zuma Corruption Trial, Sunday Times, August 6 2006.  
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particularly the Scorpions and the police. This undermines the country's 
crime-fighting capacity.48 
 
At the ISS seminar Nyanda lashed out at “opposition parties and the liberal media” 
for accusing the ANC of dissolving the Scorpions solely to protect its members 
against prosecution. However, it is increasingly apparent that one of the key reasons 
for disbanding the specialized anti-corruption unit with its high success rate (of 380 
prosecutions undertaken by February 2004, 349 resulted in convictions - an average 
rate of 93,1%),49 was that it had become too political and perceived to be targeting 
specific ANC politicians. Nyanda said: “The DSO was used to pursue a political 
agenda and to target certain people in the ANC to the benefit of sectarian and foreign 
interests.” He admitted that the ANC’s resolution to disband the Scorpions “was 
informed by the view of how the DSO conducted itself in relation to Jacob 
Zuma…They charged Jacob Zuma without having sufficient evidence and, 
subsequent to that, launched Hollywood-style raids on his house…All of this amounts 
to human rights violations.”50 
 
Two other senior ANC members would echo these sentiments. Referring to the 
origins of the DSO, new ANC secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, branded the 
Scorpions as a relic of the apartheid-era security establishment that had an “intense 
hatred for the ANC”. ANC chief whip Nathi Mthethwa labeled them as “adversaries 
of the democratic order.”51 In particular, Mthethwa said the Scorpions’ handling of the 
case of his predecessor, ANC Chief Whip Tony Yengeni, was troubling to the ANC: 
“It was supposed to be about the transgression of processes and procedures of 
parliament. Instead, the Scorpions turned it into a criminal matter.”52 
 
The irony of this last statement is shown up by events documented in this chapter, 
where at the time it was the ANC executive who insisted the Yengeni case be handled 
outside of parliament by the JIT investigators into the arms deal. As a loyal cadre, 
Yengeni had gone along with these orders from the party bosses. 
                                                 
48 Adriaan Basson, “Zuma case influenced decision”, Mail and Guardian, 11 April 2008. 
49 Sixwekazi Jekwa. “The sting of absent logic: Arguments for disbanding Scorpions illogical and 
counter-productive ”. Finweek, 3 April 2008. 
50 Adriaan Basson, “Zuma case influenced decision”, Mail and Guardian, 11 April 2008. 
51 Deon de Lange. “ANC boss’s new attack on Scorpions”, The Mercury, 24 April 2008. 
52 Deon de Lange. “ANC boss’s new attack on Scorpions”, The Mercury, 24 April 2008. 
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11.9 Conclusion 
 
Our study of anti-corruption measures in post-Apartheid South Africa has focused on 
the attitude of the government to confronting alleged irregularities in the arms deal. 
This chapter focused on Tony Yengeni who was the first high-profile ANC MP to be 
sent to prison on corruption related charges, even if these charges were peripheral to 
the main arms deal allegations. It highlighted the internal accountability mechanisms 
of parliament and the challenges individual MPs face in terms of fulfilling their 
constitutionally mandated role of exercising oversight and accountability over the 
executive.  
 
The chapter also highlighted the important role of the independent media in South 
Africa in bringing cases of corruption to light, as demonstrated by the Sunday Times 
expose of the Yengeni case. Through media coverage the public was able to monitor 
the progress of the case that with the JIT’s investigation having lost credibility 
amongst the public, mainly because of the exclusion on the SIU, had become 
increasingly important. This point relates to the final thesis proposition: “because of 
the multiple institutions, interests and centres of power that exist in a democracy (as 
opposed to a closed political system) corruption and abuses of power will be 
mitigated and eventually come to light.” 
 
The Yengeni case has illustrated the central point in our thesis, namely the need for a 
political culture that is willing to use, and not abuse, the independent institutions of 
accountability and oversight to fight corruption wherever it might appear. Also, where 
the commitment to do the right thing in the public interest trumps loyalty and 
solidarity to one’s comrades and narrow partisan or political interests.  
 
From the Yengeni case it is clear however, that while voicing support for the rule of 
law to take its course, the ANC as a party are somewhat ambivalent about the 
criminal justice process that found one of their own guilty. The Yengeni as well as 
Zuma corruption-related cases seem to indicate some tension within the ruling party, 
with certain factions lining up behind President Thabo Mbeki, and others behind the 
Zuma camp. One supporter outside Pollsmoor prison where Yengeni served his brief 
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sentence was quoted as saying “Yengeni, just like Jacob Zuma, is a victim of political 
intrigue masterminded by those in charge of the state machinery.53”  
 
Institutions such as the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions can potentially be 
manipulated and become hostage to political considerations. In-fighting amongst 
various factions in the ANC however, brings with it a new set of challenges. State 
institutions such as the DSO and NPA are now perceived as being abused to target 
political enemies inside the party, as alleged with regards to the charges of corruption 
brought by the National Prosecuting Authority against both Tony Yengeni and Jacob 
Zuma. 
 
Chapter Six of the thesis discussed specialized anti-corruption units and pointed to 
some of the dangers inherent in establishing anti-corruption bodies with far-reaching 
powers that can potentially be manipulated by the political forces. Clearly in 
establishing specialized anti-corruption units, such as the Scorpions, the mandate as 
well as accountability arrangements for such bodies need to clearly articulated and 
upheld to avoid a situation where the anti-corruption agency itself is accused of 
abusing its powers, leading to a breakdown of trust in the criminal justice system. 
 
In Chapter Twelve the final stages of parliament’s interaction around the arms deal 
investigation, resulting in the release of the JIT report in November 2001 are 
discussed, including the report’s findings, recommendations and responses to it. The 
chapter concludes with the resignation of Dr Gavin Woods in February 2002 as chair 
of SCOPA, having become another casualty in the fight for parliamentary 
accountability. 
 
 
                                                 
53 Prince Mashele. “Yengeni is a convict and should face consequences of his actions.” City Press, 27 
August 2006. 
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Chapter 12: The JIT Report as a Test of Political Will 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the release of the JIT report in mid November 2001, its findings, 
recommendations and reception are discussed including the resignation of Dr Gavin 
Woods as the chair of SCOPA in February 2002. To frame this discussion, a look is 
firstly taken at indicators of political will that indicate a credible reform agenda to 
address corruption. Over and beyond the existence and effectiveness of institutions 
that have an anti-corruption mandate, there are a number of other indicators of 
political will that have been identified in the literature. These will be discussed before 
discussing the JIT report. The concluding section evaluates the shortcomings in the 
South African government’s approach to fighting corruption, most starkly 
demonstrated by the arms deal case study.  
 
12.2 Indicators of Political Will 
 
How can one gauge the credibility and seriousness of a government’s stated intention 
to fight corruption?  
 
"Political will" is the key ingredient of effective anti-corruption efforts and a critical 
starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption reforms. Without a clear 
indication that political will exists, a government’s statements to for example reform 
the civil service, strengthen transparency and accountability mechanisms, and 
reinvent the relationship between government, citizens and the private sector to 
prevent abuses of power, ring hollow and remain mere rhetoric.  
 
Kpundeh (1999) notes that the principal challenge in relation to anti-corruption 
reforms is the need to distinguish between reform approaches that are intentionally 
superficial and only designed to bolster the image of political leaders, and substantive 
efforts that are based on strategies to create change. In order to do this, several 
indicators that demonstrate genuine political will to fight corruption have been 
identified and include: 
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• Understanding the phenomenon: Has the regime, through analytic rigor and 
information, sought to recognize the context and causes of corruption, as well 
as ways to address it? 
• Issues of process: Has the regime adopted a strategy that is participatory, 
incorporating and mobilizing the interests of many stakeholders? 
• Strategic considerations: Has the regime weighed up the strategic dimensions 
of achieving specific outcomes in relation to the selection of reforms that are 
desirable, context-specific and cost-sensitive? 
• Incentives and sanctions: Has the regime considered strategies other than 
criminal sanctions that can mobilize functional relationships to instill 
normative institutional change? 
• Monitoring: Has an objective process been created, which monitors the impact 
of reform and incorporates those findings into a strategy that ensures policy 
goals and objectives? 
• Checks and balances: Is the society a plural one, allowing meaningful 
competition in both the economic and political spheres through institutions 
that provide a check on the arbitrary abuse of power? 
 
The above factors all resonate in the South African context where over the past ten 
years, since 1997, the government has indeed put in place various anti-corruption 
strategies that seem to indicate political will to tackle the problem. Appendix 2 for 
instance, provides a benchmark of anti-corruption reforms based on resolutions 
drafted at national anti-corruption summits over the past few years. One can see that 
efforts have for instance been made in terms of issues of process, namely one that is 
participatory and involves all stakeholders, and of monitoring, two of the factors of 
political will explicitly referred to above. 
 
Lodge (2002d) provides a set of six broad indicators for the extent to which 
authorities are committed to taking effective action against corruption, suggesting that 
an effective anti-corruption program should incorporate most if not all of these.   The 
six indicators are broadly: measuring corruption; publicity; removing incentives; 
increasing penalties; political support; and bureaucratic reform.  
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Political support, as an indicator of the extent to which authorities are taking effective 
action against corruption is expanded upon in the following way: Such support for 
action against corruption must include endorsement of agency and judicial action 
against corruption, refusal to tolerate or sanction corrupt behavior by political 
colleagues, limiting political appointments within the civil service and curbing other 
forms of political patronage, public disclosure of political party finance and 
politician’s assets and acceptance of ministerial responsibility for major instances of 
departmental corruption. Politicians who are proved to have been guilty of corrupt 
behavior should be prevented from reassuming any elected or appointed public office. 
 
From our account of recent corruption-related events in South Africa, it is clear that 
the government scores lowest on indicator 5 (political support). The concluding 
chapter expands on the failure to regulate political party finance, described as the 
Achilles heel of anti-corruption reform efforts in South Africa, pointing to lack of 
demonstrable political will on the part of the ANC in this regard. 
 
12.3 The Context Behind the Release of the JIT Report  
 
The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) that probed the arms deal, a first multi-agency 
investigation of its kind in South Africa, was meant to be an optimal utilization of the 
distinctive mandates of each of the three investigative bodies that were involved. It 
was not however plain sailing as noted in the press release accompanying the report’s 
presentation to parliament: “The joint investigation was unique in that the three 
organs of State, for the first time, conducted an investigation into alleged irregularities 
and criminal conduct simultaneously. This was by no means an easy task as all three 
agencies had to pioneer their way through uncharted and, at times, difficult territory.”1 
The exclusion of the one agency identified in the Public Service Commission report 
on anti-corruption agencies as having a dedicated anti-corruption capacity, namely the 
Special Investigating Unit, has been discussed at length in previous chapters. 
 
Before we look at the content of the report, a number of factors, over and above the 
exclusion of the SIU from the investigation, cast some doubt on the JIT’s 
                                                 
1 Joint Statement of JIT, 15 November 2001. 
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independence and thus the credibility of the final report. First, the role of SCOPA’s 
interaction with JIT was impeded through the Speaker’s interventions. Second, as a 
result the JIT did not report back to this parliamentary committee that had called for 
the further investigation into the arms deal. Third, the delay in the release of the report 
(promised by July and presented in November) and subsequent revelations that the 
executive had edited it during this period instead of being presented directly to 
parliament did not inspire confidence in the final report.  
 
The JIT would in the end not report back to SCOPA, but rather release its report at an 
event in the national assembly in mid November 2001. The main reason given for the 
delay in the report coming to parliament was a controversial decision by the Auditor 
General to present the draft report to the executive for comments, in terms of a 
provision of the Auditor-General’s Act relating to national security issues. 
Unsurprisingly, this action was interpreted by some as “executive interference” into 
the final report and the Auditor General’s credibility and integrity as an independent 
Chapter 9 institution would be challenged by the media and certain members of 
Parliament (in particular Gavin Woods and Raenette Taljaard).2  
 
A successful court challenge using the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
against the Auditor General and Others by the unsuccessful bidder, Richard Young of 
arms company C2I2, eventually led to Young accessing copies of the draft JIT report, 
documents that would find their way into the media. A week before the release of the 
final JIT report to parliament, the Mail and Guardian reported that the office of the 
president – and the ministers of defence, finance, trade and industry – had already 
seen a copy of the draft JIT report in October 2001. Asked for his comment, Gavin 
Woods said he was certain suspicions existed that the report may have been rewritten 
since then and found it strange that when Auditor General appeared before a SCOPA 
meeting on 16 October he did not mention the fact that the report had already been 
shown to the executive.3  
 
                                                 
2 Debate on Committee Reports on Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement 
Packages. Hansard. Unrevised Copy. Sneller, 13 August 2002. 
3 Paul Kirk, “Report could expose state to litigation”, Mail and Guardian, 9 -15 November 2001. 
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The same newspaper article revealed that the Auditor-General had also shown a draft 
of his first report to parliament in September 2000 (the Special Review) for comment 
to among others Chippy Shaik, the head of procurement. Shaik had then suggested an 
amendment that would be incorporated into the report. While Fakie’s draft had stated: 
“The South African navy expressed its preference for the C2I2 [system]”, in a letter 
marked secret and dated June 7 2000, Shaik had replied that he did not agree with the 
draft saying: “The South African navy did not express ‘its preference to the C2I2’ 
rather “although the South African navy appreciated the technical potential offered by 
C2I2 this was outweighed by the risk-driven cost…” When Fakie tabled the reworked 
report it had been amended along the lines suggested by Shaik and now read: 
“Although the South African navy preferred the technical potential offered by the 
local company, this was outweighed by prohibitive risk driven cost implications…” 
The Mail and Guardian noted: “What makes Shaik’s meddling extraordinary is the 
fact that the issue was of direct interest to his brother, Schabir Shaik. The French 
company that C2I2 was competing against – and lost to – was Detexis, a sister 
company of African Defence Systems, in which Schabir Shaik is a director and 
shareholder”.4 
 
The media reports calling into question the independence of the Auditor General 
would eventually compel him to issue a Special Report “to present facts to deal with 
certain unfounded allegations reflecting upon the integrity and dignity of the Auditor-
General and his Office, made both in Parliament and in the media”. This report was at 
pains to detail the normal process (planning, execution and reporting) that followed 
any audit and was “necessary to give credibility to the process and ensure factual 
accuracy of the finding”.5 In reference to the JIT report, it noted that it was only 
considered a final report once it had been signed off by the three heads of the 
investigation teams and that the consolidation of the three reports into a single joint 
report dictated the elimination of duplication and technical details specifically with a 
view to condensing the reports into a user-friendly format.”6 A chapter nine institution 
                                                 
4 Paul Kirk , “Chippy Shaik meddled in arms probe”, Mail and Guardian, 23 - 29 November 2001. 
5 Special Report of the Auditor-General Pertaining to Allegations on the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) 
Arms Deal Report, 24 June 2003. 
6 Special Report of the Auditor-General Pertaining to Allegations on the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) 
Arms Deal Report, 24 June 2003. 
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such as the Auditor General having to defend his integrity in the face of evidence that 
the final report had been tampered with, was embarrassing to say the least.  
 
Once again it is the media driving the anti-corruption agenda, pointing out 
discrepancies in the official version of events as well as conflicts of interest that 
clearly undermined the integrity of the arms procurement process and the 
investigation. Institutions such as a vigilant media, independent judicial process and 
powerful legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act, ensured that 
this information came to light at all and serves to highlight how all of these elements 
are required to support the anti-corruption agenda in a country, more so when the 
party in power’s political will to fight corruption, is being questioned.  
 
Two of the thesis’ framing propositions, namely two and six are relevant here: to 
prevent abuses of power and promote democratic accountability, formal institutions 
such as a multi-party parliament and functioning criminal justice system, including 
specialized anti-corruption agencies, must be complemented by a vibrant civil society 
and independent media to both check and balance power; and because of the multiple 
institutions, interests and centres of power that exist in a democracy (as opposed to a 
closed political system) corruption and abuses of power will be mitigated and 
eventually come to light. 
 
12.4 The Release of the JIT Report  
 
On 14th November 2001 the 380 page Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic 
Defence Procurement Packages was tabled in Parliament at a joint sitting of the 
national assembly. What did the report find, what recommendations did it make, and 
how was it received? 
 
12.4.1 The Format of the Report 
 
The format of the 14 Chapter report of almost 400 page report, that included 
reviewing some 700 000 pages of documents, was the following: Chapter 1 and 2 
provides some background information and the methodology adopted for the 
investigation; Chapter 3 deals with the review of the procurement process and 
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policies; Chapters 4 - 7 explain the four procurement packages i.e. Alfa/Liff, LUH, 
Submarines and corvettes – background, what happened, how it happened with 
findings and recommendations at the end of each chapter; Chapters 8 - 12 deal with 
IONT, Cost to State, Selection of sub contractors and conflict of interest, C212 
complaints and National Industrial Participation and Defence Industrial Participation; 
Chapter 13 deals with drafting of the contracts ; Chapter 14 summarizes the key 
findings and recommendations from the individual chapters. 
 
12.4.2 Overall Findings of the JIT Report 
 
The joint statement on the arms deal investigation issued by the JIT team found that 
during the comprehensive investigation no evidence was found of any improper nor 
unlawful conduct by the Government: “The irregularities and improprieties referred to 
in our report, point to the conduct of certain officials of the government departments 
involved and cannot, in our view, be ascribed to the President or the Ministers 
involved in their capacity as members of the Ministers' Committee or Cabinet. There 
are therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government's contracting position is 
flawed.”  
 
Second, the decision that the evaluation criteria in respect of the Lead-In Fighter 
Trainer (Hawk) had to be expanded to include a non-costed option and which 
eventually resulted in a different bidder being selected, was taken by the Ministers' 
Committee, a subcommittee of Cabinet. This decision was neither unlawful, nor 
irregular in terms of the procurement process as it evolved during the SDP 
acquisition. As the ultimate decision-maker, Cabinet was entitled to select the 
preferred bidder, taking into account the recommendations of the evaluating bodies as 
well as other factors such as strategic considerations. 
 
Third, the Affordability Team and International Offers Negotiation Team took 
adequate measures under the circumstances to present to the Government a 
scientifically based and realistic view on these matters. The Ministers' Committee was 
put in a position by the Affordability Team to apply their minds properly to the 
financial impact of the procurement. 
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Fourth, there was a conflict of interest with regard to the position held and role played 
by the Chief of Acquisitions of Department of Defence, Mr S Shaik, by virtue of his 
brother's interests in the Thomson Group and ADS, which he held through Nkobi 
Holdings. Mr Shaik in his capacity as Chief of Acquisitions, declared this conflict of 
interest in December 1998 to the Project Control Board, but continued to participate 
in the process that led ultimately to the awarding of contracts to the said companies. 
He did not recuse himself properly. 
 
The JIT statement concluded: “It is evident from the investigation that the perception 
of widespread corruption within the Government is without justification. Whilst there 
may be certain individuals and department officials who used their positions to derive 
some form of benefit from the acquisition process, which might render them 
criminally liable, the integrity of the Government and its institutions is 
unquestionable.” 7 This position would become a constant refrain from the ruling party 
and for years it would literally “stick to its guns” asserting that the executive was not 
involved in any wrongdoing. 
 
12.5 Ongoing Criminal Investigations  
 
At the release of the report the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani 
Ngcuka’s made a statement to parliament summarized the status of the various 
allegations of corruption in the arms deal that had been brought to the JIT, some that 
involved ongoing criminal investigations.  
 
Regarding allegations still the subject of the ongoing investigation, these included 
suspicions of the commission of offences of corruption and/or fraud in the following 
specific areas: 
• the shareholding of various role players in some of the companies which 
benefited from the overall acquisition process; 
• the receipt of gifts by role players in the acquisition process (apart from those 
already charged); 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 4 for the full text of the Joint Statement 
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• the undue payments to certain successful subcontractors for the supply of 
various services and/or programmes; and 
• the conflict of interest in respect of various role players in the acquisition 
process. 
 
In respect of investigations into the allegation that persons including high-ranking 
officials involved in the overall acquisition process received various gifts from the 
bidders, the JIT had found substantiation for this in certain instances. Ngcuka reported 
that action had been taken against individuals who have unduly benefited in a corrupt 
manner from the acquisition process and in this regard mentioned searches in respect 
of various business premises and residences in South Africa, France and Mauritius 
that were conducted after search warrants were obtained from a judge in South Africa 
and the foreign authorities. These searches related specifically to the suspected 
commission of offences more pertinently in respect of African Defence Systems (Pty) 
Ltd, as subcontractor for the supply of the Corvette Combat Suite, Futuristic Business 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Thomson-CSF for the supply of an Integrated Logistic 
Support Services. 
 
Ngcuka dramatically announced that within the next 24 hours his office would be 
taking action with regards to the area of conflict of interest as there were “indications 
that certain officials have found themselves in incompatible positions, which might 
have led to the perception that the credibility of the acquisition process has been 
compromised in specific instances”.8  
 
In his address to parliament Ngcuka noted that a “golden mid-way” was needed 
“where a balance is struck between the demands for accuracy, rigorous investigation 
and the rights of privacy of those affected.” He noted that the investigation had 
essentially been about probity: “whether those representing the government have 
conducted business diligently, properly and in the best interest of the country” and 
“whether the contracting parties have followed the rules of good faith and fairness”. 
Relating to this was the question whether crimes had been committed and, more 
specifically, whether prosecutions could be and ought to be instituted. In essence, he 
                                                 
8 Address by the National Director for Public Prosecutions, Mr B T Ngcuka, to parliament on the joint 
report in the investigation into the strategic defence packages, 15 November 2001.  
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noted the investigators were “duty-bound to conduct our business in a measured, 
accountable and objective manner that instills legitimacy and respect for the law” and 
hoped they had done so “without abuse of power or process.”9 
 
The question of whether prosecutions could and ought to be instituted and Ngcuka’s 
specific reference to “abuse of power” with regard to the criminal investigations, is 
particularly pertinent and would come to the fore two years later.  
 
On 23 August 2003 Ngcuka would make a controversial decision (some would allege 
politically influenced) not to prosecute deputy president Jacob Zuma for corruption, 
although stating publicly that a prima facie case existed against him. As a 
consequence, Ngcuka would be accused of being an apartheid era spy – a charge 
investigated and dismissed by the Hefer Commission - and of abusing his powers. An 
investigation by the Public Protector and report to parliament would find him to have 
abused the powers of the NPA and he later resigned. His wife, Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka would take up the reins of the deputy president of the country in June 2005, 
replacing Jacob Zuma whom Mbeki fired in what may have been his biggest error of 
judgment. Zuma would be become increasingly popular and be elected president of 
the ANC in December 2007, opening the way up for his future presidency of South 
Africa. 
 
12.6 Recommendations of the JIT Report 
 
A number of specific recommendations came from the JIT report: 
 
First, a recommendation that the policy document, developed during the Strategic 
Defence Packages Procurement process be further refined with specific reference to 
the lessons learnt from the acquisition process under investigation. In this regard the 
staff of the Department of Defence and Armscor involved in procurement should be 
properly trained to ensure that they assimilate and fully understand the policy with a 
view to its effective implementation. 
 
                                                 
9 Address by the National Director for Public Prosecutions, Mr B T Ngcuka, to parliament on the joint 
report in the investigation into the strategic defence packages, 15 November 2001.  
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Second, the Department of Defence and Armscor should develop specific rules and 
guidelines to address conflict of interest issues and to ensure that personnel are 
properly informed in this regard. These rules and guidelines should be developed, 
taking into account the principles contained in the Code of Conduct of the State 
Tender Board and the King Report on Corporate Governance, 1994, regarding 
improved ethics and probity as well as international norms in this regard. Steps should 
also be taken to ensure that a particular individual irrespective of his/her position is 
not tasked with incompatible functions in multifaceted procurements. This will 
prevent a conflict or perceived conflict of interest, which could have a detrimental 
effect on the overall acquisition process. 
 
Third, parliament should consider taking urgent steps to ensure that high ranking 
officials and office bearers, such as Ministers and Deputy Ministers, are not allowed 
to be involved, whether personally or as part of private enterprise, for a reasonable 
period of time after they leave public office, in contracts that are concluded with the 
State.10 
 
12.7 Responses to the JIT Report 
 
Opposition parties responded negatively to the release of the report. At the 
parliamentary briefing the opposition United Democratic Movement (UDM) and 
Democratic Alliance (DA) staged a walk-out of what they said was a public relations 
exercise stage-managed by government to exonerate itself. The DA objected to the 
tabling of the report the day before the parliamentary recess, saying it prevented a 
proper debate.11 The PAC described the report as a “white-wash and a sad cover-up” 
with PAC MP Patricia De Lille saying she was sure the version of the report released 
had been sanitized.12 The New National Party’s media director, Francois Beukman, 
said the report raised more questions than answers and that his party was “not 
satisfied with the final product”.13  
                                                 
10 JIT Report 
11 Linda Ensor , “Government welcomes report into arms deal as a vindication”,  Business Day, 16 
November 2001. 
12 Paul Stober , “Auditor-General’s report tabled in parliament”, SABC News, 15 November 2001. 
13 Mungo Soggot and Barry Streek , “More a cock-up than a cover-up”, Mail and Guardian, 16 
November 2001. 
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In a detailed statement released the same day, the government however, welcomed the 
result of the inquiry as vindication, citing the key finding of the report that “no 
evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. The 
irregularities and improprieties ... therefore no grounds to suggest that the 
Government's contracting position is flawed".14  
 
The government noted its concern along with the report’s findings that there may 
have been individuals and institutions who used or attempted to use their positions 
improperly ... to obtain undue benefits in relation to these packages. “To the extent 
that there were such individuals and actions, applying, as the report says, in particular 
to the secondary contracting process, these were acts as much of self-enrichment as 
they were against the ethos of our government. We have noted that the Directorate of 
Special Operations (DSO) is investigating these matters; and we express our full 
support for this. It is in the interest of the government and the country as a whole that 
the law must take its course and be seen to do so.” At this point it seems the DSO had 
the support of the executive for pursuing its criminal investigations.  
 
Government ministers were quoted as saying that many of the allegations had been 
made by “pawns of those (who) were losers in the bidding” lashing out particularly at 
former judge Willem Heath and PAC MP Patricia De Lille.15 Minister of Defence, 
Mosiuoa Lekota referring to the public interest NGO, Idasa, commented:  “Indeed, let 
those who chorused that the investigation into the arms deal would prove a litmus test 
for our young democracy now proclaim with equal volume that the test has been 
passed with flying colors. The 15 minutes are over. It’s time to move on.”16  
 
Richard Calland from Idasa who had coined the “litmus test” phrase, responded in his 
column in the Mail and Guardian later that week: “Only if the recommendations of 
the JIT and Parliament are heeded can we say the test is passed. It is only if the 
government learns from the errors and defects from the arms deal – the single biggest 
piece of expenditure in South Africa’s history – that we will be able to say it is time to 
move on.” While the report was by no means a white-wash, Calland wrote “the litmus 
                                                 
14 Linda Ensor , “Government welcomes report into arms deal as a vindication”,  Business Day, 16 
November 2001. 
15 Christelle Terreblanche, “Arms deal: Scorpions to strike today”, Cape Times. 16 November 2001. 
16 Mosiuoa Lekota, “We’ve sailed through the litmus test”, Sunday Times, 18 November 2001. 
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test has not yet been passed,” at least not by all parties. While members of JIT 
“because of the thorough professionalism of the report” and “who clearly saw this as 
a defining moment in their constitutional existence” have passed the test, “regrettably, 
because of its inadequate conceptual starting point” - what is and is not “government” 
- the report fails to examine the question of ministerial accountability in this light and 
so its cause remains stagnant and undeveloped, and the litmus test cannot yet be said 
to be fully passed”. 17  
 
In his weekly letter to ANC Today, President Mbeki wrote an angry response to those 
who accused the report as being a cover-up, insinuating his critics as having a racist 
agenda. The letter is vintage Mbeki, not dealing with specific accusations point by 
point but rather mocking his accusers in general. To demonstrate the president’s 
mindset at this point in time it is worth quoting at length:  
 
“In spite of everything we have said, for a long time our country and people 
have been subjected to an intense campaign that sought to convince that there 
was clear evidence of corruption. Names of persons, institutions and 
organizations were bandied about. Firm predictions were made that the heads 
of important people in our country would roll. Intense public battles were 
fought around the question of who should be mandated to dig up dirt and who 
was courageous enough to expose evil-doing. The charge was made that our 
young democracy faced its worst ever crisis. The very top of our government, 
the national Cabinet, had been exposed as the heart and source of corruption. 
The mass media went to town to emphasize these messages. Every accuser 
was given the necessary space to be heard and seen both domestically and 
internationally. People who still have to account for the role they played in 
perpetuation of the apartheid system, including involvement with murder, 
became the greatest possible defenders of high morality. Others, who 
discharged other functions in the counter-offensive of the apartheid system, 
emerged as the greatest democrats and representatives of the people that our 
country has ever seen. Various individuals were publicly found guilty, long 
before any charge was laid against them and long before any court of law 
                                                 
17 Richard Calland, “The litmus test has not been passed” Mail and Guardian, 23-29 November  2001. 
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made any determination about the truth of any allegations. It became an 
established view that what the accusers said was obviously true and requires 
no substantiation. Genuine opinion makers came to be defined as those who 
were most daring and outrageous in the accusations they made. Each 
allegation of corruption was immediately marketed as an established fact and 
the expectation created that the team would find the accused guilty. Thus was 
it said that if this result was not achieved, it would prove that the investigators 
themselves were part of the corruption. Now it has been said that the report is 
a cover-up and that the team’s presentation to parliament was nothing more 
than a public relations exercise. At the base of all this lies the racist conviction 
that Africans, who now govern our country, are prone to corruption and 
mismanagement. (my italics). We have the facts about the defence acquisition. 
Do we have the courage and morality to demand an end to the insulting lie 
communicated everyday, that, as Africans, we are less than human?” 18 
 
This theme of racism would be picked up by Justice Minister Penuell Maduna, who 
would say “certain members of Parliament…displaying an attitude of disrespect” for 
these bodies, was “racist” because it was motivated by the “misperception that 
everything worked upon by black people could not be trusted…”19  
 
Interestingly it was deputy president Jacob Zuma who would tell reporters “I think it 
(racist motivation) is a debatable issue…the legacy of apartheid will always leave 
those kind of utterances whenever people have got problems. They are going to run to 
it as an easy area to go to”. Zuma’s comment, openly contradicting Mbeki’s assertion 
that critics of the arms deal are racist, would be interpreted by political analyst 
Dumisane Hlope of the Center for Policy Studies as statesmanship, arguing that 
although politicians may have a valid historical background to claim racist individuals 
undermine potential and competency, it seemed Cabinet was over-using the race 
card.20 
 
 
                                                 
18  Thabo Mbeki, “Racists expect Africans in government to be corrupt”, The Sowetan, 19 November 
2001. 
19 “Playing the race card”, Natal Witness, 21 November 2001. 
20 “Zuma’s race stand lauded”, The Citizen, 23 November 2001. 
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12.8 Committee Responses to the JIT Report 
 
In SCOPA meetings held on the 11th and 12th December 2001 ANC members of the 
committee insisted that only the recommendations in the JIT report be discussed and 
took the position that to discuss the actual investigation and the findings of the JIT 
would be inappropriate as it would amount to a questioning of the competence and 
integrity of the JIT bodies.  
 
ANC MP Vincent Smith stated that the ANC was totally opposed to any further 
inquiries by SCOPA into the arms deal and was determined to conclude the matter by 
12 December 2001.21 Notwithstanding the protestations of the opposition parties who 
indicated that there was much work yet to be done, the ANC decided to impose a final 
report they had pre-drafted on the Committee. As was now becoming modus operandi 
in parliament’s previously non-partisan oversight committee, the document was duly 
voted through by the ANC as the “final” report. This was something Woods would 
later comment suggested, “(falsely) that SCOPA has fulfilled its responsibility to 
Parliament and the South African public.” After blocking SCOPA from undertaking 
its obligatory investigative work during 2001, Woods (2002) argued the ANC had 
now succeeded in preventing it altogether.  
 
Without going into the detail of the separate committee reports on the JIT report, the 
findings and recommendations of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA) on the JIT report can be seen to be largely representative of the findings and 
recommendations of the other committees, and are presented here verbatim: 
 
3: Findings and Recommendations 
 
“3.1: The Committee accepts the findings and recommendations contained in 
the Report of the JIT, in particular the finding that “No evidence was found of 
any improper or unlawful conduct by the government. The irregularities and 
improprieties referred to in the findings as contained in this report, point to the 
conduct of certain officials of the government departments involved, and 
                                                 
21 Business Day, 11 December 2001. 
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cannot, in our view, be ascribed to the President or the Ministers involved in 
their capacity as members of the Minister’s Committee or Cabinet. There are 
therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting position is 
flawed.” 
3.2: The Committee notes that the government has accepted the findings and 
recommendations made by the JIT in the Report without reservation. 
3.3: The Committee further notes and supports the ongoing criminal 
investigations that are being conducted, and urges that they be concluded 
speedily. 
3.4: The Committee commits itself to monitor, through its ongoing oversight 
role, the implementation of recommendations falling within its areas of 
competency.”22 
 
Parliament’s Justice committee said that in the light of the JIT report it would 
consider making recommendations to government on changes to anti-corruption laws 
and would suggest that the revised anti-corruption bill that was currently with an 
inter-ministerial committee be “introduced as quickly as possible”.23 Chairman of the 
committee, Johnny de Lange noted “There are big gaps in the law and it is very 
apposite that changes be introduced as soon as possible…There’s clearly a gap, and 
something must be done. The quicker it gets introduced (the rewritten act) will be the 
best response to where there are gaps.”24  These gaps included specific provisions to 
be included in the new act relating to conflict of interest and post-employment 
regulations. 
 
The Justice committee would spend the next two years working on comprehensive 
new anti-corruption legislation (see chapter seven) that would come into force on 27th 
April 2004, a date celebrating ten years of democracy in South Africa. One can argue 
persuasively that the investigation into the arms deal that resulted in the JIT report 
may actually have served a constructive purpose in tightening up gaps in the 
corruption laws in the country. It would not however, go far enough, failing to tackle 
the key issue of regulating money flowing into the political process. 
                                                 
22 Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts on the Joint Investigation Report into the 
Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, 11 December 2001. 
23 Wyndham Hartley, “MPs want to close loopholes”, Business Day, 21 November 2001. 
24 “Arms-deal loopholes may lead to changes in corruption laws.” Sapa. 21 November 2001. 
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12.9 SCOPA Chair, Gavin Woods, Resigns on Principle 
 
By adopting its “final report” in December 2001, SCOPA had formally ended its 
work on the arms deal. However according to the chair, Gavin Woods, in a document 
entitled SCOPA’s intended arms deal investigation – the interventionist causes of its 
failure, this important oversight committee had stopped considerably short of meeting 
its obligations “reneging on its undertaking to parliament (and thus to the South 
African public)” – to undertake further investigative work (Woods 2001). Woods 
argues persuasively that a number of interventions took place once the JIT final report 
was tabled in Parliament on 14th November 2001, all which he believed strongly 
suggested a determination on the part of senior ANC leaders to use the occasion in a 
way which would discourage any further parliamentary oversight over the arms deal 
and related matters (Woods 2001).  
 
In February 2002 Woods released a further paper entitled The arms deal investigation 
– accountability failure – a critique of the JIT report. In it he would seriously 
interrogate the findings of the JIT report and note how SCOPA, through decisions and 
actions of the majority component, was prevented from undertaking its further 
investigation and therefore meeting its obligation to Parliament and to the South 
African public. He would argue that significant questions and concerns remained 
largely unanswered in relation to the following issues: 
• Cost of the Strategic Defence Package 
• Offsets/Industrial Participation Projects 
• The Selection of Suppliers/Awarding of Contracts 
• Policies and Procedures followed 
• Selection of sub-contractors 
• Conflicts of Interest 
• Allegations of (Criminal) wrongdoing 
• Responsibilities of Cabinet/Cabinet Sub-committee 
 
On 25th February 2002, at a press conference held at parliament, Woods who had been 
SCOPA chair since July 1999 announced that despite his efforts to restore the 
functionality and purpose of SCOPA (considered in many parliamentary systems 
around the world to be Parliament’s single most important instrument of scrutiny and 
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oversight over government activity) he would be vacating his position as Chairperson 
of SCOPA.25 His reasons included the fact that his efforts to restore the functionality 
of the committee had “been dismissed by the majority component of the Committee” 
leaving SCOPA “facing another year of possible dysfunction and failed oversight.”  
 
More fully, Woods said the reasons for his decision were: 
• That studies I have just completed, and which I make available to you today, 
confirm the extent to which SCOPA was prevented from ensuring that the 
public had its serious concerns over the Strategic Defence Packages properly 
looked into. I cannot accept the outside interventions, and the complicity 
therewith by the majority of the Committee members, which caused the 
Committee to fail in its responsibility to Parliament and the public. 
• That the majority party’s rejection of my attempts last week to deal with the 
structural problems which are damaging the Committee, would leave me 
chairing a Committee which can not achieve the role it is meant to play in 
influencing good financial management throughout government.” 
• That the majority party’s on-going attitude of hostility towards me will 
continue to have them withhold their co-operation with me as Chairperson. 
This in effect undermined the working of the Committee. 
 
Woods said his resignation “must be seen therefore as being both in protest of that 
which has undermined the Committee’s oversight role and compromised 
Constitutional accountability arrangements, and also the Committee’s refusal to take 
any positive action towards restoring its effectiveness.” His statement outlined various 
lines of action to be urgently pursued in order to make corrections necessary to re-
establish SCOPA as a committee that exercised effective oversight over public 
finances.26  
 
Woods ended his statement by acknowledging his former colleague ANC MP Andrew 
Feinstein “together with whom I believe we would have achieved a highly effective 
Public Accounts Committee, which would have translated into many millions of rands 
                                                 
25 Statement made at a press conference held at parliament, Cape Town, by Gavin Woods, 25 
February 2002. 
26 Statement made at a press conference held at parliament, Cape Town, by Gavin Woods, 25 
February 2002. 
 311 
being spent better in the South African interest. I am pleased that I have been able to 
sustain the difficult fight for the principles to which Andrew and I subscribe and for 
which he had to sacrifice his career. I am grateful for the support he has continued to 
give me in this regard.”27 In his book published five years later, Feinstein (2007:xii) 
would give Woods a similar accolade: “Gavin Woods is a man of courage and 
conviction. Despite our political differences we were united in the pursuit of truth. It 
was a difficult journey made easier by his incorruptibility and his stoicism. Along the 
way we became friends. I am proud to still call him a friend.” 
 
The ongoing criminal investigations into the arms deal would cast a deep shadow over 
President Mbeki’s presidency and the first decade of South Africa’s fragile 
democracy. The clumsy handling of the arms deal investigation from the composition 
of JIT to the bullying of SCOPA would serve to question the credibility of the 
government’s oft-stated “zero tolerance” stance against corruption. More damaging 
was the executive interference into the independent functioning on democratic 
institutions, systems such as the Auditor-General, SCOPA and parliament, institutions 
meant to promote the public interest. The damage done to the integrity of South 
Africa’s good governance institutions by the government’s handling of the arms deal 
would be felt for years to come. 
 
12.10 Further Reflections 
 
Our case study focused on post-Apartheid South Africa, a new democracy, where 
anti-corruption efforts have been primarily directed at creating functioning 
governance systems and institutions that promote the public interest and service the 
broader public needs, as opposed to the narrow partisan interests that characterized 
the apartheid system.  
 
Democracy involves certain limits and constraints on the behaviour of both citizens 
and the public officials that represent them. For example, the “rule of law” is one such 
idea, where the “rules of the game” take place in a consistent and lawful manner, as 
opposed to ad hoc, arbitrary, opaque and secretive practices, which do not apply to all 
                                                 
27 Statement made at a press conference held at parliament, Cape Town, by Gavin Woods, 25 
February 2002. 
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citizens. It is clear however, that while the value of democracy is necessary in order to 
uphold ideals such as openness, transparency and accountability, it is not sufficient to 
prevent corruption – as seen by the scandals that dominate even developed democratic 
societies - and therefore additional measures, over and above a commitment to 
democracy, are necessary to strengthen anti-corruption reforms.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven discussed the range of anti-corruption mechanisms that have 
been introduced in post-Apartheid South Africa. In general the South African anti-
corruption agenda has been impressive and included common elements for such 
reform efforts including structural changes, moral and ethical attitudes and cross-
sectoral involvement.  
 
As an emerging democracy South Africa has, following the anti-corruption literature 
and in line with the first proposition, focused on developing strong institutions to 
promote democratic accountability, as these were largely absent before 1994. These 
structural reforms have been underpinned by new “rules of the game”, i.e. the 
constitutional values agreed to by all political actors. This structuring is clearly 
evident in the arms deal case study, through for example, continual reference by the 
government to upholding “the rule of law” and to constitutional values. This creates a 
benchmark for the critique of subsequent divergences from and corruption of these 
norms.  
 
In part anti-corruption reforms since 1997 can be linked to the numerous high-profile 
scandals that have dominated the local media but also the impetus of the international 
community in this regard, culminating in the UN Convention Against Corruption.  
Over several years a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy has been 
developed through a conscious partnership approach involving all sectors of society.  
 
In many respects the anti-corruption reform policy process in democratic South Africa 
has been both systematic and sequenced and benefited from the global context that 
since the mid 90s strongly promoted good governance as the key to sustaining 
democratic reforms. Over nearly a decade specific programs and policies have largely 
realized the three key policy objectives identified at the First National Anti-
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Corruption Summit in April 1999, namely 1) Combating Corruption; 2) Preventing 
Corruption; and, 3) Building Integrity and Raising Awareness. These three goals have 
continually been assessed with each of the national summits (see Appendix 2). 
 
In 2006 the African Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) Country Self Assessment 
Report for South Africa noted the culmination of the government’s anti-corruption 
efforts in the 2002 adoption of a comprehensive Public Service Anti-Corruption 
Strategy, as a “blueprint for consolidating and reinforcing the anti-corruption 
legislative and regulatory framework as well as strengthening the institutions 
mandated to monitor, investigate and prosecute corruption.”  A further “corner stone” 
of South Africa’s anti-corruption effort, noted by the APRM report, was the 
development of key partnerships between the government, civil society and the 
private sector in fighting corruption. Examples of this partnership include the two 
National Anti-Corruption Summits (held in 1999 and 2005) and the launch of the tri-
partite National Anti-Corruption Forum (www.nacf.org.za) in 2001.  
 
In Chapter Six we reviewed the various anti-corruption legislative and regulatory 
measures adopted since 1994 that are “strong and in keeping with international 
practices.” These included various laws such as the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, The Protected Disclosures Act and The Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act. The latter “state of the art” Act focused on preventing and 
combating corruption came into force on 27th April 2004 – significantly on the 10th 
anniversary of South Africa’s transition to democracy. It is a particularly 
comprehensive law that spells out over twenty specific corruption offenses and was 
crafted against the backdrop of the finalization of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, taking into account other regional anti-corruption protocols such 
as those developed by the OECD, SADC and the African Union.  
 
In addition to these specific laws South Africa’s range of specialized anti-corruption 
agencies include the National Prosecuting Authority, Directorate of Special 
Operations (aka “The Scorpions”), South African Police Services, The Special 
Investigating Unit, the Independent Complaints Directorate, the Public Protector, the 
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Auditor General, the Public Service Commission and various Parliamentary 
Committees, are deemed part of the national anti-corruption reform agenda.28 
 
Indeed, South Africa’s anti-corruption arsenal, developed systematically since 1994, 
is impressive and the country appears to have in place, at least at the national level, 
many of the key institutions and laws cited in the good governance and anti-
corruption literature as being important to expose and prevent abuses of power.29 
However, not all anti-corruption laws and regulations are in place, nor do the ones 
that do exist always work in practice.  
 
12.11 The Achilles Heel of Anti-Corruption Reforms 
 
Corruption scandals do not materialize out of nowhere. They are rooted in the absence 
of key regulatory mechanisms and their effective implementation.  The Achilles heel 
of South Africa’s anti-corruption architecture, the key area where there is currently no 
regulation or legislation, remains the funding of political parties. It is this area that has 
fuelled ongoing allegations of corruption in the arms deal and led critics to question 
the government’s political will in tackling corruption. This lack of regulation is 
increasingly linked to the government’s Black Economic Empowerment strategy, 
where state intervention in the economy, namely through preferential policies for 
black-owned businesses to acquire assets and shares, have led to accusations of 
corruption where for a price, those benefitting from successful business deals are 
expected to contribute funds to the ruling party. 
 
For example, it was recently reported that factions representing the old and new guard 
of the ANC are fighting for control of lucrative empowerment deals, in return for 
donations to the party. “As a result of the Chancellor House audit, details have now 
emerged of how the ANC backed efforts by big empowerment players to secure 
lucrative deals, in return for donations to the party.” Here the example of politician 
turned businessman Saki Macozoma is cited where he has been called to account for 
millions paid to the party following a R1.5billion empowerment deal involving 
Standard Bank, Liberty Life and asset management company Stanlib. Shortly after the 
                                                 
28 Country Self Assessment Report, African Peer Review Mechanism, 9 June 2006. 
29 See The 2006 Global Integrity Report at www.globalintegrity.org 
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deal was completed last year, an amount of R9million from the proceeds was paid to 
the ANC. Macozama – a former ANC NEC member who is worth about R617million 
– confirmed that a trust with links to the ANC’s front company Chancellor House, 
had benefited from the Stanlib deal.”30 
 
When it comes to knowing who funds the political process in South Africa, the 
corrupting nexus between power and money, this remains a shocking lacuna in an 
otherwise impressive array of anti-corruption mechanisms. And it is something that 
the ruling party (as well as other parties in parliament) seemingly has no real interest 
in remedying. Allegations of corruption in the arms deal have continually harped on 
whether kickbacks from arms companies to secure lucrative contracts were possibly 
funnelled into ANC party coffers, rather than purely individuals within the process 
who might have benefited from the deal. Recent allegations in the Mail and Guardian 
newspaper point to a number of significant donations given to ANC related charities 
at around the time that the German arms company Thyssen was successful in its bid 
for arms contracts.31 
 
South Africa currently does not have regulations governing private contributions to 
political parties, nor are there limits on individual or corporate donations to candidates 
or political parties or any limits on total political party expenditure. Most importantly 
in law there are no requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties or 
candidates, nor any legal requirements for the independent auditing of political 
parties' finances and candidates, in respect to private party financing. Since there are 
no regulations, these cannot be effectively implemented.  
 
As noted in Chapter Seven, the public interest NGO, Idasa's legal attempt to gain 
access to financial records of political parties in terms of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act proved futile. The “conspiracy of silence” between political parties 
and private contributors is clearly a major fault line that undermines anti-corruption 
efforts. Only members of parliament can put in place laws to regulate the funding 
contributions to political parties. So far it seems there is no will to do so, and as 
                                                 
30 “Saki in ANC payoff scandal” Sunday Times, 9th March 2008. 
31 Sam Sole and Stefaans Brummer, “Arms broker did give cash to the ANC,” The Mail and Guardian, 
14 March 2008.  
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demonstrated in the case study, parliament’s ability to exercise its key oversight role 
is severely weakened by a at least two factors; the structural constraints imposed by 
an inherited Westminster tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, as well as the current 
electoral system that works against parliamentary assertion.   
 
While there is agreement that is nothing wrong with money playing a role in politics 
and that this is the norm in democracies world over, as Mondli Makhanya, editor of 
the Sunday Times notes, “the issue of regulating campaign finance in one that the 
ANC cannot put off indefinitely. The ANC now has to accept the reality of and find 
ways to formalise this practices so as to avoid corrupt elements capturing South 
African politics.”32  
 
Calland and February, Idasa analysts who seven years on believe the “litmus test” of 
democratic accountability for dealing with the arms deal allegations has largely failed, 
note the ANC’s apparent “addictive dependence on secret donations and its increasing 
willingness to use state tenders and contracts as a pump for its own finances,” 
demonstrated by recent revelations around Chancellor House, a company that has 
benefitted from a number of government tenders and is allegedly an ANC funding 
vehicle.33   
 
As noted earlier, there is an increasing perception that BEE is a ploy to extract money 
from the private sector to secretly fund the ANC. Indeed the larger questions of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) – How much is BEE political patronage rather than a 
rational political program to distribute assets? If BEE is an attempt to buy influence, 
how is this different from corruption? If political connections are supposed to “open 
doors” to what extent does this represent corruption is these doors remain closed to 
ordinary, unconnected business people? – are questions now being raised.34 
 
It is also important that it is not just elites, but the public as a whole, that benefits 
from democracy. State/political interventions into the economy, such as BEE, which 
                                                 
32 “ANC campaigns are awash in cash – we don’t know whose though,” Sunday Times, 25th 
November 2007.  
33 Judith February and Richard Calland,“Money and Politics: Two Views,” Sunday Times, 2 
December 2007. 
34 Reg Rumney, “Does patronage pay?” Mail and Guardian, March 20-27th 2008.  
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create a “get rich quick” ethos, may result in corruption problems, a warning sounded 
by theorists such as Rose-Ackerman, amongst others. Economic liberalization can 
result in new forms of corruption where transformation of the economy through state 
intervention such as deregulation or privatization creates new incentives and forms of 
corruption. For example it is clear that in the arms deal, choosing the right BEE 
partners was important for the main contractors to acquire sub-contracts. As Feinstein 
points out “pressure on the companies bidding for the main contracts compelling them 
to appoint favoured (BEE) sub-contractors before they would be awarded the main 
contracts was a crucial flaw in the procurement process.”35 This is what happened in 
Schabir Shaik’s case, where Jacob Zuma, as a political player, was bought into vouch 
for Shaik’s political and BEE credentials with the French arms company Thint, and 
for this service was handsomely rewarded by Shaik and an alleged bribe from the 
French, a case which hangs over Zuma’s head.  
 
While political parties need money, “where the rules of the game are unclear, it is a 
tacit license to raise money without providing an account of it. In an environment 
where there is no regulation of funding to political parties anything goes and the 
parties are able to get away with muddying the waters.” Since the Idasa court 
application in 2005 the ANC has yet to draft legislation in this regard. An ANC 
committee has apparently been constituted to think about the impact of money on the 
party, including looking at “revolving door” issues and the pervasive culture of 
acquisitiveness.”36 Finally it seems the ruling party is acknowledging that something 
has to be done. 
 
Concrete steps have yet to be taken to place a stopper or “cooling off period” in the 
revolving door between government employees entering private sector corporations, 
through the creation of post-employment restrictions. This conflict of interest problem 
was one the final JIT report pointed to in relation to the former minister of Defence, 
Joe Modise, who left public office to chair a private company that benefited from the 
arms deal. Recommendations were made in the JIT report that steps be taken to 
remedy this situation, but six years on, there has been minimal progress.  
                                                 
35 Andrew Feinstein, “Arms deal returns to haunt ANC”, Mail and Guardian, 11 February 2007. 
36 Judith February and Richard Calland, `’Money and Politics: Two Views,” Sunday Times, 2 
December 2007. 
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12.12 Poor Implementation of Existing Laws 
 
While in many cases the right laws may exist to prevent abuses of power and promote 
accountability, for example the access to information and whistleblower protection 
laws, the reality is these laws are not working in practice. Rather than a question 
purely of the absence of the political will to institute reforms or the absence of a 
democratic culture to nurture them, the weakness here may touch on deeper realities 
such as the extreme thinness of human capacity within the South African public sector 
in terms of skills and resources to apply and administer such laws.  
 
For example: In law and on paper, South Africa has a model Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (PAIA) with all the essential components, such as the right of appeal 
if a record is denied and an established institutional mechanism for citizen requests 
for government records. However, when one considers whether the right of access to 
information is effective or not, a very different story emerges. Results of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative comparative studies conducted by the Open Democracy 
Advice Center (ODAC) in 2003 and 2004 show that public bodies responded to only 
13 of the 100 requests submitted and sixty-two percent of them were simply ignored. 
Clearly improvements are necessary in the effective implementation of the access to 
information law, which may require both training as well as technology (e-
government) of the responsible civil servants.  
 
Another example: In law the Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 protects civil servants 
and private sector employees who report a criminal offence, a failure to comply with a 
legal obligation, a miscarriage of justice, endangering the health or safety of an 
individual, damaging the environment or unfair discrimination. The Act also states 
how these wrongdoings should be reported, preferably within the organization and 
only outside the organization under certain circumstances. If the wrongdoing concerns 
one of the above and it is reported correctly then the act protects the whistleblower 
from victimization or dismissal. There is however still widespread ignorance about 
the “whistle-blower protection” law. In practice, most civil servants who report 
financial wrongdoing suffer recrimination or negative consequences. Civil servants 
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say that when disclosures are made against very senior civil servants, the backlash is 
worse because of the power and influence those civil servants wield.  
 
In order to serve the public interest it is also necessary to have policies that regulate 
and sanction civil servants who don’t disclose their assets. It has also been reported 
that almost 50 000 civil servants have business interests outside of government (Van 
Vuuren 2007). The Mercury, a Durban-based newspaper recently reported on the 
Public Service Commission’s findings of a 0% compliance rate where no financial 
disclosures had been received from the 55 senior managers in the premier’s office in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal. The PSC report noted: “The office of the premier is responsible for 
the overall guidance and administration of the province. It cannot play such a 
leadership role if its own compliance rate in this respect is at 0%.” Although the 
national cabinet resolved that all departments should have anti-corruption strategies in 
place by 2004, in 2008 a formal anti-corruption forum has yet to be established in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal.37 
 
12.13 Threats to Institutional Integrity 
 
Over and above laws that prevent corruption, key institutions such as specialized anti-
corruption units, the criminal justice system as a whole, and parliament, are also 
required to operate effectively. To be taken seriously anti-corruption institutions 
should be sufficiently resourced, operationally independent and have the confidence 
of both politicians and the public to competently carry out their mandate to fight 
corruption wherever it may manifest itself. Fundamentally anti-corruption agencies 
should be perceived to be independent, operating without fear or favour, rather than 
being perceived as open to abuse by leaders for short-term political ends such as 
scuppering an independent investigation into a suspicious arms deal that might shine a 
light on suspect contributions to political party coffers, or more sinister, for bringing 
the integrity of political rivals into question and ostensibly ending their political 
careers.  
 
                                                 
37 “Alarm raised over KZN govt fraud threat,” The Mercury, Friday 4th April 2008. 
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While the Special Investigating Unit was well-positioned to participate in the arms 
deal investigation, it did not have the confidence of the Mbeki government and thus 
the resources invested in this particular anti-corruption agency were not used. This 
was ultimately to the detriment of the final investigation as it failed to quash critics of 
the arms deal who regarded the Final JIT Report as a “white-wash”, not least by its 
failure to involve the SIU in the probe, the only agency that could have rescinded the 
contracts had wrongdoing been found. 
 
The government’s insistence that the “rule of law” would be upheld at all costs their 
overall contracting position was not compromised by allegations of corruption in the 
arms deal, indicates that the Mbeki’s government would not entertain the idea of 
corruption in the arms deal, in case that meant contracts were rescinded – and with 
that, presumably lucrative funding to the ANC as a political party. A key reason for 
not including the SIU in the final investigation, other than personality conflicts 
between Judge Heath and the government, may have been that it was the SIU was the 
one body that had the legal powers to cancel such contracts.  
 
The criminal justice system’s independent reputation was tarnished first by the 
president side-lining the SIU from the investigation and secondly by the questions 
raised regarding the National Prosecuting Authority abusing its powers in relation to 
its investigation and now pending prosecution of former deputy president, Jacob 
Zuma. Charges brought by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) against former 
deputy president Jacob Zuma and those against Yengeni, are seen by their supporters 
as a political conspiracy with the NPA, in particular the Directorate of Special  
Operations, accused of abusing its powers. 
 
The power struggle within the ANC alliance, in particular between the Mbeki and 
Zuma camp, stimulated by the President’s handling of the arms deal probe, has had 
consequences for the anti-corruption agenda. This is demonstrated by calls to dissolve 
the Directorate of Special Operations, aka “the Scorpions”, a policy decision taken by 
the ANC when it convened its national congress in Polokwane in December 2007 and 
elected Jacob Zuma as the new president of the organization.  
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As the main institution for representing the public interest, the importance of an 
effectively functioning parliament cannot be stressed enough.  It has been argued that 
the strength of the national legislature may be a – or even the – institutional key to 
democratization. As such the focus for democrats should be on creating a powerful 
legislature and in polities with weak legislatures, democrats should make 
constitutional reforms to strengthen the legislature a top priority. If politicians fail to 
establish a national legislature with far-reaching powers, the people will still find 
themselves in a polity where their votes do not count (or are not counted properly) 
and their voices are not heard. On the other hand, if a powerful legislature is 
established, the people will probably gain and retain their freedom and a say in how 
they are ruled – even in countries that embark upon regime change with inherited 
structural and historical advantages (Fish 2006). 
 
The damage done by the arms deal debacle where SCOPA was effectively 
undermined and sidelined by the ANC and the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) from 
the investigation has left scars. Clearly the capacity of parliamentary committees 
more generally to play an oversight role needs to be bolstered. The problem with 
parliament as an institution is that the “rules of the game” favour accountability to 
one’s political party, rather than the public. This is the mistake Andrew Feinstein 
made when he raised questions on the arms deal, namely to think that he was doing 
his job to protect the public interest, whereas his real political mandate was to protect 
the ANC. Tony Yengeni understood his role far better than Feinstein, and to this 
extent survived the arms deal debacle, even after a spell in prison. 
 
Beyond the challenges to exercising its oversight function – demonstrated starkly by 
the arms deal - in the past few years the integrity of parliament itself has been 
damaged enormously by the “Travelgate” scandal that involved widespread abuse of 
travel vouchers by members of parliament in collusion with travel agents. 
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12.14 Where Things Stand 
 
So, as of April 2008, where do things stand? 
 
It is clear that South Africans are becoming increasingly concerned about the 
corruption issue. Public opinion surveys, such as the one conducted by Markinor in 
late 2007, cite corruption as the main concern of 23% of South Africans, slightly 
ahead of crime (21%), HIV/Aids (14%), housing (11%) and unemployment (8%).38 
Analysts such as Hennie van Vuuren from ISS relate this to the unrelenting stream of 
scandals around the funding of political parties, as well as the handling of the 
National Prosecuting Authority, where its head Vusi Pikoli, was suspended in late 
2007 by the president for reasons which are still unclear, but allegedly relate to his 
office issuing an arrest warrant for the National Commissioner of Police, Jackie 
Selebi, on racketeering and corruption charges. The subsequent suspension and 
criminal indictment of the National Commissioner and the decision by the new ANC 
leadership headed by Jacob Zuma in December 2007 to call for the dissolution of the 
Scorpions, means that leadership and law enforcement capacity in South Africa to 
deal with high-profile corruption by senior political figures, is seriously under threat.  
 
Curiously there has been continuous and disingenuous denial of there being any 
corruption in the arms deal, with President Thabo Mbeki reiterating this point at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos in 2007, and more recently the online ANC journal, 
ANC Today. However, the criminal trials and convictions of both Tony Yengeni, 
former chief whip of the ANC jailed for covering up his receipt of a large discount on 
a luxury vehicle from one of the bidders in the deal, and Schabir Shaik, financial 
advisor to former president, Jacob Zuma, sentenced to fifteen years in jail for fraud 
and corruption related to the arms deal, “blatantly belie this fact where it has now 
been proven in courts of law that there was indeed corruption in the arms deal.”39  
 
The publication of former ANC MP, now “dissident” Andrew Feinstein’s book, After 
the Party, in September 2007 documents persuasive evidence of the full extent and 
purposeful manner in which the ruling party decided to undermine any independent 
                                                 
38 “Crime, corruption top public concerns,” Sunday Independent, 18th November 2007. 
39 Andrew Feinstein, “Arms deal returns to haunt ANC”, Mail and Guardian, 11 February 2007. 
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investigation of the arms deal. ANC Today of 16th November 2007 would question 
Feinstein’s claims and facts arguing the following: that SCOPA conducted its own 
investigation without any hindrance by the ANC government; that BAe Hawk trainers 
satisfied technical requirements and were a logical choice; that the fraud/corruption of 
Schabir Shaik had nothing to do with primary contracts in the deal and that there was 
no evidence of BAe, German or French firms paying bribes to the ANC to help fund 
the election campaign; and finally if there was any corruption it would have come to 
light by now.  
 
The Joint Investigating Team’s (JIT) investigation that included three agencies, the 
National Prosecuting Authority, Auditor General and Public Prosecutor concluded in 
November 2001 that the government was exonerated from corruption with regard to 
the primary contracts. Now however, with international investigations by the Serious 
Fraud Office in the UK raising questions about payments made by BAe to certain 
players, and investigations by German authorities into payments of $25milion by 
Thyssen to similar actors such as Chippy Shaik, head of acquisitions in the SANDF at 
the time of the deal, alleged to have solicited and received $3million, the arms deal 
will not go away. Finality is required in terms of the arms deal investigation. South 
African anti-corruption agencies must assert themselves and cast the net wider to 
achieve closure on a saga that has bruised almost all our democratic institutions, and 
deeply divided not only the ANC but also the country.  
 
The political culture of loyalty to the ANC as an organization (necessitated in a 
struggle context), as opposed to that of a broader concept of accountability, may 
explain some of the government’s (mis)handling of the arms deal and aversion to 
Feinstein’s outspokenness. Feinstein’s book consolidates criticisms of the ANC as a 
party having lost its way with the politics of morality and accountability being 
trumped by both money and political expedience. In the book Feinstein repeats the 
claim, increasingly accepted, that the motive for much of the arms deal expenditure 
was a way for the ANC as a political party to raise substantial funding for 1999 
election. An ANC official at the time commented that the ANC leadership saw the 
arms deal as the perfect opportunity to line its own next which is why, at a time of 
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growing financial crisis for the organization, “even some of its leaders with the 
highest degree of probity, were willing to turn a blind eye.”40  
 
While some unscrupulous individuals such as the Shaik brothers, former defence 
minister Joe Modise and his advisor Fana Hlongwane may have benefitted illegally 
from unscrupulous arms companies, it was more likely the ANC as a political party 
and affiliated charities such as the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund may have been 
the major beneficiary of bribes paid. President Mbeki may not personally have been 
bribed but may have played a role in soliciting funds for the ANC in return for which 
he distorted the procurement process to favour certain companies. 
 
Political leadership on fighting corruption in South Africa is seriously stalled with 
both President Mbeki and the newly elected president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, both 
tainted by the arms deal scandal. What is the way forward?  
 
Zuma has now been formally charged by the National Prosecuting Authority on 
corruption charges relating to the arms deal and his case is due to be heard in August 
2008. However, he has also appealed to the Constitutional Court to set aside a ruling 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal that upheld the search and seizure warrants 
undertaken by the Scorpions in August 2005 to obtain crucial documents relating to 
these corruption charges, arguing that his right to a fair trial were negatively affected. 
This matter is pending. 
 
Feinstein is very clear about what should be done about the arms deal: the 
government should appoint an independent judicial inquiry able to conduct a 
completely unfettered inquiry with no political or other pressures brought to bear on 
it. “It should be able to work freely and openly with all the other international 
investigations into the arms deal and it should set out, once and for all, exactly what 
happened in that deal. It should identify whether they are alive or not – everyone who 
was involved in corruption in the deal – and exactly who was involved in covering it 
up. This should be done so that we can learn lessons from this, so that those who 
benefitted inappropriately can suffer the legal consequences of that and so that we can 
                                                 
40 Judith February and Richard Calland, “Money and Politics: Two Views,” Sunday Times, 2 
December 2007. 
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move on. A thorough examination of the deal would be a very good place to start, for 
some sort of moral regeneration.”41 
 
For now, calls for a full judicial commission of inquiry into the arms deal (and 
possible amnesty for full disclosure) continue to echo across the political and NGO 
spectrum, including from the outspoken Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Should this 
happen, President Mbeki’s role in the deal would come under increasing scrutiny – 
after all he chaired the cabinet sub-committee that approved the deal. He is also 
alleged to have met several times with arms companies at crucial times in the 
procurement process, something he conveniently cannot recall.  
 
Information emerging into the public arena from the German and British 
investigations into the deal, allegedly probing more than $200million and up to a 
billion pounds in bribes or “commissions” relating to the South African arms deal, is 
coming to light, with government no longer controlling the flow of information on the 
arms procurement. Although under pressure of closure themselves, the Scorpions 
have recently re-opened their inquiry into the BAe and SAAB contract, stalled by 
Ngcuka, an Mbeki ally, years ago. Here the procurement criteria were shamelessly 
altered to favour BAe, with cost taken out of the equation. 
 
It is unlikely however, that Mbeki would appoint such a commission after resisting it 
for so many years. There may however be some accountability yet on the arms deal, 
this time coming from an unlikely source; within the ANC itself. This is the case in 
arms deals elsewhere (for example India) where political in-fighting among the ruling 
party led to crucial information being made public, years after the cover-up. Feinstein 
believes it is possible that the current glut of information emerging about the arms 
deal is simply the consequence of score-settling within the divided ruling party.  
 
Within the new ANC leadership structure, pressure is being put on Mbeki to come 
clean on his role in the arms deal and a committee has been appointed to gather facts 
as part of an internal ANC fact-gathering process on the arms deal and allegations of 
corruption that, after almost ten years, have not gone away. While calls have been 
                                                 
41 Sue Segar, “Thabo Mbeki, the ANC and the intoxication of power” Weekend Witness, 17th 
November 2007.  
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made for these findings to be made public it remains to be seen whether the ANC will 
comply. With no public judicial commission of inquiry, similar to the Scott 
Commission of Inquiry into UK arms dealing in sight, the South African public will 
for now continue to be in the dark about the R50 Billion arms deal, whose rising cost 
has indirectly impacted the cost of power and electricity regeneration, literally 
ensuring that South Africans across the country are in the dark due to ever frequent 
load-shedding and power cuts. 
 
12.15 A Crisis of Integrity 
 
Unfortunately, fourteen years into our democracy and almost a decade since the 
allegations of corruption in the Strategic Defense Procurement Package first 
materialized, the depressing legacy of the arms deal can be summed up as resulting in 
a “crisis of integrity”. Citizens have lost faith in both the institutions of state that 
govern them, the individuals who lead them, and the political process as a whole – to 
do what it says it is going to do. The political system has lost its integrity – it has been 
corrupted. 
 
From the Public Protector, to the Auditor General, to the National Prosecuting 
Authority, to Parliament – each of these institutions and the individuals leading them, 
have in some way failed the test of integrity. The voices of a few brave individuals 
such as ANC MP Andrew Feinstein and former SCOPA Chair Gavin Woods were 
partially silenced by their respective resignations from parliament, but in Feinstein’s 
case have found powerful outlet in a political memoir. Opposition political parties 
continue to put pressure on the ruling party to establish a judicial commission of 
inquiry into the arms deal, but will they be heard? 
 
Externally, the ongoing international criminal investigations into commissions and 
bribes paid by British and German arms companies in the South African arms deal 
will hopefully ensure the investigation is not over yet, albeit that in November 2001 
the JIT report was so eager to assure South Africans all was well. External peer 
pressure and international monitoring, be it through NEPAD and the Africa Peer 
Review Mechanism or governance scorecards conducted by international NGOs such 
 327 
as Global Integrity or Transparency International, play an incentive for countries to 
keep democratic anti-corruption reform efforts on track. South Africa’s hosting of the 
2010 Soccer World Cup will guarantee ongoing international interest in these 
reforms.  
 
The tragedy for President Mbeki’s legacy is that although responsible for instigating 
many of the policies, laws and strategies on corruption reform, including the 
establishment of the Scorpions, and for hosting the major global, international, and 
African anti-corruption conferences in South Africa during his two terms in office, 
corruption in South Africa appears more prevalent than before. There is a tangible 
disconnect between what exists in law, and what happens in practice, what 
government says, and what it does – a veritable  “crisis of integrity” that will be hard 
for any future government to overcome.  
 
Ironically, it may be that the arms deal scandal, from 1999 onwards, not only 
stimulated a bitter succession debate within the ANC tri-partite alliance, but also 
played a critical role in profiling anti-corruption reforms. It certainly put Mbeki’s 
presidency on the spot and fully engaged and tested the key institutions of democratic 
accountability, from the press to parliament, prosecuting authorities to the Auditor 
General. In a positive way it kept the issue of corruption firmly on the policy agenda 
and may have stimulated specific reforms in areas such as the tightening of 
procurement and conflict of interest regulations and the range of corruption offences 
stipulated in the new Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act.  
 
12.16 Conclusion 
 
To conclude: In thinking about initial hopes and aspirations for evaluating the success 
of South Africa’s transition to democracy with respect to not only preventing abuses 
of power such as corruption, but more broadly, the following statements, both general 
and specific, provide a thought experiment in the form of a set of ideals against which 
to evaluate this country and other new democracies42: 
                                                 
42 This section draws from an unpublished paper on “Anti-corruption reform efforts in democratic 
South Africa” given at the “After Apartheid” Conference, Yale, New Haven, April 2007. 
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1. South Africa post 1994, would be a qualitatively different moral society 
compared to the venal values that characterized the apartheid regime and that 
the constitutional values of openness, transparency and accountability would 
infuse all government institutions and interactions between citizens and their 
state.  
2. Ethical leadership characterizing the struggle against apartheid would continue 
to inspire those committed to the hard work of governing and that South 
Africa would provide a leadership role, particularly in Africa, to fight 
corruption and promote good governance. 
3. South Africa, because of its special circumstances (for example, its level of 
development) would not become a typical African economy, largely 
dependent on the state, characterized by patronage and dominated by ethnic 
interests. 
4. Systems set up by the apartheid state to further its illegitimate racist ends 
would be truly ruptured and under a new system of democratic governance all 
South Africans would tangibly experience the gains of the struggle for 
freedom and democracy, leading to true equality.  
5. Race would not play a corrupting influence in both the state and the economy, 
and while legitimate interventions to address inequality and “the legacy of 
apartheid” would be undertaken, these would not occur at the expense of 
professionalism and efficiency.  
6. The new state would establish an impartial professional civil service 
committed to creating “a better life for all” and that delivery of basic services 
such as security, housing, water, electricity, education, infrastructure would 
not be undermined by maladministration, inefficiency and corruption. 
7. There would be a multi-party democracy and a strong opposition that would 
be vigilant in demanding accountability from the ruling party. A strong 
distinction between the ruling party and the state would ensure that state 
resources would not be abused for political ends.  
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8. Parliament would exercise effective oversight over the executive, particularly 
in relation to public funds, to ensure that the public interest was served by 
responsible and rational public expenditures.  
9. The media would be independent, fair and vigilant and journalists would be 
safe and responsible in exposing corruption wherever it emerged. 
10. Organizations in civil society would play an active role as a partner in holding 
the state accountable and facilitating access to information for citizens in order 
to exercise and uphold their rights.  
11. Citizens would be equally protected before the law and those who spoke out 
against unfair or corrupt practices within the public or private sector would be 
protected and rewarded.  
12. Where maladministration and corrupt practices were reported or exposed, 
appropriate measures would be taken by dedicated and specialized anti-
corruption resources to investigate, prosecute and convict both corruptor and 
corruptee and that the criminal justice system, in particular the judiciary and 
the national prosecuting authority, would be independent, respected and 
impervious to manipulation for political ends.  
The ideals, hopes and aspirations expressed in the above statements provide a 
checklist for the kind of society South Africans deserve to live in. Our constitution 
provides the foundational values for this vision. It is hoped that this thesis, through its 
detailed workings of a particular case study of high-profile corruption, has gone some 
way towards understanding the challenges to some of these ideals on which the future 
success of South Africa’s democracy hangs. 
 
The final chapter relooks at the theoretical chapters of the thesis and discusses how 
relevant these theories are in the light of the South African case study. The thesis 
concludes with “lessons” learnt for an effective fight against corruption.  
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CONCLUSION  
Chapter Thirteen: Conclusion 
13.1 Background 
This thesis discussed both the existence and the effectiveness of anti-corruption and 
accountability systems operating in democratic South Africa. It focused primarily on 
assessing the South African government’s policy reforms to deal with public sector 
corruption and the handling of corruption allegations in the arms deal, following the 
largely peaceful transition to democracy in April 1994.  
Since corruption contributes to the de-legitimisation of the political, economic and 
institutional systems in which it takes root, it is rightly a central focus of concern in 
contemporary democracies. The study of anti-corruption reforms in South Africa and 
the assessment of their effectiveness as well as limitations, contribute towards our 
understanding of good governance initiatives in general. This, at least, is my 
argument. 
Several distinct propositions provided an analytical framework for the inquiry into the 
South African arms deal case study in particular, and the institutions that support 
democracy as well as anti-corruption reforms in general. To recall these were: 
First, and most basic, formal institutions in a democracy, structure power 
arrangements so as to express certain standards, norms and the “rules of the 
game.”  
Second, to prevent abuses of power and promote democratic accountability, 
formal institutions such as a multi-party parliament and functioning criminal 
justice system, including specialized anti-corruption agencies, must be 
complemented by a vibrant civil society and independent media to both check 
and balance power.  
Third, to ensure that they fulfil their mandate to protect the public interest, 
these institutional and administrative mechanisms require adequate capacity, 
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independence and resources, not only through their formal existence “in 
law”, but also their effective functioning “in practice”.  
Fourth, politics is important. Formal institutions and mechanisms do not 
emerge in a political vacuum but rather exist and function within a distinctive 
political culture more or less broadly commensurate with the set of norms 
associated with the institutions of democratic accountability.  
Fifth, political interference and intervention in the legitimate functioning of 
democratic institutions may occur and serve to undermine their effectiveness 
and integrity.  
Sixth, because of the multiple institutions, interests and centres of power that 
exist in a democracy (as opposed to a closed political system) corruption and 
abuses of power will be mitigated and eventually come to light. 
Three key questions were posed upfront: 
1. Does democratic South Africa have the systems in place to address corruption 
effectively?  
2. Do these anti-corruption systems (laws, institutions, policies, strategies) work 
in practice? 
3. Does the necessary political will exist in South Africa to address corruption 
effectively? 
What follows is a brief summary of each of the four parts and twelve chapters 
preceding this concluding chapter. I then relook at the theoretical chapters (2-4) and 
discuss how relevant these theories are in the light of the South African case study. 
The thesis concludes with some “lessons” learned for an effective fight against 
corruption.  
13.2 Summary of Thesis Chapters 
13.2.1 Part One 
In Part One, Theories of Corruption and Control, (Chapters 2-4), the general theory 
of corruption and its control were set out by examining the relevant international 
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literature on conceptions, causes and consequences of corruption, including theories 
that underpin and inform current policies and strategies to address corruption. 
Arguably, the “new” South Africa benefitted from these ideas as its transition from an 
abusive, authoritarian regime to an accountable, democratic society, coincided with 
unprecedented international scholarship and focus on the ideas of promoting good 
governance to prevent corruption.  
Chapter Two, “Definitions and Conceptions of Corruption,” examined various types 
and definitions of corruption, adopting a working definition useful for the remainder 
of the thesis, namely corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. 
LeVine’s theoretical model of political corruption was examined closely with regard 
to its relevance for the South African context. His analysis of the various elements in 
the core and extended processes of political corruption and his argument that an 
alternative informal polity with different rules to those of a democracy may be the end 
result of a particular political culture resonated with the proposition that formal 
institutions and mechanisms do not emerge in a political vacuum but rather exist and 
function within a distinctive political culture.  
The effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies are determined by the social, cultural, 
economic and political environments that create conditions conducive to both the 
incidence and severity of corruption. Chapter Three, “Conditions and Consequences 
of Corruption,” discussed specific conditions that encourage and give rise to 
corruption, particularly in Africa. The negative consequences of corruption 
internationally were noted to underpin the urgency of devising ways to prevent it, 
from international conventions to civic action. The compelling case citing empirical 
evidence of these negative consequences supports the idea that comprehensive anti-
corruption interventions are required at a variety of levels by a number of institutional 
actors.  
Chapter Four, “Theories of Corruption Control and Evaluation,” assessed various 
theoretical approaches to controlling and preventing corruption, such as those 
developed by Klitgaard (on monopoly, discretion and accountability); Rose-
Ackerman (on reducing incentives and creating risks); Mbaku (on institutions, 
incentives and the rules of the game) and Johnston (on democratic consolidation and 
social empowerment). This chapter will revisit these theories and consider their 
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relevance for the South African case. The Global Integrity Index methodology was 
also described as a new tool to assess the existence, effectiveness and sustainability of 
anti-corruption efforts. The chapter stressed that there is no blueprint for controlling 
corruption and that to have legitimacy, anti-corruption reforms are required to be 
home-grown with both culture and history important when designing effective 
strategies. In this regard actual case studies, such as this thesis, are crucial to discern 
the interplay between formal institutions and political culture and the incentives that 
may operate to influence the effective functioning of institutions and reforms.  
Most of the theorists focused on institutional mechanisms to prevent corruption. 
Institutional safeguards alone are not sufficient to turn the tide on endemic corruption. 
Rather efforts to promote good governance need to be planned and implemented in a 
wide, systemic and multi-dimensional perspective. Since corruption is a symptom of 
problems at the intersection of the public and the private sectors, it needs to be 
combated through a multi-sectoral strategy, including preventive, administrative, 
investigative and legislative measures. Ultimately public resentment towards 
corruption is the key to the success of reform initiatives and thus what is ultimately 
needed is a change in the attitudes and behaviour of the public as unethical conduct in 
government is largely shaped and conditioned by such behaviour in society. Here 
Johnston’s emphasis on social empowerment is crucial. 
13.2.2 Part Two 
Part Two, Corruption and Reform in South Africa, (Chapters 5-7), examined the 
context of corruption in South Africa both before and after transition to democracy in 
1994. In particular, dedicated reform efforts taken by the government since 1997 to 
address corruption, including institutions, laws, policies and strategies, were looked 
at. The purpose of this section was to emphasize the political will needed to seriously 
combat corruption as a social problem by putting in place the necessary systems and 
institutions to address it. Allegations of corruption in the arms deal would severely 
test the integrity of these institutions and reform efforts.  
Chapter Five, “The Nature and Extent of Corruption in South Africa”, asked several 
questions: How much corruption is there? Is it worse now than it was under 
apartheid? Relative to other problems, how important is corruption as a problem to 
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citizens? What empirical data do we have to answer these questions? Did the new 
South Africa inherit a public administration that was endemically corrupt? Was 
corruption a parallel system or was it localized and isolated and confined to certain 
spheres? Was it primarily routine venality or something more grandiose?  
By looking at the available data, Chapter Five found that corruption in South Africa is 
neither a new nor a declining phenomenon. Public opinion surveys and media analysis 
reveal that corruption in democratic South Africa is mostly petty and opportunistic, 
occurring at local level and in specific sectors. The arms deal case study however, 
reveals political corruption of a grand type, not picked up by survey data. This type of 
corruption has a far more damaging impact on the integrity of public life and the 
institutions that support democracy. The chapter touched on new risk areas for 
stimulating corrupt activity such as state intervention in the economy through for 
instance Black Economic Empowerment and affirmative action policies linked to the 
drive for representivity. The data shows that public tolerance for corruption is 
decreasing as local and international expectations for clean government grow and it 
remains an important concern of citizens around the world. 
Chapter Six, “Anti-Corruption Reforms in Democratic South Africa,” looked at the 
politics of anti-corruption reforms, identifying factors that need to be taken into 
account if reforms are to be regarded as both credible and feasible. It traced the 
constitutional and institutional framework that set the stage for anti-corruption 
debates and initiatives that took place after 1994 to promote public sector 
accountability. The various conferences and summits convened by the government 
from 1998 - 2005 to devise a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy for South Africa 
are documented. The chapter included a section on the debate around the 
rationalization of specialised anti-corruption agencies.  
Chapter Seven, “Designing a National Anti-corruption Strategy and Law” takes a 
more detailed look at South Africa’s national anti-corruption strategy. Based on 
consultation and partnership with numerous stakeholders, the resultant strategy is a 
participatory one and praised by anti-corruption activists around the world. The 
comprehensive Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act that came into 
force on 27th April 2004, the 10th anniversary of South Africa’s transition to 
democracy is examined. It is clear that the drafting of this law was influenced by the 
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backdrop of the criminal investigations and cases that emanated from the Joint 
Investigation Team and its final report into the arms deal as well as the international 
legal context of anti-corruption conventions that occurred around this time. The new 
law’s failure to include specific provisions relating to the regulation of the private 
contributions and sources that fund political parties, a lacuna in the anti-corruption 
architecture that seriously questions the political will to address the corrupting 
influence of money in politics, is covered. 
13.2.3 Part Three  
Having addressed both the theory of corruption and its control (Part One) and the 
policy landscape with regards to anti-corruption measures in South Africa (Part Two), 
Part Three, The Arms Deal, (Chapters 8-9), examined a specific case study, namely 
allegations of corruption around the multi-billion rand arms deal. Since allegations of 
corruption first surfaced in 1999 involving senior cabinet figures and the presidency, 
no other issue has so dominated the political landscape nor so acutely tested the 
effectiveness and integrity of legislative, policy and institutional mechanisms in place 
in democratic South Africa to prevent abuses of power. The arms deal case 
demonstrates the limits of the institutions, laws and practices currently in place to 
prevent abuses of power in South Africa and points to the importance of taking other 
factors into account such as political will, political rivalries, political culture and 
context as factors that play a role in influencing the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
agencies and credibility of anti-corruption reforms.  
Chapter Eight, “Anatomy of an Arms Deal” described the actual composition of the 
final Strategic Defence Procurement Package. Numerous problems characterised the 
deal from the start such as in-built irregularities in the procurement process, the rising 
costs of the deal that government was warned about and yet chose not to disclose to 
the public, and arguments around “off-sets” that would allegedly create several 
thousand jobs. In particular, the role of parliament and its committees in exercising 
oversight over the executive branch of government was examined focusing on the 
ANC’s extraordinary attempts to prevent a truly independent parliamentary 
investigation into the deal through intimidating members on parliament’s Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), particularly those calling for the inclusion 
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of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) as part of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 
probe.   
Chapter Nine, “The Case for Excluding the SIU” looked at the sophisticated 
justification on the part of the government, drawing strongly on a constitutional 
judgment, to exclude the Special Investigating Unit - regarded by the public as the 
most effective anti-corruption agency in the country – as part of Joint Investigation 
Team into the arms deal. The SIU’s exclusion would continue to raise questions as to 
the independence, integrity and credibility of the JIT’s investigation into the arms 
deal, and calls for an independent judicial commission of inquiry persist today. This 
chapter also examined the intervention of the Speaker in December 2000 questioning 
the interpretation of SCOPA’s 14th report to include the SIU as part of the JIT, the 
Cabinet press conference to defend the integrity of the deal, and finally the personal 
intervention of President Mbeki in January 2001 who announced that the SIU would 
not be given a proclamation to proceed with the investigation.  
These reactions on the part of the government to prevent an independent investigation 
into the arms deal would raise suspicions as to the oft-stated commitment to fight 
corruption. The justifications to exclude the SIU, couched in the language of 
respecting constitutionality and upholding the rule of law, would prove even more 
sinister, and point to a possible cover-up by the ruling party. The case study starkly 
demonstrates how the politicization of the fight against corruption was damaging for 
the long-term integrity of South Africa’s various democratic institutions, in particular 
parliament.  
13.2.4 Part Four 
Part Four, Arms and Accountability, (Chapters 10 – 12), further examined the 
challenges faced particularly by parliament and individual MPs to fulfil their 
oversight functions and hold the executive accountable. The cases of two ANC MPs, 
Andrew Feinstein and Tony Yengeni, and their respective roles in the arms deal case 
leading to both of their resignations from parliament, albeit for very different reasons, 
were closely examined in Chapters Ten and Eleven respectively. Both the Feinstein 
and Yengeni case illustrate the central point in the thesis, namely the need for a 
political culture that is willing to use, and not abuse, the independent institutions of 
 
337 
accountability and oversight to fight corruption wherever it might appear, and where 
the commitment to do the right thing in the public interest trumps loyalty and 
solidarity to one’s former comrades or narrow partisan or political interests. Chapter 
Twelve documented the outcome of the Joint Investigation Team's report, reactions to 
it and the principled resignation of Dr Gavin Woods as chair of SCOPA, for 
parliament having failed in its duty to exercise oversight of the executive.  
Chapter Ten, “Parliamentary Oversight under Pressure,” documented the increasing 
pressure placed on members of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA) from the executive. This included the highly critical letter signed by the 
Leader of Government Business, Jacob Zuma, to the chair of SCOPA, questioning 
SCOPA’s authority and oversight role, the Speaker’s questionable role in defending 
parliament vis a vis the executive and the increased “side-lining” of the Committee 
from the investigation. For asking awkward questions, ANC MP Andrew Feinstein 
would be removed from SCOPA and subsequently resign from parliament in 
September 2001 citing his party’s handling of the arms deal as the reason for his 
departure. His highly critical memoir, After the Party published six years later, would 
document damning evidence of the ANC’s conscientious attempt to preclude an 
independent parliamentary investigation into the arms deal.  
Chapter Eleven, “The case of Tony Yengeni,” examined the case of another ANC MP 
involved in the arms deal, namely the Chief Whip and former chair of the 
Parliamentary Defence Committee, Tony Yengeni.  Following the exposure in the 
independent media for having accepted a 47% discount on a luxury Mercedes 4x4 
from a company tendering for part of the arms deal, Yengeni would reluctantly resign 
from parliament in October 2001. A lengthy criminal process that found him guilty of 
defrauding parliament for not declaring the discount would result in a briefly served 
jail sentence in 2006. Yengeni would never accept responsibility for his actions, 
rather accusing the National Prosecuting Authority of abusing its powers and acting 
as part of a political conspiracy to target certain individuals. The handling of the 
Yengeni case is illustrative in that once again a parliamentary committee, this time the 
Ethics Committee, was prevented from exercising its constitutionally mandated 
oversight role and conducting an independent parliamentary investigation. Instead the 
ongoing JIT investigation into allegations of corruption into the arms deal - an 
 
338 
investigation controlled by the executive - would take precedence so that what should 
have been a relatively simple parliamentary investigation conducted by the non-
partisan ethics committee was essentially hijacked by the executive. A consequence 
of this intervention was a drawn out criminal investigation and multi-year jail 
sentence for Yengeni, for what was essentially a breach of the parliamentary code. 
Chapter Twelve, “The JIT Report as a Test of Political Will”, discussed the final 
stages in parliament’s interaction around the arms deal investigation resulting in the 
release of the JIT report in November 2001. Compiled by the three investigative 
agencies comprising JIT, namely the Auditor-General, Public Protector and National 
Prosecuting Authority, it would exonerate the executive and government from any 
wrongdoing with regards to corruption in the arms deal. The findings and 
recommendations contained in the report, as well as public reaction to it, are 
discussed in some detail. The Chapter discusses the principled resignation of SCOPA 
Chair, Dr Gavin Woods in February 2002 on the grounds that SCOPA had failed in its 
duty to hold the executive accountable. It concludes with some further reflections on 
the arms deal and corruption in South Africa, including a section on where things 
currently stand with the investigation and a thought experiment consisting of twelve 
statements or ideals against which a truly independent and accountable South African 
state could be assessed. 
13.3 Applying anti-corruption theory to the South African case study 
So what does this thesis - looking at South Africa’s anti-corruption reforms over the 
past ten years, and a detailed case study of a high-profile case of political corruption - 
tell us about the relevance, or not, of contemporary conceptions of corruption, so far 
as concerns its causes and consequences, as well as various theories of corruption 
control as articulated in earlier chapters (2, 3 and 4)? Looking at the broad theoretical 
implications of the study what do we learn from South Africa about how we can 
prevent corruption?   Is there a need to revise any existing theory?  Which theory (Le 
Vine, Klitgaard, Rose Ackerman, Mbaku and Johnston) is especially relevant to the 
thesis findings? Are there any aspects of these current theories of corruption control 
that appear questionable and in need of revision? 
 
339 
The first point to be made is the following: in surveying the literature on both 
understanding and controlling political corruption in the African context, the main 
theorists that were selected (Le Vine, Klitgaard, Rose Ackerman, Mbaku and 
Johnston) resonated on some level with the South African experience. As such my 
reading of these theories is likely to have focused on ideas that had some application 
to my understanding of the South African situation as I interpreted it at the time. In 
the light of the case study and subsequent research, aspects of these theories certainly 
remain relevant, in some cases more than others. 
In what follows, I try and distil from the body of research covered in this thesis some 
key “lessons” for an effective corruption control strategy in a new democracy. I see 
how these lessons are supported, or not, by the theory which has been covered. First I 
revisit the theories discussed upfront on conceptions, causes and particularly the 
control of corruption. 
13.3.1 Conceptions of corruption 
Defining what counts as corruption is an important first step towards developing both 
theoretical and policy responses to effectively identify, understand and control it. 
Different forms of corruption require a varied response. In South Africa policy 
makers have adopted a broad definition of corruption - “the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain” - and created a wide array of tools to address it. The anti-corruption 
debate in South Africa has however focused primarily on addressing petty 
bureaucratic corruption, and yet as Hennie van Vuuren from the Institute for Security 
Studies argues convincingly, “low level, petty corruption is kept largely in check in 
South Africa (with the exception of a few sectors)” and that “there is much to suggest 
that political corruption is in fact one of the greatest challenges we face and is 
therefore central to the debate on what can be done to improve the functioning of the 
national integrity system”.1  
Chapter Two of the thesis discussed political corruption as a form of grand 
corruption. The arms deal case study, involving bribery, a large-scale deal, high 
                                                 
1 Van Vuuren, H. 2008. “Power, profit and political corruption in South Africa” New Agenda, 5 
August 2008. 
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placed officials, greed as a motivator, undue influence as well as “violations of 
procedure” and “distortions in due process,” clearly counts as a case of what the 
literature (Doig and Theobold) define as grand political corruption.  
LeVine’s theory on the dynamics of political corruption can be seen to be of 
relevance to this South African case study. According to LeVine’s “extended process” 
of political corruption, a “culture of political corruption” exists if politically corrupt 
transactions become pervasive, commonplace and the norm. This sounds very much 
like systemic corruption. According to Johnston, corruption is systemic, when it is 
open and “routinely used”, when systems depend on corruption for their survival, 
when there are few practical alternatives, when their workings constitute a parallel set 
of procedures and where wrongdoing is the norm and is regularised and 
institutionalised. In my judgment this is not at present the case in South Africa. 
An “informal polity” is constituted when informal political networks (such as those of 
former struggle comrades) become so well established within the political system that 
their activities and influence begin to parallel that of government structures. As 
LeVine (1975:8) puts it “In the absence of a culture of political corruption, an 
informal polity cannot develop. However, a culture of political corruption can exist 
without an informal polity.”  Thus an “informal polity” depends on a culture of 
political corruption in order to thrive.  
It remains true that struggle connections in South Africa are valued and that 
relationships formed pre-liberation hold great sway, even to the extent of defending 
one’s comrades (even when they may have engaged in criminal activities, as 
evidenced in, for example, Carl Niehaus’ recent fall from grace and the ANC’s 
defence of him). What this means according to theories of political corruption such as 
LeVine’s, is that if the “informal polity” exists, as it appears to in the South African 
context, then it is even more important to ensure that “a culture of political 
corruption” does not take root, for this could lead to corruption becoming systemic 
and thus the norm.  
Despite being under threat, as we have seen in the case study, the values of the 
constitution and the rule of law are in South African political society, still upheld as 
the norm, against which corrupt activity is pitted as a transgression. Criminal 
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investigations into alleged corruption by high-profile politicians, including Jacob 
Zuma are still ongoing and for now, the law is such that any public official, including 
a sitting president, must be accountable for their actions and face the full force of the 
law. Although subject to various legal challenges, including threats to the 
independence of the National Prosecuting Authority and the closure of the highly 
effective Scorpions, the fact that these investigations continue, shows some political 
will, if not resilience on the part of independent institutions such as the NPA, to 
continue to fight corruption. Pressure from opposition political parties and the 
independent media, as well as civil society, has also been instrumental in ensuring the 
arms deal investigation is not swept under the carpet.  
13.3.2 Conditions and causes of corruption 
With that broad background, we can now consider the question, how applicable are 
the various theories of the conditions and causes of corruption to the South African 
case study? In the literature the causes of corruption are complex and varied. Whether 
ideological, institutional, cultural or economic, some of these factors are more 
relevant to the South African situation than others. Five causes of corruption that 
appear in the theory and are relevant to the South African case are looked at here, 
namely colonialism or the “legacy of apartheid”; poverty and inequality caused by 
low and uneven growth; absence of political competition; poor governance and the 
absence of institutions to deal with corruption; and a weak civil society. 
Understanding the causes of corruption links closely to suggested control measures, 
discussed later. 
According to one theory the prevalence of corruption is caused by colonialism. In 
South Africa this translates into the rather nebulous concept of “the legacy of 
apartheid”. This factor was discussed in some length in Chapter Five and provides 
some reasons for mistrust in state institutions and a general lack of respect for the rule 
of law. It is clear that corruption is neither a problem that emerged nor disappeared 
overnight with South Africa’s transition to democracy. By its very nature and 
operation the apartheid state and its multiple systems of retaining power were corrupt. 
Apartheid as an abusive regime benefiting a minority at the expense of a majority was 
inherently corrupt. The “legacy of apartheid” thus refers to a range of inherited 
problems, including corruption. It does however, tend to wear rather thin when the 
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main abusers of power disregard the new regime’s systems of checks and balances 
that have come into being post 1994. It will take years for the new governance system 
to both right the wrongs of the past, as well prevent future malpractices. While abuses 
of power are more likely to come to light in democracies because of institutions such 
as a free media and values such as openness, accountability and transparency, 
developed democracies are not entirely sheltered from corruption. Here however, 
corruption manifests itself in more entrenched, subtle and sophisticated ways to 
protect various “special” interests.  
The legacy of apartheid argument includes a much-cited factor for the prevalence of 
widespread corruption, namely poverty and inequality. This theory may explain the 
prevalence of petty corruption such as social grant and housing fraud, where poverty, 
patronage and poor control systems, allow for citizens and civil servants who are not 
eligible, to abuse the system, cases of grand political corruption such as alleged in the 
arms deal case study cannot be sufficiently explained by this theory.  
In South Africa, as opposed to many African countries, the state is not the main force 
in the economy. In countries with few economic opportunities, political office is seen 
as the most direct route to personal wealth (often through corrupt means). In South 
Africa it does appear that being in politics and then going into the private sector gives 
one an advantage as political contacts bear fruit in the form of state contracts. The fact 
that there is no “cooling off” period for political office bearers plays a definite role in 
this “revolving door” phenomenon. 
In his political memoir, leader of the parliamentary opposition, Tony Leon notes 
(2008:628) “These existential conditions on the ground were made worse by a form of 
parasitic capitalism, which soon enough collapsed the distinction between the 
bureaucracy and business. A revolving door had begun to operate with displaced 
ministers and top officials straying into the fields of business over which previously, 
often just months before, they had held regulatory sway…senior officials, including 
ministers, were directly ‘advising’ companies as to whom their ‘empowerment 
partners’ should be. Such BEE credentials were necessary for compliance with the 
state-sanctioned licenses – from mining rights to cell-phone networks – depended.” 
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To overcome the “legacy of apartheid”, new institutions and laws are required. To 
address poverty and inequality empowerment policies to democratize the economy 
through state interventions such as BEE, are clearly important in overcoming this 
legacy. However, these have also opened up new opportunities for corruption and 
given rise to accusations of there being a small elite who are benefiting from such 
interventions.   
Absence of competition is another cause cited of corruption. This seems to hold true 
for South Africa. In the past where the national party government dominated the 
formal political landscape in South Africa, and more recently with the hegemony of 
the ruling ANC, there is an absence of political competition, which inevitably leads to 
a decline in accountability, and potentially a spread of corruption. The ANC’s 
dominance as a political party has meant it has a monopoly on control of power, and 
is therefore susceptible to abusing institutions and failing to remain accountable to the 
public interest.  
Closely linked to this particular cause of corruption is the theory that the nature of the 
political system has a role to play. In South Africa the centralized party list system 
currently utilized to appoint MPs  - rather than a system of constituency 
representation - operates in a way that places enormous power in the hands of 
political party bosses ensuring that elected representatives are largely accountable to 
them and not the electorate. Van Vuuren (2008:11) argues “this undermines 
parliament’s independence and means that MPs may very well be reluctant to tackle 
political corruption where it leads back to the small group of individuals at whose 
mercy they serve.” 
Corruption is the result of poor governance and the absence of laws, regulations and 
institutions to deal with abuses of power. This understanding of the cause of 
corruption is particularly persuasive in the South African context. The absence of 
certain regulations, for example laws governing disclosure of private contributions to 
political parties, or the weak implementation of conflict of interest provisions due to 
human resource capacity, amongst other causes, and poor financial administration and 
management skills, is another factor. Poor governance results in poor decision-
making over the allocation of public goods and systems don’t function to promote the 
public interest. 
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Finally a weak civil society is mentioned as a cause of corruption. When this sector is 
weak it is not able to hold the powers that be to account. This was seen in the arms 
deal case study where civil society’s opposition to the scope and scale of deal – in the 
light of other more pressing socio-economic issues - in the first instance was 
unsuccessful, and its subsequent engagement in trying to ensure a thorough 
independent parliamentary investigation, failed. Civil society’s participation in the 
National Anti-Corruption Forum is however, seen as part of the success of anti-
corruption efforts, where there is a conscious commitment on the part of government 
to engage actively with civil society as part of the solution. This will be discussed 
more under anti-corruption theory. 
One other cause of corruption relevant in the South African context can be mentioned 
namely the culture of entitlement, which is linked to a rampant materialism that 
analysts such as Mamphele Ramphele warn of. She notes, “The temptations of 
materialism are everywhere. Success is defined not by what one accomplishes, but by 
what one owns. Many young people know no other motivation for developing their 
talents than to be able to make money. The use of state resources to feed this 
materialism is worrying. The National Party government used “state capture” to 
enrich their constituency at the expense of the rest of the population.  Post-Apartheid 
South Africa cannot afford to allow “state capture” by the new elites. It would 
undermine everything we yearn for in a free, democratic society.”2  
The sense that it is “payback time” following the harsh deprivation of the struggle for 
liberation that many political leaders have endured, must factor itself into the self-
deceptive calculations of those for whom public office is not about serving the public 
interest, but rather themselves. The infamous remark by ANC spokesperson Smuts 
Ngonyama “I did not struggle to be poor”, is telling. Theories of the causes and 
conditions of corruption thus need to add reference to the culture of materialism and 
entitlement as an important factor that may stimulate corrupt behaviour.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Mamphele Ramphele. 2008. Laying Ghosts to Rest – Dilemmas of the transformation in South 
Africa. Tafelberg. Cape Town.  
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13.3.3 Consequences of corruption 
Mainstream theories of corruption cite its largely negative economic and political 
consequences and the South African case study supports this. Some of these 
consequences relevant to the thesis topic include the fact that corruption undermines 
public trust (Klitgaard), reduces political participation because of growing cynicism 
(Johnston) and undermines development by distorting priorities (Rose-Ackerman). As 
Klitgaard notes, the winners are few and well connected.  
The economic consequences are such that where corruption is high, economic 
performance is poor. This is because corruption reduces investment, distorts the size 
and nature of government expenditure and weakens the financial and tax system. It is 
the poor who suffer most as corruption undermines the social safety net and may deter 
the poor from seeking basic entitlements and other services.  
In the South African case it is difficult to link poor investment in the country directly 
to perceived corruption, when there are multiple other contributing factors. Gumede 
(2005:100) mentions some of these: “Foreign investment – one of the bedrocks of 
economic policy since 1996 – has remained a trickle, much of it in the form of short-
term flows. Investment as a percentage of GDP has averaged around 16 to 17 percent, 
low by the standards of successful developing countries. Relatively little of the paltry 
investment received has gone into major new projects or plants. Government often 
blames the country’s skills base, volatility of the exchange and interest rates, the cost 
of inputs, such as transport and telecommunications, lack of competition in the 
domestic market, and poor perceptions of Africa as a whole and the southern region in 
particular for sluggish investment….If neither government nor local investors show 
confidence in the economy, how can foreign investors be expected to pour money into 
the country.” 
It is true however, that government expenditure has been distorted by the arms deal 
and the choice to spend billions of Rands on arms purchases as opposed to other more 
pressing social needs. As Gumede (2005:111) notes again, “ …it is impossible to 
calculate the final cost to taxpayers. The deal has been widely and justifiably 
criticised. South Africa should hardly be spending billions on sophisticated military 
hardware instead of on poverty alleviation and social upliftment.”  
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According to general corruption theory, the political consequences of corruption are 
such that it undermines trust, creating instability and potential disengagement of 
citizens from the formal political process. Johnston notes the importance of trust for 
an open, responsive and effective political process, where citizens abide by the rule of 
law. The issue of trust in government and the mistrust caused by corruption is real in 
the South African case.3 Indeed new political parties, such as Congress of the People 
(COPE) have fighting corruption as a key theme in their 2009 election manifesto, 
calling for an independent inquiry into the arms deal. Trust is also linked to quality of 
leadership, and when the leaders of the ruling party are under a cloud of suspicion and 
facing charges of corruption, money laundering and racketeering, this can only cause 
disillusionment, if not disengagement from the political process. 
13.4 Theories of corruption control 
Let us re-look at the theories of controlling corruption that we discussed earlier and 
see, in the light of what we have learned in the case study, what relevance, if any, they 
hold for South Africa. 
There are various theoretical approaches to the control of corruption. Many of them 
promote good governance reforms that rest on democratization and economic and 
political reform. For instance, the pluralist approach focuses on the nature of the state 
as being limited, legitimate, honest and transparent. The systems approach to fighting 
corruption as articulated by Robert Klitgaard focuses on the management systems of 
organizations. An approach focused on economic liberalization and redefining the 
relationship between the market and the state through deregulation and privatization, 
is articulated by Susan Rose-Ackerman. We can take each of them in turn. 
13.4.1. Klitgaard  
Twenty years ago, anti-corruption theorist Robert Klitgaard concluded his book, 
Controlling Corruption, with the following statement arguing that attempts to control 
                                                 
3 The Afrobarometer (Working Paper No. 102, October 2008, Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa) empirically assessed the relationship between trust and corruption in 18 African countries including South Africa and 
found that corruption never produces trust-enhancing effects regardless of the evaluation of public service quality and that 
perceived and experienced corruption impact negatively, but differently, on citizens’ trust in political institutions.  
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corruption, whilst difficult, were not useless: “Something is wrong in societies where 
corruption takes over. And just so, something is wrong when great wealth coexists 
with squalor, when human rights are quashed, or when racism denies our common 
humanity. We should not lose this sense of moral violation. But as we reflect on 
questions of why, we should also do our best on questions of how. We should not 
yield to the temptation to escape from the hardest and most ethically loaded problems 
on the grounds that there is nothing we can do about them…(w)ith regard to 
corruption, policymakers and citizens are not helpless. There are things we can do 
about even this most difficult of problems. At least this practical and normative 
assumption should drive more of our work on the problems of the poorer nations” 
(Klitgaard 1988:210). 
In terms of things to be done to control corruption, Klitgaard’s theory to explain 
corruption (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability) is based on neo-
liberal economics. Control of corruption would therefore imply limiting monopoly, 
through competition, limiting discretion, through a more rules-based approach, and 
increasing accountability and transparency, through a more active civil society and 
media.  
In South Africa the focus on anti-corruption reforms has been on improving 
accountability and transparency measures by creating democratic systems and 
institutions that embody these values.  In this regard Klitgaard’s approach has been 
very influential in the South African policy context where anti-corruption reforms 
have focused on creating and re-engineering systems to promote good governance.  
A more rules-based approach implies that the rules, or laws, are at the least 
understood and accepted, whether or not adhered to. Klitgaard’s theory clearly 
depends on their being rules in place, there being consensus on the rules, and in 
having the human and institutional capacity in place to monitor such indiscretions, 
should they occur. This cannot be assumed in the South African context. For instance, 
conflict of interest regulations are a case in point where formal rules might exist, but 
they are not adhered to in the spirit of the law, as was the case with Chippy Shaik and 
the arms deal. It is also questionable how effective the code of ethics for members of 
parliament is when there is no real enforcement by parliament’s Register of Members 
Interests and where the system largely relies on the integrity of individual members.  
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The weakness of Klitgaard’s approach is therefore that it relies on rules that firstly 
need to be in place, and that second there needs to be consensus on. Discretion 
requires some level of education and experience to apply the rules judiciously, and 
this also cannot be assumed. Thirdly in terms of limiting monopolies and promoting 
more accountability, this relies on there being a culture of accountability which 
functions in practice, and this cannot be assumed in the South African context where 
the ruling party has a powerful hegemony on various organizations of state, such as 
parliament.  
In a functioning democracy civil society and the media should play an important role 
in promoting transparency and holding the government to account. These have been 
weakened in South Africa for a number of reasons, including accusations of racism, 
which have encouraged self-censorship on the part of the media, as well as the limited 
capacity of media houses to pursue investigative journalism strategies. The Mail and 
Guardian newspaper is an exception in this regard. Johnston’s theory of controlling 
corruption through social empowerment strategies, including strengthening civil 
society, is referred to later in this chapter. 
13.4.2. Rose-Ackerman 
According to Rose-Ackerman, the basic structure of the public and private sectors is 
what produces or suppresses corruption. As such, effective anti-corruption reforms 
require changes in both the constitutional structures and underlying relationship 
between the market and the state. She argues that fighting corruption can not be done 
just through focusing on improving integrity systems, but rather in the actual way that 
government does business i.e. the underlying incentives to either pay or receive 
bribes, and the risks of getting caught, have to be changed.  
In South Africa political liberalization has focused on dismantling the apartheid state 
and institution building. State interference in the economy, such as BEE, has been 
necessary to address inequalities, but this as we have seen, has its own challenges.  
Rose-Ackerman warns that economic liberalization can result in new forms of 
corruption where transformation of the economy through state intervention such as 
deregulation or privatization creates new incentives and forms of corruption. 
State/political interventions into the economy, such as BEE, may result in corruption 
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problems.  According to Gumede (2005:223) the way that the government promoted 
BEE created a negative perception to start with. “Damningly, BEE has since come to 
be associated with a small and elite group out to make as much money as they can at 
the expense of broad black society. The actions of the new breed of black 
entrepreneurs reinforce the notion that, instead of benefiting the previously 
disadvantage black community, BEE has become a means of self-enrichment for the 
few where BEE deals typically involve the same handful of people, over and over. 
‘The same people with political connections are always getting the contracts. It is not 
evenly spread,’ complained one struggling black entrepreneur.” 
Rose-Ackerman points out that the way to fight corruption and create a state that is 
efficient, fair and legitimate is to reduce incentives and to increase the risks. 
Something is wrong if state institutions are used for personal enrichment or to provide 
special benefits to groups. She is correct in saying that it is not just an integrity 
systems approach that is required to fight corruption, but that the way in which 
government conducts its business, plays a role. Thinking about the structure of 
incentives in South Africa, it is increasingly clear that BEE is creating perverse 
incentives where political contacts are important for a company receiving contracts. 
Rather than merit and track record, skin colour and political affiliations are more 
significant. This undeniably has some impact on corruption levels in the country.  
In South Africa the law on corruption has been tightened and the criminal justice 
system is being re-engineered to make it more effective in terms of actually increasing 
the risks for would be criminals in terms of actually getting caught. If, as appears to 
be the case in South Africa, political connections are a factor in securing government 
contracts, then it makes sense for those wanting to get state contracts to ingratiate 
themselves with the individuals and political party that is in power and makes these 
decisions. This can be done through gift giving, lavish entertainment of public 
officials, or even private donations to political parties. There are some worrying 
suggestions that gift-giving to public officials making such decisions is not being 
effectively monitored and usually happens before the contracts, particularly at local 
and provincial government level, are awarded. And it is still the case that 
contributions to political parties from the private sector are unregulated and need not 
be disclosed, so the “conspiracy of silence” between the business sector and 
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government and the perverse incentive where one has to “pay to play” is not being 
challenged.  
13.4.3 Mbaku 
Mbaku’s contribution to the theory on corruption control is his observation, similar to 
that of Rose-Ackerman, that corruption is often related to government regulation and 
the state’s role in the economy. Since corruption occurs when there is state 
intervention in the economy coupled with opportunistic civil servants, limiting corrupt 
practices requires limiting state intervention in private exchange. His solution is to 
call for comprehensive institutional reform in both government and economy. In 
addition, institutions need to embody particular values, which are greater than 
individual self-interest, and set the rules of the game as well as structure incentives for 
behaviour. He argues that corruption control requires modifications of the incentive 
structure through changes in the existing rules. Institutional reform is required, and 
effective reform efforts need to have studied the rules that regulate socio-political 
interaction. From Mbaku’s perspective the first step in preventing corruption is thus to 
determine the rules of the game, i.e. the legitimate scope of behaviour for members of 
the government.  
Mbaku’s approach throws light on one aspect of corruption control in South Africa. In 
this country constitutional values have played an important role in setting the scope of 
behaviour and “rules of the game” for the public service. However, where there is no 
“cooling off period” for government employees who wish to enter the private sector, 
and no disclosure requirement for private contributions to political parties, these gaps 
in the anti-corruption framework create incentives for abuses to occur. Unless the 
rules of the game change, and these loopholes are filled, then corruption will occur in 
these areas and there is nothing “illegal” about them, as there are no laws or rules 
regulating this behaviour. And in South Africa the moment for putting in place such 
regulations may have passed. Calls for more transparency with regard to political 
party funding have been completely ignored by the ruling party, which does not 
believe it to be in its interests to make such information public.  
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13.4.4 Johnston 
For Johnston, hope for the control of corruption lies in democratic consolidation and 
social empowerment. Having identified various syndromes and degrees of corruption, 
he notes that corruption in a society often reflects the deeper challenges caused by 
imbalances between economic and political forces. According to him it is clear that 
weak political institutions and poorly institutionalized markets enable a variety of 
illicit connections to flourish. Thus anti-corruption efforts cannot just detect, 
discourage and punish corrupt offenders, but actually need to address the deeper 
imbalances if they are going to succeed.  
Social empowerment is the long-term social foundation that is required over and 
above institutional reform in the state and economy. This is especially in cases where 
corruption is systemic and trust in institutions is low. Where social empowerment is 
effective, institutional reforms can converge with social values and thus grow in 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Johnston highlights the important role of civil society of 
balancing the state in corruption reform efforts.  He notes that the cultivation of civil 
society is not a substitute for institution building and that the two must work together; 
“Without a strong civil society to energize them, even a full set of formally-
democratic institutions will not produce accountability…. Where civil society is 
weak…vital social support for limits on corruption is lost” (Johnston 1998:94).  
Johnston’s theory of social empowerment as a focus for anti-corruption reforms is 
particularly persuasive in the South African context. South Africa has a strong history 
of social and civic organizations to draw on and there needs to be a new social 
movement focused on fighting corruption, just as the struggle movement was 
characterized as a broad coalition of interest groups fighting against the abuses of the 
apartheid state. The state has created the space for civil society to flourish and this 
space needs to be taken advantage of in a more strategic way by new leadership from 
civil society, so that reform can occur from the bottom upwards. There are some signs 
that this is happening as in recent months new organizations such as the seemingly 
broad based Social Justice Coalition have taken to the streets outside parliament to 
demand that government is held accountable to and call for a Commission of Inquiry 
into the arms deal, a call that won’t go away.  
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In a democracy, independent civil society organizations, such as Idasa and the 
Institute for Security Studies, and independent media sources, such as the Sunday 
Times and the Mail and Guardian, can continue to put pressure on the government to 
be accountable, by shaming if necessary. Thomas Jefferson reminds us “the price of 
freedom is eternal vigilance”. This is even more so in a country that is transitioning 
from both a struggle and laager mentality into an open, accountable and transparent 
society. In this new space there are multiple interests and centres of power, including 
institutions to check and balance this power. These include an active and free press 
that cannot be suppressed, constantly reminding those in power that they are 
ultimately accountable to the citizens that entrust them with that power.   
Johnston’s theory of corruption syndromes reminds us to take into account the 
specifics of each country when fighting corruption and how corruption is often 
symptomatic of the deeper challenges to democratic consolidation, and the balance 
between economic and political forces. Reforms are only truly sustainable and 
legitimate if they rest on a social foundation, and citizens need to be empowered to be 
change agents and participate actively in promoting good governance and public 
accountability.  
The National Anti-Corruption Forum in South Africa is a start, although more 
communication and education needs to occur to encourage greater civic awareness 
and participation in fighting corruption. Ultimately this is about creating trust and 
responsibility with citizens speaking out whether through civil society, the media, or 
political organizations, to make sure the rules of the democratic game are being 
upheld. It is clear that the National Anti-Corruption Forum’s agenda is broader than 
purely to improve the criminal justice capacity to control corruption. Resolutions 
taken at National Anti-Corruption Summits over the past several years also focus on 
preventing corruption, empowering civil society, stimulating a moral regeneration 
movement etc.  
In summary, theories of corruption control argue for fundamental institutional 
changes in the state and market in order to change incentives and the rules of the 
game. These changes need to be systemic in a way that limits monopoly over power, 
limits discretion, and increases transparency and accountability. The importance of 
civil society in this regard is what Johnston brings to the table, arguing for a 
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sustainable citizen-based approach to fighting corruption where the local 
manifestation of the problem of corruption is tackled as a symptom of deeper 
economic and political imbalances. Democratic consolidation, where democracy is 
deepened through citizen participation and commitment, is what is required in 
Johnston’s model and resonates deeply with the South African experience.  
The above theories are important and useful insofar as they inform anti-corruption 
strategies on the ground. To conclude, the final section focuses on three crucial 
elements that need to be in place in order to effectively fight corruption. These 
include credible information to inform and monitor policy reforms; sustainable 
institutions to promote accountability and the public interest; and ethical leadership 
and political will. 
13.5 Lessons Learnt4 
Our case study focused on post-Apartheid South Africa, a new democracy, where 
anti-corruption efforts have been primarily directed at creating functioning 
governance systems and institutions that promote the public interest and service the 
broader public needs, as opposed to the narrow partisan interests that characterized 
the apartheid system.  
Democracy involves certain limits and constraints on the behaviour of both citizens 
and the public officials that represent them. For example, the “rule of law” is one such 
idea, where the “rules of the game” take place in a consistent and lawful manner, as 
opposed to ad hoc, arbitrary, opaque and secretive practices, which do not apply to all 
citizens. It is clear however, that while the value of democracy is necessary in order to 
uphold ideals such as openness, transparency and accountability, it is not sufficient to 
prevent corruption – as seen by the scandals that dominate even developed democratic 
societies - and therefore additional measures, over and above a commitment to 
democracy, are necessary to strengthen anti-corruption reforms.  
                                                 
4 This final section draws on a recent paper published by the South African Institute of International 
Affairs: Camerer, M. 2008. “What makes for effective anti-corruption systems?” Reinventing 
Governance, An occasional papers series produced by the Governance and APRM Programme.   
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The core question underlying this thesis was: How can corruption be effectively 
countered? Drawing on the theory of corruption control and the case study of South 
Africa, I conclude that a number of conditions are required to ensure that anti-
corruption reforms in any context are effective, sustainable and not easily subverted. 
These conditions include having the necessary data to inform and monitor policy and 
strategy; comprehensive legal and institutional safeguards to prevent corruption and 
protect the public interest; and, the most difficult to secure, the necessary political 
leadership and will to tackle corruption credibly and put in place long-term reforms.  
 
Lessons learnt over the past decade indicate that controlling corruption requires a 
comprehensive, dedicated, sequenced and sustained approach premised on a long-
term political commitment to building appropriate and effective institutions to serve 
the public interest. There is no easy fix, silver bullet or blueprint. When safeguards 
such as an independent media, engaged citizenry and functioning oversight 
institutions like parliament do not exist, corruption in its many forms will continue to 
flourish and undermine democratic gains. To be effective, sustainable reforms require 
credible information, functioning institutions and an active and engaged civil society. 
To be taken seriously they need to be embarked on by ethical leaders who 
scrupulously observe the rule of law in tackling the problem, wherever it may 
manifest itself. 
 
There is no universal blueprint for fighting corruption: each country’s unique 
experience will affect the policy options that can be employed to address it. As we 
have seen, corruption manifests itself in different ways and intensities; it requires 
differentiated responses. To retain credibility for anti-corruption efforts, institutions 
and systems must be strengthened and reformed to entrench transparency, 
accountability and above all fairness. Fighting corruption also requires dedicated 
financial and human resources. It is clear that to be effective, national anti-
corruption/integrity systems require more than a single agency approach. Rather, they 
need to be supported by an institutional matrix of legal and oversight systems to 
ensure effective prosecution of offenders. While reform-minded governments should 
take the lead, a partnership approach involving stakeholders from business, civil 
society and labour will deepen and legitimise the effort.  
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Democratic institutions that protect the public interest include an ombudsman or 
public protector, auditor-general, parliament, the judiciary, revenue service, and 
public service, and should be supported by comprehensive anti-corruption laws. 
These institutions mediate the relationship between citizens and the state. In a 
democracy they ensure oversight and accountability, and check state powers to 
prevent abuse. An independent media, vigilant civil society and trustworthy criminal 
justice system are particularly vital. While government is necessarily the key player 
when it comes to reforming public sector institutions, civil society organisations play 
a vital role along with independent media in keeping a watch on power. 
 
Fortunately in South Africa there are strong entrenched safeguards that protect our 
democracy. As Gumede (2005:237) notes, “Power is not wholly concentrated in the 
state, since an established business sector wields enormous influence, not necessarily 
in favour of the ANC. The press is free…civil society and pressure groups are 
energetic, gutsy and bold. The trade union movement is formidable…and the 
judiciary is fiercely independent.” He quotes Archbishop Desmond Tutu who says 
South Africa’s political system is robust enough to make descent into authoritarianism 
rather difficult: “If it were to be the case that the governing party oversteps the mark, 
we have the Constitutional Court, we have the Human Rights Commission, we have 
the Public Protector, and I think that more than anything else, we also have a lively 
civic society.5”  
 
It is clear that establishing effective anti-corruption institutions and instituting 
credible policy reforms based on accurate data needs high-level political support. 
However, even if determination is strong, it often diminishes as the realities of office, 
the vested interests in the status quo and the pressure of more immediate tasks bear 
down. Corruption scandals – such as the South African arms deal that has been 
marred by allegations of bribery for almost a decade – can stimulate or retard anti-
corruption reforms, depending on the way they are handled and the lessons 
government learns. The credibility of the JIT investigation was compromised in a 
number of ways – for instance by excluding the SIU – that have left lingering 
                                                 
5SAPA 13th April 2004 
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questions over its integrity.  
 
More than public statements and conferences, political will relates to the commitment 
of political leaders to institute specific action and to ensure that the necessary 
elements for success have been catered for. Anti-corruption measures will simply not 
succeed without political support for resources, powers, independence and 
accountability mechanisms. Reformers will lose public trust if they fail to deliver on 
promises to net the ‘big fish.’ It is highly fashionable for politicians, both in power 
and opposition, to proclaim their commitment to fighting corruption when running for 
office. This rhetoric predictably and quickly gets exposed for what it is when the hard 
work of governing kicks in. While calls for reform have translated into a change of 
political leadership, fighting corruption is hard work and requires dedicated resources, 
capacities and commitments. It needs to be tackled comprehensively by leaders with 
political courage and long-term vision. Hard policy choices will need to be taken by 
leaders as they choose where and how to introduce reforms. Certain areas (for 
example criminal justice) may be higher on the reform agenda than others (for 
example anticorruption education). 
 
Ethical leadership is required and it is crucial that those leading the anti-corruption 
crusade cannot be tainted, and must set an example. Ethical leaders have a crucial role 
in translating electoral promises into tangible laws and policies. The success of any 
anti-corruption campaign will therefore depend on the example set by senior societal 
leaders. In South Africa the ANC as the ruling party has a particular example to set. 
Gumede (2005:304) notes: “Having made the transition from an authoritarian 
apartheid state to a democracy, South Africa now needs to consolidate its political 
system. For this to happen, the institutions of state and the political parties have to 
reflect, practice and embody democratic values, such as accountability, transparency 
and active engagement with the people. The internal dynamics of the ANC will have a 
major impact on defining the future and roles of all the other political institutions. 
Undemocratic tendencies in the ANC endanger the consolidation of South Africa’s 
democracy and will leave footprints on the country’s infant political system as a 
whole.” 
 
The independent media play a crucial role in uncovering and reporting on cases of 
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corruption, as well as following up on how agencies of state deal with the issues. And 
research-based NGOs such as the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC), Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) and Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) also 
play an important role in advocating for legal and policy changes – for instance, in 
corruption legislation, access to information, and budgetary monitoring of public 
bodies where money is exchanged for services. An engaged citizenry, organised into 
NGOs that demand more accountable and responsive government, is part of an 
effective fight against corruption. Of course it is crucial that these NGOs uphold at 
least the same levels of accountability and probity that they demand from the 
institutions they monitor. 
 
Finally, the successful prosecution of high-profile corruption offenders works 
wonders to build public trust and confidence, and its absence feeds cynicism and 
resignation. Bringing down the corrupt serves to counter both the sense of impunity 
on the part of the offender, and public disillusionment over any suggestion of a lack 
of political will. However, it is not without its dangers; due process and fairness need 
to be followed at all time so that institutions of criminal justice are themselves not 
corrupted while cracking down on abuses of power. It is not uncommon for 
allegations of a political conspiracy to underlie corruption crackdowns (for instance 
the investigations into ANC President Jacob Zuma by the National Prosecuting 
Authority), especially in contested political environments or where the incumbent has 
come to power on an anti-corruption platform.  
13.6 Conclusion  
To respond to the three original questions posed upfront in this thesis: 
1) Yes, South Africa has most of the systems in place to fight corruption 
effectively, besides the obvious lacuna, “Achilles heel”, relating to the lack of 
regulation when it comes to political party funding. 
2) But, when it comes to addressing corruption in practice, these anti-corruption 
systems are not always effective, have limited capacity and rely on political 
will and resources.   
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3) Finally, it is unclear whether the necessary political will exists in South Africa 
to address corruption effectively. While cases of petty corruption are mostly 
followed up on when they come to light either through the media, internal 
investigations or audits, the government’s sensitivity, defensiveness and 
mishandling of high- profile allegations of “grand” corruption in cases such as 
the arms deal that involve enormous and often overlapping political and 
business interests, prevents one from answering this question decisively. 
The necessary political will to address corruption in South Africa today is under 
threat, if not highly questionable and has been severely damaged by the way in which 
the government handled allegations of corruption into the arms deal.  
In a democracy citizens have rights and well as responsibilities, one of these being to 
use democratic means to hold to account those entrusted with the power to make 
decisions that affect their lives. As such, political will is not just the preserve of 
politicians. Citizens themselves need to demand more of their social and political 
space. Through active engagement in civil society and by exercising their often hard 
won right to vote at the ballot box, citizens can impact the rules of the game, and thus 
affect the outcome. In South Africa they can choose to elect ethically competent 
leaders who can credibly commit themselves to the ongoing fight against corruption. 
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Appendix 1: Chronology of Anti-Corruption Reforms 
April 1994 – ANC wins a landslide victory in South Africa’s first democratic election 
May 1996 – Parliamentary Code of Conduct with regard to Financial Interests 
March 1997 – National Crime Prevention Strategy released 
March 1997 – Special Investigating Unit Units and Special Tribunals Act enacted 
June 1997 – Code of Conduct for the Public Service 
December 1997 – Thabo Mbeki becomes President of the African National Congress 
September 1998 – Cabinet approves a National Campaign Against Corruption 
October 1998 – A Moral Summit is held in Johannesburg 
November 1998 – Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference in parliament 
April 1999 – First National Anti-Corruption Summit in parliament 
June 1999 – Thabo Mbeki becomes President of South Africa 
September 1999 – The Strategic Defence Procurement Package (SDPP) is announced 
September 1999 – PAC MP Patricia de Lille blows the whistle on corruption  
October 1999 – 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) in Durban 
March 2000 – The Promotion of Access to Information Act comes into effect  
July 2000 – The Executive Members Ethics Code comes into effect 
September 2000 – Auditor General’s Special Review of the SDPP finds irregularities 
October 2000 – SCOPA releases its 14th Report calling for an investigation  
January 2001 – President Mbeki announces the exclusion of the SIU from JIT 
February 2001 – The Protected Disclosure Acts no 26 of 2001 comes into effect 
June 2001 – Launch of the National Anti-Corruption Forum in Cape Town 
July 2001 – President Mbeki announces anti-corruption measures  
August 2001 - SADC Protocol Against Corruption signed by South Africa 
November 2001 – Final JIT Report released exonerating government 
January 2002 – Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted by Cabinet 
April 2003 – UN/DPSA Country Corruption Assessment Report released 
March 2004 – SA signs AU Convention on Preventing and Combating of Corruption 
April 2004 – The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12  
November 2004 – South African ratifies the UN Convention against Corruption 
March 2005 – Second National Anti-Corruption Summit in Tshwane 
March 2007 – South Africa hosts the Africa Forum on Fighting Corruption 
April 2007 – South Africa hosts the Global Forum V on Fighting Corruption 
December 2007 – Jacob Zuma elected president of the ANC 
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Appendix 2: Benchmarking Anti-Corruption Reforms 
 
April 1999 January 20021 April 20032 March 20053 
Combating 
Corruption 
      
A review and 
revision of 
legislation.  
Justice has started the 
review of the 
Corruption Act 
New Prevention of 
Corruption Bill has 
been developed.  
Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 
Establishment of a 
whistle-blowing 
mechanisms 
Protected Disclosures 
Act commenced on 16 
February 2001, but 
guidelines for practical 
implementation do not 
exist 
Protected Disclosures 
Act promulgated on 16 
February 2001, but 
guidelines for practical 
implementation do not 
exist. 
Protected Disclosure Act 
commenced on 16 February 
2001 
Speedy enactment 
of the Open 
Democracy Bill  
Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000 
assented to on 3.3.2000. 
Privacy element of 
Open Democracy Bill 
currently with SA Law 
Commission 
Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000 
assented to on 3 
February 2000. Privacy 
element of Open 
Democracy Bill 
currently with SA Law 
Commission. 
Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000. Privacy 
element of Open Democracy Bill 
currently with SA Law 
Commission. 
Establishment of 
special courts to 
adjudicate on 
corruption cases  
Responsibility of the 
Department of Justice 
and Constitutional 
Development. Courts 
not functioning as yet. 
A specialised 
commercial crimes 
court and prosecuting 
unit was established as 
a pilot in Pretoria in 
2000, and a second 
pilot site was 
established in 
Johannesburg in 2002. 
A specialised commercial crimes 
court and prosecuting unit was 
established as a pilot in Pretoria 
in 2000, and has been rolled out. 
Establishment of 
Sectoral 
Coordinating 
Structures 
(broadly classified 
as Public Sector, 
Civil Society and 
Business)  
Establishment in early 
conceptual phase. 
 Anti-Corruption 
Coordinating 
Committee established 
for the Public Sector in 
2002. 
Anti-Corruption Coordinating 
Committee established for the 
Public Sector in 2002. 
                                                 
1 National Anti-Corruption Strategy: Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy. Department of Public Service and Administration. 
January 2002. 
2 Progress Report on Implementation of Summit Resolutions. Country Corruption Assessment Report. April 2003. 
3 Progress report on implementation of the resolutions of the first national anti-corruption summit, 23 March 2005 
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Preventing 
Corruption 
 January 2002  April 2003  March 2005 
Blacklisting of 
individuals, 
business and 
organisations who 
are proven to be 
involved in 
corruption 
Mechanisms currently 
in conceptual phase. 
National Treasury 
considering central 
database of corrupt and 
under-performing 
service providers. Some 
departments have 
established own 
blacklists. 
A central database of 
corrupt businesses has 
been established and 
departments cannot 
utilise businesses that 
appear on the blacklist. 
The blacklist is 
accessible on the 
National Treasury’s 
Web site. 
Arranged in the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act, 2004. Government has in 
principle approved that corrupt 
employees are blacklisted from 
employment in the public 
service: and this system will be 
implemented once the legal 
issues have been resolved. 
    Government has in 
principle approved that 
corrupt employees are 
blacklisted from 
employment in the 
public service: this 
system will be 
implemented once the 
legal issues have been 
resolved. 
  
Establishment of 
Anti-Corruption 
Hotline  
Established in all nine 
Provinces 
Established in all nine 
Provinces. 
National Public service Anti-
Corruption Hotline System 
established in 2004 (0800 701 
701) 
Establishment of 
Sectoral and other 
Hotlines 
Established Established for specific 
industries in the 
Business Sector. 
  
Disciplinary 
action against 
corrupt persons  
Disciplinary codes 
revised. Efficacy of 
application still to be 
measured. PSC 
completed report on the 
investigation into 
dismissals as a result of 
misconduct (1999) 
Disciplinary codes for 
public service to be 
revised. Efficacy of 
application still to be 
measured. 
Disciplinary codes revised and 
being applied. 
Consistent 
monitoring and 
reporting on 
corruption  
To a limited extent 
done by Transparency 
International and 
political parties, NGO 
and media. No Public 
Service mechanism 
established yet. 
To a limited extent 
done by political 
parties, NGO and 
media. No Public 
Service mechanisms 
established yet. 
Country Corruption Assessment 
report published in 2003. Budget 
Vote of Department of Public 
Service and Administration 
contains Sub-programme: Anti-
corruption Monitoring and 
evaluation April 2006. 
Promotion of and 
implementation of 
sound ethical, 
financial and 
related 
management 
practices.  
New Public Service 
Regulations and Public 
Finance Management 
Act 1999 contain 
elements. Honesty and 
Integrity is a defined 
competency for SMS. 
Ethics and Fair Dealing 
is one of five pillars in 
newly established 
Procurement 
Guidelines. 
New Public Service 
Regulations and Public 
Finance Management 
Act of 1999 contain 
elements. Honesty and 
integrity is a defined 
competency identified 
for the Senior 
Management Service 
(SMS) of the public 
service. Ethics and Fair 
Dealing is one of 5 
pillars (procurement) 
New Public Service Regulations 
and Public Finance Management 
Act of 1999 contain elements. 
Honesty and integrity is a 
defined competency identified 
for the Senior Management 
Service (SMS) of the public 
service. New Supply Chain 
Management Framework issues 
with strong anti-corruption 
measures. Training programmes 
to support implementation have 
been launched. 
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Building Integrity 
and raising 
Awareness 
 January 2002 April 2003 March 2005 
Promotion and 
pursuance of 
social research 
and analysis and 
policy advocacy to 
analyse causes, 
effects and growth 
of corruption  
No substantial 
studies/research done. 
UNODCCP sponsored 
project to do country 
assessment will take 
effect soon. 
First step is the 
completion of the 
Corruption Country 
Assessment. 
Country Corruption Assessment 
Report is first step. Impact 
assessment of national policies 
budgeted for in 2007/07 
financial year (contained in 
Estimate of National 
Expenditure). 
Enforcement of 
Code of Conduct 
and Disciplinary 
Codes in each 
sector  
Public Service Code of 
Conduct, new 
Disciplinary Code and 
practical guideline on 
the Code of Conduct 
are in place. 
Public Service Code of 
Conduct, new 
Disciplinary Code and 
practical guideline on 
the Code of Conduct 
are in place. 
Public Service Code of Conduct, 
new Disciplinary Code and 
practical guidelines on the Code 
of Conduct are in place. Codes 
on Corporate Governance are in 
place for SOEs 
Inspiring the 
youth, workers 
and employers 
towards 
intolerance for 
corruption  
No particular strategy 
in place as yet. 
No particular strategy 
in place as yet. 
No particular strategy in place as 
yet for youth. Within 
employment relationship, 
departments have commenced 
with anti-corruption awareness 
programmes 
Promotion of 
training and 
education in ethics  
No T & E programme 
in place. Provincial 
workshops on Code of 
Conduct and anti-
corruption were 
conducted by PSC in all 
provinces. Risk 
management workshops 
were also conducted. 
Workshops on the Code 
of Conduct were 
conducted by the PSC 
in all provinces. Ethics 
incorporated in public 
service training offered 
by the South African 
Management 
Development Institute 
Workshops on the Code of 
Conduct were conducted by the 
PSC in all provinces. Ethics 
incorporated in public service 
training offered by the South 
African Management 
Development Institute 
Sustained media 
campaigns to 
highlight aspects 
of the strategies  
No visible Government 
media campaign. Some 
media houses are very 
visible in reporting on 
corruption. GCIS 
prepared Draft 
Communication Plan 
for a National Integrity 
Strategy and the 
Introduction of 
National Anti-
Corruption Forum. 
Limited Government 
media campaign is 
visible 
Ongoing activity. 
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Appendix 3: Institutions and Individuals in the Arms Deal Case Study 
 
Constitutional Bodies:  
Auditor-General, Shauket Fakie 
Public Protector, Selby Baqwa 
 
The Executive:  
The Presidency 
President, Thabo Mbeki  
Deputy President, Jacob Zuma 
Director General in the Presidency, Frank Chikane 
Former Presidential Legal Advisor, Fink Haysom 
Cabinet 
Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad 
Minister of Justice, Penuell Maduna,  
Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin 
Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel 
Minister of Defence, Joe Modise 
 
The Legislature:  
Speaker, Dr Frene Ginwale  
IFP SCOPA Chair, Dr Gavin Woods 
ANC Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni 
ANC MP, Andrew Feinstein 
PAC MP, Patricia de Lille 
UDM Leader, Bantu Holomisa 
DA MPs, Raenette Taljaard 
 
Parliamentary Committees: 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
Joint Committee on Members Ethics  
Justice and Constitutional Development 
 
The Judiciary: 
Constitutional Court  
Pretoria High Court 
 
Prosecutorial and Investigative Units: 
National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka  
Special Investigating Unit, Judge Willem Heath (replaced by Willie Hofmeyr) 
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO aka “The Scorpions”) 
 
Department of Defence and Arms Industry  
DoD Chief procurement officer, Shamin “Chippy” Shaik 
Director of ADS/Thomson and Zuma’s financial advisor, Schabir Shaik 
Unsuccessful bidder for an arms contract, Richard Young of C1C2 
BAe.Saab 
EADS, Michael Woerfel, 
Thomson Thales, Alain Thetard 
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The Media: 
Business Day 
The Mail and Guardian 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation 
The Star 
The Sunday Times 
 
Civil Society:  
COSATU, Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Ecaar, Economists Allied Against Arms Reduction 
Idasa, Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
ISS, Institute for Security Studies 
ODAC, Open Democracy Advice Center 
PSAM, Public Service Accountability Monitor 
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Appendix 4: Joint Investigation Team (JIT) Scope of Investigation 
 
The table below lists the final areas of responsibility and inter-relationship between 
the three investigating bodies that eventually took part in the arms deal investigation. 
 
Public Protector 
(Act No 23 of 1994) 
Auditor-General 
(Act No 12 of 1995) 
National Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions 
(Act No 32 of 1998) 
SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
• Public phase of the 
investigation in terms 
of section 7 of Act no 
23 of 1994 
• Liaison with other 
investigating agencies 
• Actual process 
followed compared to 
the approved process 
• The roles played by 
various committees 
and individuals 
• Identify possible risk 
areas in the process 
followed 
• Conflict of interest 
• Cost to State 
• IONT 
• Criminal aspects of the 
joint investigation 
• Preparatory 
investigation 
• Investigation 
• Company Structures 
Public Phase of the 
investigation 
Documentation 
Interviews 
Documentation 
Interviews  
(in compliance with 
section 41 of Act No 32 of 
1998) 
REPORTING REPORTING REPORTING 
 JOINT REPORT  
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Appendix 5: JIT Statement on Arms Deal Report 
 
JOINT STATEMENT BY AUDITOR GENERAL, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF 
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND PUBLIC PROTECTOR: 15 NOVEMBER 
2001 
 
JOINT INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE 
PROCUREMENT PACKAGES 
 
Today the joint investigation team headed by myself, Shauket Fakie, Auditor-General, 
Selby Baqwa, Public Protector and Bulelani Ngcuka, National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, presented our report into the largest investigation of its kind ever 
undertaken in South Africa, to Parliament. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
On 15 September 2000, I, as the Auditor-General, issued the Special Review Report 
on the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages. 
 
The Special Review was the subject of hearings and deliberations of the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). It was 
subsequently decided to conduct a joint investigation into the Strategic Defence 
Procurement Packages. 
 
The investigation agencies received numerous allegations, many of which were of a 
criminal nature, some relating to mal-administration and others to financial 
irregularities. 
 
A three-phase approach was adopted: 
· The Public Protector conduced public hearings; 
· The Office of the Auditor-General conducted the forensic investigation; and 
· The National Prosecution Authority (NPA) conducted a criminal investigation. 
 
As the different parts of the joint investigation involved many of the same role players 
and key issues, considerable care was taken to ensure that one part of the investigation 
did not have a negative impact on any of the other parts. 
 
The joint investigation was unique in that the three organs of State, for the first time, 
conducted an investigation into alleged irregularities and criminal conduct 
simultaneously. This was by no means an easy task as all three agencies had to 
pioneer their way through uncharted and, at times, difficult territory. 
 
The joint investigation was conducted in accordance with internationally recognised 
due process procedures and practices. This included gathering, studying, analysing 
and interpreting information. One of the many challenges, was to control and manage 
documents in excess of 700 000 pages, which were obtained from, inter alia, DoD. 
We furnished our draft report to the relevant and affected government agencies, 
offering the opportunity to make inputs/comment on the factual accuracy of the report 
before it was finalised and tabled in Parliament. 
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However, given the complexity of the criminal investigation it will still be continuing 
for some time. Thus far, 102 summonses to interview witnesses in the criminal 
investigation have been issued more than 57 statements have been taken and statutory 
records of 193 entities and numerous documents have been obtained. Various 
premises in France, Mauritius and South Africa have been searched and documents 
seized. In order to avoid disclosure of information sensitive to these investigations it 
has been decided not to make the details public. 
 
Some of our key findings are as follows: 
· No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by the Government. 
The irregularities and improprieties referred to in our report, point to the conduct of 
certain officials of the government departments involved and cannot, in our view, be 
ascribed to the President or the Ministers involved in their capacity as members of the 
Ministers' Committee or Cabinet. There are therefore no grounds to suggest that the 
Government's contracting position is flawed. 
 
· The decision that the evaluation criteria in respect of the Lead-In Fighter Trainer 
(Hawk) had to be expanded to include a non-costed option and which eventually 
resulted in a different bidder being selected, was taken by the Ministers' Committee, a 
subcommittee of Cabinet'~. This decision was neither unlawful, nor irregular in terms 
of the procurement process as it evolved during the SDP acquisition. As the ultimate 
decision-maker, Cabinet was entitled to select the preferred bidder, taking into 
account the recommendations of the evaluating bodies as well as other factors, such 
as strategic considerations. 
 
· The Affordability Team and International Offers Negotiation Team took adequate 
measures under the circumstances to present to the Government a scientifically based 
and realistic view on these matters. The Ministers' Committee was put in a position by 
the Affordability Team to apply their minds properly to the financial impact of the 
procurement. 
 
· There was a conflict of interest with regard to the position held and - role played by 
the Chief of Acquisitions of Department of Defence, Mr S Shaik, by virtue of his 
brother’s interests in the Thomson Group and ADS, which he held through Nkobi 
Holdings. Mr Shaik his capacity as Chief of Acquisitions, declared this conflict of 
interest in December 1998 to the Project Control Board, but continued to participate 
in the process that led ultimately to the award~-g of contracts to the said companies. 
He did not recuse himself properly. 
 
Amongst the recommendations in our report are the following: 
· We recommend that the policy document, developed during the Strategic Defence 
Packages Procurement process be further refined with specific reference to the lessons 
learnt from the acquisition process under investigation as reflected in this report. The 
staff of the Department of Defence and Armscor involved in procurement should be 
properly trained to ensure that they assimilate and fully understand the policy with a 
view to its effective implementation. 
 
· The Department of Defence and Armscor should develop specific rules and 
guidelines to address conflict of interest issues and to ensure that personnel are 
properly informed in this regard. These rules and guidelines should be developed, 
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taking into account the principles contained in the Code of Conduct of the State 
Tender Board and the King Report on Corporate Governance, 19g4, regarding 
improved ethics and probity as well as international norms in this regard. Steps should 
also be taken to ensure that a particular individual, irrespective of his/her position is 
not tasked with incompatible functions in multifaceted procurements. This will 
prevent a conflict or perceived conflict of interest, which could have a detrimental 
effect on the overall acquisition process. 
 
· Parliament should consider taking urgent steps to ensure that high ranking officials 
and office bearers, such as Ministers and Deputy Ministers, are not allowed to be 
involved, whether personally or as part of private enterprise, for a reasonable period 
of time after they leave public office, in contracts that are concluded with the State. 
 
In conclusion, I would like to say that the investigation was initially viewed with a 
certain amount of skepticism, which was not conducive to an enabling environment. 
However, as it progressed, confidence grew in the credibility of the process and role 
players and witnesses cooperated freely. 
 
We thank all the government agencies, individuals, other role players and foreign 
governments who assisted us with search applications in various countries. 
